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This  study examines   Edmund  Burke's  reliance upon   the philosoph- 
ical assumptions  of the Scottish  "Common  Sense" school of  critical 
realism.     Scottish realism was articulated   in   the writings  of Thomas 
Reid,   Dugald  Stewart and James   Beattie,  and   constituted  a  significant 
part  of  the generally-accepted   intellectual phenomenon of the Scottish 
Enlightenment, which reached   its  zenith in  the   last half  of  the eigh- 
teenth  century.     By identifying the various   forms which Burke's  Scottish 
connections   took,   this   study   seeks  to narrow  the gap between  Burke studies 
and recent historiography of   the Scottish  Enlightenment.     The Scottish 
Enlightenment   is  now seen as   second only  to  the  French Enlightenment 
as  a   formative   influence upon  the  course of  thought   in eighteenth- 
century   Europe.     Older writings have established   the "critical" nature 
of  the Scottish Common Sense   school and of  the  Scottish Enlightenment 
in general.    A number of commentators have noted   the philosophical 
similarity between  the   critical  cast of the   thought of the  Scottish 
school and  that of  the  contemporary critical  idealism of  Immanuel  Kant. 
This  study suggests   that   the historical and  philosophical   connection 
between Burke and   the Scottish Enlightenment,  as well as   the philosoph- 
ical  similarity between Scottish and Kantian  critical realism and 
idealism,   together   indicate a philosophical  kinship between  critical 
realism,   critical   idealism,  and  some    of the assumptions   in   Burke s 
thought. 
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CHAPTER  I 
INTRODUCTION 
This   thesis explores  the place of  thought of Edmund   Burke   in the 
Enlightenment.     It does  not  seek to deny  the  portrait  of  Burke painted 
by those historians and   commentators  of "the"  "Natural Law" school who 
have   followed  the  lead of Peter Stanlis   (Edmund   Burke  and   the Natural 
Law,   1957)   and  others.     On  the contrary,   the  Burke who emerged   from the 
writings of  this   school  seems  to be both  coherent and   logically and 
philosophically,   correct.    What   this   thesis questions   is  the historical 
coherence of  Burke,  as  an eighteenth-century man whose   thought was  sup- 
posed  by some  to have originated   in  the classical/medieval  tradition of 
"the" Natural Law.    What   is  suggested here   is  that a Burke similar   to 
that   figure described by   the  natural  law school of commentators  on 
Burkean thought  could well  have been  formed  by contemporary eighteenth- 
century British thought,   especially by  the  "critical" philosophy of 
Scottish realism  (or "Common  Sense"), which  in turn resembled  the  critical 
philosophy of Kantian idealism.     This   study was written,   therefore,   in 
the  same spirit which Norman Suckling announced was  the purpose of his 
essay on "The  Enlightenment  and  the Idea of Progress"  (1967).     Suckling 
wrote: 
This  paper   is  not a work of erudition.     It does not  announce  the dis- 
covery of any new facts.     I offer   it--tentatively—because  it may be 
of use as  casting facts  already known into a different  perspective 
While only a philosophical   similarity between the Scottish and German 
schools of the eighteenth century  is  suggested here,   the   connection 
between  Burke  and  the Scottish realist   school is  shown  to be  both philo- 
sophical  and historical.     A "Natural  dualism" which  characterized  the 
Scottish  and German schools'  reconciliation of previous  schools  of phi- 
losophy,   rather   than a  classical/medieval  tradition of Natural Law, 
seems   to  be a more historically appropriate explanation  in part  of  the 
origins  of Burke's   thought.     Once   this  Natural dualism is recognized 
as a characteristic of Burke's  thought,   Burke's  theories of reality and 
of our knowledge  of reality   (including his notions  of prescription and 
of prudence)  become more understandable;   given  this   recognition,   one 
recognizes   the philosophical  and/or historical proximity of his   thought 
to the various  and  diverse  schools  of  thought   flourishing in   the British 
Isles during the   last  third  of the eighteenth  century.    The most 
important   comparison point   to be kept   in  mind   through    the descrip- 
tions here of Burke and his   contemporaries   is   the critical nature 
of  the philosophies of  these   contemporaries.    Whether  considering 
the  critical  idealism of Kant or the  critical  realism of Reid and 
the Scottish school when drawing a possible parallel  with  Burke's 
thought,  we arc always  elaborating upon   the  critical   element and  all 
its   implications  of  the  idealist philosophy or   the realist  philosophy, 
not   idealism or realism in themselves.     That   is,  while   the  "Copernican 
Revolution"   in philosophy which Kant   inaugurated  ".   .   .   asks us   to assume 
In revolutionary   fashion   that  objective  reality,   to be  known at   all,  must 
conform to  the essential  structure of the  human mind,"    and while   the hall- 
mark of  (Scottish)   realism is   the direct  perception of   the real   and  per- 
manent  existence of external  objects,   the   characteristics  of the  philoso- 
phies which allow suggestion of their  similarity with  Burkean thought 
are  those which are  inherently part of each of the philosophies:     re- 
spectively,  Kantian  idealism considers  external objects  and experience 
to be as real  as  the perceiving  subjects,  and,  on  the  other hand, 
Scottish  realism considers  (mind)   equally as real  as  the objects  of 
the perceived world. 
Bernard Peach's  explanation of  the critical   implicitness of   the 
idealist  and   the realist philosophies may serve here  to  give a partial 
understanding of  the  phrase,   "Natural dualism."    Such  a dualism rejects 
one-sided  views which reduce reality and our  knowledge and  judgments of 
it  to one  origin and meaning.     Natural dualism rejects  such reductionist 
theories without   succumbing  to  that cleavage of mind and matter,  subject 
and object, which  characterizes  Cartesian dualism and which actually re- 
sults   in reductionist   theories  of knowledge   (if not of  ultimate reality) 
because of  the  impossibility of  bridging the declared  "bifurcation" of 
nature3 between mind  and matter.     Peach sees  a difference merely  in 
"approach" between   the  substantially kindred doctrines of Kant and   Reid. 
The moderation of Reid  and  Kant was based on  their respective 
positive and  complex philosophies  rather  than upon any eclectic or plural- 
istic amalgam of others' views.     Therefore,   a comprehensive  judgment   is 
required   to distinguish and weigh  the competing claims  of subject and 
object,   mind   and  matter,   and  by   just what   chemistry  or  art   they  combine 
to give us  knowledge of reality.     Our actions   are then based upon our 
knowledge  and our  judgments  of a  complex reality.       Not only were Reid's 
and Kant's  views  not  an amalgam of other views,  but   an early twentieth 
century historian of philosophy believed  that   the Kantian  and Scottish 
views of a  complex reality and of,   consequently,   the heterogeneous 
components of our knowledge of  that  reality represented between  them 
the  confluence of all  the previous major philosophical   systems.    John 
T.  Merz  said  that   ".   .   .   the  teaching of Descartes, Locke,  Leibniz,   and 
Hume  had   given way   to  specific  developments,   chiefly  in   the   Scottish 
and German schools."    The Scottish  school represented a  concern for   the 
problem of  the reality of,   and relation between,   subject   (or  perceiving 
mind)   and  object   (perceived  matter)--in Merz's  words,   "Scottish  philos- 
ophy cultivated   the  field of psychological research."    On the  other  hand, 
"German philosophy  centered   in metaphysics," or   the problem of the rela- 
tion of  ideal and  real  (or,   in Kantian  terms,   between noumenon and 
phenomenon). 
But   the critical philosophies  of the Kantian and  Scottish  schools 
made  the   twin distinctions between  (and also   the  complementarity between) 
the  ideal  and  the  real and between mind   (subject)   and matter   (object). 
Such distinctions avoid  the reduction of reality and of knowledge  to a 
narrow,   formalistic  (Cartesian)  dualism,  and   to a   confused monism, which- 
ever   form  such  monism assumed   in  eighteenth   century  philosophy.     The 
rigid dualism of  the Cartesians neglected  the distinction between  ideal 
and real.    This distinction would have  allowed  the participation to a 
certain extent of the  ideal   in the real and vice  versa.     The distinction 
did   in  the Kantian and  Scottisli views  serve as  an explanatory  pre- 
paration  to hetorogeneous epistemological and  ethical views which 
require   the  use  of   the  active   judgment   to  assign   the  respective 
elements   the proper weight   in  the  formation of epistemological, 
ethical and moral problems.     Such a distinction between  ideal  and  real 
would otherwise have allowed   the building of a bridge across  the  chasm 
left  by rigid Cartesian dualism separating mind and   matter,  subject  and 
object.     But  given the rigid  Cartesian bifurcation  of nature into the 
two antagonistic  and mutually exclusive   spheres of mind and matter,   the 
insurmountable problem existed of bringing the  two  spheres   together  in 
order   to make possible an objective knowledge of the  whole  of reality. 
Because  the Cartesians   could   not  in  fact  build a bridge between mind 
and matter,   ".   .   .  men's minds become so preoccupied  with  this world 
of nature   .   .   .  witli  the  totality of physical   things,   the matter   in 
motion  [and with]   that  vast   geometrical drama of the   universe," that 
concern with "the mind's   furniture" was  gradually eroded behind  a 
mechanistic materialism,   a "cobwebby curtain of neglect"' drawn down 
before  the mind's  eye by among others,   the French materialists, 
d'Holbach,   Helvetius et  al.     Cartesian dualism historically ended   in 
o 
a materialistic monism. 
CHAPTER   I 
NOTES 
Norman Suckling,   "The  Enlightenment  and   the Idea of Progress," 
Studies   on  Voltaire  &  the  Eighteenth   Century   (Transactions   of   the  Second 
International Congress  on the Enlightenement,   IV),   Vol.  LVIII   (1967), 
p.   1461. 
Greene,   Theodore  Meyer,   ed.,   Kant  Selections   (New York: 
Scribner's Sons,   1929),   p.   xxxvii. 
Charles 
This   is Andrew Seth's  phras.e. See Andrew Seth   (A.S. Pringle.. 
Pattison).     Scottish Philosophy.     A Comparison of the Scottish and 
German Answers   to Hume.     ("Balfour Philosophical Lectures." University 
of  Edinburgh).     (Edinburgh   and  London:     William  Blackwood  and   Sons, 
1899),   pp.   75-77. 
Peach wrote:     ".   .   .   there  is  a significant difference   in approach. 
Kant was   by  training and   inclination more rationalistic than empirical. 
Reid [was]   more empirical   than rationalistic.     Indeed,   if one   characterizes 
Kant's   response   to  Hume  [Hume's   skeptical  empiricism]   as  an  attempt   to 
reestablish reason,   one ought   to describe Reid's  as  an attempt   to re- 
establish  experience.     Yot neither man  succumbed   to an extreme   in either 
of these  directions.     They were  both,   therefore,  philosophers  of moderation. 
They both reject  extreme  empiricism on   the one hand,   extreme rationalism on 
the other.     They both,   for  example,   regard  the   'preanalytic'   data of experi- 
ence as  a  complex unification of  sensation and  judgment.     They  both,   there- 
fore,   also needed   to   identify components  of knowledge  that are  not   the 
results   of either experience or  reasoning   ..."  (Bernard Peach,   "Common 
Sense and Practical   Reason   in Reid and  Kant."    Sophia  (Padova),   Vol.  XXIV 
(1956),   p.   66).    Peach's description of Reid's  and  Kant's views   is  consis- 
tent with Goethe's   (see  infra.,   Chapter  III,  p.18 )   and with Burke's   (see 
infra.,   Chapter III,   p.   18)   characterizations of the Scottish  school of 
Common Sense realism as embodying a philosophy of moderation. 
James McCosh,   the   last direct philosophical descendent  of Reid's 
school of realism,   perceived   a difference  in degree  between Reid's  and Kant's 
answer   to  Hume's   skepticism:      ".    .   .   Kant  was   strong  where  Reid   was  weak; 
that   is,    in  power  of  dissection  and   construction:      but  was  deficient  where 
Reid  excelled,   in  patient  observation."     James  McCosh.  The  Scottish 
Philosophy   -  Biographical,   Expository,   Critical.     From llutchcnson   to 
Hamilton.   (New York:     Robert  Carter and   Brothers,   1875),  p.   160. 
on,  McCosh   noted  a  more  precise  kinship   between  Reid   and  Kant. 
Further 
"In one respect   indeed,   the  two,   the Scotch  and German philosophies, 
were  alike:     both  stood  up  for principles which did not  derive  their 
authority  from experience."   But   the Scottish  metaphysicians discovered 
these  by a careful  inquiry  into  the  operations of the human mind;   Kant, 
by a process of  logical deduction."    The differences between Reid  and 
Kant which McCosh points out,   seem to be partially based  upon McCosh's 
own wrong-headed   view of Kant  as  a rigid   subjective  idealist,   no differ- 
ent   from his pupil,   Fichte, who was   "only  advancing a  few steps   farther 
on  the  same road  [as  Kant]   when he made  the whole universe  a projection 
of   the  mind."     Ibid.,   p.   274.     Fichte's  philosophy was   a  perversion,   or 
inversion,  of Kant's  Critical philosophy,   not  an  extension of it   (See 
Appendix B). 
One  author,   D.   Daiches  Raphael,   comments  upon Reid's philosophi- 
cal proximity  to Kant,   and   in particular,   hints  of Reid's  possible 
superior answer   to Hume's premises   (including  the  "whole philosophy of 
ideas  or presentations")   that  Kant's answer  to  the deductions Hume 
drew  from his   (Hume's)   premises.     Referring  to A.  Campbell Fraser's 
work,   Thomas  Reid,   "Famous  Scots   Series,"   (Edinburgh  & London:     Oliphant, 
Anderson & Ferrier,   c.   1900),  Raphael  says:     "Reid's  admirers have 
sometimes placed him on a level with Kant.     This doubtless   is an 
extravagant  judgment.     Yet Reid  has   this virtue   in common with Kant, 
that  he  has   for Hume both a respect  and a reply.   .   .   .   Kant  professes 
to  find   flaws  in Hume's  deductions;   Reid denies  his premises.    Of  the 
two I  am not  sure  that   Kant's method  of reply  is   the right   one.     It 
would be extravagant   to  judge Reid's  own system of philosophy,   taken 
as a whole,   to be on a par with Kant's;  but   taken simply as  an answer 
to  the  sceptical   conclusions  of Hume,   it  is perhaps more useful   than 
the Critique of Pure Reason.   ..."    D.  Daiches   Raphael,  The Moral 
Sense   (London:     Geoffrey Cumberiege,  Oxford  University,   Press,   1947), 
p.   147. 
Lewis White  Beck  summarized  Kant's   thought   in a sentence: 
"In order  to know and   to act,   it   is  necessary both  to see and  to  think." 
Beck does not  say  that   this  "insipid   statement   is  the sum and substance 
of Kant's philosophy," but  "there   is  merit   in  this  as a  summary if one 
insists   upon post  card  brevity in  the history of philosophy."    Lewis 
White  Beck,   "Kant's   Strategy." Journal  of the  History of Philosophy. 
Vol.  XXVII,   No.   2  (April-June,   1967),   p.  236. 
"John Theodore Merz, A History of European Thought   in  the Nine- 
teenth Century, Vol.   Ill,  p.  41   (New York:     Dover,   1965;   original, 
London:     William Blackwood & Sons,   1904-1912). 
Giorgio Tonelli   (University of Pisa)   referred recently to Reid 
and Kant,   together,   as   constituting one of the major  lines   of  thought 
in  the  eighteenth  century.     Tonelli wrote:     ".   .   .   although  I  am per- 
sonally  inclined  to assume  an even greater prevalence of eighteenth- 
century  scepticism than Professor   [R.H.]   Popkin does,   .   .   .   scepticism 
cannot  be  considered  as  a general   (and much  less  as  a  typical)   eighteenth- 
century attitude;   the anti-sceptical   trend was,   of  course,   of capital 
importance   too,   climaxing   in   England   in   the   Common  Sense   School,   and 
in Germany  in Kant."    Giorgio Tonelli,   "The   'Weakness'   of Reason  in 
the Age  of Enlightenment."     Diderot  Studies,   Vol. XIV  (1971),  p.   218. 
Harry  Prosch,   The  Genesis   of  Twentieth  Century  Philosophy. 
The Evolution of Thought  from Copernicus  to  the Present   (Garden City, 
New York:    Anchor,   1966,   1964,  p.  47). 
8 
McCosli  referred   to  the French  materialists'   (Condillac, 
HelvetiUS,  Cahanis,  d'llolbach)   one-sided   interpretations  of Locke. 
"The French   looked exclusively at   .   .   .   the  experimental  side   ...  of 
Locke's  philosophy,   carrying Locke's  theory a stage  farther;   they  left 
out  reflection,   made   little  use of observation,  betook themselves  to 
analysis,   and   exerted   their   ingenuity   to derive all   ideas   from sensation." 
McCosh,   op.   cit.,  p.   2 72. 
CHAPTER   II 
NORTHERN  LIGHTS 
Burke showed  a philosophical   kinship with   the  thought of   the 
Common-Sense Scottish realists   in his various   lengthy and   favorable 
book reviews  of the works  of  the   leading representatives  of  the  Scot- 
tish  Enlightenment   in general.     Burke's review-essays   included   the 
following:      (1)    (Burke),   Review  of  An   Essay  on   the  Nature   and   Immuta- 
bility of Truth,   in Opposition  to Sophistry and  Scepticism,   by James 
Beattie,   in The Annual  Register   for   1771,  6th  Edition   (London:     1786), 
252-260;   (2)(Burke),   Review of An Account  of Dissertations Moral  & 
Critical,   by James  Beattie,   in The Annual  Register  for  1783   (London: 
1785),   207-223;   and   (3)     (Burke),   Review of Elements  of the Philosophy 
of   the  Human Mind,   by   Dugald   Stewart,   in  The  Annual   Register   for   1793 
(London:     1810),   153-171. 
Apart   from the above reviews,   the historical prominence and 
proximity of a critical,   progressive-minded Scottish  Enlightenment, 
in relation  to the eighteenth-century milieu  in which Burke   flour- 
ished,   suggests,  at  the  least,   that   Burke was exposed  to the  general 
thought  of  the northern Enlightenment. 
J.   11.   Brumfitt   characterized   the eighteenth  century as   the 
age which  "saw the beginning of [Scotland's]   greatest  period  of intel- 
lectual and   literary enlightenment," an age  "when  the Scottish renais- 
sance was  bearing  fruit  [and which]   was   for  England a period  of relative 
decline."       Peter Gay wrote   in his recent work on  the Enlightenment   of 
10 
the differences of English   thought   in   the eighteenth century,   as 
distinguished   from the more  articulate  and  cohesive  schools of  thought 
in Scotland at  that   time. 
The English Enlightenment was   far   less well organized   than   its 
Scottish  counterpart.   .   .   .   If there   is  no single comprehensive 
study on the   'English  Enlightenment,'   as   there  are numerous 
studies  on the  French  Siecle des   lumieres,  and   the German 
Aufklarung,  this may have a single  cause; more   than elsewhere 
the boundaries  between rationalist,  Anglican, Armenian dissent, 
tepid Christianity,  and  outright deism are so thin and  so porous 
that   it   is nearly  impossible to discern a distinct grouping of 
men,   even  if there  is,  as  I should   insist  there   is,   a distinct 
set   of   id* as  | Gay's   emphases]    that   makes   for  an   identifiable 
anti-Christian  English Enlightenment.   .   .   .2 
Franklin L.   Ford placed   the Scottish  and English Enlightenments 
on an  equal   standing regarding the question of whether or not  there 
was a  "European Enlightenment."    Ford wrote:     "The real question   is 
whether we  could adequately discuss   the  European Enlightenment   leaving 
out   the English and  Scottish   thinkers.     The  answer,   quite  clearly,   is 
that  we  could   not."        Hugh  Trevor-Roper  went   further   than  Ford,   when 
the  former gave the   Scottish  Enlightenment   the preeminent place,   as 
representative of Enlightenment  thought,   in   the  "Anglo-Saxon world," 
as  French-speaking Geneva could  serve as   the representative  of the 
French   or  Mediterranean   Enlightenment.     Trevor-Roper  declared   in   1967: 
The   first  International  congress on   the   Enlightenment  took place 
in Geneva.     It  is   appropriate that  the  second should  be   in Scotland. 
For   if French-speaking Switzerland was   the  crucible of the Enlight- 
enment,   the  meeting-place   of  those   intellectual  emigres   of  Europe 
who   inspired   it,   Scotland,   another  Calvinist   country,  was   its   out- 
post   in  the  Anglo-Saxon  world.     By   the   later   18th   century,   the 
universities  of Geneva   and   Edinburgh   could  be  described   by  Thomas 
Jefferson as   the  two eyes of Europe.^ 
Burke could hardly have  been unaware of the presence  of  the 
northern philosophies  and of the  significance  of the Scottish  Enlight- 
enment   in general. 
11 
Part of the  significance of  the Scottish  renaissance   is 
the critical and progressive nature of the  thought  of  the Scottish 
Enlightenment.     That  thought   is partically  formed by  the  "general 
dissemination  of   the   ideas   of  the  French   Enlightenment   in  Scotland,"-1 
which,   going back a step  further,   "may also owe  something to  the 
continued   influence—literary,   philosophical and  political--of Scot- 
land's old ally,  France."       It was especially during  the decades of 
the   1760's   (when Burke was on   the threshold of his   long public career) 
that   "the  output  of  French   Enlightenment  works  [especially  those  of 
Voltaire]   becomes more striking" in  Scotland.     Brumfitt  concluded: 
"From all   these contacts,  articles and publications   it   becomes  apparent 
that  a knowledge of the thought of the French Enlightenment was  fairly 
widespread   in  the Scotland of   the second half of  the eighteenth century."' 
R.  G.   Cant declared,  with Brumfitt:     "The  fact   is  that by the 
mid-eighteenth century the atmosphere  of Scottish society had  become 
o 
remarkably   liberal  and  tolerant."      Cant believed   that   this   liberal 
attitude reflected  Scotland's  own history and  traditions,   that  the 
Scottisli Enlightenment  thought  was a "fulfillment   in a new  form,  of 
certain deeply cherished  aspirations of the  Scottish people,   above all, 
a desire  for   liberty   ..." which was   "the great theme of Scottish 
history"  even  during   the  Reformation   in  Scotland. 
In contrast  to   the dormant  English universities,   Oxford and 
Cambridge,   during   the   eighteenth   century,1"  Cant  pointed   to   the  Scots' 
general regard  of  their  universities--St. Andrews, Glasgow,  Old Aberdeen, 
Edinburgh,   and  New Aberdeen—as  "part of a national  system of educa- 
tion,"12 a broad-bottomed,   non-exclusivist system in which  "any pupil 
M 
12 
of reasonable ability—the   'lad  o'pairts'  of Scottish  tradltion--could 
proceed   to a  university without undue difficulty,M'3    The  system drew 
its members   from a society which,   "even before  the end of  the [seventeenth] 
century,   .   .   .   must have been one of   the most   literate of  its age."1* 
Cant   then  went  on to show how  the   fact   that  these universities were 
located  in  urban centers,  saved   the universities   in Scotland   (unlike 
those   in  England)   from becoming  "backwaters of privileged   indolence,   or 
that   they would be  swept  out of touch with  reality by  any new wind of 
intellectual  change.""    The Scottish Enlightenment was  therefore  the 
most  prominent   focus   for  the most  progressive and   critical   intellectual 
climate of   thought which existed   in the  "Anglo-Saxon world"  in the  last 
half of the  eighteenth  century. 
^ 
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CHAPTER   II 
NOTES 
LJ.  M.   Brumfitt,   "Scotland and   the French  Enlightenment"   in 
The ARC of Enlightenment^     Studios presented   to Theodore  Bestcrman, 
eds.,  W.  H.   Barber,   J.   I!.   Brumfitt,   R.   Shacklcton and  S.   S.   B.  Taylor, 
(Edinburgh and London,  Oliver and Boyd,   1967),   pp.   318-329,   esp.  p.   318. 
Scotland and   the Scottish Enlightenment were  something more  than 
what   Bernard   Bailyn and John  Clive called Scotland   (together with America) 
--"England's   'cultural provinces'   feeling intellectually and  aesthetically 
[??)   inferior   to England and  especially   to London,  and were  both places 
where middle-class  professional men  hungry  for distinction and recogni- 
tion made up   the   intellectual   leadership."    Cited   in  Robert M.  Calhoon, 
The Loyalists   in Revolutionary America   1760-1781,   Founding of the American 
Republic Series   (New York:     Harcourt,   Brace,  Jovanovich,   Inc.,   1973),  p.   203. 
Calhoon was  citing John Clive  and Bernard  Bailyn,   "England's  Cultural 
Provinces:     Scotland  and  America."     William and  Mary  Quarterly, 
(April,   1954)   200-213.     The point that  Calhoon,   Clive  and  Bailyn put 
forward of Scotland  as  England's  cultural province   in  the eighteenth 
century,   is hopefully qualified   in the next  few pages  of the  present 
study.      For   the  second   point   made  by  Calhoon  here--of   the  middle-class 
Scottish entrepreneurs  on the make as   composing the  intellectual   lights 
of the Scottish Enlightenment--see Appendix B.     There   it  is   shown  that 
the   leading lights of Scottish  Enlightenment  thought were not  alienated 
from their community,   that   they were,   in   fact,   many of  them  "establish- 
ment" types,  but who,  on  the other hand,   did not  necessarily seek  to 
justify any personal material  success  or any general  status quo,  but 
rather  sought   to  improve  their society along progressive  lines,   lines 
which would not  have  clashed with  the  French pliilosophcs'   suggestions 
for reforms within  their society.     For   the recent historiography on   the 
moderate,   non-alienated   tone of  the philosophes'   thought,   see Appendix B. 
One of  the  factors   in  the moderate-liberal   tone of Scottish 
Enlightenment   thought was.no doubt  the   fact   that Scotland was,   on  the 
whole,   economically prosperous,   especially during  the  last half of  the 
century.      See  Malcolm P.   Gray,   The  Highland   Economy,   1750-1850   (Edin- 
burgh:      1957);   Henry  Hamilton,   An  Economic  History   of  Scotland   in   the 
Eighteenth  Century   (Oxford:     1962);  Marjorie Plant,   The  Domestic Life of 
Scotland   in the  Eighteenth Century  (Edinburgh:     1952);  Andrew N. L.   Hodd, 
"Runrig  on  the  Eve  of   the  Agricultural   Revolution   in  Scotland,"  Scottish 
Geographical Magazine,   (Great  Britain),   Vol.  XI,,   No.   2   (1974),   130-133; 
Malcolm Gray,   "Scottish Immigration:    The Social  Impact  of Agrarian Change 
in  the Rural Lowlands,   1775-1875," Perspectives  in American History,   Vol. 
VII  (1973),  95-174.     Sir Walter  Scott's  reaction  to  the accelerated   econ- 
omic changes  in Scotland after  1750,  perhaps reflects   the moderate  tone 
of  Scottish  Enlightenment  thought.     Scott's attempt   to reconcile Scottish 
tradition and  the swift  changes  of  the   first  Industrial  Revolution in 
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Britain was  similar,   for   instance,  to  the eighteenth-century  Scots' 
historians'   "conjectural  history" which  sought   to reconcile past and 
present,  or,   nature and   civilization,   etc.   (see Chapter Til).     See 
John J. MacQueen,   "Scott  and   'Tales of My Landlord.'"    Scottish Studies, 
(Great Britain),    Vol. XV,  No.   2,   85-87. 
"During Sir Walter Scott's  lifetime,   the appearance of  the Scottish 
countryside and   the customs and manners of  its people were  substan- 
tially altered,   while   Scott,   the  conservative, regretted   the disap- 
pearance   of distinctly   Scottish   traditions,   Scott,   the  pragmatist, 
recognized  the changes   to be   inescapable and often  beneficial.    Scott 
was   concerned with   the   continuous   process  and  development   linking 
past with  present  in his prose of the  1810's and   1820's   .   .   ." 
See  Historical Abstracts,   Part A.    Modern History.    Abstracts 
1450-1914.     (Santa Barbara,   California:     American Bibliographical  Carter- 
Clio Press;   Oxford,   England:     European Bibliographical   Carter-Clio Press, 
1975),   p.   71. 
See also T.  C.   Smout, A History  of  the Scottish People   1560-1830 
(New York:     Scribners,   1969),  espec.  Part Two,   "The Age  of Transformation, 
1690-1830," Chapters XIV and XV,   pp.   332-390. 
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Peter  Gay,   The  Enlightenment.     An  Interpretation.     Vol.    1,   The 
Rise of Modern  Paganism.     (New York:    Alfred A.   Knopf,   1966),   pp. 431-432. 
Hiroshi Mizuta recently said  that: 
".   .   .   there was  no English  equivalent  to the Scottish or Continental 
Enlightenment except  the   thoughts of some  forerunners  in  the  seven- 
teenth  century [Bacon,   Hobbes, Locke,   Newton]   and of  the English deists 
at   the beginning of  the  eighteenth.   .   .   ."   (Hiroshi Mizuta,   "Towards  a 
definition  of the Scottish Enlightenment," Studies on Voltaire and 
the  Eighteenth Century.     Ed.,   Theodore Besterman [Transactions of the 
Fourth  international  congress  on  the  Enlightenment,   VI],   Vol.  CLIV 
[1976] ,   1459.) 
For  the early  eighteenth-century  English deists—hardly a cohesive school 
of serious philosophical writers--see Norman Torrey's short  study,   Voltaire 
and   the  English   Deists   (New York:     Archon Books,   1967;  Yale University 
Press,   1930).     Torrey discusses  the  thought of the   following deists:    John 
Toland, Antony Collins,  Thomas Woolston, Matthew Tindal,  Thomas  Chubb, 
Bolingbroke,   Conyers Middleton,  and Peter Arnet. 
3Franklin L.   Ford,   "The  Enlightenment:     Towards a Useful Definition" 
in   Studies   in   the  Eighteenth   Century.      (Papers  presented   at   the   David  Nicol 
Smith Memorial   Seminar,   Canberra,  Australia,   National  University  Press, 
1968),  pp.   17-30,  espec.  p.   22. 
^Hugh  Trevor-Roper,   "The   Scottish   Enlightenment."     Studies  on  Voltaire 
and   the   Eighteenth  Century   (Transactions   of  the  Second   international  congress 
on   the Enlightenment  IV),  Vol.  LVIII   (1967),  p.   1635).    See    also:    William 
Law Mathieson.     The Awakening  of Scotland:     A History  from  1747  to   1797 
(Glasgow:     1910). 
Ian Simpson Ross referred   to "the opening of a golden Age of  intel- 
lectual activity   in Scotland"   in the  1750's   (Ian Simpson Ross, Lord  Kames 
and   the Scotland   of His   Day  [Oxford, At  the Clarendon Press,   1972],   p.   166, 
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especially Chapter  9,   "The Modern Athens" [Edinburgh],  pp.   166-181,   and 
Chapter   10,   "Works and   Days," pp.   182-201.)   displaying  the spirit  "of 
the Athens of the age of Pericles with   its   freedom of  thought  and keen 
delight   in  the  clash of minds," and enjoying  "an   intellectual  eminence 
somewhat  reminiscent of  that won by Athens   in  the ancient world   .   .   ." 
(idem).     The  "intense  intellectual activity"   in Scotland during this 
period matched   that of  the Enlightenemnt  on  the Continent,  which  in   turn 
was witnessing  in the   '50's   the  "most   illustrous" decade  "of  the whole 
course of  the Enlightenment   in   point  of  the publication of works of   far- 
reaching significance"   (ibid.,   p.   182).     Ross mentioned,   to  this point, 
the work of d'Alembert,   Diderot,   Rousseau  in France,  Johnson  in England, 
and  in  Scotland:     the work of Hume, William Robertson,   Sir James Steuart 
(1713-80,  a  political  economist), Adam Smith,   Adam Ferguson,   John Millar, 
George  Campbell,   among others.     But   it was  David Hume  and Robertson whom 
Voltaire  saluted   "in a way which marks   the  impact  of  the Scottish  contri- 
bution  to the Enlightenment": 
'II y a quatre  jours que j'ai recu le beau  present  dont vous m'avez 
honore.    Je  le lis malgre   les   fluxionx horribles  que me   font   craindre 
de perdre  entie'rement   les  ycux.     T  me   fait  oublier   tous mes  mauz. 
C'est a'vous  et a M.   Hume qu'il appartient  d'e'erire   l'llistoirc.     Vous 
etes   eloquant,   savant,   et   impartial.     Jc  me  joins a  1'Europe  pour 
vous   estimer'   (ibid.,   p.   190). 
George S.   Pryde wrote that   ".   .   .   there was  some  truth  in Voltaire's 
comment made at   the start  of  the period   (1762)--'it   is   from Scotland   that 
we receive rules of taste   in all   the arts--from the epic poem to gardening. 
(George  S. Pryde,   Scotland   from   1603  to   the Present  Day fLondon,   Edinburgh, 
Paris, Melbourne,   Johannesburg,   Toronto,   N.Y.:     Thomas Nelson and  Sons, 
Ltd.,   1962]   p.   176.) 
5J.  M.   Brumfitt,   op.   cit.,   p.   319. 
6Idem. 
7ldem.     See:    Alison K.   Howard,   "Montesquieu,  Voltaire and  Rousseau 
in Eighteenth-Century Scotland:     A  check  list of  editions  and  translations 
of   their works  published  in  Scotland  before  1801," The  Bibliothck,   Vol.   II 
(1959), 46-63;   0.  M.  Brack,   Jr.,   "William Strahan:     Scottish Printer and 
Publisher," Arizona Quarterly,   Vol.  XXXI,   No.   2   (1975),   179-191;  A.   R.   Turn- 
bull,   "The  Antecedents  of   Edinburgh,"  Scholarly  Publishing,   Vol.   V,   No.   2 
(1974),   111-120. 
8R.  G.  Cant,   "The  Scottish  universities and Scottish Society in   the 
eighteenth   century,"  Studies   on  Voltaire  and   the   Eighteenth   Century   (Trans- 
actions of  the Second   international  congress on  the  Enlightenment   IV),   Vol. 
I.VIII   (1967),  pp.   1953-1966,   p.   1960.     For   the critical   thought  of one  of 
the  leading representatives  of  the Scottish Enlightenment, Lord Kames,   see 
Nelson S.   Bushnell,   "Lord Kames and  Eighteenth-Century Scotland," Studies 
in  Scottish  Literature,  Vol.   X,   No. 4   (April,   1973),   241-254.     Bushnell 
dealt especially with  the  critical  progressive  legal   thought of  the repre- 
sentative Kames. 
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'Ibid.,   p.   154.     Cant referred  Co   the  "egalitarian dogmas of 
Calvinist   theology," Idem,  p.   1972.    Sec also Arthur   Donovan,   "Chemistry 
and  philosophy  in  the Scottish Enlightenment," Studies on Voltaire and 
the  Eighteenth Century   (Transactions of  the Fourth  international  congress 
on  the Enlightenment,  II),  Vol.  CLII   (1976),  p.   597.     Donovan wrote of the 
differences between,  on  the one hand,   the  centralized hierarchical  struc- 
ture  of   the  Established  Anglican  Church   and   the  Crown's  assumption  of 
Papal  authority during the English Reformation,   and,   on  the other hand, 
the  location of authority of  the Scottish Kirk  (restored as  the national 
church,   after   the end of  the  Restoration   in  1690)   "in  the congregation 
rather  than  in an episcopal hierarchy." 
"To  instruct   the members of the church and   insure  that   they were 
prepared   to discharge  their duties,   the Scottish  reformers  pro- 
posed  a comprehensive  system of education  culminating in  theologi- 
cal   training  in  the national universities.     Although never  fully 
implemented,   this   educational  plan was   cherished   throughout   the 
seventeenth  century as one of  the religious and national   liberties  the 
Scots were   fighting  for.    After  the Glorious  Revolution  the Kirk was 
able   to retain only a small portion of  its   former  control but   the 
universities nevertheless  continued   to serve as   the  centres of 
intellectual  life and provided  the most  advanced   instruction offered 
within  a  national   system of  education   [emphasis  added]"    (Idem). 
See   also:     Sir  A.   Crant,   The  Story  of  the   University  of   Edinburgh,   2  vols. 
(London:     1884);   D.   B.   Horn.    A Short History of   the University of Edinburgh 
1556-1889   (Edinburgh:     1967);     Henry W. Meikle,   Some Aspects of Later Seven- 
teenth Century Scotland   (Daniel Murray Lecture,  Glasgow:     1947);  Alexander 
Law,   Education   in  Edinburgh   in   the  Eighteenth  Century   (Publications   of  the 
Scottish  Council   for Research  in  Education,   No.   54)   (London:     University of 
London Press,   1965); William Ferguson, Scotland   1689  to the Present   (N.Y., 
Washington:     Frederick A. Praeger Pub.,   1968)   ("The Edinburgh History of 
Scotland," General  Editor,  Gordon Donaldson),  Chapter  7,   "Education and 
Culture   in   the  Eighteenth  Century,"  pp.   198-233;   Douglas   Sloan,   The  Scottisli 
En] ij'.htenment   and   the  American  College  Ideal   (N.Y.:     Teachers  College  Press, 
Teachers  College,   Columbia University,   1971),   espec.  Chapter I,   "The 
Scottish Universities   in the Enlightenment," pp.   1-35;   Robert  Noycs   Smart, 
"Some   observations   on   the  provinces  of   the   Scottish  universities   1560- 
1850"   in  The  Scottisli   Tradition.     Essays   in   Honor  of  Ronald  Gordon   Cant, 
edited   by  G.   W.   S.   Harrow.      (St.   Andrews  University  Publications,   No.   LX) 
(Edinburgh:     Scottish Academic Press,   1974)   pp.   91-106.     See also,   Douglas 
Young,   "Scotland   and   Edinburgh   in   the   eighteenth  Century,"     Studies   on 
Voltaire  and   the   Eighteenth   Century   (Transactions   of   the  Second   international 
congress   on   the  Enlightenment   IV),   Vol.  LVIII   (1967),   1967-1983.     See  also: 
Cant's   earlier   book,   The  University  of  St.   Andrews:     A  Short  History   (Edin- 
burgh:     1946). 
l^See Hugh Trevor-Roper,  op.   cit.,  p.   1636.     See also:     Lawrence 
Stone,   ed.   The  University   in  Society,   Vol.   I,   Oxford   and  Cambridge   from  the 
Fourtli   to   the  early Nineteenth  Century,   and  Vol.   II,   Europe,   Scotland,   and 
the  United   States   from  the  Sixteentli  to  the  Twentietli  Century   (Written  under 
the auspices of the Shelby Cullom Davis Center   for Historical Studies, 
Princeton University).     (Princeton,  N.J.:    Princeton University Press,   1975). 
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11 Ibid.,   pp.   1956-58. 
12 Ibid.,   p.   1955. 
Idfm.     George S.  Pryde wrote   that  one of the  reasons   "Edinburgh 
.   .   .   was hailed  as   'the Athens of  the North1" was   that   the  city was  not 
an   island  in the  sea of darkness,   but   the apex or   the  focal point  of one 
of  the most  highly  literate  societies  of the  time.     "The broad  base of 
the   intellectual,   literary and  scientific achievements  of  the   time was 
provided by a system of elementary education which,  with many gaps  and 
defects, was a credit  to  the nation,   for at   long   last   the Knoxian  ideal 
of a  school  in every parish was within  sight of  realisation.   .   .   ." 
(George  S.   Pryde,   op.   cit.,   p.   162). 
14 Idem. 
15 Ibid.,   p.   1956. 
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CHAPTER   III 
BURKE  AND  THE  "ART  VS.   NATURE"  PROBLEM 
John Plamenatz  speaks  in his work, Man  and  Society   (1963),  of 
the visions  of  the   future   common,   he  believes,   to all Utopias. 
...  We may not   trouble to criticize them on  the ground   that 
their  visions of  the   ideal society are unrealistic.    We may think 
it wasted   labour   to object to  those visions on  specific  grounds; 
we may object more generally  that   it  is unreasonable   to prepare 
schemes   for   the   future   because  men,   being   limited  by   the   ideas 
of their own time,   cannot predict what the   future will   be   like, 
since   those who  come after them will have   ideas  different   from 
theirs.     Marx and   Engcls, when  they called   the more speculative 
of the  early  socialists  Utopian,   also had   this  objection   in mind. 
Now,   it might be  held   that   this  is   one objection which would come 
better   from such  a man  as Burke  [emphasis  added]   than  from them. 
If what   is   to come after cannot be   foreseen,   is not the  revolu- 
tionary  the man who wants  society   completely transformed,   merely 
destructive?    He aims at putting an end to what   exists without 
knowing what will   take   its place.     What reason   can he have  for 
believing that  the unknowable   future will  be better than  the 
past?   .   .   .l 
Plamenatz lias   a no more broad-minded  view of  the role and meaning of 
the   concept   of  Utopia   than  did   the   Immanuel  Kant,   as   described   by 
Ernst Cassirer;   in addition,  Plamenatz  associates   Burke--wrong- 
headedly--with his own narrow view of Utopia,   equating Utopia with 
unreality and  prophecy rather  than with   the hard-arrived-at and   closely- 
ranged prediction by use of   the  intellect.    l!urke--and  in similar ways 
the Kantian and  Scottisli views—recognized  the  reality of the   internal 
world   (of,   for  instance,  a human nature   constant   in some things)   and 
the reality of the external world   (of,   for instance,   the historical 
events  themselves),  and   the   interplay between  internal and  external, 
between subject  and object. 
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Cassirer,   on the  contrary,  expresses  his  broader concept of 
Utopia   in his  Essay on Man  (1944): 
The writings   of Plato and of his   followers have always been liable 
to objection   that  they refer  to a  completely  unreal world.     But 
the  great ethical thinkers  did not   fear  this objection.     They 
accepted   it and proceeded  openly to defy  it.     The  "Platonic 
Republic," writes Kant   in the Critique of Pure  Reason,   "has  been 
supposed   to be a striking example  of purely  imaginery perfection. 
It  has become   a byword,  as  something that  could exist only  in  the 
brain of an idle thinker.   ...    We should do better,  however,   to 
follow up his   thought  and  endeavor   to place  it   in a clearer  light 
by our own efforts,   rather  than to  throw it aside as  useless,  under 
the miserable  and  very dangercus pretext  of its   impracticability.   .   .   . 
For  nothing can be more mischievous  and more unworthy of a philos- 
opher   than   the   vulgar   appeal   to what   is   called   adverse  experience 
[emphasis  added],  which  possibly  might   never  have  existed   if  at 
the  proper time  institutions had been  formed according to  those 
ideas, and not  according to  crude  conceptions which,   because  they 
were derived   from experience  only,  have marred  all  good  inten- 
tions   .   .   ."2 
Contrary   to Plamenatz's view of Burke,   Burke was  not   imprisoned by his 
particular historical  setting,  although  Burke was aware of the   circum- 
stances which even   ideally would  contribute to the   fulfillment  of 
principle and  extra-historical   (not ahistorical)   influences on an 
individual's   thought   (or upon a state's  existence). 
Burke was,   in his own words,   the occasionalist,  but not  the 
server of occasions.     Burke  could   judge the singular   importance  of the 
French Revolution,   the universality of its  ideological assumptions,3 
and   could   therefore   foresee  the  course of   the Revolution.     Thus  Burke 
could   lament all  the more  the absence of what would   today be called 
"contingency plans"  by the  British state and her Allies  to control  the 
expansion of the Revolution  state.    More  generally,  he could advocate 
the use, whenever and  to the greatest extent possible,   of  the active 
policy-making  intelligence of Allied statesmen to shape  the near 
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future   to the  extent   to which present  possession of empirical data and 
general   knowledge  of  the   fundamental principles  of morality and of the 
constant   factors of human nature  in society, would allow. 
One   important   instance of the  extra-empirical  and  extra- 
historical dynamic and  activist view Burke had of the   faculties  of the 
mind,   and   the  possibility of shaping experience rather  than merely 
being shaped   by it--was  his notion that  "art   is man's nature."    This 
concept was expressed   in   the  "Vindication of Natural  Society"  1756, 
Burke's   ironic    satire o£  Bolingbroke's deism and analytic Cartesian 
rationalism.     Stanlis wrote of  Burke here: 
As an Aristotelian,  he believed  that man  is  by nature a political 
or  social   animal,   that   "art   is man's  nature." To  Burke,   civil 
society however  imperfect was  superior  to any hypothetical simple 
"state of nature" without organized   institutions.   .   .   .     Burke 
showed   that  Bolingbroke's attacks  on artificial  religion applied 
equally  to  political   institutions  and  to organized   society  it- 
self:     "Show me an absurdity  in religion,  and  I will  undertake to 
show you an hundred   for one  in political   laws and   institution   .   .   ." 
In short,   without   irony,   Burke believed   that   "artificial"  institu- 
tions   such  as Church and State are  "natural"  to man,  and  that a 
state of "natural  society," without   institutions,  was  a  fictitious 
and dangerous  illusion when applied   to man.   .   .   .-> 
But  Stanlis went on  to describe  Burke's  opposition to Bolingbroke  as 
aimed  primarily at  the rationalism,  or the methodology,   of Bolingbroke, 
by which he had  made  the antithesis between art and nature as  a prelude 
to an assumed  superiority of the  state of  nature.     Stanlis  in describing 
Burke's position,  seems  to  assume  of Burke's   thought  the  same anti- 
thesis which Burke was satirizing,   that of art vs.  nature;   but   in 
Stanlis'   Burke,   the  form of   the antithesis  is   the  impotence of  individual 
reason within  "his subordinate place in  the moral universe."6    Stanlis' 
commentary on  Burke's   "vindication"  is  important because of Stanlis' 
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preeminent place  in contemporary Burke studies,  and  his  belief  that 
the  philosophical assumptions of  the  "Vindication"  spoke   "the grand 
themes     that  ran  through almost  everything he ever wrote.   .   .   ."' 
Stanlis  seems   to have Burke equate  individual reason with  the  "clear 
and  distinct"   ideas  of dogmatic Cartesian rationalism,   and  both as 
conflicting with  the performance of "moral duties"  in  the  "moral  uni- 
verse."    But  it   is  Bolingbroke's  rationalism,   his methodology,   not 
so much as his  antithesis between  art  and nature per se, which  Burke 
attacks.     Burke 
.   .   .  attacked  Bolingbroke's   rationalism,   and argued  seriously 
that   the  civil world of man would  be destroyed   "if the practice 
of all moral duties, and   the   foundations of society,   rested  upon 
having their reasons made  clear and demonstrative  to every individ- 
ual.     Ilis  satire attacked   the  theory  that   if every individual was 
free  to speculate  upon political and moral  subjects, with no sense 
of self restraint  arising  from an awareness of the   limitations  and 
fallibility of his private reason,  and  from his  subordinate place 
in   the moral  universe,   then  everything among all   the excellent 
achievements of man throughout history was   subject   to the destruc- 
tive analysis of rationalistic  criticism.     Burke perceived  that 
this   is precisely what  the  rationalistic philosophers of  the 
Enlightenment  encouraged men  to do.   .   .   .[The   following themes 
run  throughout  Burke's writings;   Burke's]    .   .   .   attacks  on a priori 
reasoning  in politics, his   contempt   for metaphysical abstractions, 
his   fear of  "the contagion  of project and  system," his deep skep- 
ticism toward  the  "species of delusive geometrical accuracy  In 
moral  arguments.   .   .   . 
But  the above antithesis between  individual reason and  the almost 
deterministic  "moral universe" which Stanlis describes,  does  not 
correspond  to  Burke's own views  on  the "art vs.   nature" problem. 
In  the Preface  to  the 2nd  Edition of  the   "Vindication"   (1757), 
Burke explained   the defect of Bolingbroke's nature worship. 
.   .   .   the same engines which were  employed   for  the destruc- 
tion of religion, might be  employed with equal  success   for 
the   subversion  of  government    .    .    .y 
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Bolingbroke'a rationalism is unlike that species of "vulgar reasonings 
and notions, taken from the beaten circle of ordinary experience [and] 
admirably suited to the narrow capacities of some, and to the laziness 
of others." Burke   then  goes  on   to describe  the  correct use of "vul- 
gar" reason,   and a methodology   (for discerning  the  art   in man's  nature) 
which  is   anything but  vulgar.     It  requires   the active use of  the   intel- 
lect  and   an   intermediate  knowledge  of objects  removed   from the subject's 
setting.      But   in  order   for   the  active  mind   to  reach  out   beyond   any 
immediately perceived  or   felt  objects,   it must at   the  same time  retain 
the notion  of  the   limitation of reason,   a  limiting  concept which   turns 
about  and,   in a heuristic   fashion,   allows  more play  for   the application 
of reason by  the active mind within reason's  proper  sphere.     Burke 
wrote  that   "this  advantage" of a   "vulgar" reason 
.   .   .    is   a  great  measure,  when  a  painful,   comprehensive  survey 
of a  very complicated  matter,   and which  requires a great variety 
of  considerations,   is   to  be  made;  when  we  must   seek   in  a  profound 
subject,   not   only   for arguments,   but   for new materials of argument, 
their  measure  and   their  method   of  argument;   when     we  must   go  out  of 
the sphere of our ordinary  ideas  and when we  can never walk  surely, 
but  by   being  sensible  of  our   blindness.     And   this  we   must  do,   or  we 
do   nothing,  whenever  we   experience   the  result   of  a  reason  which   is 
11 not our  own   .   .   .   * 
The   facile  and   incomplete rationalism of Bolingbroke   is   in  fact   the vulgar 
way of  thinking.     It  seeks   to win  itself over by a persuasion built upon 
those  points  which   it   thinks   represent  a  philosophical  vacuum  created   by 
the   limitations  of reason  (or of reason's  paradoxes),  not  realizing  that 
these   limitations  are  an   inherent   part  of   the   right   use  of  reason   itself. 
Burke wrote: 
It   is an  observation which  I   think Isocrates  makes  in  one of his ora- 
tions  against  the Sophists,   that   it  is   far more easy   to maintain a 
wrong cause,  and  to  support  paradoxical  opinions   to the satisfaction 
of a common auditory,   than  to establish  a doubtful  truth by  solid and 
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conclusive  arguments.     When men   find   that   something  can   be   said   in 
favor of what,  on  the  very proposal  they have thought  utterly  inde- 
fensible,   they grow doubtful of   their own reason;   they are  thrown 
into a sort  of pleasing surprise;   they run along with  the speaker, 
charmed and   captivated   to  find  such a plentiful  harvest  of reason- 
ing, where all seemed   barren and   unpromising.     This   is  the  fairy 
land  of philosophy. 
The difference  between  the establishment  of a  "doubtful   truth" on  the 
one hand,  and  of  "paradoxical opinions" on the  other,   is  the difference 
between  Burke's   limited  reason which  recognizes  the heterogeneous   com- 
pound   of art  and nature  in man,  as against  Bolingbroke's  rationalism 
which   cannot   tolerate  the  accumulated  givens of  the historical/phenomenal 
world   (of  "art"),  viewing  the realm of   "art" not as  a real   and   indepen- 
dent  reality,   but merely as  a strawman,   a paradox,   to be  explained 
1 o 
(away)   exclusively  in  terms  of  the "natural." 
In his  extensive review of Adam Ferguson's  Essay on the History 
of  Civil   Soviety   (1767)   in   the  Annual   Register   for   1767,   Burke  referred 
to   the   study of man,   "so various a being," as a "subject   ...   so exten- 
14 
sive  that   it   can never be  exhausted." It  is   further the study of man 
in  society,  with  which  Ferguson--and   the  general   Scottish   inquiry   into 
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the   study,   now  called   sociology,   of  "Man  and   Society"     --is   concerned, 
and whicli offers  the "most   fit"   instance of studying the moral duties 
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of man. Ilobbes  and Rousseau    have both   therefore given  incomplete 
pictures   of  man,   both  anthropologically  and  morally,   when  they  assumed 
the  nature of man   to be  complete  in,  respectively,  a malevolent  or a 
benevolent,   solitary state of nature.     But  the heterogeneity of man's 
nature and  of his moral duties   is only   fulfilled   in society.     "Mr.  Fer- 
guson,"   Burke  wrote   in  the  Annual   Register,"   .   .    .   has  refuted   them  both 
1 u 
[Rousseau  and  llobbesl   in  the  most  masterly manner   ..." 
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No one [Burke continued]   can be more  fully  calculated   for examing 
thoroughly  into,   and describing  expressively,   man in  that  state, 
than  he  who   is   chosen  by  a   learned   body,   as   the  most   fit   to  point 
out  and enforce   those moral duties, of which   the social   form is  so 
principal  a part.     The   learned author has  accordingly handled   this 
subject   in  the most masterly manner;  the work abounds with subtle 
thought,   ingenious sentiment,   and  extensive knowledge.   .   .   .19 
That  the  study of the moral  duties  of man in society necessitated 
"subtle   thoughts,  ingenious   sentiment,   and extensive  knowledge"  is 
partially due  to Ferguson's   belief that man was  a  "moral actor" whose 
"political activity,  promoting the moral development  of actors  and bene- 
ficiaries   alike,   is   the  highest   command  of moral   science."     Just  as  the 
natural   law was defined  by A.   P.  d'Entreves as  "the   intersection between 
laws  and morals," 20 
The  political  and   moral   angles   of  vision  overlap,   according  to 
Ferguson,   but   they   do  not   comprehend   fully   identical  segments   of 
reality  at   most   times.      In  his   Essay  on  the   History of  Civil   Society, 
then,   Ferguson portrays  a world  complicated  and   full of   tensions   in 
these as  in other respects.    His  groping for a   language able  to dis- 
cuss   sucli   complexity  leads        him  often  into   imprecision  and   this 
helps   to account   for neglect  of his work.   .   .   .21 
But  Ferguson's   contemporaries,  and especially Burke,   did not  neglect him. 
Man,  as a  complex moral  actor applies  his wider moral   vision   in order  to 
shape and   form his environment   (including his historical environment or 
traditions),   rather  than  passively  allowing  it   to  shape  him.      Burke 
cited  Ferguson: 
"We speak of art as   distinguished   from nature;   but  art  itself  is 
natural   to  man.     He   is   in   some  measure  the  artificer  of  his   own 
frame,   as well as his   fortune,   and   is destined,   from the   first age 
of  his   being,   to  invent  and   contrive,     lie  applies   the  same   talents 
to a  variety  of purposes,   and  acts   nearly  the   same  part   in  very 
different   scenes.     He would   always   be   improving  on   his  subject,   and 
he carries  this  intention wherever he moves,   through the streets of 
the populous   city,   or  the wilds  of  the forest.   .   .   ."22 
The    'moral  universe" is   not set against   the conscious   individual  reason 
of man,  J but rather man  as  a moral  actor and therefore as a complex being, 
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is  continually attempting to  reconcile,  or as Burke said elsewhere, 
"insinuate"*^ morality into political  life. 
The  realization  that   the  complex affairs of men were  such 
because characterized by  an overlapping of   the  "political and moral 
angles  of vision," saved  the eighteenth-century Scottish social 
scientists   from constructing strictly hypothetical  speculative or 
deductive theories  of human behavior.     At   the same   time,   the Scottish 
attempt  to articulate a science  of society was recognized by contem- 
poraries as significant.     In  a similar manner, Burke  thought  it desir- 
able   to consider morals  a science—in  order  to avoid the moral  confusion 
of  the philosophes—but,   at  the same  time,   did not wish morals  to become 
a   "theorical" or speculative exercise either   (see infra. ,   Chapter IV, 
p. 104   ).     Douglas Adair wrote  that before  the French  Revolution  caused 
the word "philosophy"  to be "equated with  the guillotine,   atheism,   the 
reign   of  terror," and made   "philosophy" and "philosophizing" a pejora- 
tive   "smear-word"  synonymous with the  "fuzzy-minded  and dangerous 
social   theorist" or   "social engineer," 5  the notion of  "philosophy" 
had a positive and   optimistic meaning.     Adair portrayed George Washing- 
ton  as   philosophe when the   latter said   in his circular letter to  the 
state   governors   in  June,   1783: 
"The  foundation  of our Empire was not   laid  in the gloomy age of 
Ignorance  and Superstition   .   .   .  but at  an Epocha when  the  rights 
of mankind were better understood and more  clearly defined than 
at   any former period [one  is  reminded here of Burke's   idea of  the 
way  in which, bv  a "liberal descent,   .   .   .   our  liberty  becomes  a 
noble  freedom."2^];  the  researches of  the human mind after social 
happiness have been carried  to  a great extent.   ..."     [In  the 
1780's,]   "scientist   [or philosopher,  meant]   a man  deep   in knowledge, 
either moral or-natural." 
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A1 though   the   Scottish  sociologists  drew  a  more  precise   line 
between moral  and natural knowledge  or science,'" still, 
Washington's  assurance that  already scientific knowledge  about 
government  had accumulated  to such  an extent   that   it   could be 
immediately  applied   to the uses  of   'legislators,'  pointed  less 
toward France  than  toward Scotland.     There, especially   in   the 
Scottish universities, had been developed  the chief centers of 
eighteenth-century social science  research  and  publication  in 
all the world.     The names of  Frances  Hutcheson,   David  Hume,  Adam 
Smith,   Thomas   Re id,   Lord  Kaines,   Adam  Ferguson,   the most   prominent 
of   the  Scottish philosophers, were  internationally famous.   .   . 
Adair's description of  the  Scottish  assumptions about  the constancy of 
human nature matches  that  of David Kettler.     Adair continued: 
The Scottish system, as it had been gradually elaborated in the 
works of a whole generation of researchers, rested on one basic 
assumption, had developed its own special method, and kept to a 
consistent aim. The assumption was 'that there is a great uni- 
formity among the actions of men, in all nations and ages, and 
that human nature remains still the same, in its principles and 
operations. The same motives always produce the same actions; 
the same events   follow from the same  causes.   .   .    .'" 
The  complexity  and  the  constancy of human nature,   taken together,   let 
the scientific  study of  man  in society proceed without  degenerating 
into  theoretical  speculation.     Burke wrote   (infra.,  p.  37)   as  if he 
believed   in  the  same  assumptions which  guided the enquiries  of   the 
Scots   (see Appendix C)   for the moderate character of   the Scottish 
Enlightenment. 
Actually  the Scottish social scientists were so confident   they 
had   formulated  a  comprehensive and workable science of  society,   that 
the  idea of  an omnipotent  legislator as applying the  laws of  society 
(let  alone  as   correcting  or improving  the society)  became superfluous 
and external  or even alien to the understanding and maintenance of 
society.     Society   (or the people in a society)   could correct   and  improve 
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itself by  its own  "autonomous mechanism,"—now discovered  by the  Scots. 
The "'destruction   [of   the  legislator myth] was perhaps  the most  original 
32 and daring  coup  of  the  social science of   the  Scottish Enlightenment.'" 
The  laws   of society  replaced  the  laws of any Solons.     The   coup was  spear- 
headed   by   Adam Smith's Theory of Moral  Sentiments   (1759), which   "solved 
for  the  first   time"  the old  controversy  among British moral philosophers 
"from Hobbes   to Hutcheson of  the  contradiction between private  inter- 
est   and   public   interest   or  stability. 
The  crux of   the old controversy  is most   clearly seen   in   the  title 
of the most  notable eighteenth-century   representation of one side of 
the  argument:     Bernard  de Mandeville's popular "Fable of  the Bees, or 
.   .   .   Private Vices,  Public Benefits."    The historiography  on Mandeville's 
views  does  not  seem to have  changed  much   in the   last  century;  Sir Leslie 
Stephen wrote  in  1876 of Mandeville: 
With   Mandeville  nature   is   a  power  altogether   inscrutable   to  our 
feeble   intelligence.   .   .   .   Nature   is   a dark  power, whose   [contra- 
dictory]   action   can only be  inferred  from facts, not   from any 
a priori   theory of  design, harmony and  order. 
The following words were written in   1976: 
Mandeville  leaves us with  his  paradox   [of private vices  and public 
benefits],  offering no resolution, no   counsel,  proclaiming the 
true religion  only  to render it   inoperative,  while he demonstrates 
the mystery of  our  confused being.   ■" 
It  should  be  pointed  out,   though,   that  a recent   author has  taken a little 
of   the dark mystery  and  confusion out  of Mandeville's paradoxes.     M.   M. 
Goldsmith   saw  Mandeville  as  attacking   the   hierarchical,   closed   class 
structure  in  England,  a structure  in which  those private virtues equated 
with the public good, were  those virtues  commonly regarded as  charac- 
teristic exclusively of  the high-born.     Goldsmith wrote: 
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Although  it   [Mandeville's system of paradox]  may be  partly a self- 
regulatory system,   I  believe  that   the skillful politician enters 
to emphasize   that   it   is a conventional system;   it   is built up   from 
previous  actions and  i_t might  be  changed by human  decisions   [empha- 
sis added;   for instance,]   .   .   .   The beneficial harmony which  results 
from private vice depends  upon laws.   ..." 
The  difference between  Adam Smith as  one of  the   leading social scientists 
of   the Scottisli Enlightenment,   and Mandeville,  was  that while  the self- 
regulation   in Mandeville's  scheme was   largely  a mysterious phenomenon, 
akin   to Pope's   teleological  argument   in his Essay on Man,   that   "partial 
evil   is universal good,"—Smith's  idea of  "sympathy" and  the self-regula- 
tion,  or "self-preservation" of society,   reflected the  critical  formula- 
tions by the   Scottish sociologists  of   the   laws  or mechanisms of society. 
Much   in  the  vein  of  a Kantian moral   imperative,   Smith's notion of 
"sympathy" demanded   the   agent,   in his moral  and economic  conduct,   con- 
sciously step  outside himself  and  imagine himself  in   the  other fellow's 
shoes,  before  taking one  or another  course of  action.     Smith's notion   of 
sympathy represents 
The most   advanced idea of civil society as autonomous mechanism 
[and his]   .   .   .   happy union of moral philosophy and political 
economy was  a specific product of   the Scottish Enlightenment.   . 37 
Perhaps Burke's notion of  prudence  as   a social virtue reflected some  of 
the   influence  of Smith's notion of "sympathy." 
Burke did  favorably  review Smith's Theory  of Moral  Sentiments   in 
the  1759 issue  of The Annual Register.     Sympathy was for Burke here, not 
a facile sentiment,   but a  conscious,   critical and  reconciling virtue 
with which Smith sought, wrote Burke, 
.   .   .for the  formulation  of  the just,   the fit,   the proper,  the 
decent,   in  our most common and allowed passions   .   .   . 
An example  of   the "fit,  the  proper,   the  decent,"   (as opposed  to the 
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"paradoxes" of Mandeville's  scheme)   sympathy of  Smith in the economic 
field, was his distinction between poverty and misery.     This  distinction 
served  as   a justification for continual restructuring of society, because 
the  distinction becomes   in Smith  "the  distinction between that   condition 
which  is  inevitable and   irremediable  and that which is unnecessary and 
capable  of   cure.     u    Sympathy is   a complex virtue  of practical morality 
which  requires  that   the  agent not   intrude himself   into a largely unseen 
whole  by equating  his  conduct   (whether virtuous or vicious)   as  an inherent 
(and unseen)  part   of that whole.     Rather,  sympathy requires  the  agent 
step   outside  himself  both   spatially  and   temporally.     He   is   capable  not 
only of   imagining   the other  fellow's moral  and economic   reason  for being 
(the   other  motivations,   conduct)   in a  given and  real situation,  but  the 
sympathetic   agent,  wrote  Burke,   can sympathize with  the dead.^1 
This  sympathy of which Burke said existed  in all men  for the 
dead,^2   is   tne widest-ranging of  this   critical and virtuous  sentiment. 
Yet  it   is   tethered   to the  criteria of   the   "just,  fit  and proper"  and as 
such  is  a sympathy which will  in   fact  enlarge the human  understanding 
by  its very  fitness   and articulate distinction between  itself  and  the 
objects  of  sympathy  and among  the  objects   themselves. 
Perhaps Burke was  referring to Mandeville's narrow paradoxes, 
or confusions,  as  Burke would consider  them, when he wrote a letter to 
Smith praising the  Theory of Moral  Sentiments.     Burke wrote  in  1759  to 
Smith of   the   false  paradoxes   of past moralists:     "I  have even  thought 
that  the  old  Systems  of morality were too  contrasted  and  that  this Science 
could never stand well upon  any narrower  Basis  than   the whole of Human 
Nature.' Because   falsely paradoxical,   these moralists before  Smith 
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were narrow;  to this point,  Burke continued,   referring  to "All   the 
writers who have  treated   this  Subject before you were  like  those 
Gothic Architects who were  fond of turning great   Vaults  upon a single 
slender Pillar   ..." Sympathy was an  imaginative faculty  in man where- 
by   the   individual could   regulate or improve  himself.     Thereby,   the   cohesive 
bonds of  society  could be maintained   in a  conscious and  critical manner. 
Louis Schneider, in his anthology of The Scottish Moralists On 
Human Nature and Society cited the works of Francis Hutcheson, David 
Hume,  and Dugald  Stewart   on the   "Uniformity of Human Nature" But   the 
complexity of  the history of human nature  in  society was   realized by   the 
eighteenth-century Scots  in the  form of   their notions of   "individual 
Actions  and  Unintended   Social Outcomes."'1'     Although the   Scots  shared   the 
general  "Enlightenment   stress  on   the uniformity of human nature   [which] 
could and did  sometimes   go to  the point where   the  representation of men 
and women,  as  in historical writings,  involved a sameness   of portrayal 
that was  certainly  challengeable,"      the  Scots   realized  that  laws  could 
not  be  applied  to express  our knowledge  of human nature   in society as 
for  instance,   the Newtonian laws  of gravitation and motion had described 
the  realm of physical nature.     Schneider,   in  explaining  the  latter 
characteristic of   the  thought of   the Scottish  moralists,   referred  to  the 
development   of   the   theme   [of   the]   .   .    .   Scots'   analysis   to  show how 
the  larger   'objects'   [of any   intended  action]   are brought  about 
indirectly but  effectively through the  pursuit of more   restricted 
goals  that men   can set   for  themselves.     In   the development of   the 
theme  it   is  argued   repeatedly  that human  reason   is  too  frail a 
reed  to rely upon to bring about  a variety  of   'results. '^9 
Schneider  cited  to  this  effect Reid, Lord Monboddo,  Hume,  Adam Smith, 
Adam Ferguson,  and Dugald  Stewart.     But  it   is  Schneider's  Reid who is 
similar to both Burke and Kant  on   the subject  of  the unintended 
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consequences of  individual actions.     Schneider wrote  of  P.eid: 
By instinct  and habit,   Peid argues, man   is  led  to   'many actions 
necessary for his preservation  and well being which, without   instinct 
and habit,  all his  skill  and wisdom would not have been  able  to 
accomplish.1     There   are  at work  in man   'inferior principles  of 
action'   and   these   'with   little  or no  aid of  reason or virtue,  preserve 
the species.'50 
Reid's notion of   instinct  and  habit   here   as  aids   to  the  reason,   or,  as 
aids  to man's purposeful  action,   resemble Kant's   reconciliation   (see 
Appendix B)   between  a purposeful Nature and the  absolute Purpose  of the 
moral realm.     Man   (his  judgement),  with his  feet   in both  camps—as both 
a creature  of  purposive Mature   (as  an  instinctual  creature  of habit,   for 
instance),   and  as  a free moral agent—brings   the  realms together  in such 
a way as   to  show their mutual  complementarity.     The  Scottish moralists 
saw both  the   constancy of  human nature   (representing  the moral  realms) 
and   the accidents of  the historico/phenomenal realm to which man,  as a 
creature of nature,   is  susceptible.     As   for Burke,   Schneider cited 
J.   G.   A.   Pocock's article  on  "Burke  and  the Ancient   Constitution   .   .   ,"'* 
as  a variation  on  the   theme  of   "unintended  consequences," but Pocock was 
speaking of  "institutions  as  incorporating   'wisdom,' that   is,  of the 
"unintended  consequences"  of institutions.     (For Burke   and Pocock,   see 
immediately below.) 
Contrary to the   traditional  interpretations  of  the ahistoricity 
of Enlightenment   thought   (see Appendix C)   and  contrary  to the  Burke 
portrayed  as  a prisoner of history—past   (as  a  traditionalist or reaction- 
ary Burke as  seen,   for example,  by Burke's   contemporary James Macintosh, 
or,  Burke  as seen as  a member of"the" natural   law school)  or  present 
(Burke as positivist/utilitarian)55—Burke here would   come closer  to what 
.1.   B.   Black called  the   "modern"  temper.     Black wrote   in his  1926 study 
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of  The  Art   of  History:     A  Study   of   Four  Great  Historians   of   the  Eighteenth 
Century  (Voltaire, Hume,  Robertson and fiibbon) :    ".   .   .  what  the modern 
mind   craves   is not  the reduction of all events and  characters  to a common 
denominator, but   their differentiation."0"    Burke,   representing the 
moderate,  comprehensive,   complex   thought of  the Enlightenment   (see Appen- 
dix C) , did  not   only differentiate, but   tried  to reconcile   the different 
realms with one  another. 
Burke's  attempt to  reconcile  the constant  and the   changing,  after 
the pattern of  the Scottish  sociological historians,   is  seen in his views 
on the nature of prescription and  custom,  as  part of   the common law. 
Burke's views on prescription and  custom offer here  an evident  comparison 
between his   thoughts  on this  subject  and   the  Scottish methodology.     Two 
authors, Paul Lucas  and .7.   G.   A.   Pocock      have   recently agreed  in their 
respective studies  regarding   the content  of Burke's  thought   on  this 
matter,  but have,   at  the same  time,  each drawn different   interpretations 
of  the meaning of   the   relation of  Burke's  views   to the  common law tradi- 
tion.     Lucas  and Pocock differed in   their  interpretations  of Burke's 
thought not because  the  former two had opposing views  of what  certain 
principles of  the  common  law meant,   but   rather because  Lucas would 
disqualify an historicist Burke from the  natural law tradition on the 
basis   of  Burke's  views   on  the   common   law.     On   the  other  hand,  Pocock, 
and Francis Canavan,  S.J.,  in   a 1973   article,       on the same  basis,  did 
not see  Burke  as historicist.     Neither did  Pocock and Canavan deny   (or 
affirm)   Burke's thought here   as reflective of  any natural  law  tradition. 
Canavan,   though,  did explicitly admit Burke  into  the natural   law frater- 
nity on  the basis  of Burke's views on  custom and prescription. 
33 
60 
Paul Lucas  seemed  to have  followed  in  the Leo Strauss/Peter 
Stanlis  school, which Interpreted the eighteenth  century as  a blank 
tablet upon which was written  their ahistorical schematic version  of  the 
victory of   the natural rights   tradition over the natural law tradition. 
Lucas saw Burke  as   representing  the  "new sense of  time" of eighteenth- 
century thought,   in which "once supra-temporal  truths became  embodied  in 
time  and  thus   also subject  to  the computation of  prescription."-5'    This 
was   so because prescription also arose   in time,   and  it was   this  develop- 
ment   of prescription  throughout  time which served as   its justification. 
Although Burke  confused  prescription and custom,   *■ when he described  the 
constitution  as  a prescriptive one,  the  truth  is  that   "prescription is 
an  individual  and personal privilege arising  in   time," whereas   "at 
common law,   custom is  a group  and  territorial  right  existing since  time 
immemorial.    .   .   .""^    What was  Burke's notion of  a gradual evolutionary 
constitution  is  seen by Lucas as evidence  of the  immanentism of  Burke's 
natural rights position,   and evidence of  Burke's  relativistic historicism. 
Burke  is now set   against   the  lawyers of  the  common  law  tradition  and 
their notion of  a static  constitution of   custom,   a constitution whose 
origins stretch back  to time   immemorial   (that  is,   a  timeless  constitution) 
Lucas wrote: 
.   .   .Burke had to call  the  constitution a prescriptive   instead  of a 
customary one;   for prescription was essentially a dynamic,  historical 
conception of new rights arising  in  time and,  as Burke stressed,  both 
preserving an  inherited  antiquity and allowing growth and future 
acquisitions.     Prescription  also  eliminated   anachronisms   and  encom- 
passed  a modern sense of historical progress,   for prescriptive 
beginners  were known and were within  the   time of   legal memory.     For 
all these  reasons,  Burke  relied upon  rather  a prescriptive   constitu- 
tion than   the  immemorial  custom of   the  common  lawyers 63 
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This merely represented   for Lucas prescription's   "historicist   tinge"6^ 
—a prescription which had "no transcendent basis,"6-5 but which rather 
"possessed  an  immanent justification"  devoid of  any  "positive,  ethical 
norm" except  the passage  of  time.     The transcendent   (the  original 
principles  of  the   immemorial constitution,  which were  lost   in  Saxon 
myths  approaching  a "state of nature")   was   immanentized.     "The Great 
Chain of  Being became  a great  chain  of becoming,"       in which   the presump- 
tive constitution was  shaped according  to  the manner in which men justi- 
fied the  past  and manipulated   the present.     What   the common  lawyers had 
viewed  as   a value-laden  constitution  now became  a history-,  or time-laden, 
constitution.     Such  an historicist prescriptive  constitution no doubt 
directly  flies  in the  face of  the natural  law tradition. Likewise 
opposed  to the natural   law tradition,   is  the  denial,  as Lucas   claimed 
was  Burke's,  of  a "supernatural  revelation"to aid right reason  and  to 
provide  a standard  and  guide  for judging human   laws  and  traditions  and 
prescriptions  "and the denial"   (Burke's  supposed denial)   or  "mistrust 
of   the   individual person's   faculty of   reason   [which   characterizes]   .   .   . 
the  Scholastic's   intellectualistic process of   cognition by which  the 
natural  law may be made known."  °    Also anathema to Natural   law princi- 
ples  is   the  presumption of  Lucas's  Burke  that   "man's mind was  such  that 
time  alone became  the material and efficient  cause  of prescription.""' 
But  Francis Canavan has shown that Burke's explicit belief  in 
a transcendent  moral order       inherently   involves  a dynamic,  elastic 
history-laden notion of prescription as  Burke's   (and  as Lucas described 
accurately enough) :     prescription for Burke  "meant   that  God willed  the 
historically evolved  social  and political order,"       or,—"The universal 
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moral  order  is  the  order of   a real, historically existing world."72    To 
Burke,  as   for  the  Scottish  sociological historians,73  this  flexible moral 
order  involved "a cultural,  but never an ethical,   relativism."     In terms 
of  a theory of  the  British  constitution,   this meant  a dynamic   combination 
of  the universal and  the particular,  the  constant  and  the changing. 
Canavan  cited  Burke on  the  constitution: 
'The foundation  of government   is  there  laid, not  in  imaginary rights 
of  men   .   .   .   but  in political   convenience,   and   in human nature;  either 
as   that  nature   is  universal,  or  as   it   is modified by  local habits  and 
social aptitudes.'   (Burke's  "Appeal   from the New  to  the Old  Whigs," 
1791).      'In the  created   universe,   the necessary  is  realized   in the 
contingent,  the  universal  in the particular,  the natural in   the  con- 
ventional.   .   .   .'" 
Burke's prescriptive   constitution,   reflecting a complex and flexible moral 
order, would reconcile continuity and reform,'-' and this,   together with 
the  presumption of   the  rational  (not  arbitrary)   consent of   the governed  " 
to a "good" government which has long flourished under a constitution, 
is evidence of   the  fact   that   ' Prescription of  government   is  a part of 
the law of nature." Lucas had seen Burke's  reconciliation between the 
past   (an "inherited   antiquity")   and   the present   (Burke's   theory of 
constitutional  growth   through   "future acquisitions" and Burke's   theory 
of "historical progress")  as part of   Burke's  "ahistorical   conservatism" 
and Burke's prescription with   its  "historicist   tinge." J.   G.   A.   Pocock 
also referred   to Burke's  "pragmatic" prescription as  a  "conservatism 
without   traditions." Lucas had said  Burke's  notion of  a prescriptive 
constitution was  a relativist-historicist   idealization   (or justification) 
of history;  Lucas had  said that  Burke's was  a notion denying   the need for 
any objective   (transcendent)   ethical  standards   (such as   the  original 
principles, existing since  "time   immemorial" in   the  form of   inherited, 
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or presumed,   custom).     Pocock also saw Burke's new "pragmatic prescrip- 
tion" as  combining the  past   and  the present.     But Pocock,  unlike Lucas, 
held that  such   a prescription was not untrue either—explicitly—to the 
common  law  custom or  to  the natural  law  tradition  as  that   tradition has 
been described  in this  study.     The  use of human   reason as  a tool  to 
consider the  complexities of  history and man   in society and   to attempt 
to  reconcile  them with   the  absolutes  of a transcendent  law is  part  of 
the natural  law  itself. 
Pocock has shown  that  such  a methodology  is not  alien   to   the 
tradition of   the   common  law.     To accept Lucas' distinction or  opposition 
between Burke's  prescription  and the  custom of common  law,   one would be 
bound   to accept  his narrow view of   the static,   immemorial  custom of 
common law and  of  tradition  in general.     What  Lucas  referred   to  as   the 
customs of   the common  law, Pocock called  the  "traditions" of  the  common 
law.     These were  presumptive—"an indefinite series of   repetitions  of 
an  action, which on each  occasion  is   performed  on   the assumption  that 
it has been  perfomred before. Traditions were prescriptive because 
they  represented   a continuity with the immemorial  timeless  "original 
o t 
principles"  of "the common  law   [which]  was  common  custom." But  even 
immemorial  traditions   (or,   the   customs  of   common  law),  presumptive  and 
on 
prescriptive   as  Burke  pointed   out,        required   for   their  "full  exposition" 
a sophisticated mind and  highly subtle language." An argument  "more 
Qf 
subtly   traditional"      than  the   seventeenth/eighteenth  century  cult  of 
the  ancient   immemorial constitution seeking to return  to  the   "original 
principles" of  an  idealised  pre-Conquest constitution,   characterized 
Burke's  "conservatism without  traditions."    Burke pointed out  in  the 
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first place  the simple  illogic of  the notion of   the  immemorial   constitu- 
tion. 
Burke  pointed out   that  an  immemorial  constitution can have no 
original  principles,   since  a system whose knowledge of  its  own 
past  is based exclusively on  the presumption of  transmission 
can never arrive at knowledge of  them."* 
Because he opposed   the  cult  of   the immemorial constitution,  Burke did 
not  throw principle completely overboard.     His  position was  described  by 
Pocock as  holding  to pragmatic prescription minus  presumption.     Burke's 
pragmatic prescription,  or "conservatism without   traditions,"  combined 
both past  in  the form of  precedent,  and present  realities   in  the   form 
of necessity■     Pocock explained Burke's   two-edged   theory: 
A pragmatic action must  have  a  [historical]   context   and make sense 
in  that   context.     A prescriptive style,  which  appeals  constantly to 
precedent,  may have much   in common with  a pragmatic   style, which 
appeals  only to necessity;   this  is how the conservatism of  the 
eighteenth  century  could  reflect   the  thought both of  those who 
thought   the  Revolution justified by precedent   and  of   those—the 
so-called  de facto Tories—who thought   it justified only by 
necessity.     Burke was  able  to unite  these  lines of  thought by 
demonstrating that neither entailed,   and each  rejected,   the estab- 
lishment  of an  abstract  and recurrent  principle of dethronement. 
Pragmatism  is the establishment  of a continuous  style  of  behavior 
which  cannot  any  longer be presumed:   this   is   the sense   in which  it 
is  conservatism without  traditions. 
Burke's  position seems  "historical" rather  than historicist  or ahistorical, 
as Lucas had  argued.     It   is  those supporting  the notion of  a narrow 
received traditionalism,   including the presumed   transmission  of   the 
"original   principles" of  a mythical  constitution, who are ahistorical 
(much  as  were   the  original  states  of  nature   in   the   thought   of  Hobbes   and 
Rousseau)   in   their   thinking. 
This  is   all apart   from the fact,  as Pocock pointed  out,  that  the 
common law itself,  although  implying that  custom was   immemorial,  "need 
not   .   .   .   imply a static and  unchanging  content."0'     The  common lawyers 
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realized   that  "custom was   constantly being subjected   to  the   test of 
experience,  so  that   immemorial it was,  equally,   always  up  to date." 
This view of  the  common law coincides with Burke's historical-laden 
pragmatic prescription. 
Lastly,   the use  of  the  individual   reason   in  interpreting the law, 
which use Lucas minimized  in his  description of   the presumptive prescrip- 
tion of  the  law  (and  of "original principles"), was  shown by Pocock  to 
be  in  fact   an  Inherent  part  of common law,  and  of  Burke's views regarding 
the  continuous  reinterpretation of   the law.     Pocock wrote  that  Burke was 
both alike   and opposed   to Chief Justice Sir Matthew Hale.     Hale wrote 
"one of  the  standard books  of  the eighteenth century,  History of  the 
on 
Common Law." Hale's  "empiricist   and  traditionalist" view of   the 
common   law   is written  in opposition   to  "individualistic   rationalism." 
Rather,  for Hale,   the  law was  a    series of  particular decisions.     Law, 
as a matter of  "applied morals," is  so infinitely  complex, Hale believed, 
that   "there were no universally valid rules,  only accumulated  experi- 
Q 1 
encc.   .   .   ." "Experience"  included the  "complexity and the   instability 
of  the  social context   [which]   render  it  impossible   'for  the wisest  Council 
Q 9 
of men at first to foresee."    But because certain laws have weathered 
93 
the  instabilities  of past  ages   "furnishes  the prescription" of   the 
original goodness  of  the law,  but  also of   the good effects of  the law.: 
So,  at   the  last,  for Hale,   the  law is  "instructable." Burke  agreed, 
up   to a point, with  the empirical side of Hale.     In fact,  Burke wrote  in 
his  "Essay towards  a History of   the Laws of England"   (cir.   1760),   that 
Hale  failed  to  recognize   the  truly  '"very mixed and heterogeneous mass'" 
which  the common law represented,  including  the  influence  of elements   from 
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95 foreign nations. Burke,  though,   did not believe the   law to be so 
complex as   to be  inscrutable. 
The   "difference  between Hale   and Burke"  is  that  Burke was 
thoroughly  an eighteenth-century man  in  that he  sought  to shape the 
phenomenal   (historical/empirical)  world and not  have it shape him. 
Burke went   completely outside  common  law proper   in order  to  find 
influences  upon  legal decisions which  possibly  could be seen  in  the 
wider  perspective  of a social pattern   or of a broader law of human 
behavior.     It   is  at  this point which Pocock compared Burke  to the 
Scottish "historical sociologists"   (or,  as  they have been  referred   to 
by others—the Scottish  sociological historians).     Referring  to Burke's 
use  of   the  phrase,   "spirit  of  the   laws," Pocock wrote: 
.    .    .Here   is   thoroughly  eighteenth-century   language:     the   idea  that 
peoples   or their institutions  possess a   'spirit1,  or historical 
character,  which may be understood by relating  it  to just such  things 
as   'the manners,   the   religion,   and  the commerce of  the  people', 
might  come  direct  from Montesquieu or any of  the Scottish histori- 
cal  sociologists with whom Burke was   later to be acquainted.     The 
words prefigure  the   'Speech  on Conciliation with America'   and  the 
orator who was  to depict  the   'spirit'  of   the American  colonists  in 
as   impressive  a passage  as eighteenth-century historiography con- 
tains.   .   .   .Burke  is  thoroughly of  his age   in believing  that  laws 
can be understood by   reference  to  the operation of general social 
factors,   and he   rejects  the empirical mystique of the  immemorial 
partly  on   these grounds.     He   implies  clearly that the history of  the 
law can  be made  intelligible. 
Another role  in which  the  Scottish social scientists avoided  both 
flights  into speculative   fancy onthe one hand,  and merely descriptive 
catalogues of  the history and/or the   (mechanical)   motivations and behavior 
of human nature  on the other hand,  was  their role as  "primitivists." 
That  is  to say,   the Scottish sociologists  as  primitivists neither  ideal- 
ized  the  noble   savage and his noble  traits, nor did   they disregard him 
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altogether.     In  the  debate  over  the primitive as  opposed  to  the   civilized 
(poetry, society,   law,  etc.),   the Scots did not   "take  sides" between nature 
and  art,  or,   an  ideal primitive  Rousseauian  primitive state and  civiliza- 
tion.     (Nor did  the writers of   the Scottish  Enlightenment subsume  one 
into  the other—the latter confusion—in  the more general  form of   the 
confusion between nature  and  reason—was noted by Paul Hazard  as   a distin- 
guishing trait  of  the French philosophes.)97  Robert  C.   Elliott noted that 
Adam Ferguson was  one of   the  few eighteenth-century  figures who maintained 
a balance between  the  primitive   and the civilized. 
.   .   .that   luminary of  enlightened  Edinburgh,   carefully balanced 
the gains  and  losses entailed by man's   advance   from a savage 
to a civilized   condition.     No primitivist,   Ferguson still  found 
things  to admire   [such  as  an heroic  literature]   in  the savage 
state  as he  and   his  contemporaries  conceived  it. 98 
..99 
Those who  could not   accept  Ferguson's  natural dualism which saw good  and 
bad   in both  the  primitive  and   the   civilized,   emphasized   the exclusive 
ideality   (and reality)   of either   the primitive or  the  civilized,   accord- 
ing  to  their respective  prejudices.    Those who saw the price of progress 
to civilization  as   too high were   Rousseau and  Sigmund Freud.    The   latter, 
in  his   Civilization   and   Its  Discontents,   suggested   that   "the whole 
agonizing effort  to establish civilization has not been worth the  pains." 
Those who would complacently accept  "the   future  impoverishment of  the 
life  of  the  imagination,"100 of   (heroic)   literature,   etc.,   to the progress 
toward  civilization  included  Condorcet,   Turgot,  Restif  de   la Bretonne, 
Morelly,   Louis  Sebastian  Mercier   in   the  eighteenth   century,   and,   in   the 
twentieth  century,  Aldous Huxley,   the Marxists   (Trotsky),  Herbert Marcuse 
and  the American "New Left"  radicals.    This group would do  away with 
literature  and with history itself   as merely  "embarrassments" left  over 
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from man's  primitive  state   (that   is,  any state which had  preceded   the 
present state).     Mercier  asked rhetorically in his Memoirs  or   the Year 
2500   (published   in France,   1771,   and translated   into English   in  1772): 
"Why  should we  read Plato  or Socrates?,  he asks, when progress has 
left   them so far behind,"101 or,   as  recent jargon would phrase  it,  when 
progress has made  them "irrelevant".     "For Mercier   [as  for Condorcet], 
the  price to be  paid   for progress  is history.   .   .   .M102    This   is  so 
because for Mercier and Turgot and   the  group  of which they were members, 
progress,   or  civilization,   including "the. knowledge of  nature  and of   truth, 
it i m is   infinitely  cumulative.   .   .   . The most highly civilized   is  the most 
recent  and   the most   immediate,  and  that which  is   removed   from the most 
immediate epoch  is, to that  extent, not  civilized,  but primitive.     In  the 
eighteenth  century,  the Utopias  in  Restif de  la Bretonne's   fantasy 
(translated   into  English   as  The   French   Daedalus,   1781), 
.   .   .   outlaws myth  and  allegory   [as  heroic,  but  primitive 
literature!—modes   of  saying  that which is not—as obstacles 
to  truth.104 
What was  true  and  civilized was the  relevant and  the   immediate  and   the 
real.     "'We want   only  the  real'" was  the   byword  of  de  la Bretonne's 
characters. In  the   twentieth century,   this attitude of ethical 
intuitionism and epistemological reductionism, was   represented  in 
Huxley's Utopia,   Island.     There Huxley 
.   .   .   denigrate[d]   literature savagely   [seeing  it   as]   .   .   .   incom- 
patible with human  integrity, with philosophical   truth,  with a 
decent social system—incompatible with everything he says,   'except 
dualism  [emphasis added],   animal  lunacy,   impossible aspiration,  and 
unnecessary guilt.     Huxley was  convinced like so many others,   that 
the  negative  correlation between   literature   [the primitive]   and  the 
good  life   [civilization, which,   in  the  sense Huxley uses  it,   the 
true life]  was   absolute.     One had  to choose between them;   and   for 
him,   as for his eighteenth-century predecessors,   only one choice 
was possible.10" 
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Because Ferguson  and  the Scottish  social scientists saw civilization 
as more than the   immediate and  real, they did not  see other historical 
events   (including a primitive  state)  whicli were  removed  in time  and 
place,   as merely  derivative and/or   irrelevant. 
Ferguson  and   the  Scots would have mounted  the  rostrum in 
supnort of President Kingman Brewster, Jr.'s  famous  address on  "relevance" 
given  to  the  freshman  students  at  Yale  in 1972.     Huxley and his  eigh- 
teenth-century predecessors who would confuse   civilization  and   the 
primitive,   art and nature   (as Hazard's philosophes  did)—they  could have 
been the student  subjects of Brewster's  advice.     The very definition 
of relevance,  Brewster said,  assumed   the  real to  require more   than  that 
which was within the  immediate proximity of  the present  subject: 
.   .   .   relevance   is   a dependent  word;   it  prompts   the question: 
'relevant  to what?'   [and also,   for what? that  is, why even 
bother to consider   relevance   if not  to include  "something out 
there" removed   in either time  or  space  from the  immediate  and 
the  present?].     Such slogans   as   'the only purpose of learning 
is   action'   left no   room for the  search   for truth or beauty  or 
goodness  for  its  own sake.   .   .   .   There was  an   impatience   [among 
students]   to work on   the  immediate   [problems of society]   .   .   . 
Most particularly the  demand   for   relevance was  scornful of 
history.   .   .   .   [and  part of  this   scorn  is  included]   in  the 
glorification  of   the   'happening'.      Anything was   good  as   long 
as  it expressed   the  real, now self   [emphasis  added]. 
The dualistic theory of reality which   "relevance"   (that  is,  genuine 
relevance)  assumes,  goes  hand  in hand with a theory  of knowledge which 
assumes   the   immediate  present's   capability  of   an   intermediate  percep- 
tion  and  knowledge of  things and  events   (including  the primitive) 
removed   in time  and place   from itself.     The present  state of  civiliza- 
tion  is not necessarily the  apex of past greatness;   the present   is  not 
necessarily the  latest step of a neat   cumulative,   linear development 
of history.     History  is not necessarily all siphoned off  into  the 
A3 
narrow channel of the   "real" of  the here and now.     Some of  it  is  and 
some  of  it  is not  so siphoned off.     The dualistic theories   of reality 
and of  an  intermediate   knowledge,   such  as  the  Scots  assumed, would 
offer a discriminating view of history.     This view would neither 
become,   as  one recent   commentator put   it,   a  "captive" of   the past  nor 
would it  distort or overwhelm that  past.     On   the  other hand,  by shaping 
the past,   the present   can,  to a certain extent,   have some  control  over 
the   future.     Civilization,   in  this  sense,   is not   a state,  but   a process, 
an attitude,   a way of   thinking.     It might even  be  called synonomous with 
a dualistic  theory of   reality and an  intermediate  theory of  knowledge 
capable of corresponding with  the  past and shaping the  future.     The 
historian of   cities,  Lewis Mumford,   referred   in   1921  to civilization  in 
these  terms.     He wrote: 
Civilization is  the nagic  instrument by which men live in a 
world of  time   that  lias  three dimensions:     the past,  the 
present,   and  the   future. 108 
In  another address  to another freshman class   in  another year   (Columbia 
University,   1975),  Peter  R.   Pouncey   (dean of  Columbia College)  gave   a 
balanced  view of history much like  that of the eighteenth-century 
Scottish  thinkers.     Pouncey said: 
We  are  all  captives   of  our past,  personal  and  collective.     Just 
as we often seem limited  and defined by  the expectations  others 
have had  of us,  so  society as a whole seems   limited  and defined 
by the expectations   for it which one generation   foists  on   to 
another. 
The past can,   If we allow,  become  a  retarding  force.   .   .   . 
However,  we  should  not   be   frightened   that   in  dealing  with 
the past,   it will act   on us deterministically,   imprinting  on 
our minds   .   .   .   its  outworn  ideas  and theories.   .   .   . 
What you are  asked  to do is  to follow  the progress of human 
intelligence  as   it  grapples with   changing  circumstances,  and as 
it  tries  to make sense of its world, shifting its presuppositions, 
reshaping  its  ideals  and from time to time   forming from its experi- 
ence some statement  of particular force  and  imaginative power,  so 
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that  instead of being merely an expression of   an age,   it seems 
to have a lasting validity,   and to speak cogently to us still.   09 
This   is   the attitude by which the eighteenth-century Scots hoped to 
elicit   a cogent   response  from history, while at  the  same  time maintain- 
ing a discriminating  respect  for Clio. 
In contradiction to  the  confusion of Hazard's  philosophes,  and 
the  confusion of Mercier,   Condorcet, Huxley and the American   "New Left," 
all  of whom equated   the real   (civilization) with  the   immediate  and   the 
now,   the  social scientists of  the  Scottisli Enlightenment  accepted  the 
duality   implicit  in  Brewster's  remarks,   and  applied  that  duality to  the 
study  of   the historical  and scientific development  of  society.     (See 
Chapter V and Appendix D for Burke and the  problem of   intermediate 
knowledge.) 
The notion  shared by  the writers of  the  Scottish Enlightenment 
of  a "conjectural" history   (including the   idea of  an  ideal primitive 
society)   and  "a kind   of cultural relativity" allowed  them to show  that 
eacli stage of history has  its merits and defects.     See  also,  Roy Harvey 
Pearce's work.   10    Pearce wrote:     "Thus  it was not  a matter of  the 
superiority of primitive  to civilized  life.     It was  a matter of  analyz- 
ing the  virtues and   defects, necessary in  the very scheme of  things, 
of a given  stage of  social evolution." Pearce's words on  the Scots 
touch  the  same chord  as Peter Pouncey's when   the  latter said,   in the 
same  speech  cited  above, 
.   .   .The past,   then, not merely tells us  its gloomy  story  of decline 
and  falls,  of society spinning   its web ever thicker  to strangle  it- 
self,   but it  also offers us   the  encouragement  and  confidence of  a 
tradition of intelligent  activity and   initiative, which takes  the 
materials of an age  and  an environment   and makes something positive 
out   of   them.I12 
The Scots  confirmed  the past without  denying  the present. 
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Hence,  the  Scottish writers were not exclusively primitivists  as 
Lois A.  Whitney had said. But,   as will be shown   immediately below, 
Burke had a heterogeneous  view of  the art vs.  nature  problem,   a complex 
view expressed   in   the many roles which man as  a social animal   adopted. 
The Scottish writers were,  on  the contrary,  "constrained to demonstrate, 
even when they were dissatisfied with  certain aspects of civilized  life, 
that   there was no question of  preferring savage   to  civilized   life." 
Pearce  cited   the  works   of   a number  of   prominent   Scottish  Enlightenment 
writers who held  this  two-edged  view—Dugaid  Stewart,  Adam Ferguson, 
John Gregory,   James  IXinbar, William Robertson115—and  three  figures, 
Lord Monboddo,  Hume,   and Adam Smith, who saw nothing whatsoever of 
worth  in primitive man. '-'■'     But  the   "most   important"11"  figures  Pearce 
considered  to be  those who  reconciled   the  savage virtues with   the great- 
ness  of   civilization  and  man  in  society.      Adam  Ferguson's  and   Dugald 
Stewart's positions   represent   the acceptance of  the reality of both 
historical evolution   (of  the various  stages of  civilized society)   and 
an  ideal, primitive   "Homeric" state of   "conjectural history." 
If we   take   the  ideal primitive   to be the   "moral" and  the 
civilized  to be the  "political," we have  an instance of  the  overlapping 
—but not  confusion—of the  "political  and moral angles   of vision," an 
attitude conducive  to  the balanced Scottisli methodology  described  above. 
But  Pearce described   the  "general methodology of  the Scottish writers" 
which Stewart   represented  in his   role  as   a  limited   primitivist:     the 
Scottish writers  ".   .   .   studied  and conjectured upon  the evolution of 
society;   and   they attempted   to analyse  the various   characteristics  of 
society  in each  of  its historical  stages  and   to relate   those characteristics 
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to  the  circumstances  in which they developed.     For most  of   the Scots 
this  led  to a   cultural—never an ethical—relativism, which,   in turn, 
enabled  them to perceive  the cause  and effect   relationship between  the 
good  and   the  bad in both primitive  and  civilized society." The 
"limited" primitivism of  the Scottish writers  might  be  looked upon as 
an   instance of   their distinction between moral  and natural knowledge, 
between  ideal primitive   and real historical,   between  art   and nature,   or 
between conjectural history   (using   the notion  of an   ideal  primitive 
state  in what  Kant called a  regulative, heuristic manner)   and  a cultural 
relativism combined with an evolutionary historical viewpoint. 
The   figure of John Millar,   the "notable historical sociologist," 
may serve as  a last   instance of the balanced Scottish methodology of 
combining art   and nature   and denying neither realm.     Millar held  the 
chair of  Civil   Law at Glasgow from  1761  to the  end of  the  century and 
i on 
beyond. Millar believed   in an evolutionary   "parallelism    by which 
different  societies go through  the  "same phases   or stages"  in their 
respective developments.     Millar as   "materialist" saw a Harringtonian- 
like  coincidence  between  certain  "property forms" and certain forms 
121 of government—the latter  "induced"  from the  former.   '       This half  of 
Millar would represent what might be   called Millar's  argument   from 
nature.     On the   other hand,   and  representing the   argument  from man or 
of  art  or of  civilization, Millar saw  "no   rigid evolutionary scheme," 
but,  as  the  "realist" was  "aware that   accident  can play an  important 
"19 9 
role  in historical events." The study of  the  science of  man  involved 
the attempt  to distinguish between the   forms, property and governmental, 
through which the evolutionary process expressed   itself,  and  the  "accidents" 
which were not  necessarily part  of natural  evolution. 
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The  "limited primitivism" of  the  Scottish writers  assumes,  with 
Burke,   the existence of a "concrete,   complex,  and moral" order,     3  as 
opposed,   for instance,  to  the   "moral calculus"  of Hutcheson.     But   the 
"limited primitivism" of  the writers  of  the  Scottish Enlightenment   still 
assumed,   in the  general eighteenth-century manner,   that  a science  of man 
was possible to a  certain extent,  a science which would   lead beyond 
relativism  (see  Appendix C). 
Burke  recognized   the   limited role of "accidents"  in history.     In 
November of   1792,  he vrote: 
.   .   .   we may be looking   in vain in the   regions of politics 
for what is  only the operation of   temper  and character upon 
accidential circumstances.     But I never  knew accidents  to decide 
the whole   (Burke's emphasis]   of any great business.   .   .   ."* 
But   it   is his   first  "Letter on   a Regicide Peace"   (1796) ,   that  Burke wrote 
as if he had absorbed  the  teachings of  Millar and the  inquiries  of   some 
of  the other Scottish social scientists.     Burke, while  recognizing the 
fickleness  of history and  the  sometimes disingenuous  causes  of great 
events,   sees   this   as  not   a hindrance   to   the   scientific  study  of   society 
or of history, but  as part  of  the necessary   "concrete,   complex and 
moral"   order  with  which  such  a   study must   contend. 
It  is  impossible  to convey Burke's  comprehensive and balanced 
view of  the outlines of history   itself—as  a  part  of  the  concrete, 
complex and moral world—of history's  "accidents" and of history's 
substantial   (predictable)   structural   reality,   and  of   the  degree   of 
preciseness with which man can know this history—it  is  impossible  to 
convey Burke's views on this  subject without extracting a considerable 
chunk of  his   first   "Letter on a  Regicide Peace."    An appeal can  only be 
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made   to the   reader's  patience by way  of yet  another citation,  this one 
from William Hazlitt's   famous warning  to would-be students  of Burke that, 
in order to  fully understand Burke nothing  less  than  the whole  corpus  of 
Burke's works must be  read.     The  following   is merely one page of   that 
body, but  a representative page.     Burke wrote  in 1796: 
.   .   .  Not  to lose  ourselves   in  the   infinite void  of  the   conjectural 
world,  our business  is with what   is  likely to be  affected,   for the 
better or  for  the worse, by the wisdom or weakness  of our plans.     In 
all speculations  upon men  and human affairs,   it   is  of no small moment 
to distinguish things of  accident   from permanent  causes,  and   from 
effects   that  cannot be altered.     It   is not every irregularity  in our 
movement   that is  a total deviation   from our course.     I  am not  quite 
of   the mind  of  those  speculators who seem assured  that  necessarily, 
and  by the  constitution of  things,   all states have  the  same periods 
of  infancy,  manhood,   and decrepitude that  are   found  in  the individuals 
who compose  them.     Parallels of   this sort  rather  furnish similitudes 
to illustrate or to adorn  than supply analogies  from whence  to  reason. 
The objects which  are attempted  to be  forced   into an analogy are not 
found   in  the same   class of  existence.     Individuals  are physical beings, 
subject  to  laws universal  and  invariable.     The   immediate   cause   acting 
in  these  laws may be obscure:     the   general  results  are subjects of 
certain   calculation.      But   commonwealths   are  not  physical,  but   moral 
essences.     They are  artificial   combinations,   and,   in   their proximate 
efficient   cause,   the  arbitrary productions  of   the human mind.     We  are 
not yet   acquainted with the   laws which necessarily  influence  the 
stability of  that  kind of work made by that  kind of  agent.     There 
is not  in the physical order   (with which  they do not  appear to hold 
any assignable connection)   a distinct cause by which any of those 
fabrics must necessarily grow,  flourish or decay;  nor,   in my opinion, 
does   the moral world produce  anything more determinate on  that   subject 
than what may serve  as an amusement   (liberal,   indeed,  and  ingenious, 
but still only an amusement)   for speculative man.     I  doubt whether 
the history  of mankind is yet  complete enough,  if ever it   can be so, 
to furnish grounds   for a sure  theory on  the  internal  causes which 
necessarily  affect  the  fortune of  a  state.     I am far from denying 
the operation of  such  causes;  but  they are  infinitely uncertain,   and 
much  more  obscure,   and  much  more  difficult   to   trace   [but   not   impossi- 
ble  to trace,  Burke  seems  to be  saying],   than   the  foreign  causes  that 
tend  to  raise,  to depress,  and sometimes  to overwhelm community. 
It   is often impossible,   in   these  political  inquiries,   to find any 
proportion  between  the apparent force of  any moral   causes we may 
assign and  their known operation.     We are  therefore obliged   to deliver 
up  that operation to mere chance,  or, more  piously,   (perhaps more 
rationally) ,   to the occasional  interposition and  irresistable hand 
of the Great  Disposer.   .   .   . 
[Regarding the unexplained  rise   and fall of nations,  Burke contin- 
ued:]   .   .   .All this has happened without  any apparent previous  change 
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in   the general  circumstances which had brought on   their distress. 
The death of a man at  a critical  juncture, his  retreat,  his dis- 
grace, have brought   innumerable  calamities on a    whole nation.     A 
common soldier,   a child,  a girl at   the door of  an  inn,  have changed 
the  face  of  fortune,   and  almost  of  Nature. 
Such, and often influenced by such causes, has commonly been the 
fate of monarchies of long duration. They have their ebbs and their 
flows.   .   .   . 
Difficult   indeed  is our situation.     In all situations of  diffi- 
culty  [men can shape events  rather  than allowing events   to shape  them], 
men will be   influenced   in   the past  they   take,  not only by  the  reason 
of   the case,  but  by the  peculiar  turn of  their own  character.   .   .   . 
. . .If we command our wealth, we shall be rich and free; if our 
wealth commands us, we are poor indeed.   .   .   .[emphases  added] 
This passage could be  interpreted as  a rebuttal against   the   radical  social 
scientists  in France   (such as d'Holbach,  Helvetius, Turgot,   Condorcet, 
etc.)   and a qualified,   cautious  yea-saying  to the moderate  social scien- 
tists of   the Scottish Enlightenment.     However that may be,  the bare out- 
lines of   Burke's notion of history become visible here.     Just  as  the 
historian or social scientist  should be  able  to discern  the  accidential 
from the   substantial within historical   development,   so  the  statesman 
contending with  the present   crisis  of  the  Revolution   in France,  should 
distinguish between  the substantial   "wealth"  of  the nation   (wealth  is 
used here  by Burke  in  its broadest sense—that  is,  Britain as  having  a 
wealthy,   or healthy,   political  tradition and   condition)   and  the  accident 
of history which  the upheaval  in  France   represents. Burke  opposed 
both a rigid evolutionary or cyclical determinism,   and history   as arbi- 
trary,  reasonless catalogue  of  accidents.     Burke  looked  to an ever- 
increasing  knowledge   of   the   structure  of   historical   development,  while 
avoiding  a  sceptical view of history as  the  playground of  arbitrary 
accident. 
Burke's distinction between "change  and reformation,"  implies   a 
critical use of  the judgement as necessary  in  order  to recognize  and 
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analyze  the  distinction.    The  "essential" must be sifted out   from the 
"accidential,       '   the  spontaneous   "novelty" of  change  reflecting the 
passing public fashions  and passions  of  the moment   from positive,   and 
genuinely progressive,   reform.     Burke wrote of  the "French Revolution- 
ists" in his   "Letter  to a Noble  Lord"   (1796) : 
.   .   .1  know that  there is   a manifest,  marked distinction, which 
ill men with  ill designs,   or weak men   incapable of any design 
[emphasis  added] will constantly be  confounding,  -that  is,  a 
marked distinction between change and  reformation.     The   former 
alters   the substance of  the objects themselves  and gets  rid of 
all their essential good  as well as of   all   the accidential evil 
annexed   to them.     Change   is novelty.   .   .   .Reform is not  a change 
in  the  substance  or  in the  primary modification of   the object, 
but  a direct   application of  a remedy  to  the grievance  complained 
of.   .   .   . 128 
Burke wrote  in the  "Reflections" of   the English policy of  an  "entailed 
inheritance" of  constitutional   liberties ".    .   .derived  to us  from our 
forefathers,   and  to be   transmitted  to our posterity.   .   .   .By  this means 
our Constitution preserves unity in so great  a diversity of  its 
parts.   .   .   . "*29    When Burke said that such a policy was  the  "result   of 
profound reflection—or rather  the  happy effect of following nature 
(which  is wisdom without   reflection,   and above   it, he  is setting 
against   it  the  "spirit  of   innovation" or of   change.     Such a spirit 
substantially  and  therefore wrongly alters   the  object which  it  aims   to 
improve,   instead of  improving  the object itself   (or,  in Vincent Luizzi's 
scheme,   Burke here   represents  the  "argument   from nature").     True 
reformation does    not necessarily follow nature,  but does  respect  its 
autonomy   (that   is,   the autonomy of both phenomenal nature  and of man as 
a creature of nature with  a history)   and seeks  to learn  from  it—after 
the active Kantian fashion—here,   to improve  the   constitution by com- 
bining the best  of  the old with  the  givens of   the present,   or,  as 
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Burke said in  the  "Reflections":   ".   .   .the  same plan of  conforming  to 
nature  in our artificial  institutions" which constitutes   "this idea 
131 of  a  liberal descent.   ..." Burke  continued  in  the  "Reflections" 
and wrote that   innovation, which did not   follow Nature: 
.   .   . is generally  the  result  of a selfish  temper and  confined 
views   [These words  seem to coincide with Burke's  strictures 
(see Chapter IV.   p.   98,     n.   112)against  the monists who  confuse 
vice  and virtue, seeing  them as defined  only in relation  to one 
another,  rather  than as positive moral ends  in  themselves.     The 
common eighteenth-century equation of  private vice  and  public 
virtue   (Mandeville) ,  or  private  interest with  the public good 
(Hutcheson,   Bentham,  the  classical  economists),   represents   the 
same confusion of monism.     See  infra.,   Chapter  IV,   p.   93, n.   111]. 
People will not  look forward   to posterity who never look backward 
to  their ancestors.     Besides,   the people of  England well know that 
the   idea of   inheritance   furnishes   a sure principle  of  conservation, 
and  a sure principle of   transmission, without   at  all excluding a 
principle of   improvement.     It   leaves acquisition  free;  but  it 
secures what   it   acquires.   ...     By a constitutional policy working 
after the pattern  of Mature, we  receive, we hold, we transmit our 
government and  our privileges,   in  the same manner  in which we enjoy 
and  transmit  our property and  our  lives.   .   .   .     Our political 
system  is placed   in a  just correspondance  and  symmetry with the 
order of  the world,  and  with  the mode  of existence  decreed  to a 
permanent body  composed  of transitory parts   [we  are   following  the 
form of nature,  not  its  substance or  its minute mechanical workings], 
wherein,  by   the   disposition  of   a  stupendous  wisdom,   moulding  together 
the  great mysterious   incorporation of  the human   race,   the whole  at 
one  time  is never old or middle-aged or young, but   in  a condition of 
unchangeable  constancy, moves on   through   the varied   tenor of perpetual 
decay,   fall,   renovation,   and progression.     Thus,  by preserving  the 
method  of Nature   in the  conduct  of   [emphasis added]   the  state,   in 
what we  improve we  are never wholly new,   in what we retain, we  are 
never wholly obsolete.   .   .   . 
Not  only does reformation,  as   distinguished   from change,  not  alter substan- 
tially the reality and autonomy of nature   (see supra.,  p.   50)—and in  this 
way does,   so to speak,  serve nature or makes  the  "argument  from nature' 
—but   it  states  the  "argument   from man".     This   is so because  the end of 
imitating the  "method of Nature" is   to  combine   the stability of a 
received   institution with the  continual   improvements  of   the state.     Burke s 
views on  this particular point  are expressed  in the  following passage 
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from the  "Reflections": 
That   he may obtain justice,  he gives up his   right  of   determining 
what   is in point  the most essential  to him.     That he may secure 
some   liberty,  he makes  a surrender  in  trust   of  the whole of  it 
.   .   .    .natural   rights   .   .   .   their abstract perfection  is  their 
practical defect. 
Burke   respects Nature  and natural rights so  that man may be able  to 
carry  forward substantial  improvements upon substantial  realities. 
In her recent  study of  "Burke,   Freud  and   the Gothic," Pamela 
Kaufmann  saw Burke  as  an anti-romanticist  in his use of  reason as  a 
brake  on or as a guide for the unpredictable   instincts. Just   as 
reform,   unlike  change,  does not alter the substance of  the  objects   to 
be  redirected,  so Burke's   critical  reason and judgement  guides   the 
instincts   in a Madisonian-like manner without  distorting  the  instincts. 
Kaufmann   compared  Burke's   reason with Freud's notion of  "civilization". 
Both notions   represent,  so to speak,  both nature  and art,   or,   the  inertia 
of history  on the  one hand,   and human  freedom on  the other   (much like 
Burke's notion of   the   "refracted  rays" of natural  rights entering 
society* In  his   Civilization  and   Its  Discontents   (1929),   Freud, 
.   .   .   muses upon the price man has  to pay   to society  in  exchange 
for the  social  and  cultural advantages  of   civilization—'civili- 
zation  alternately   limits  and prohibits  instinctual satisfaction 
.   .   .Wisdom is   comprised of   lowering our expectations  of   life,   of 
accepting human   limitations,   of   finding sublimations  for the 
instincts, or of  repressing or controlling   them.     It means  "quiet 
happiness"'   [Burke used  a similar phrase  to  correctly characterize 
the  philosophical assumptions  of Newton's   "mathematical way".     See 
Appendix  A].     Yet   in our heart  of hearts our  atavistic natures still 
cherish   that uninhibited wild  impulse—gratification which we 
secretly call  pleasure.     Our Ego   [Burke's   reason]   keeps   our  instincts 
in   line,   and  at best  gives   them token opportunities for expression, 
little by  little and  always   controlled.   ... 
Although   the   "quiet happiness"  of wisdom entails  acceptance   of  human 
limitations,   wisdom is not necessarily "following nature",  but   is 
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accepting the  reality of nature   (phenomenal/empirical   and historical) 
and of  using it as  a fulcrum to discover human  limitations.     There- 
fore,  Freud's   civilization and Burke's   "Ego  (reason]" are,   to use 
Luizzi's phrases,   "arguments  from man" rather than  "arguments  from 
nature".   "       Further,   they are,   to keep  the  analogy,  arguments  from 
individual man—Kaufmann wrote:     "Both Burke  and Freud  agree that   the 
fundamental human desire  is  to live,   and  to  live  as  individuals  as 
opposed  to living as a species," and,   as opposed   to  the  "Gothic 
fantasy" which  "deals with   today's  helpless   individual   (the weak hero 
or heroine)   overwhelmed by his  alien world of existential  absurdity." 
Another application  of Burke's notion of art  and reflective 
reason  as man's  nature   is  his double-edged notion  of actual  and virtual 
representation.     Actual representation  represents,   in  the  terms used 
above,   an argument   from nature, or,  a  respect  for  the substance of  the 
object, whether   that   object be a given of phenomenal  or historical 
reality.     The notion  of virtual  representation, on  the  other hand, 
represents  the  argument  from man, of  reason's ascendence  over  the 
instincts  and over the  inertia of  tradition   (the  latter  two dovetail- 
ing  in  the Romanticist,  Gothic  fantasies of  the felt  past).     Hanna 
Fenichel   Pitkin wrote  of  Burke's notions  of  a double-edged  representation 
in  a 1967   study.^*    Stanley N.  Katz wrote  in a review-essay of Pitkin's 
book that   she noted   the  formalistic sense  of  representation: 
One  is  authorization,   in which the   representative   is  specifically 
empowered  to  act   for his  constituents,   and  the  other  is accountability, 
in which the   representative  is held  to account   for his actions.   .   .   . 
[In natural  law terminology,     authorization would perform a prescrip- 
tive  role, while  the  role  of  accountability would be  a descriptive 
one.]   .   .   .Mrs.   Pitkin discovers   a multi-faceted   conception of 
representation  in Burke's writings:     elite representations of  the 
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nation,   and botli  actual and virtual  representation of  the constitu- 
encies.     She shows how Burke made  sense of these seemingly contra- 
dictory versions of  representation by arguing that  the legislative 
process   requires both  the careful   deliberation  characteristic of  an 
elite and   the accurate reflection of popular feelings  provided by 
the presence of   interested representatives.     Thus  for Burke the 
ancient method of   representation  could be synthesized with the 
concept  of   interest   representation  for the good of  the nation  as 
a whole.142 
David  Kettler's description of  Ferguson's ideal statesman  is 
similar to the  Burke who   refused  to characterize  the maintainence of 
either permanence or of   change as  the exclusive purpose  of  the constitu- 
tion or of  the state  operations 
Ferguson's kind of   thought also puzzles   those who like  to  classify 
political thinkers  according  to sO-called   'ideological'  patterns. 
Ferguson  supports  existing governments  in almost all situations; 
he  is  sceptical if not hostile  towards   [sic]  projects   for reform; 
he believes   that  real  changes  come  gradually and by degrees; he 
fears  the masses   in  commercial societies;  he  seeks  to secure 
property and privileges  as obstacles   to political despotism;  and 
he worries  constantly about national spirit and  threats of moral 
decay.      But   lie will  not   repose   quietly  within  a   'conservative'   clas- 
sification  of  the   conventional  sort.     Not  the inevitability of war 
nor even  its social  utility authorizes  the moral theorist   to stop 
looking  for peace.     Real  change may be gradual, but  revolution 
cannot  be  excluded:     Ferguson's  arguments  are primarily designed 
to show that wild   fears  and hopes both misjudge  the possible 
consequences  of such events.   ... 
In the same pages of  Ferguson's Essay on   the History of Civil Society 
which Burke had  cited   in his book review,  but which he did  not  cite 
directly   (for  reasons  of  space no doubt) ,   Ferguson wrote of  the  specific 
need  of   recognizing,  as part  of a complex human nature,   the  presence of 
both  permanence   and  change,   tradition and  reform in  the nature  of man 
and  society.     Ferguson wrote: 
At  once  obstinate  and   fickle,  he complains of  innovations,   and is 
never sated with novelty.     He is  perpetually busied   in  reformations, 
and is  continually wedded  to his errors.     If he dwell  in a cave, he 
would  improve  it  into a cottage;   if he has  already built, he would 
still build  to a greater extent.     But  he does not propose  to make 
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rapid and hasty  transitions; his  steps are progressive  and slow; 
and his  force,   like the power of a spring,  silently presses on 
every  resistance;  an effect   is sometimes  produced before  the 
cause  is perceived;   and with all his talent   for projects, his 
work is  often accomplished before  the plan  is   devised.     It appears, 
perhaps, equally difficult   to retard or to quicken his  pace;   if 
the projector  complain he  is   tardy,   the moralist   thinks him unstable; 
and whether his motions  be rapid  or slow,   the  scenes of human  affairs 
perpetually change   in  his management;  his  emblem is   a passing stream, 
not   a stagnating pool.     We may desire  to direct  his   love  of  improve- 
ment  to  its proper object, we may wish  for stability of   conduct; 
but we mistake human nature,   if we wish   for a termination of  labour, 
or a scene  of  repose. 144 
Ferguson here  is echoed  in  Burke's words   in the   "Peflections":     "...   A 
disposition to preserve,  and  an  ability  to  improve,   taken together, would 
be my  standard of   a statesman.     Everything else  is vulgar   in   the  concep- 
tion,  perilous   in   the execution.   ..."     J    That  Burke might have  gotten 
his  comprehensive view of   the  complex nature  of man  and society,  and 
man as not merely serving,   but  actively participating,   in   the moral order, 
that  Burke saw the need   for both permanence  and  change,   reform and   tradi- 
tion,   and might have  gotten   this view from a  reading of  the natural  law 
tradition is remotely possible.     The possibility   that  the   origins  of 
Burke'S  thought here  are partially the  influence of   the prominent 
"sociologists" and moral philosophers  of   the eighteenth  century Scottish 
Enlightenment   is   less   than remote,   in  terms of intellectual  content, 
and of physical  and   temporal  proximity. 
The  refusal  of Burke  and  Ferguson  to separate  art  and nature, 
coincides with the classicist Goethe's praise of Kant's  reconciliation 
of art   and nature  of morality  and   freedom witli nature  and necessity   in 
the latter's  Critique  of Judgment   (1790).     Goethe was similar  to Fichte 
in rejecting Kant's  unknowable noumenal   thing-in-itself,  and Goethe 
assumed  the   immanence  of the divine within   the world,  while Kant believed 
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in  the transcendence and   immanence of   the  divine  in relation  to  the 
world. Goethe  also believed,   in  opposition to Kant's notions,  of 
the possibility of man's knowledge of   the   immanent   in  the world.     Goethe 
believed in  the possibility  of  an  "intellectual  intuition" of   transcend- 
ent   (or rather,   immanent)   values, of   the   "inner  creative nature" of   the 
knowledge process. Goethe nevertheless  declared  that he owed  to 
Kant   "a most highly   joyous  era of life" for reconciling  art  and 
nature  in the  Critique   of Judgment.     For Goethe,   it was  "'an exceeding 
great  deed   .   .   .   that Kant  placed art  and nature  in his Critique of 
Judgment  side by side'   so  that   they could   'illuminate  each other"      ' 
The     exceeding  great  deed"  of  Kant   in  his   3rd  Critique   that   "occupied 
Goethe  constantly" was  that 
.   .   .   'art  and  products   of nature'   are  seen here as  interrelated. 
'A work  of art  should be   treated   like   a work of nature  and a 
work of nature   treated  like  a work of   art,  and  the value of  each 
should be developed out  of  itself  and  subjected  to  the same power 
of  judgement. '"1->U 
In Goethe's view,   the judgement  seems   to perform more of an  underwriting 
or a descriptive  function  in  the  outlining  of the   realm of nature 
(necessity)   and  the   realm of   art   (freedom,  morality)   and  their  inter- 
penetration,   or rather,   their  fusion with one another.     Kant's 
distinction of   the  "reflective judgement's   a priori regulative  concept 
of  the  purposiveness  of Nature  serves as  a  connecting link between  the 
domain of   the   concept  of  Nature on the one  hand,  and  the domain of   the 
concept  of   freedom on   the   other."1 Nature   and  art   remain   apart   and 
retain their  identities  and,  the judgement   is more  than a  catalyst   or 
umpire  overseeing and describing the  connection between  the  two  realms. 
The judgement  constitutes neither nature nor morality,     ' yet  is 
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inherently  that part  of both which serves to bring  them together.     The 
essential  agreement  among  Burke,  Ferguson and   the eighteenth-century 
classical   tradition  as   represented by Goethe  regarding  the   "art-vs.- 
nature" problem,  supports Henry V.   S.   Ogden's view of  the  age  as 




^John  Plamenatz,   Man  and Society.   A Critical Examination of 
Some   Important  Social and Political Theories  from Machiavelli   to Marx, 
(London:     Longmans,   1963), p.   55. 
•'Ibid.,   p.   66.     See   Appendix  D  for   the  similarity  between   the 
Burkean  and Kantian  approacli  to a complex  reality,   and  Appendix A,   esp. 
p.   34.     For the similarity between Burke   and  Kant  and  Rend,  regarding 
the  epistemology based upon  the  complex  reality  (an epistemology which 
assumes   in both  cases  a  "complex act  of perception"),  see Appendix  D. 
3In his  "Thoughts   on  French Affairs"   (1791),  Burke   "pointed 
out   that  the  French  Revolution was unlike  any previous  political change 
in Europe.     He  likened it  only to the Protestant   Reformation,  for   'it 
is  a  revolution,'  he  said,   'of  doctrine  and   theoretic  dogma.   [Burke 
predicted what   is  called  nowadays,   the exportation of revolution.]     It 
has   a much greater  resemblance  to those  changes whicli have been made 
upon  religious  grounds,  in which a spirit   of   proselytism makes  an 
essential part,'   and   its principle  is such  as   'by its essence could not 
be  local  or  confined   to the   country  in which  it had its  origin.'     Burke, 
cited   in Perez Zagorin,  "Prolegomena to the  Comparative History  of 
Revolution   in  Early  Modern   Europe,"   Comparative  Studies   in   Society  and 
History,  Vol.   18, No.   2   (April,   1976),  155.     See also,   (Burke), Writings 
and   Speeches   of   Edmund   Burke,   Beaconsfield  Edition   (Boston:     Little, 
Brown   and Company,   1901),   IV,  pp.   3-55.     In  his second  "Letter on a 
Regicide Peace"   (1795/96),   Burke wrote of   the  French Directory:     "What 
now stands  as  government  in  France  is struck out as a beast.     The design 
is  wicked,   immoral,   impious,   oppressive;  but   it   is  spirited   and  daring 
..."   [emphasis  added].     (Burke),   ibid.,   V,   p.   375.     Gerald Chapman 
wrote:     "Burke was  probably  the   first man   in  history ever to grasp, 
certainly the   first   to give   cogent expression  to,  the  idea of  revolu- 
tionary  liberalism as  a cultus   (a view commonly recognized since)." 
Gerald W.   Chapman,  Edmund Burke.   The Practical  Imagination   (Cambridge, 
Mass.:     Harvard University Press,   1967),  p.   227.     It  is not  unlikely 
that  Burke's view of  the French Revolution  as   reflective of  certain 
constant   springs   in human nature  itself,  and  the Revolution  as  a prel- 
ude  to  a broader development   in  the history of  human society—that 
Burke's views here were  influenced  to an extent by his readings  of the 
Scottish  "sociological historians" and social  scientists.      (See p. 25, 
Chap.   III). 
*For  the  "Vindication," see Works.     Burke elsewhere wrote of 
Bolingbroke  as   "a presumptuous  and superficial writer."    Writing  and 
Speeches   (Boston:     Little,  Brown and Company,   1901),   III,  p.   398.     On 
the  "vindication" as   irony,   see:    Murray N.   Rothbard,  "A Note on Burke's 
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'Vindication  of  Natural Society,'" Journal of  the History of Ideas, 
Vol.   XIX, No.   1   (January,   1958),  pp.   114-118,   and John  C.   Weston,  Jr., 
"The  Ironic Purpose of Burke's   'Vindication'   Vindicated," Journal of 
the  History of  Ideas,  Vol.   XIX, No.   3   (June,   1958),  pp.   435-441. 
5Peter J.   Stanlis,   ed.,  intro.,  Edmund Burke:    Selected writings 




9(Burke)   Writings  & Speeches   (Boston:  Little,  Brown  and  Co., 
1901),   I,  p.   5. 
10 Ibid. ,  p.   6. 
Ibid.,   I,  pp.   5-6.     David Cameron recently wrote:     ".   .   .   The 
evidence suggests   that Edmund Burke,   and Jean-Jacques  Rousseau  as well, 
were  attacking the  apparently  imperial ambitions of the  rational  faculty, 
and not reason's  busy activity within what  they regarded  as   its  proper 
province."    David Cameron,  The Social Thought of Rousseau and  Burke. A 
Comparative  Study,   (Toronto:     University of Toronto Press,  1973),  p.   37. 
l^Ibid. ,   p.   5.     One  is put   in mind of Augustine Birrell's  charac- 
terization of   the  "Via Media" of  Anglicanism as  "after all   ...   a blind 
alley,   leading nowhere."    The Via Media represented  for Birrell a credu- 
lous creed of  compromise.     This  is  in contradistinction to Cardinal New- 
man's   ratiocination which  "is  the great principle  of  order in   thinking: 
it  reduces  a  chaos   into harmony,   it  catalogues the  accumulations of  know- 
ledge."    Augustine Birrell,   "The Via Media," in Birrell, Obiter Dicta, 
First  Series   (New York:     Charles Scribner's  Sons,   1894), pp.   178-199, 
p.   179).     "Though  it does not   go so  far as  to ascertain  truth;   still, 
it   teaches us  the direction in which  truth   lies,  and how propositions 
lie towards each other."  (Ibid.,  pp.   179-180.)     According to at   least 
one author  (Giorgio Tonelli),   this  is explicitly the method of  Kant's 
philosophy  and  the  thought  of   the Enlightenment   in general.     See Giorgio 
Tonelli,   "The   'Weakness'   of Reason  in  the Age of Enlightenment," Diderot 
Studies, Vol.   XIV   (1971),  pp.   217-232.     But   the   "Englishman's  creed  is 
compromise" and  "looks  for safety in  our opinions,"  opinions which do 
not demand   logic,  or,   in Burke's words,   "solid  and  conclusive arguments," 
but which,  on  the contrary,  are  the  "paradoxical   opinions" supported by 
the  "common  auditory."    Birrell echoed Burke when the  former wrote: 
"But  talk as we may,   for  the bulk of mankind  it will always  remain true 
that a  truth does not exclude  its  contradictory   .   .   .   the too  apparent 
absurdity of  this  is pressed home when the baffled illogician,   persecuted 
in one  position,   flees  into  another   .   .   .   (Ibid.,  p.   181),  and  selects 
his next  opinion  "in  the same  fashion  as  ladies  are  reported,   I  dare 
say    quite falsely,   to do their afternoon shopping—this  thing because 
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it is  so pretty and   that  thing because   it   is  so cheap"(Ibid.,  p.   191). 
Burke thought Bolingbroke's rationalism too cheap  and the nature-worship 
of Hobbes   (a malevolent nature)   and Rousseau   (a benevolent nature)   too 
pretty and   simple to account  for the  complex and heterogeneous  nature 
of man. 
It was the   thesis of Donald Greene's   1971 essay on the Via Media 
of eighteenth-century Anglicanism,  that  this  form of Christianity "is  to 
be taken seriously  as  a highly  important  force in  the social and intellec- 
tual history of England in the eighteenth century"   (Donald Greene,   "The 
Via Media in an Age  of  Revolution:    Anglicanism in   the  18th Century,"  in 
The Varied  Pattern:     Studies  in  the  18th Century,  Eds.,  Peter Hughes  and 
David Williams,   [Toronto:    A.  M.   Hakkert,  Ltd.,   1971],   pp.   301-302). 
Greene noted   that  latitudinarianism within  the Anglican Church was  a sign 
of strength,  not of weakness, of  the  faith.     But Victorian historians who 
played the   "baffled   illof>icians"    gave  a doctrinal significance to  the 
terms,   "latitudinarian," when  in   fact  the  terra has not,   and did not have 
in the  eighteenth century,   any such significance   (Ibid.,  p.   312).     Such 
historians  used  until   recently such an   interpretation of eighteenth- 
century Anglican latitudinarianism in order  to support  their subjective/ 
negative views of  the  general  laxity—doctrinal and  personal—or the 
"worldliness" and "venality of  eighteenth-century   [Anglican]  prelates" 
(Ibid.,   p.   303).     Some historians have  seen Anglican divines  flirting with 
the traditionally supposed English heresy, Pelagianism, when the   latter 
supposedly  "reject the Augustinian doctrine of original  sin,  as  stated  in 
Article   IX of   the Anglican  church   (Ibid., p.   311).     "From a    rejection of 
Article   IX  follows   [in  the   latter-day historians'  minds]   a rejection of 
Articles XI   to XIV, which state  the doctrine of justification by  faith 
alone and  deny  the doctrine  of justification by works"   (Ibid.,  p.   312). 
But, more  to the point  liere,   latitudinarianism was supposed by one  of  the 
historians who "disturbed" Greene,   Ronald Cranes,   to have been  the  impetus 
of  "the popular triumph of   'sentimentalism'   toward   1750."    Sentimentalism 
stemmed  from,   in Crane's view,   "'the combined  influence of numerous 
Anglican divines of   the  Latitudinarian  tradition, who from the Restoration 
onward  into  the eighteenth  century had preached   .   .   .   essentially  the 
same ethics  of benevolence,  good nature.   .   .   (Ibid.,   p.   310).     Greene 
then pointed   to  the  resemblance between  this supposed representative 
Anglican  latitudinarian   thought   to  the  thought   of Shaftesbury, but  citing, 
on  the way,   the "sturdy Anglican  Samuel Johnson's  scathing  comment on  the 
Shafteburian  philosopher" in Johnson's  Rasselas   (Ibid., p.   311).     Johnson 
then, and   the  poet W.   H.   Auden in   this century,  are more  representative  of 
Anglican doctrine as preached  and practiced in  the eighteenth century. 
These are  those Anglicans who could be  latitudinarians, but   turn away  from 
the vague,  confused and   lazy naturalism of  the  Shafteburian philosophy. 
Greene cited  Auden's   lines:     '"You shall   love your crooked neighbor/With 
your crooked heart'" as  parallel  to  the  "orthodox Anglican attitude, 
throughout  the  century,   as earlier  in Donne and Herbert"  (Ibid.,  p.   312). 
Only the  Shaftesburian would be pleased at  the  alteration of Auden's 
lines:    "The moment you alter it to   'You  should  love your crooked neighbor 
with your  intrinsically pretty admirable  and meritorious heart,'  you are 
in  a different   and highly dangerous world,  as not only every Anglican 
clergyman,  but  every  intelligent Anglican   layman of   the   (eighteenth) 
century brought  up on  the Book of Common Prayer, was well aware"   (Idem). 
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This  shared  culture  of  the eighteenth-century English did  not   assume  a 
pretty and simple or "admirable and meritorious" human nature.     Rather, 
it   could  live  comfortably with the realization  that,   in  Birrell's words, 
"a truth  does not exclude  its  contradictory";   they keep  to  a latitudi- 
narian faith without  succumbing   to  the self-sufficiency or self-absorp- 
tion of  the Pelagian heresy,  or  that heresy's variant,   the   Shaftesburian 
ethic and view of a simple benevolent human nature and moral order  (or 
rather moral  confusion).     See  infra.,  Chapter IV, p.   96 et  passim,   for 
Burke's strictures  against  the Shaftesburian  philosophy. 
JIt   is  perhaps not   too  far-fetched  to say that  Burke's   animus 
here  toward Bolingbroke 's  confusion of  art  and nature,   reflects  Burke's 
attacks upon  that ethical  confusion between virtue and vice which  Burke 
found in Rousseau  (see   infra,   Chapter IV,  p.102 et  passim).     Further, 
Burke's  1769 pamphlet  defending  the Rockingham Whigs,  his   "Observations 
on   'The Present  State of  the Nation,'"  represents   an  attack on  that 
political  confusion which characterized  Bolingbroke's   thoughts  on  parties. 
Issac Kramnick wrote  of the views   of  the sceptic,  Sir William Temple,  who 
equated party with devisive   factionalism.     Kramnick wrote:     "'Nothing 
besides  the  uniting of parties  upon  one  common bottom  can  save  a state 
in  a pempestuous  season.'     Temple   is much closer here   to what would  be 
Bolingbroke's  attack  on  parties   [Bolingbroke's  famous   "Patriot King"] 
than he is   to Burke's  defense."     Issac Kramnick,  Skepticism   in English 
Political Thought:     From Temple   to Burke,"  Studies   in  Burke  and His Time, 
Vol.   XII, No.   1   (Whole No.   39)   (Fall,   1970),  pp.   1649-1650.     For a general 
historical background,  see Henry V.   S.  Ogden,   "The Rejection  of   the Antith- 
esis  of Nature and Art   in English Political Writings,   1760-1800," Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of  Chicago,   1936. 
[Burke],  Review of Essay on the History  of   Civil  Society,  by 
Adam  Ferguson  in The  Annual Register   .   .   .   For  the Year  1767,   4th Edition, 
(London:    .T.   Dodsley,   1784),   pp.   307-316. 
See Gladys  Bryson,  Man  and  Society.     The  Scottish   Inquiry of  the 
Eighteenth Century,   (Princeton:     Princeton University Press,   1945). 
For  Ferguson,   see:    John  Small,  "Biographical  Sketch  of Adam Fer- 
guson ," Tj^njacjj£ns_oJ_tJie_Royjy;_^ Vol.   XXIII   (1864), 
pp.   599-665.     See  Hugh Trevor-Roper,   "The Scottish Enlightenment,"  Studies 
on Voltaire   and  the  Eighteenth  Century   (Transactions of   the  Second  interna- 
tional   congress  on  the  Enlightenment   IV), Vol.   LVIII   (1967),   1635-1658. 
Trevor-Roper referred   to  the particular "social  character" of  Scottish 
thought   in the later eighteenth  century  (Ibid.,  p.   1640),  of   the   figures 
of Hume,  Ferguson,  Adam Smith,   Francis Hutcheson, William Robertson,  John 
Millar,   among   others,   who were   all   "so  preoccupied  with   the   problem  of 
social   change"   (idem)   and "of  the new science of sociology,   that  peculiar 
contribution  of  the Scottish Englightenment.   .   .   ."   (Ibid.,   pp.   1655-1656.) 
Some  of   the recent work on the  Scottish  sociologists  and historians 
of  the  Scottish Enlightenment   includes the following:     Roy Pascal,   "Property 
and Society:     The  Scottish Historical School  of   the Eighteenth Century," 
The Modern Quarterly,  Vol.   I   (1938),   pp.   167-179;   R.   L.   Meek,   "The   Scottish 
Contribution  to Marxist  Sociology,"  in Economics  and  Ideology   (London:   1967), 
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pp.   34-50;  A.   C.  Macfie,  The Individual   in Society:     Papers  on Adam 
Smith   (London:     1967);  Duncan Forbes,   "'Scientific Whiggism':     Adam 
Smith and John Millar," Cambridge Journal, Vol.   VII   (1953-1954),  pp. 
643-670; William C.   Lehmann, Adam Ferguson  and   the Beginnings  of Modern 
Sociology,   (N.Y.:     1930),   and by the  same   author:     John Millar of Glasgow, 
1735-1801,   (Cambridge:     Cambridge University Press,   1960),  espec.   Chapter X 
"Eighteenth-Century Scottish Thought," and  also by Lehmann, Henry Homes , 
Lord Kames,   and  the   Scottish Enlightenment:    A Study  in National   Character 
and   in  the History of  Ideas,   (The Hague:     Martinus Nijhoff,   1971). 
See  also:    Andrew Skinner,   "Economics  and History—The  Scottish 
Enlightenment,"  Scottish Journal of  Political Economy, Vol.   XII   (1965), 
1-22,   and  Skinner,  "Natural History   in  the Age  of Adam Smith," Political 
Studies,  Vol.   XV  (1967),   32-48, and Lastly,  Skinner's  Introduction  to Parts 
I-III  of Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations   (London:     Penguin Classics, 
1970);   Hugh Trevor-Roper's  article,   "The Scottish Enlightenment," Studies 
on Voltaire  and   the  Eighteenth Century, Vol.  LVII   (1967),   1635-1658,   and 
Trevor-Roper's book,   Religions,   the   Reformation  and Social   Change,  and 
Other Essays   (London:   1970),  pp.   231-232.     Also see Peter Gay, The Enlight- 
enment.     An   Interpretation,  Vol.   II,  The  Science  of  Freedom   (N.Y:     Alfred 
A.   Knopf,   1969),   Chapter 7,   "The Science of Society";  T.   C.   Smout, A History 
of   the  Scottish People  1560-1830  (N.Y. :     Charles  Scribner's  Sons,   1969), 
espec.   chapter XIX,   "The Golden Age  of Scottish Culture," pp.   480-517. 
See  also:     Louis Schneider, The  Scottish Moralists  on Human Nature 
and Society,   "The Heritage  of  Sociology" series,  edited by Morris  Janowitz, 
(Chicago:     University of Chicago Press,   1967). 




Idem.     Burke's  favorable  review of  Ferguson occurred   (1767)   in 
the  latter's more  "liberal" early period.     Caroline  Robbins wrote   that 
Ferguson's  "...   continued emphasis  on  inequalities  or rank and his 
strictures  upon slavery have   led  to  a sometimes exaggerated  estimate  of 
his  liberalism.     He modified  his views  as he  grew older.     The  Institutes 
(1769) ,   first  product   of his  Edinburgh  classroom,   laid much more stress 
on  the equality of man  than his  later  Principles,  published   in  1792  after 
his  retirement."    Caroline  Robbins, The  Eighteenth-Century  Commonwealth- 
man.   .   .   .   (N.Y.:     Atheneum,   1968  [1959]),   p.   199. 
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20A.   P.   d'Entreves,   Natural  Law.     An  Historical   Survey,   (New York, 
N.Y.:     Harper   and   Row,   1965   [1951]),   p.    116. 
21David Kettler,  "The Political  Vision of  Adam Ferguson,"  Studies 
in Burke  and His Time,   Vol.   IX, No.   1,  Whole No.   30   (Fall,   1967),   p.   775. 
22 [Burke],  Annual Register  ...   for   the Year  1767, 4th Edition, 
(London:  J.   Dodsley,  1784),  p.   311. 
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23 Robbtns wrote that Ferguson  in his  Essay on  Civil  Society 
(1767), on  the  one hand  "believed  in an evolution, was  a philosopher 
of gradualness and disclaimed  any credence  in   the accomplishments   of 
single lawgivers   like Numa or Lycurgus.     Frequent and drastic changes 
were undesirable."    Robbins,  op.   cit.,  p.   200.     Nevertheless,  Ferguson 
"was by no means  pessimistic about  the result  of the efforts of gifted 
and industrious  individuals  to   improve their fortunes   and  the laws  and 
policies of  the  state under which   they  lived."     Idem. 
24 See Writings  and   Speeches  of Edmund  Burke   (Boston:     Little, 
Brown & Co.,   1901), XI, 69. 
25 Douglass Adair,   "'That  Politics May be Reduced   to a Science': 
David Hume,  James Madison  and the Tenth   'Federalist,'" The Huntington 
Library Quarterly,  Vol.   XX,  no.   4   (August,  1957),  p.   344. 
Burke wrote  in the  "Reflections" of   the use   to which the   present 
generation could put  the past   in  its   (the present's)   definition of   its  own 
liberties.     "Always  acting  as   if   [emphasis  added]   in  the  presence   of 
canonized  forefathers,  the  spirit  of  freedom,   leading  in   itself  to misrule 
and  excess,   is   tempered with  an   awful gravity.     The  idea of  a liberal 
descent  inspires with  a sense of  habitual  native dignity, which prevents 
that upstart   insolence  almost   inevitably adhering to and disgracing  those 
who are  the  first  admirers  of any distinction.     By this  means  our  liberty 
becomes a noble  freedom."     [Burke],   "Reflections  on the  Revolution   in 
France   .   .   .   ," Writings and Speeches of Edmund  Burke   (Boston:    Little, 
Brown 6- Co.,   1901),   III,  pp.   275-276. 
27Adair,   pp.   343-344. 
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See  Roger L.   Emerson,   on  the "Select  society of  Edinburgh," 
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of   the Scottish Enlightenment  in general;   see Appendix C. 
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Philip Pinkus,   "Mandeville's paradox,"  Studies  on Voltaire  and 
the Eighteenth Century  (Transactions  of the  Fourth   international  congress 
on the Enlightenment,   IV),  Vol.   CLIV   (1976),  p.   1635; see also:     for the 
most   recent  historiography on Mandeville in regard   to the private-vice- 
public-virtue  controversy:     H.   T.   Dickinson,   "Bernard Mandeville:     an 
independent Whig," Studies  on Voltaire  and   the Eighteenth Century   (Trans- 
actions of   the Fourth   international congress  on the Enlightenment,  II), 
Vol.   CLII   (1976),   pp.   559-570,   and Bernhard   Fabian,  "The  Reception of 
Bernard Mandeville  in eighteenth-century Germany,"   ibid., pp.   693-723. 
M.   M.   Goldsmith,   "Public Virtues and Private Vices," Eighteenth- 
Century Studies,  Vol.   9, no.   4   (Summer,   1976),  p.   510.     For the most   recent 
historiographical  studies  on the Mandeville problem, see Malcolm Jack, 
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Vices,  Public  Benefits,'" Journal of  the History of  Ideas,  Vol.   XXXVII, 
No.   2   (April-June,   1976),  pp.   369-376. 
37 Hiroshi Mizuta, ibid., p. 1461. 
38 See Writings  and  Speeches of  Edmund   Burke   (Boston:     Little,  Brown 
& Co.,   1901),   II,  pp.   268-269;   IV,  pp.   22-23.     Burke's use of prudence as 
a social virtue here,   (as distinguished   from  the notion of  prudence as a 
narrow  calculation   of   self-interest   and  expediency)   coincides  with  W.   D. 
Falk's   recent   description of   the   common eighteenth-century use  of  the 
term,  prudence.     Falk wrote:     "Prudence   in  [Bishop Joseph]   Butler's time, 
as  throughout   the ancient world, was not yet   the cheap commodity which   it 
is with us;   and the price of  virtue varies with  the  market."    W.   D.   Falk, 
"Prudence, Temperance,  and  Courage," in Moral  Concepts, ed.  Joel Feinberg, 
(London:  Oxford University Press,   1970   [1969]),  p.   115.     In  the  eighteenth 
century,   the  price,  or notion,  of  prudence as   a social virtue was high,  or 
high-minded. 
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41 Burke,   ibid. ,  p.   489. 
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in  the  "Reflections."    See Writings  and Speeches  of  Edmund Burke,   (Boston: 
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43Burke,   Correspondence,   (Cambridge, England & Chicago,   Illinois: 
1958),   I,  p.   129. 
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ancient   idea or prejudice.     The   theory of  prescription  is   as  follows: 
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cation  of an  a fortiori  systematization of experience,   as distinguished from 
the  Kantian systematization  of  experience   (of the  Critique  of  Pure   Reason) 
and   the  further  shaping of  that  substantial phenomenal realm according to 
the moral categorical  imperatives of  the  second Critique. 
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CHAPTER  IV 
THE  KINSHIP   BETWEEN   SCOTTISH,   BURKEAN  AND KANTIAN 
THEORIES  OF   (HISTORICAL)   REALITY 
Andrew Skinner neatly correlated Burke's explicit awareness 
of  the Scottish  thinkers of his day,   those  Scots'   historians'   (Robert- 
son,  Adam Ferguson,   Lord Kames,  John Millar,   Adam Smith, Hume,   Dugald 
Stewart,   and Sir James Steuart)   balanced analytic/historical   (organic) 
approach  to  their subject matter.     Such  assumptions  or methodology 
reflected   their belief  in  the constant  springs of  a human nature play- 
ing upon  an  ever-changing environment.     It also mirrored  the open door 
such a methodology and such assumptions  afforded of creating  the possi- 
bility of  the prediction of events.     The Historians   (Skinner's name 
for the  Scottish school of historians   in the  eighteenth century) were 
to Skinner,  more of  an experiential rather than of a crude empirical 
cast,  that  is,   they  used  or shaped  the given  facts  of history to reveal 
"principles  and  causes" without  detracting from either the  reality of 
the  facts   themselves  or from the  principles  and causes after whicli  the 
Historians  sought  to  reveal.     Nevertheless,   the  facts of  the empirical/ 
historical world  are used  as  tools by the  reason of   the Historians  in 
order to draw out  the  principles.     This  is,  of  course,   the experiential 
methodology of Kant also,  and as described by  Peter Gay: 
[To Kant,   in the Critique of  Pure  Reason]   .   .   .   intelligence  is an 
active  force  in  the world.     Reason,  he wrote, with its principles 
in one hand,   and experiment in the other,   approaches nature to 
learn  from it, but not  in the  passive attitude of  the pupil;  rather, 
it acts   like a judge who   'compells   the witnesses   to answer questions 
which he himself has  formulated'. 
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Thomas   Reid  opposed  the empiricist  idea of   "representative  perception" 
or   the notion  that we  passively receive  sense-based  impressions  on 
the brain and   then "perceive"  the  "ideas"  that  these impressions had 
made on the brain.     Reid   thought   that  such an  assumption of the direct 
influence  of the body on   the mind detracted from the complex unique- 
2 
ness  of  the mind and   its  operations,    and,   to the point  here,   involved 
an  unacceptable passivity  of  the mind.     S.   S.   Grave described Reid's 
views on this point: 
'We know nothing whatever about   the nature of  the  connexion 
between body and mind,   and any ways  of speaking that mask this 
ignorance  have  to be   repudiated.'     In  particular,  Reid will not 
have   'impressions'made upon  the mind.     There  is no neutrality 
in this word  as a philosopher's word.     It   is dangerous  long 
before   it   acquires   the  formidable powers  it has   in Hume's 
vocabulary.     Impressions   are made on wax and things like wax, 
and what  Reid is  resisting is  the suggestion that  the mind  is 
in any way  a thing   like wax  [both in   its passiveness  and  its 
simplicity].... 
The  Cambridge Platonist  Ralph  Cudworth's   reaction to Hobbes was  compared 
by A.   0.   Lovejoy to Kant's   reaction   to Hume   (and  F.   Copleston   compared 
to Reid's  reaction to Hume with Kant's  reaction  ).     Cudworth expressed 
identical views   to  those of  Reid on  the primacy, not   the passivity, of 
the mind vis-a-vis  the body and the phenomenal world.     Cudworth made 
the point   that  the mind  or  thought  in man   is   "not dependent  on  body." 
This   initial point  of  Cudworth's  is  roughly analogous  to what S.   A.   Grave 
called  the  "metaphysical committment  of common  sense,"    the a priori 
element   of   common  sense  which   allows   for   the  possibility  of   an  extra- 
empirical  intermediate knowledge of data removed  in  time and place  from 
the perceiving subject   (see Appendix D).     Cudworth's   criticism of 
Hobbes'   theory of knowledge stands on  the mind's awareness of "seemings" 
75 
apart   from the   immediate perceptions or  "premises of perception" 
which can in   fact be  "analyzed into motions  in matter, but which can 
not explain  our awareness of those motions."       Cudworth does not 
deny that  "Every  seeming may have behind  it  a   'certain configuration 
of material particles.'"      Cudworth maintains  a  theory of  realism, 
that  the objects of perception are  real—but he does  say  that   "only 
in a certain  setting—namely,  in a conscious being—do these  configura- 
o 
tions generate   'seemings.'"       Cudworth wrote against what Hobbes 
'   .   .   .   hath publicly   [said]'   .   .   .   that   'mind is nothing but   local 
motion in  the organic parts of man's body.'     Cudworth went  on  to 
write that   this  argument  did not   account   for   'the   consciousness of 
it'   .   .   .    'if  there were  any other action besides  local motion 
admitted,   there must needs be some substance acknowledged besides 
body.'     Cudworth  developes  his  theory   into  a  denial  of   the  passivity 
of the mind   in  the  act of perception  and an assertion of our  freedom 
in Volition.   .   .   .     Human knowledge   ...   'is not  a mere passion 
from sensible  things'   [and not]  merely  the  inevitable response of 
one group  of  particles  to a stimulus   from another group.   .   .   . 
Specifically,  Cudworth's notion of "seemings" resembles  Reid's 
notion of  "suggestion"  in regard  to the   latter's   theories of the nature 
of perception.     To understand   Reid's notion of  "suggestion," one must 
be  aware  of the   three-fold distinction which  Reid made  in his  common- 
sense notion of  perception.     The three  divisions  of perception for 
Keid were:     "(1)   'sensation,'   (2)   'original perception,'   and   (3)   'unac- 
quircd perception."'    P.   G.  Winch  cited Reid's On   the  Intellectual 
Powers  of Man   (1783)  on the three divisions:     "...   'Sensation.     An 
act   of  the  mind,   which  hath  no  object  distinct   from  the   act   itself.    .   .    . 
In  the  earlier   Inquiry   into  the  Mind  on   the   Principles  of   Common  Sense 
(1764),  Reid had written: 
'Original Perception. Our perceptions are of two kinds: some are 
natural and original; others acquired and the fruit of experience. 
When I perceive   that  this  is the taste of  cyder, that of brandy; 
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that   this  is   the  smell of an  apple,   that  of  nn  orange;   that this 
is  the  noise   of   thunder,   that  the ringing of  bells;   this  the sound 
of  a coach passing,   that the voice of such   [and such]   a friend: 
these perceptions  and others  of  the same kind are not  original— 
they  are acquired.     But the perception which  I have by  touch,  of 
the hardness,   or softness  of bodies, of their extension,   figure 
and motion,   is not  acquired—it  is original   [emphases  added].' 
Having made   this  distinction,   Ueid's  task is  to account   for  the 
relation which holds between   these  three   'ingredients'   of  percep- 
tion,  and  for  this purpose the notion  of   'suggestion'   is  invoked. 
.   .   .      [The use,]  which  is most characteristic of  Reid's  theory 
[is   that which serves]   ...   to describe  the relation between 
'sensation and original perception. 
In the same  general manner by which  Cudworth's  "seemings"  in  the  active 
human  intellect take  into account  both  the empirical and  the extra- 
empirical  factors   in  the  act  of perception,   Reid believes  his notion of 
"suggestion" is an   "original perception"       or as   "'an original principle 
12 13 of human nature,"        and not an acquired perception.   "     Given this 
assumption,   together with Reid's view that  his divisions of  perceptions 
should  be   ".   .   .   understood as  referring  to  real entities  in  the  observ- 
able world,   and not merely  to logical differences between different 
types of   linguistic expression,"       that  "we are concerned to  find out 
what  is  objectively   the  case   in  the world outside us,"      the  function  of 
"suggestion"  serves  as  a bridge,  so  to speak,  between the sensational 
and the extra-empirical   ("suggestion" as  an  "original perception")   realms 
becomes   evident. 
Further,   as   Cudworth  denied   the  passivity  of   the  mind  in  his 
two-fold  theory of  a    heterogeneous perception,  Reid  could  likewise 
claim (although Winch  thought, wrongheadedly,)   that he had discerned 
by  '"accurate   attention  and  reflection'   to the  operations  of his own 
mind.   .   .   ,"17    Winch admitted  that  a  "legitimate" use of the word 
"suggest," a use which  Reid   (merely)   believed  to be applied to the 
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word   (but such  a belief  by Reid  is  all that  this present  study is 
concerned with)   causes  us   to "conclude that nothing is either 
entailed or excluded  regarding the  occurance of   conscious  reflection" 
1 ft 
[emphasis added]. Copleston is more explicit   on this point of  the 
role  of   the  active  intellect  in the  act  of perception and knowledge  in 
general.     Copleston wrote  that  Reid's   "'first principles of  contingent 
truths'" demonstrated  the mind's  control over our actions  and our will. 
That we have some degree of power over our  actions  and over 
the determinations of  our will,   and  that  there is life  and 
intelligence in our fellowmen with whom we   converse,  are  also 
among  the   first  principles mentioned by Reid. 
Cudworth,   the Cambridge Platonist,   and   Reid,  the  Scottish critical 
"Common-Sense"  realist,   and  Kant,   the German Critical idealist, all 
shared   a heterogeneous view of  reality and of man's knowledge of  that 
reality—combining in  fact elements  of empiricism or realism,  and 
idealism,   and,   in the mind,   of  reason  and  feeling or sentiment.     These 
different views   of reality  and  of knowledge,  and   these assumptions of 
the heterogeneous  faculties  of  the mind together  call for the  active 
use of  the  intellect   in order to reconcile the different  levels of 
reality and  the various elements which  constitute   our combining, 
critical knowledge. 
The  same comprehensive and critical attitude toward  the 
forming and  shaping of   the  givens of   reality without distorting  that 
reality  was  represented,   in   historiographical   terms,  by   the   "Scottish 
Historians" and,  by Burke himself  through  the latter's favorable 
reviews  in the "Annual  Register," of  the works of William Robertson, 
the  leading  light   of   the historians of   the  Scottish Enlightenment. 
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In the  Critical Kantian fashion,   the  Scottish Historians 
rejected  facts  as  such,  or  rather rejected "too  great a  concentration 
on facts   and  'singular events.'"    Skinner wrote: 
The  approach   .   .   .  was analytical as well as historical; 
they sought  principles  and causes so that   if  it   is necessary 
to start   from  the  facts  of history   [Skinner next  cited  Robert- 
son's History of  Charles  V]   'it   is not necessary  to observe 
the order of  time with a chronological accuracy.'     [It was  a 
matter of  the  active  intelligence,   or  reason,   acting  on  real 
facts:]   .   .   .   The  study   .   .   .   involved the   thoughtful   [Skinner's 
emphasis]   consideration  of  the   facts.   .   .   .     The Historians 
attempted  to unite  the  techniques of  the  philosopher  and the 
philologian  in the  search for principles  and common elements  at 
work at   all   times   and in all places. 
Burke's historical  thought  is  of the same   critical  analytical cast  as 
the  thought  of  the  Scots. 
Burke's   lengthy  and favorable  review of William Robertson's 
History of America  in  the Annual Register for  1777   (pp.   214-234), 
reflects  Burke's admiration in Robertson of  the  kind of  critical 
thinking described  by  Skinner.     Burke began his   review by debunking 
the  "supposed" "golden  age" of   "the state  of simplicity,   innocence, 
and nature,   the origin  of society and  the  source  of law.'"        But, 
thanks  to  Robertson,  we now discover  that  age to have been  a Hobbesian 
state, not  one peopled by  Rousseau's noble savages. 
...   it  affords  only a state of weakness,   imperfection,   and 
wretchedness, equally void of  innocence,   and  incapable  of 
happiness.     If we  find man without  property,   and  feeding  on 
acorns,  we also   find him a sullen,  suspicious,  solitary,   and 
unhappy being.   .   .   . 
But   the discovery and exploration of   the New World produced revolutions 
in "the  affairs of both  the hemispheres    —changed  the face of Nature" 
in the New World and,  on  the whole,   "has  caused a wonderful change  in 
the manners,  habits, modes  of  life,  and state of  policy"  of the 
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European  states. Just  as Burke applauds man for having shaped 
nature and  the  course of  his own history,  Burke celebrates  also  the 
active  role  of   the historian   (Robertson)  himself  in shaping  the 
subject  matter of history  and not   allowing such a vast panorama of 
the story of  the  cultivation of  a new continent  to overwhelm his 
critical  faculties.     Burke wrote: 
It required   the  ability of  a great master  to arrange  the 
different  parts   of  this magnificent picture in their proper 
places,   to  bestow on each  its due proportion of   light,   shade, 
and  coloring,  and to oblige   the smallest  to contribute  its 
exact  share,  and no more,   to  the great effect  of the whole. 
The delineation of human nature in such  a variety of new 
situations,   and   the nice discriminations of those shades   that 
mingle  imperceptibly in so many different gradations of savage 
life,   required no common combination of qualities.     Besides  a 
great degree of penetration and sagacity,   and  an extensive 
knowledge  of man  in his  artificial state,   this part of the 
subject   required  a mind   turned,  and  accustomed  to philosophical 
disquisition,  an  acute,   critical,  and discriminating spirit, 
with  a temper capable  of the most patient  investigation and 
research.   .   .   .     [In  Robertson's work]   .   .   .   the majesty  of 
history   is  blended with  the  truth,  philanthropy,  and discern- 
ment of philosophy.   .   .   . 
Burke's praise here   for Robertson's  critical/analytical historiography 
coincides with  the new "philosophical history" of   the  Enlightenment, 
and  of  the   Scottish Enlightenment.     This   "new history" is distinguished 
from the simple  descriptive historiography of the  seventeenth-century 
erudites   (see Appendix D). 
Peter Hans Reill's  recent  article on a representative  of   the 
new "philosophical history," the German historian, Johann Christoph 
Gatterer (1727-1799),26 could have  taken Burke,  and  the Scottish 
historians   (including Robertson),   as  also  representative of the 
critical "philosophical history" of  the Enlightenment.     Reill's 
comments on Gatterer coincide not merely with Burke's philosophy of 
history, but with  other areas of Burke's   thought. 
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Reill wrote  that   for Gatterer, 
.   .   .   the ultimate  purpose  of historical understanding   .   .   . 
was   'not  the  learning of  facts but   the  increased understand- 
ing of human nature'   [through a]   .   .   .   critical-analytical 
methodology.*' 
The  attempt   to understand human nature   (so as  to be better  able  to 
prescribe   the  future  actions motivated by  that nature),  rather than 
merely describe  past events,   is   implicit   in Burke's special notion of 
prudence as   foresight,  or an  active,   critical shaping of events  and 
policy according  to  a predetermined end. In Reill's description of 
the  contemporary eighteenth-century philosophical basis  of  the new 
"philosophical history"—Newton's  "Rules  of Philosophizing"—lies 
also  a source of Burke'.s method of  thinking.     That  Burke   followed  the 
"Rules of Philosophizing," unlike many of his  contemporaries,  lias been 
shown to be the case elsewhere  in  the present  study   (see Appendix A). 
Lastly,   the methodology of the   "philosophical history" taken by itself, 
resembles  the  critical  approach to the natural  realm  (historical/ 
phenomenal)   of Kantian  philosophy.     Reill  explained  the aversion of 
the Aufklarungers   to both the   fact-gathering erudites and  to the 
speculative system-builders of  Cartesian rationalism.    Only when 
history could be "suffused" with philosophy,   "could  the  seemingly 
chaotic  collection of   facts made by countless  seventeenth-century 
erudites  take on  form and meaning." 
A  basic   tenet   of   the   Aufklarung was   its  distrust  of   abstract 
speculation;  during the early eighteenth  century,  there had 
been  a decided  shift   away  from the method outlined by Descartes's 
Discours   to Newton's   'Rules  of Philosophizing.'     This  shift had 
resulted  in the  rejection of the primacy  of  deductive   reasoning, 
but  it  had not  eventuated  in  a radical empiricism;  for,   in  fact, 
the magpie  instinct  of  the seventeenth-century polyhistorians 
had itself demonstrated the bankruptcy of  random and undirected 
fact gathering.   9 
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Applied  to  the study  and  stuff of history,  the  avoidance of dogmatic 
(Cartesian)   rationalism and radical empiricism,   allowed  the historian 
to use  instead  the critical,   forming,  but non-distorting  reason to 
gain  an intermediate knowledge of  past events,   to approach  the 
historical  realm in the same manner in which Kant approached nature: 
"not   in the  passive  attitude of  the  pupil   (but   armed with  "reason and 
experiment")   .   .   .   like  a judge who   'compells  the witnesses  to  answer 
questions which he himself has  formulated'"  (see supra., Chapter IV,  p. 73). 
.   .   .   eighteenth-century thinkers   turned  to an emphasis  upon critical 
analysis, which posited  a mutual   interaction between  theory  and 
empirical observation;  each  informed  and mutually qualified   the 
other.     Hence,  especially  in  the writing of  history,   the materials 
had  to be ordered   in such  a manner as  to answer a set  of well-defined 
questions.     The historian's   task gradually came  to be  conceived as 
the  posing   of   a  set   of   intellectual   questions,   the  search   for  materials 
pertaining  to  the questions   [and not   to form the questions  around  the 
materials;   the  occasionalist,  but not   the server of  occasions],   and 
their  arrangement of   it   in such a manner  that  the whole became  compre- 
hensible.   .   .   .     No  longer was the  historian   'the simple narrator of 
events,'   the passive  and objective mirror of  the  past.     Now he was 
charged  with the  task of   interpretation.   .   .   . 30 
That   the particular  interpretative  "philosophical history" which Burke 
had praised in Robertson was characteristic of Enlightenment  historio- 
graphy,   is supported by the likemindedness which Hugh Trevor-Roper 
pointed  out  existed  between Robertson,   Voltaire,  Gibbon and Montesquieu. 
In his  review of  "The Historical Philosophy of  the Enlightenment," 
Trevor-Roper equated   the new philosophical  history with  '"critical his- 
tory,'"32 which "rejected the mere accumulation of detail and  fact,"  and 
instead  "looked   for explanation." Part  of   this explanation,  the   "new 
philosophical  content" which would "reanimate  the mass of historical data 
..34 into which  the  old ideological structures had decomposed, were  the 
double   concepts  of   the dynamic  idea of progress and the  concept  of  the 
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"organic nature  of  society."    The  latter was   "the  idea that  human 
societies  have  an   internal dynamism,  dependent  on  their social 
35 
structure  and articulation.   .   .   . Taken  together,  these   two 
concepts were made   "explicit" by and did   form the basis of   thought 
of  the  critical  "philosophical historians" of  the Enlightenment: 
Montesquieu,  Turgot, Hume,  Voltaire,   Robertson and Gibbon. Gibbon 
recognized   the especial significance  of the   "Scottish Historians" as 
leaders  of   the new critical history, when he wrote: 
'Machiavelli and Guicciardlni   .   .   .  were justly esteemed  the  first 
historians  of modern languages  till,  in   the present age,   Scotland' 
—that   is, Hume,   Robertson  and Adam Smith—'arose to dispute  the 
palm with  Italy herself." 
The 'interdependence" among the critical historians of  the Enlightenment 
was  evident   in   the   unqualified  praise  which   Robertson  bestowed  upon 
Voltaire,       the  "same basic assumptions" shared by Montesquieu,   Robert- 
39 son and Gibbon,       and  the mutual  admiration between Montesquieu, 
Voltaire,   Robertson  and Gibbon. The  critical and comprehensive 
trait  of   the  new history was evident   in the kinship between Voltaire 
and Gibbon,  who were   "alike  in their scale  of values,   in their humanity," 
and most   important   to the point of  a balanced  critical history,   "in 
their  combination of  a quest  for purpose with a refusal to systematise." 
Again,   the   comprehensive side of   the  critical history  is seen  in Voltaire's 
remark  that  his Essai  sur les moeurs 
.   .   .   required  of  him,   ideally,  he said,   'la patience d'un 
beWdiction—that   is ,   of a Mabillon  or a Montfaucon   [erudites] 
—et  la plume d'un  Bousset'   [Bishop Bousset,  the  late seven- 
teenth-century  "universal," but  not   critical, historian, who 




Trevor-Roper  then  traces  a rift  between  "Montesquieu and his  disciples 
on the one hand   [and]   the  French encyclopedists on   the  other." The 
former group,   including Gibbon and Burke,   "the most  influential  of  all 
Montesquieu's  disciples,"       represented   the  exclusive concern with  the 
organic   (historical)   theory of society—they were  the   "German  conserva- 
tives  and  English Whig8" who adopted Burke's   'Reflections'   as   their 
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Bible. The   latter group  represented  an equally exclusive   focus  upon 
and extension of   the extra-,   or  ahistorical,   idea of   the  linear  progress 
of society and  of man   in society   (or of human nature   itself)—these were 
the  followers of   Voltaire who  "became more   radical" after 1789.     The 
followers  of Montesquieu—Gibbon and Burke—adopted  an essentially passive 
attitude  toward   the  reformation of society  and  toward   the events   that 
shaped society  and men's  lives.     The  followers of Voltaire were   "activists" 
(my word),   if not entirely  "critical," and believed  they  could  shape events. 
V/here the  radicals  had  seen the state  as  the necessary reformer 
of  society,   the new conservatives now saw society   [or the organic 
laws of society,  or,   of history]   as   the necessary  corrector of 
the state.^6 
Although  C.   P.   Courtney  in his work, Montesquieu and Burke,   stated  the 
same historical/philosophical brotherhood  of Montesquieu and Burke as 
did Trevor-Roper here,  Colm Kiernan  in his   recent   (1973)   study of   "The 
Enlightenment  and   science  in eighteenth-century France"      saw only an 
"incongruity" between Montesquieu's use of history and science as 
supports   for his   ideas." Kiernan's use of   "history" or  "the  life 
sciences"  in order  to describe Montesquieu's balanced or comprehensive 
position,   is   roughly analogous  to Trevor-Roper's use of,   respectively, 
the passive  "organic theory of society" and  the   active   "idea of progress" 
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as a way  to describe  the  comprehensiveness of   the new philosophical 
history.     Kiernan wrote  that 
The  use of an historical rationale has both  conservative   and 
reactionary  implications.     These were carefully worked  out by 
Edmund Burke.   [Kiernan cites  C.   P.   Courtney to this effect.] 
The  use  of the life  sciences,  on  the other hand, has  radical 
implications.     These were  developed by Rousseau who,   in   the 
interests  of political radicalism, placed  far less reliance on 
history.   .   .   . 49 
Yet, 
It was Rousseau, more than Edmund Burke, who understood the spirit 
of Montesquieu's laws. Du contrat social represents Montesquieu^s 
political principles  carried   to  their  logical conclusion.   .   .   . 50 
because  Montesquieu  combined   the  historical  argument  with   the   philosoph- 
ical,       or the  biological argument   taken from the life sciences.    Montes- 
quieu's Esprit  des   lois   represents  an attempt   "to synthesize   a rationalist 
52 
and an empirical approach as  they refer  to society. 
To  the extent   to whicli  it   is   true, Kiernan's  portrait  of a 
critical and   comprehensive Montesquieu   (as  reflected  in Rousseau,  and as 
set  against  Burke  and his  followers)   qualifies Trevor-Roper's   catalogue 
of  the split  among  the   "philosophical" historians, with the Montesquieu/ 
Burke camp pitted against  the  followers of Voltaire.     On the other hand, 
Kiernan's Montesquieu would resemble   the Montesquieu whom Trevor-Roper 
describes   as one of   the new "critical,  philosophical" historians before 
his   (Montesquieu's)  break with Voltaire.     It  is   to these  latter critical 
philosophical  historians,   including  the   "Scottish  Historians,"  whom 
Burke,  in  the   "Annual Register" reviews,  praises.     Burke and Montesquieu 
may be kindred spirits,  as  admirers   and/or practitioners  of  the new 
history, but not   in the  passive,  uncritical sense by which Trevor-Roper 
brought  them  into alliance. 
85 
The  "philosophical history's"  thoughtful and  critical considera- 
tion  and measuring of  the given  facts according to objective principles, 
is contrary to the  tyranny of  "facts  standing around" which the late 
Richard Weaver  (in his The Ethics of Rhetoric,  1965)   thought a passive 
Burke allowed   to exert over himself.     Weaver saw in Burke's  thought 
only a  "philosophic vacuum:" 
'Of clear rational principle,' Weaver noted, Burke   'had a 
mortal distrust. '     [Rather]   .   .   .  Weaver found  only a bowing 
to  the pressures of   'facts  standing around,'" 
that  is,   to the  circumstantial  argument which 
.   .   .   refuses   to   look beyond things  as   they are  and to offer 
an  alternative vision  of society.   .   .   . 
Angus  Campbell makes  some Kantian noises when he disagrees with Weaver's 
estimate  of   the supposed hollow center of  Burke's  thought: 
Burke's  confinement  to  the  category of  circumstance, however, 
is not absolute,   for he  does not simply report  circumstance, 
but  shapes   it.   [Emphasis   added; see supra.,  Chapter IV,  p.   73.] 
His own practical  imagination at   once  grounds him  in  the 
historical social order  and enables him to see beyond its 
details   to its  inner spirit  or character.   .   .   .   ' 
The argument  from circumstance which Burke uses,   then,   far from resting 
on   (as Weaver said)   a  "'love  of quietude   [and]   relish  for success'" 
(in the Wolffian/Shaftesburian teleological  sense],       rests upon  the 
reason of   the  individual, who  shapes  circumstances  according to objec- 
tive  a priori principles.     "It   is not  Burke's use of   circumstance, but 
the principles governing his  selection of   circumstance which reveals 
the bent of his thought.   .   .   ." It   is   this  thoughtful   consideration 
of past  circumstances  and events which led   to the discovery by the 
Scottish Historians   (all,  or most,  reviewed   favorably by  the periodical 
co-founded  by Burke,   the  "Annual  Register")   of  "the uniformity of the 
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human constitution.   .   .   .     [The]   peculiar nature of  their   [the Historians'] 
history lies  in  the  link which  it  establishes between  the  constant princi- 
ples of human nature  and   the  changing environment of man." Beyond 
methodology  and analysis,   the  "Historians" sought   to dwell  on the problems 
of  the present  rather than attempt  to chart   the  future by  the past.     Skin- 
ner maintains  that   this  "choice  of problem—the  interest  in order rather 
than prediction—may simply  reflect   the   conditions  of   the  time   [and  there- 
59 fore]   ...   is not  possessed  of great  analytical significance.""       Skinner 
at  the best   reasons  backwards   from the Historians'   "functional" concern 
with the  present  order rather than  future  predictions,  or  improvement 
possibly   of   that   order,   to   the   Historians'   analyses,   to  their  methodology, 
and concludes   that   their concern with  the complexity of method, made 
necessary by the   inherent complexity of history itself,   caused  them to 
preclude  any prediction  and  concentrate  instead on  description of   the 
present  order.     Skinner  concludes: 
Lovers of system,  the Historians were  acutely conscious  of   its 
dangers;   sensitive  to the problem of method,   they had a profound 
respect   for  the  complexity of History.     This respect  and sensitivity 
to the problem of method may have  confined  them  to the question of 
order  rather than prediction  and probably would have  so confined 
them even  in  a  different historical  context.   .   .   . 
However,   it  is one   of  the  aims of   this  study  to show  that Burke, while 
respecting the  complexities  of history and  human nature,  did not   let 
this  respect confine him,   as  Skinner says   it did the   (Scottish)  Historians, 
to   immediate   concerns.61     This   respect,   on   the   contrary,   set  Burke   to 
write  of  the  foreseeable,   open  future.     This was a method of  statecrafts- 
manship which allowed   for reformation without   revolution,   for descrip- 
tive  and prescriptive  accounts and analyses—and syntheses—of the past 
as prologue to  the present  and  to  the   future. 
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Burke's doctrine  of prescription  and  reformation  allowed   for 
present  action not  being based on   that  rigid   and submissive  and almost 
exclusive dependence  on  a past   assigned by Russell Kirk and his school 
to Burke wherein  the dead hand  of  the past made  Burke   its  passive 
emissary  to the present   (see supra.,   Chapter III,  p. 48   et  passim).     As 
Burkian prescription was not  based  on the democracy   (or tyranny)  of the 
dead   (past)   over the   living present, neither was  it based  on what might 
be  called the  democracy of the  present,   i.e.,  on  that  Scottish  school 
of Common Sense which,  misinterpreted   (as   it has been),  becomes a simple 
appeal to  the   intuitive  sentiments of   the vulgar  crowd—a kind of philo- 
sophical Gallup poll,  a  consensus philosophy  forming  itself upon  the 
lowest   common  plebiscitory denominator,   "to tlie  universal belief or 
persuasion  of  ordinary  people,"       without   consideration   for   the   actual 
Scottish  18th century Common Sense distinction between  sensation and 
perception,  subject   and object,  necessary truths and  contingent   truths, 
and the  other sub-categories,  of self-evident principles,   first princi- 
ples,  secondary principles, etc.     All of   these epistemological distinc- 
tions  aid  the   individual  reason,  guided by objective  "first  principles, 
to shape  experience,   to shape events  and not merely act   upon experience 
alone  or  react   to events.     One   avoids a  reductionism in philosophy 
(monism)   and epistemology   (the  crude  sceptical empiricism of Hume)   and 
thereby  avoids  a political  reductionism  (a teleological  faith   in the 
Tightness  of  the past  because  it  is   the past, because  it  exists). 
For  instance,   the  Scottish  "methodological  tradition" of  the 
second half of  the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-centuries was 
characterized by  an  almost   incomprehensible  dualism or pluralism, but 
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yet  constituted   a coherent whole.     G.   N.   Cantor recently      described 
the Scottish philosophers'   refusal  to categorize  themselves   in any one 
of the  prominent  methodological  traditions  of   the   times.     Their refusal 
kept  them following a "middle  path,"      which  avoided  alike  an exclusive 
concern with simple  Baconian empiricism or with a speculative  a priori 
reason.     Rather,   the Scots  combined  the  Baconian and  the Newtonian 
traditions   into a  "rigorous  type of   induction modelled  on Newton's 
Opticks"  (see  also,  Appendix A,   for  the Scots   as proper Newtonians). 
This "rigorous"  induction laid  less  stress  on  the Baconian  "gathering 
of experimental data" and  required  fewer, but more  "judicious," experi- 
ments. Cantor described  this special  form of  induction as 
.   .   .  more  accurately described as a posteriori reasoning 
based on  a small  amount   of empirical data   [which]   served 
the   function  of directing  the progress  of science when 
used   in conjunction with   'crucial'  experiments. 
Thomas Peid  is  an example of   this hybrid,  empirically-based a posteriori 
reasoning.     Reid,   following Newton's   "'Rules of Philosophizing,'" 
would deny hypotheses   in order "to explain   the phenomena of nature, 
but would "by a just  and copious induction   .   .   .   get   to the  top 
[but not]   at  once   [as would]   the  ingenious men   [who]   .   .   .   invent 
hypotheses   .   .   .   ."68    Further,  Reid, who "reiterated  in epistemological 
debates"69 Newton's methodological rules,  represented  at once  the  two 
seemingly conflicting methodological  traditions  among  the Scottish 
philosophers• 
Just as Hume's  "metaphysical scepticism," which set  "a  limitation 
on man's knowledge" of final  causes  in nature      was complemented by his 
"demand for physical  continuity in nature   in  order to make  the  actions of 
. 
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a cause  comprehensible,"       so Reid,  in  following Newton's  "Rules," 
represented   first,   the  "anti-conjectural"  tradition which   "rejected 
conjectures,  hypotheses and theories with   'just  contempt'   from all 
72 brnaches of  science." But   Reid  also  represented  a second tradition 
in Scottish philosophy.     This tradition,  although not   reductionist, 
did seek,     as  one of  the  aims of  science   [and epistemology, see above], 
the  reduction of knowledge to a few general principles." Reid  saw 
that   the 
.   .   .   business of natural philosophy   'is,   from particular 
facts  in the material world,   to collect,  by a just   induction 
the  laws   that  are  general,  and  from these   the more general, 
as   far as we   can go'.   .   .   .'*   [Emphasis  added.] 
Building up generalizations   from experience  by a "just  induction   .   .   . 
as  far as we can go," demanded the eventual  application of a    general- 
ization  induced   from demonstrable  evidence  to  "a new situation in 
which  its existence had not  yet been demonstrated." 
Roger L.   Emerson  in his recent  article on the  "Select society" 
of  Edinburgh  illuminati during  the  early   (1750's)   Scottish Enlighten- 
ment  described   the  "methodological norms" of  the Society. These 
norms were  a hybrid of empiricism and extra-empiricism.     The norms 
were  "...   in some sense empirical." 
Locke  and Newton received   applause  in their   [the  Scots'] 
published works.   .   .   .     Experiments were  their guide  in  the 
physical sciences.     Yet  most had  a committment   to  a systematic 
ordering of beliefs which was academic  if  not quite  scholastic 
in appearance.     The ghost  of rationalism haunted  them as  it 
did  most  of   their  contemporaries;   Thomas   Reid,   not   Hume,   became 
in  time their philosophical guide.77 
On this point of   the balance  in Scottish Enlightenment   thought between 
systematic yet not scholastic  thought,  on  the  one hand,   and empirical 
enquiry on the other hand    see supra., Chapter III- 
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The  Scots'   use of   the notion  "generalization" here would have 
the same effect  as  that of   the application of an hypothesis  or con- 
jecture to  the  givens of  the empirical world.     In  fact,   "...   the 
Scots  themselves were often  unclear in which sense  they were using 
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the word." Cantor summarized the   "middle path" which the   Scots 
adopted   in the  late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries;  such 
a path sought   to  reconcile  experiment   and  critical observation and 
judgement,  or,   in Kantian   terms, nature  and   freedom. 
The  scientific method used by  the   Scottish natural philosophers 
may be  characterized  as   a subtle heuristic interplay between 
the   cautious  use  of  inductive generalizations  and powerful 
reasoning.   .   .   .     The most adequate expression of the  interplay 
between  theory and judicious experimentation was given by  [John] 
Playfair   [a minor,   though  representative, early nineteenth 
century natural philosopher of the  Scottish  tradition(s)].     He 
rejected   conjectures which were unsupported by empirical evidence, 
yet  he  considered   that   lack of a theory   'does not secure   the 
candour of an  observer,   and   it may much diminish his skill'   in 
practising science.   .   .   .     Having  rejected simplistic  induction 
on the one  hand and blatant hypothesizing on  the other,   the  Scottish 
natural philosophers  found  a middle  path calculated  to assist   the 
progress  of  science more effectively.'' 
The method which  Playfair represented   also characterized the  general 
Scottish attitude   to mathematical   theory,  as   recently described by 
Richard Olson. The  Common  Sense realists  and most   Scottish  philosophers 
could not accept the  "Platonic" view of mathematics.     The Platonic view 
was the  "dominant  attitude  toward the nature  of mathematics" in Scotland 
and England "during  the period  immediately prior to the.  rise of  Common 
Sense philosophy.   .   .   ."81     It held  that 
.   .   .   mathematical   ideas were divorced from physical  existence  and 
mathematical  certainty was seen as  independent  of  any need for a 
capability  of empirical verification."82 
A second position, which was   "discussed but not adopted by  the Scottish 
philosophers,   .   .   .   tied mathematics directly to physical experience 
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and demanded  an empirical verification of  any mathematical  state- 
ment. This notion was   taught by one James Ferguson, who was,   for 
that,  "far out  of  the main stream of Scottish  thought."°^    But   "most 
Scottish philosophers  took a third position, 
.   .   .   arguing  that mathematical  ideas are  tied  to experience 
insofar as  the original suggestions  for mathematical  concepts 
could  come  only from sense data,  but also contending  that 
mathematical  ideas  are separated  from that sensory context 
by a process of  abstraction which somehow transforms  the 
nature  of   the entities under  consideration"   [emphasis  added]. 85 
In terms  reminiscent  of  Reid's notion  of   "suggestion"  (see supra., 
Chapter  IV,  p.75),  an anonymous  essay on mathematics denied  that either 
empirical sense data or abstract   speculation exclusively determined our 
knowledge of geometrical  axioms. 
.   .   .   the  author  claims, our  inability to find  perfect  geometrical 
shapes   in sense data does not  hinder our ability to reason about 
them:      '.   .   .   from this we see no hindrance   in pure,   abstract 
geometry.   ...     We  reason neither from a real, not  apparent, 
but a supposed   [or suggested]   construction.     And we  are satis- 
fied that a  demonstration  is  .iust, when  the  conclusion  depends 
only on what   is  required  in  the  supposition.'""" 
This  anonymous paper represented,   said Olson, both sides of   the 
. . . Common Sense attitude to the nature of mathematics . . . 
—the belief that the ultimate source of mathematical ideas, 
lies in physical reality and the insistence that the process 
of abstraction somehow frees mathematical reasoning from the 
necessity of empirical verification and inductive reasoning. 
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In regard to  the   "moral  side  of  Scottish philosophy," the demand for 
a sensory  referent with  respect  to  the  objects of mathematics, 
including   those  of  geometry,  was  balanced  by   the  views  of   "Reid,   for 
instance   [who] wrote that  the objects  of mathematics   'are  things   con- 
ceived without  regard for their existence.   .   .   .'" 9    Further,  the 
Scots'   preferred geometry over algebra because the latter served to 
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better train the  reason and  the  use of  the  intellectual powers of  the 
mind than the  former. 
According to the  Scots ,  one had to be aware of  the  individual 
processes and  their functioning in order to effectively  train 
them.     Geometry kept one aware of  the  steps of reasoning 
involved  in a mathematical argument and algebra did not;   there- 
fore,  geometry was better for  training  the   intellect  than 
algebra.90 
While serving the training of  the  intellect,  geometry, unlike algebra, 
avoided abstract speculation by  its   "constant  reference  to diagrams 
which  served   to keep  the  reasoning powers under control." 
Reid  and   the  Scottish school of  common sense,   and  the Scottish 
Enlightenment   in general exhibited   that happy balance described by 
Goethe   above   and   in  the  balanced   dualism  of   the  Kantian   Critical 
philosophy  in  Germany.     David Daiches  sees  a  "paradox    in  the whole 
of contemporary  Scottish  society in the  18th century,  a paradox which 
might or might not  reflect or be  reflected   in  the  Scottish philosophy: 
"...   another paradox of Scottisli  culture   [was]   the  co-existence of 
a cooly rational tone  and method with a belief  in  the moral value of 
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feeling." More precisely,   Daiches quotes Thomas  Reid's  disciple, 
Dugald Stewart,   as holding to a belief   in progress, or,  a confidence 
in the  ability of the active  intelligence  to affect—by a  thoughtful 
consideration of  the  real and  complex empirical world—the  course of 
events   (without  at   the  same   time  detracting  from   the  reality  of  these 
events),   a consideration based  upon  the  realization of  the  constant 
factors  of human nature  and   the  "universal applicability  of common 
sense   : .93 
...   to illustrate  that  the belief in a humane reasonableness, 
so characteristic of   the period, goes side by side not only with 
a belief   in progress but  also with a deep belief in the uniformity 
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of human nature   and  the universal applicability of  common sense, 
1 quote   this characteristic praise of William Robertson by 
Dugald   Stewart   .   .   .9^ 
If,  as Charles  E.   Vaughn  contends,       "it was  because Burke  never 
reached the  conception of  progress  that   the  principles  of justice 
and expediency jostle each other uneasily  in his system," sucli a 
supposed  deficiency in Burke was  not  caused by any contact Burke had 
with  the ideas  of  the  Scottish Common Sense  school or with   the  Scottish 
Enlightenment   in general.     At  the  least,   if one  assumes  Burke  to have 
had an awareness of   the balanced Common  Sense philosophy of  Reid, 
Stewart  and  Beattie,  one may better understand why,  for example, John 
MacCunn could say  that   the   central  problem in Burke study is   the 
"reconciliation of  Burke's  notions of   'organic'   and providential 
national development   and of man's mind as  a proximate efficient  cause 
96 or change." 
If justice and expediency jostle each  other uneasily  in Burke's 
thought,   it   is partially because Burke did  not  think to  let  the mass 
of empirical  data and   facts,   past   and present,   and their myriad inter- 
relationships  distract   or  intimidate him  to  inaction and   to an Adullamite- 
like  or worse,   a Panglossian teleological  acceptance of   the status quo 
for its own sake.     "He exerted  himself not for the status  quo,  but   for 
its   [vitalistic]  principle,   its  fundamentals." One of   these principles 
Inherent   in  the  status  quo  is  that of  not merely the  collection,  collation, 
and   interpretation of   the given facts   themselves, but of   the  interrelation- 
ships  among  the empirical facts and between the  facts and  the  forming 
human intellect which  interprets them.     Gerald  Chapman quotes Dr.  Johnson 
on Burke's  insatiable appetite and love of  facts and  the   colour  Burke 
, 
94 
gives  to  the  facts.     Johnson said  of Burke: 
'His stream of mind  is perpetual'—he   [Samuel Johnson]  went on 
to define  Burke's peculiar quality as   'copiousness and fertility 
of   allusion;   a power of diversifying his matter,  by placing it   in 
various relations.'    This gets  to  the point.     Burke's metier and 
special calling   is his urgent, passionate,  almost obsessive  aware- 
ness  of the  interrelatedness of things   in actual  life,   combined 
with   the power  to  let   all sectors  of his knowledge  freely  intersect 
and   cross-fructify,  after a literary  fashion,   in  the  interest  of a 
humane practicality.      'Reading,  and much reading,   is good,'   Burke 
wrote  to his son   [in February,   1773];   'but  the  power of diversifying 
the matter  infinitely  in your own mind   [my emphasis],  and of  apply- 
ing  it  to every  occasion that arises,   is far better, so don't sup- 
press   the vivida vis.'     It   is this  assimilative side of his  intelli- 
gence which  keeps  resistance  to theory  from being merely negative. 
Burke  fed upon  theory  and upon knowledge of all kinds as a plant 
upon  light,   taking what he   could use,   assimilating,  transforming, 
while  his main energies were engaged by the world of solid  and 
growing  [my emphasis]   actuality."" 
The Burke described  by  Chapman   above is worlds apart   from the 
Burke portrayed  by Sir Ernest  Barker.     Barker, after noting Burke's 
famous  phrase echoing Pope—"'The  individual  is  foolish   .   .   .   but  the 
species   is wise,"1 proceeds  to say:     "Profound words,  on which one  can 
build a whole philosophy,"       and proceeds   to describe Burke as  having 
done just   that.     Burke would seek to  "justify" how  "in every society 
the  collective mind  of man   .   .   .   lias been  active throughout  the 
generations in building a fabric of social and political experience 
and  a system of social  and  political values."J However, 
.   .   .   this   fabric  of past experience,   this system of inherited 
values,  also needs   to be  criticized,   in each generation,  for 
eacli generation,   by each generation,   if   it  is ever  to be  carried 
to a higher stage;   and  this   is a necessity which Burke  tended 
to minimize  and even to  ignore.   .   .   .     Burke was  prior to Hegel, 
but he had an Hegel within him and he well knew   .   .   .   the working 
of   'objective  mind'   .   .    .    .-'•"1 
Barker's  Burke seems  closer  to,   in terms  of  the history of  philosophical 
thought of eighteenth  century England,   the  passive Shaftesburian school. 
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Although with Hegel Reason,   or the   Ideas, might be  Immanent 
in history  and with Shaftesbury God  Is "an   immanent  and all-pervading 
force," the  result  regarding use,   or non-use,  of  the active  intellect, 
the   "vivida vis," is  the  same—history or nature   is  objectified or 
deified and  the  conscious use  of the   intellect  to shape  the empirical 
world is  lost  as  a motive  to action.     With  this motive   is  lost   the 
attempts  at   reconciliation of subject  and  object,  or at  least  of  a 
belief  in the reality of subject and object   as  two independent,  but  not 
autonomous and  self-sufficient   realities.     Whether the   result  is  an 
objective   idealism  of   a  Hegel  or  the   subjective   idealism  of   Shaftesbury 
and   the English Moral  Sense school, whether  the   form of such philosophi- 
cal  impreciseness  and non-discrimination  is   the pantheism of  a Spinoza, 
the rationalism of a Leibniz,  or  the   Panglossian  optimism of  a Shaftes- 
bury and  a Pope,   the  result   is   that   the categories of  subject-object 
become  irrelevant and  lose  their identity as  respective  ends;   instead 
everything and every  individual  is merely derivative of some universal 
Force  or  Idea or Deity operating  in  this monistic universe by its own 
inertia of mass,  cunning  of reason,   or the moral sense  of Shaftesbury 
which   is  "merely a particular application of   the  faculty by which we 
apprehend the harmony" or  the  '"universal mind,'   by which the whole   is 
animated  [and which]   is   the keystone  of  Shaftesbury's writings." 
Burke may scorn  to have been  at   times  overawed, like a good Shnftesburian, 
with   the  complex worJd and   the  impossibility   of the human intellect   to 
act  in  it,   let   alone upon   it.     In Burke's treatment of,   or use of,   the 
British empirical tradition  (below),  he  is both  (1)   aware of  the   incom- 
pleteness of his explanation of the  "problem of induction," the problem 
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of   causation in relation to our  ideas on  the sublime and the beautiful, 
and  of man's futile  attempt at knowing the  "chain of  causes"  that   leads 
ultimately to God.     Yet,  Burke   (2)   does not hesitate at discussing God's 
plan for man,  and the  great potentialities   for the use of reason by man 
within  the province God has  laid out for man's activity   (see Appendix A). 
Such a misinterpretation  of Burke  as presented above may be 
given to his statement   in  "Thoughts on French Affairs," in which he 
admits: 
The world  of   contingent  and  political combination  is much  larger 
than we are   apt   to  imagine.    We  never can say what may or may 
not happen, without  a view to all  the  actual  circumstances. 
Experience,   upon  other data than  those,   is of   all  things  the 
most  delusive. "** 
However,  Burke   fed  upon  the mass of  empirical data.     He did not  let   it 
overwhelm him,   in  the  sense  that he  did not  fall back upon a monistic 
system such as   the  continental rationalism of Leibniz  and Wolff, or 
upon   the early eighteenth-century "Moral Sense" school  in England; 
both  the  continental schools and  the  English school  concluded   in the 
"whatever  is,  is  right" nostrum—a position which minimized participa- 
tion  in  the system by  the active human  intellect,   if  it  recognized 
such participation by  the  reasoning  faculties at  all. 
Burke believed   that  the consequences of sucli  a monism as 
Shaftesbury's—or any  form of monism—would  negate morality,  or the 
moral problem, of   the  reconciliation of  the   "is" and the   "ought," or 
the real and  the  ideal,   or  the particular and  the universal.     -     The 
complexity of Burke's  assumptions—his  heterogeneous ethic  reflecting 
a dualistic world-view—is seen in a bit of  conversation  toward the 
end of his   life and  recorded by Mrs.   Crewe.     Burke  says  that morality 
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should be  acknowledged   as  a science, but not  systematized by the 
human intellect.     Customs   (or the mass of empirical  data coming  out 
of history)   are an  arena  in which morals  are translated  into visible 
acts,  as  transiently and  artificially manufactured   (by the whimsies 
of men)   fashion  is  not. 
Morals.     Should be  acknowledged  as a science,  and not be 
subject  to doubtful Laws—Customs  for this  reason only 
should be preferred  to Fashions.     Theorical   [sic]  Virtue 
leads   to systematical  Vice,  and  therefore dangerous.106 
The  theoretical virtue of  Shaftesbury's universe of  harmony  and benev- 
olence would of  itself—that  is,   the simple belief  of such  a monistic 
universe—serve vice  by assuming responsibility or justification   for 
vice.     This  is  so, because  virtue   in the long run  represents vice,  or 
vice versa.     Virtue   is  confused with vice—like  Dante's   thieves, 
virtue and vice melt   into one  another. 
Francis  Hutcheson   (1694-1746) ,   a disciple  of  Shaftesbury   and 
one of   the  leading figures  of  the Moral  Sense  school, was  a transition 
figure  in that  his  finished ethical system used  the  criteria of   the 
utilitarian pleasure-pain  calculus.     In the broad terms  of  theories of 
reality,  the substance of Hutcheson's  argument  reflects the monism of 
the Moral Sense school   (and  indirectly the monism of  the Leibniz/Wolff 
continental   rationalism),   a monism which assumes everything  to be 
related to everything else,   and   the easy and significant  conclusion 
that everything eventually runs   into everything else.     The epistemologi- 
cal upshot  of this view of   reality  is  a passive, non-forming epistemology 
in which moral ideals  are  confused with clear and distinct  actions,  and 
perceiving subject with the moral objects of perception. 
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In Hutcheson's  scheme,   the passivity  of   the moral sense  is 
like the passivity which Locke had  assigned  to  the external senses 
whereby we  receive simple empirical data.     The moral sense  also 
receives   the moral  data,  so to speak,  from the  observed external 
moral world,  just as   the external senses  received sensations  from 
the physical world.     Hutcheson   follows  the  same  line of   thought  in 
his  concept  of a "more passive   reception of beauty,   reflecting the 
eternal harmonies." The moral sense  itself   reflected an "omnis- 
cient  natural  reason," but was yet  the affection acquired when we 
perceived others'   "benevolence manifested   in action." Only per- 
ceived benevolent  actions are morally good.     Thus virtue here becomes 
synonymous with perceived benevolent   actions. But  since there  are 
so many different  actions  taking place in so many varied settings and 
forms,   actions which might be   interpreted as benevolent   (i.e., morally 
virtuous),   the   internal moral sense  or senses  corresponding  to  the 
different  kinds of benevolent  actions  grow in number until  the moral 
sense simply  represents  a psychological enumeration,  or at most  cata- 
loging,   of  the   fait  accompli of   the  various benevolent actions.     The 
moral  sense becomes  in a sense  an  imitation, a mirror of perceived 
actions.     The  object   is  confused  with   the subject. 
.   .   .  once wc begin  to distinguish  [as Hutcheson did]  senses 
and   faculties  according  to  distinguishable   objects  and   aspects 
of objects,   there  is hardly  any  limit  to the number of senses 
and   faculties which we  can postulate.112 
We are not judging  the  objects,  but   the objects   are,   so  to speak, 
judging or controlling us.     So, while Hutcheson's utilitarian  calculus 
may aim at   a "moral" end—the greatest happiness  of  the greatest number- 
99 
the determination of   this morally desirable end rests  upon  an epistemo- 
logical confusion between subject  and  object,  a confusion resulting  in 
the predominance  of object  over subject  and the equation of   certain 
kinds of perceived  actions with morality  itself,  the equation of  is 
with ought.     The  utilitarian ethic  is merely a quantitative rearrang- 
ing or maneuvering of received  empirical data.     How this data  is   to 
be  rearranged is  determined by facile  assumptions of   the moral correct- 
ness of   the consequences  of  actions   rather than a critical  study of   the 
causes  or motivations of   the   actions—whether  the causes be some  trans- 
cendent   ideal or   Idea,  or an   immanent   force,  or some  natural process, 
or some particular set  of historical,   social,  political, etc.   settings 
and/or developments,  or  a combination  of some or all of  these  causes 
and conditions.     J 
Burke explicitly attacks  the   form of monism expressed   in 
Hutcheson's works.     In his  "Essay on  the Sublime and   the Beautiful," 
Burke  criticises   the monism of  Locke,  but Burke's strictures could 
reflect  a disagreement with Hutcheson  and  the Moral Sense school just 
as well.     The substance  of  the  argument   against monism remains   if  the 
word, virtue,   is  substituted  for the word,  pleasure   (or pain),   and 
vice substituted  for pain. 
Many are of  the  opinion   [Burke writes],  that pain necessarily 
arises   from the  removal of some pleasure;   as  they  think pleasure 
does   from the   ceasing or diminuation of some pain.     For my part 
.   .   .   pain and  pleasure,   in   their most  simple and natural manner 
of affecting,   are each of  a positive nature,  and by no means 
necessarily dependent  on each other  for their existence.     ...   I 
can never persuade myself   that pleasure  and pain are mere  relations, 
which  can only  exist  as  they are  contrasted.     Nothing  is more  cer- 
tain to my own  feelings as  this.11^ 
The epistemological/psychological confusion of  the pleasure-pain formula 
is paralleled by the moral confusion of  Rousseauian revolutionary polemics. 
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Burke  sees  Rousseau's   confusion of vice and virtue  as  a 
practical example of  the  results of  an indiscriminate monism.     The 
Jacobins who have  taken Rousseau as  their model  "infuse  into their 
youth an unfashioned,   indelicate, sour, gloomy,  ferocious medley of 
pedantry  and   lewdness—of metaphysical speculations blended with 
the coarsest  sensuality." Rather,   as Burke says a few years 
later,   the   "subordination  of mind" is  necessary to avoid extremes 
(and,   to  avoid an indiscriminate monism,  for subordination is  discrim- 
ination).     Burke  tells Mrs.   Crewe   (1797): 
A tone  of   fastidiousness   too  often  substituted   for   true 
taste which ought   to consist  of Indulgence  as well as 
refinement.     All  societies  apt  to  run into opposite extremes 
if affectation be  not   kept under properly.   .   .   .     Common 
sense  would  avoid   such   f astidiousness. *-±0 
But  the  fastidious   "Modern  Authors" mix virtue with vice  and refinement 
with indulgence.     Burke complained to Mrs.   Crewe  that 
Many of  them were very dangerous  from their  flattery to 
Vice—all  characters are by nature morally  in Tune,   and 
do not   like  to have discords played upon   them—for which 
reason,   the new Philosophers when  they would persuade must 
blend virtuous sentiments  in   their poisonous compositions. 
.   .   .   Mr.   Burke   frequently spoke with great disgust  of  the 
new fashioned feelings   introduced  into  the World by  Rousseau, 
Sterne,  etc.   .   .   . 11* 
The Jacobins  corrupt   their youth by exposing them to the   "mischevious" 
works of   Rousseau 
.   .   .   and all the more mischevious   for the mixture   .   .   .   for 
perfect depravity  of sentiment   is not reconcilable with elo- 
quence;   and   the mind  (though  corruptible not  complexionally 
vicious)   would   reject  and  throw  off  with  disgust   a  lesson  of 
pure and  unmixed evil.     These writers make even virtue  a pander 
to vice.   .   . 118 
Burke believed that only political chaos  and disorder could and would 
result if  this  philosophical   confusion were  to be accepted by a national 
leader in time of  crisis. 
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Burke   pointed out  that  Henry IV of  France,  unlike his successor, 
Louis XVI,  avoided such  confusion in thought  and deed,   and,   to the 
extent  lie did  avoid  such confusion, was  a successful monarch.     Further, 
Burke warned   in a  letter  of October,   1790,  the present  King of France 
would prove  to be  an  unsuccessful  ruler  and would become a slave  to 
the   tyranny of  events and  immediate   circumstances   if he  failed to avoid 
such confusion   in his  thoughts.     If  Henry  IV of Navarre had confused 
the virtues of   mercy, benevolence and   the honoring of past obligations 
to one now become his  and   the state's enemy, Henry would have  thereby 
served the vice of   civil war.     But Henry  rightly saw the positive 
function—characterized by  "vigour,   activity and  foresight of  a 
Henry 4th"—of  virtue  in  this setting  to be  that  of  exterminating the 
vice.     The  "virtue"  of   the present French King, Louis XVI,  lacks  the 
positive  and  purposeful policy of the old king.     Lacking a grasp  of 
positive  virtue,   the present king allows events,   accidents,   trifles   to 
shape him and  his policy and he not  them.     The  "accidents" which Burke 
points  to might  be seen here  as  events not  tested or touched  by a 
positive virtue,  and  therefore  as  "false" events,  in  the sense  that 
they have arbitrarily entered upon  the stage of history without having 
been   opposed by  any  corresponding and/or forming virtue, without  a 
nay-saying  to  their  intrusions,  without   that  "holding back at   certain 
points"119 by  an  opposing number of an event or train of events which 
might  not have   otherwise  occurred.     Burke wrote  in his  letter of the 
benevolence of Henry  IV in quickly and decisively crushing a  revolt  by 
the  Due de  Biron, whose  ambition had led him to plot with his   country's 
enemies against   his  king.     Burke wrote: 
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He   [Henry  IV] would not have deserved  the Crown, which he won 
and wore with so much glory,   if he had scrupled by all  the 
preventive mercy  of rigorous  Law to punish   those Traitors  and 
Enemies  of  their   Country and of mankind.     For believe me,   there 
is no Virtue where there is no Wisdom.     A great, enlarged, 
protecting,   and preserving Benevolence,  has  it, not  in  its 
accidents and  circumstances, but   in its very essence,   to exter- 
minate Vice,   and  disorder and  oppression from  the World.     Good- 
ness spares  infirmity; Nothing but weakness a congenial  thing 
is  tender of  the  Crimes  that  connect themselves with power to the 
destruction of  the  Religion,  Laws,  polity, morals,   industry, 
Liberty  and  prosperity of your Country?    Henry  the 4th  if  he had 
such men  as his subjects, would have done his duty I doubt not. 
The present King  is  in the place of  the Victim not of  the  avenger 
of   these  Crimes.     That he did not  prevent   them with  the  early 
Vigour,   activity,   and  foresight of  an Henry  the  4th  is  rather his 
Misfortune  than his Offence.     He lias,  I  hear,  and believe,   a good 
natural  understanding,   as well as a mild and benevolent  heart;  and 
these  are  the  rudiments  of Virtue.     But  he was born   in purple;  and 
of  course was not  made  to a situation which would have  tried  a Virtue 
the most   fully perfected.     By what  steps,  by what men, by what means, 
on what  pretexts,   thro what projects,  by what  a  series of mistakes 
and miscalculations  of  all kinds he has been brought  to  the State, 
in which he   is obliged   to appear as a sort  of  instrument   in  the 
ruin of his Country,   is a subject   for History. 120 
Benevolence   for Burke's Henry IV was not   (as  it   seemed  to be   for Louis XVI) 
the  facile yea-saying  to the givens  of history and/or (as  the  Shaftes- 
burian Moral  Sense school would have it)   the   immediately and directly 
felt sentiments.     Benevolence was  a  "great, enlarged" application of 
the virtuous wisdom of  a monarch who weighed past  loyalties  and obliga- 
tions, and present   realities on the  scale of  reasons  of state.     Benevo- 
lence as  a virtue encompassed both  the sentiment  and understanding of 
historical events   and human  actions, but benevolence  also  included  the 
wisdom which would not   confuse the   "natural understanding" with benevo- 
lence  in  the   latter's   true  "enlarged" and virtuous sense. 
More   recently,  Hans Barth has described Burke's thought   in  terms 
similar to the  impressionistic portraits of Burke by  Samuel Johnson and 
Gerald Chapman.     But Barth,   in addition,  offers  an interpretation of 
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Burke's phrase—"the species  Is wise,  the individual  is  foolish"— 
which coincides with Chapman's view of Burke and which conflicts with 
Barker's  interpretation of  the phrase  and  Barker's view of  Burke   in 
general.     It   is  Burke's essential dualistic view of  reality which helps 
him avoid confusion of  ideal and real,  subject  and  object—such  a 
confusion marked  historically  for example,  by  the  immanent,  monistic 
cosmology and reductionist epistemology and ethics  of  Shaftesbury  and 
his  school in eighteenth-century England.     Barth, with Chapman  and 
Samuel   Johnson,  realizes  Burke's special  concern  for  the variety and 
complexity  of   the  objective  empirical   and  historical   world,   and  yet 
Burke's   confidence  in the human  intellect  to shape  this objective 
world according  to  that world's own   laws and the  laws  of  the universal 
moral order.     Barth  cites   the nineteenth-century German scholar,  Helnrich 
von Sybel's view of  Burke's  thought   as characterized by 
.   .   .   the  instinct   'of giving himself  up to things, of penetrating 
into the wealth  of   life,   and  of  beginning his  own mental activity only 
after being sated   (but not overwhelmed)  with an  abundance of  observa- 
tions.'     This   is  reverence  toward  that which  is.     But  it  alone would 
hardly suffice  to make Burke a discoverer of the historical world 
and   the specifically historical way of  thinking  and observing.     For 
the   respect   of   the past would only justify  the defense of  the  status 
quo.     Status quo is purely  static.     But history  is not only  the 
permanent,  but   also the changing, which, while changing,   retains  its 
identity.^21 
Barth  then cites  the phrase,   "the species   is wise," but draws a different 
meaning   from  it  than did  Barker.     Barth  interprets   it   to mean   the  active 
formative  intellect   of successive  past  generations each molding   their 
respective objective settings   in  accordance with  the objective principles 
of the moral  order.     Human  reason interprets  the  objective principles  and 
applies  them to the  respective settings and  circumstances.     This  dualism 
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of Burke  avoids,  for example,   the  relativistic ethic of Shaftesbury, 
an ethic based upon  an  assumed monism,   a cosmology of universal 
harmony,   and  reflected   in the   immanentization of  objective moral 
values.     The  immanentization  results  in an assumed  identity of  the 
moral values with  certain human psychological   traits, especially, 
certain felt   (passively received)  benevolent  sentiments.     Barth  argues, 
.   .   .   the   traditional political  institutions  and customs  are 
not venerable  and valuable  simply because  they  are historical, 
because  they have  existed  and have been accepted  for a long 
time.     Their acceptance  rests rather on  the  fact   that  they 
represent  the  reason   [emphasis added]   of earlier generations. 
That  is  the meaning of Burke's  assertion  that   the species   is 
wise.     The historical view of man and of  the   forms of  social 
life   [serve]   .   .   .   the basic principles  of moral order.     'The 
great   law of change'   had  to be  reconciled with   the   'principles 
of  original justice.'     Burke would have  insisted,  as Herder did 
in his   consideration  of Shaftesbury's ethics,   that  there can 
never  be   'a  plurality  of   reasons  within   the  human  species'    [the 
various  felt benevolent sentiments]   and  that   'several highest 
principles  of morality'   are not   'ever thinkable.'    Not  a trace 
of   the  relativism of  value  and truth, which resulted  from the 
radical historication of  thought   in the   latter part of  the 
nineteenth  century   [and which Barker sees  as  characteristic of 
Burke's   thought,   see  supra,   page 94],   is   to be  found in Burke's 
speeches  and writings.     For him,  only abstract  and general reason 
is  fatal,  because,   compared with concrete  reason which deals with 
real,  given situations,  it   is  inferior precisely because of   its 
abstractness and   exerts a destructive  influence  on  the  concrete 
political  and social  reality  to which  it   is applied. 122 
The jostlings  of justice and expediency,  or of objective   (moral)   values 
with  the  laws   or norms of   the  objective empirical world, of  the  ideal 
with the   real,   all serve  the moral  order.     Human reason must  accept the 
objective reality of   the givens—of  a priori moral principles  and of  the 
empirical world   (abstract  reason is unacceptable   to Burke,  because it 
intrudes  upon,   in an unmoral manner,   "the  concrete and political and 
social reality   to which  it   is  applied").     But having done so, human 
reason must   then appraise  and mold, not justify,  the  givens of  objective, 
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moral principles  and of   the objective empirical/historical  realm. 
In the   language of   the natural  law  tradition viewed by a recent 
commentator,   the reason carries out   the function of  the Natural Law, 
which 
.   .   .   both describes and prescribes.    On  the  one hand,   its 
principles   [whatever  they  may  be]   describe   Clio   [moral,   not 
physical]   regularities which are  to be discovered  in  the 
universe.     On  the other hand,   its principles set  forth norms 
in accordance with which men are morally obligated  to  live.-*-^ 
But the point   of   the present study  is  to note  that in  the same manner 
by which the   reason of   the natural   law would both describe  and prescribe, 
so the  philosophical  assumptions of   certain eighteenth-century schools 
of  thought—specifically,   those  of  the "Scottish Historians" and of 
the Scottish  Common Sense realists— would describe and prescribe. 
That   is,   these  assumptions would  take  into account,   for example, both 
"justice  and expediency"   (see supra.,   p. y3).     They would,   so  to speak, 
describe  expediency—that  is,  describe  and not distort   the  independent 
reality  of  the  phenomenal-historical world,  and,  given  this, would 
prescribe certain moral rules   in order to guide human actions beyond 
the  immediate   and particular (historical)  settings  and  circumstances. 
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NOTES 
Peter Gay,  The Enlightenment.     An  Interpretation,  Vol.   II, 
The Science of   Freedom  (N.Y. :    Alfred A.  Knopf,   1969), pp.   7-8.     See 
two articles  by Skinner:     "Economics and History—The Scottish Enlight- 
enment ," Sc£tj^ij5h_JouniaJ^_oJ_Po^^ Vol.   XII   (February, 
1965),  1-22,   and Skinner's more  recent  article,   "Natural History  in 
the Age of Adam Smith," Political  Studies,  Vol.   XV   (1967),   32-48. 
o 
Seth,  Pringle-Pattison referred  to  the  "Natural Dualism" of 
Scottish  Common-Sense   realism,  a dualism which  included a number of 
elements which maintained   the separate   reality of matter  and mind 
repectively, while at   the  same  time  avoiding a mechanistic  philosophy 
capable of degenerating,  for example,   into  associationism,   the  psycho- 
logical basis  of utilitarianism.     See Andrew Seth   (A.   S.   Pringle-Pattison), 
Scottish Philosophy.     A Comparison of   the  Scottish  and German Answers  to 
Hume   ("Balfour  Philosophical   Lecture,"  University  of  Edinburgh)    (Edinburgh 
and  London:    William Blackwood and  Sons,   1899),  pp.   76-77.     More  recently, 
I).   Daiches  Raphael has explained the Natural Dualism of  Reid's  Common- 
Sense   realism:     "Reid   insists   that mind  and matter are wholly different 
and subject  to wholly different  processes  and conditions.     Yet,   there  is 
no need,  he thinks,   for the  Cartesian perplexity  concerning the  possibility 
of  contact between these two different  forms of being.     There  clearly is 
contact between mind  and matter,  Reid  holds,  but we must not view the 
relation between  them as we view the  relation between  two pieces of matter 
in contact;  the word   'contact'   is but  a metaphor taken by analogy  from a 
relation that  is usually  required for matter to  interact with matter." 
D.   Daiches  Raphael, The Moral Sense   (London:    Oxford University Press, 
1947),  pp.   146-147.     See also  the  late  Jerome Weinstock's article,   "Reid's 
Definition of  Freedom," Journal of  the History of  Philosophy, Vol.   XIII, 
Number 3  (July,   1975),  pp.   335-345. 
3S.   A.   Grave,   The   Scottish  Philosophy  of   Common  Sense   (Oxford:     at 
The Clarendon Press,   1960), p.   19. 
ASee  Frederick Copleston,  A History of Philosophy,  Vol.   IV,   Modern 
Philosophy:     Descartes   to Leibniz   (Garden  City,  N.Y. :     Image  Books,  A 
Division of Doubleday  and  Co.,  Inc.,   1963,   1960),   p.   49. 
5S.   A.   Grave,   op.   cit., pp.   94-109. 
6See Basil Willey, The Seventeenth Century Background .Studies  in 
the Thought  of  the Aee  in Relation  to Poetry  and  Religion   (N.Y.:     Columbia 
University Press,   1967,   1934),  p.   155. 
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7 Ibid. ,  pp.   155-156. 
*Ibid.,  p.   156. 
yIdem. 
10P.   G.   Winch,   "The Notion of   'Suggestion'   in Thomas Reid's 
Theory of Perception," The Philosophical Review  (U.   of St.   Andrews), 
Vol.   Ill, No.   13   (October,   1953),  p.   328. 
11 
12 
Ibid. ,  p.   340. 
Ibid. ,   p.   337. 
1JThe resemblance of  Reid  to Kant here  is easily demonstrated. 
As  a self-evident   (Copleston,  op.   cit.,  V,   ii,  p.   170)   "original percep- 
tion" "not  the   result  of   'custom'   or   'habit'   as in  the  case of   'acquired 
perception'"   (P.   G.   Winch,  op.   cit.,  pp.   340-348),  the notion of suggestion 
was one  of the  "common principles which are  the  foundation  of all  reason- 
ing and of  all science"   (Copleston,   op.   cit.,   V,   ii,  p.   171). 
Such   common   principles  seldom  admit   of  direct  proof   [for  example,   of 
the  direct proof of   local matter  in motion which Hobbes  relied upon 
and which  Ctidworth  denied],  nor do they need it.     Men  need not   to be 
taught   them;   for  they are such  as all men  of  common understanding 
know.    .    .    .    (Idem.) 
Whether "suggestion" be one of   the  subdivisions of these  self-evident, 
first   "common principles"—either  "necessary  truths,   the opposite of which 
is  impossible,"  or  "contingent   truths,  the  opposite  of which  is possible" 
(idem)—is  less  to  the point here  than  it   is  on this point   that,   as  Bernard 
Peach said, 
".   .   .   the greatest  similarity between Kant   and  Reid   is   to be   found, 
in the principles   that  Reid  considers   to be   'first  principles'   and 
those which Kant   attempts   to establish  as  a priori synthetic princi- 
ples  of   the pure science of nature.     Reid  asserts  as  a   'first  meta- 
physical principle  of necessary   truth   .   .   .   that whatever begins   to 
exist must  have  a cause which produced   it.'    He asserts   that  the 
principle  cannot be drawn  from experience  any more  than   from abstract 
reasoning.   .   .   .     [Reid   chooses]   ...   to  regard  it   as  self-evident 
and  in need of  no proof but   to be  received  as  an axiom which  cannot, 
by  reasonable  men,   be   called   in   question.    .    .   .      [Although]   .    .    .   Reid 
does  not  draw  the  distinction  between   theoretical   and   practical  princi- 
ples   [respectively,  principles  concerned with the  realms  of nature and 
with the  realm of morality]   as sharply as Kant,  nor does he work  out 
the details.     But he does make  the distinction explicitly   [in Essay 
on  the  Active   Powers   of  Man] 
'To judge  of what is   true  or false   in speculative points,   is   the 
office of   speculative  reason;  and to judge of what   is good  or ill 
for us upon the whole,   is  the office of practical  reason.'"[For 
Burke's distinction between  speculative  and critical  reason,  see 
Francis  P.   Canavan, The Political Reason of Edmund  Burke   (Durham, 
N.C.:     Duke University Press,   1960),   Chapter 2,   "Reason and Theory," 
espec.   pp.   28-29.] 
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Peach referred  to  the practice of Kant  and  Reid 
...   of   regarding certain principles  as   'innocent until proven 
guilty'   [as]   .   .   .   characteristic not only  of   their approach  to 
questions  of  knowledge generally,  but  also  in morals.     (Bernard 
Peach,  "Common Sense  and Practical Reason   in  Reid  and Kant," 
Sophia   [Padova],   Vol.   XXIV   [1956], p.   67.) 
Reid's and  Kant's  similar doctrines   regarding knowledge or   the  act  of 
perception assumes   an active  intellect  sifting out not  only the world 
of sense  from the world of  principle,  but drawing distinctions   among 
various  types  of "first principles"  themselves. 
14 Ibid. , Winch,  p.   339. 
Ibid.,  p.   330.     Reid denied  "suggestion" was  an acquired 
perception,  but  did  not deny that our perceptions begin in sensations 
of  the external world.     Reid will not  "...   admit  that any theory 
which asserts   that   the notions of external  qualities  are arrived   at  by 
any means of  some  sort of  habitual  association between different sorts 
of sensations   can be  satisfactory.     On the other hand, he remains   firmly 
convinced  that   our possession of   concepts of objects  of perception does 
depand on  the   fact   that we have  sensations.   .   .   (ibid., p.   337). 
This   is,   of  course, Kant's   aim.     A.   C.   Geneva  reminds us   that 
Kant's Copernican Revolution  involved   "...   the   turn to the  agent,   the 
recognition   .    .   .   that before we  can  give an account  of the  character of 
objects, we must  first  take  account   of what  and  how it   is  that   the knower, 
in his use  of   intelligence,   contributes   [emphasis   added—contributes, not 
overwhelms]   to  the epistemological context.     This   critical  self-awareness 
is   the  central   idea underlying Kant's   'Critical  philosophy'   and   it  is only 
through such resulting   'transcendental   [a priori]   knowledge'   that we can 
assess ourselves of both  the  objective extents  and   limits of  human  culture 
.   .   .   the notion of   'objectivity'   is  the most   fundamental  idea in  this 
thesis   ..."   [emphasis  added].        A.   C.   Oenova,   "Kant's  Enlightenment," 
Studies on Voltaire   and  the Eighteenth Century   (The  Voltaire  Foundation, 
Thorpe Mandeville House, Banbury, Oxfordshire),  Vol.  LXXXVIII   (1972),   578. 
The Copernican   Revolution is  a revolution precisely because   it  does avoid 
the internalization of the  external world—a step   involved in any  subjec- 
tive  idealism.     The  Copernican Revolution does,  on  the  contrary,  partially 
measure the extent  and the  limits of  the  influence of the forming,   shaping 
critical human   intellect,  according  to considerations which  the   intellect 
must give   to  the objective   laws of  the external empirical  (phenomenal) 
realm.     This measuring is what saves  the  intellect   from the  subjective 
idealism of Berkeley or the  subjective  rationalism of  the Cartesians,  or 
of  the  T,e Lbniz ian/Wolf f ian  school. 
17 
18 
Ibid. , Winch, p. 340. 
Ibid. , p. 332. 
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9Copleston,   op.   cit.,  Vol.   V,  Part  ii,  pp.   171-172.     Gavin 
Ardley  recently distinguished Reid  and George  Campbell's Common Sense 
realism from that  of James  Beattie,  on  the basis of  their  respective 
views  on  the use of  the reason.     Whereas Beattie's Essay on   the nature 
and   immutability of   truth,   in opposition  to sophistry and scepticism 
(1770)   may be  seen  as "preaching  the  imbecility of  the intellect,   .   .   . 
there  is   little ground  for bringing  this  charge against  Reid."     (Gavin 
Ardley,   "Hume's  Common Sense Critics," Revue   Internationale   de Philo- 
sophic   [Commemorative  issue:     David Hume  1776-1976], Vols.   115-116, 
fasc.   1-2   (1976),  p.   1.19.)     Even  Reid's critics, notably  the   "Scholastic 
commentators"  from the  late eighteenth to the   twentieth centuries   admit 
that   "...   the  resort   to common  sense as blind instinct  is not  Reid's 
authentic doctrine;   that,   in  fact,   Reid is  a champion  (though sometimes 
confused)   of   the rational philosophy of being"   (ibid.,  p.   111).     Reid 
is with Oswald  and  against  Beattie here.     "...   Reid  and  especially 
Oswald,  are quite  clear in their affirmation.     They do not believe   that 
common sense  is  confined  to deftness   in everyday action;   they do not 
admit  a disjunction between practice  and   theory, between  the   life  of 
action and  the  life of speculative   thought.    They recognize   in common 
sense  a rational power of   discernment  of the   first principles  of know- 
ledge,   an access  to being"   (ibid.,  p.   113).     Even Reid's use   of  the 
word  "instinct" is an  instance of   a distinction of the  reasoning faculty. 
"If,   at  times,   Reid speaks  of common sense as  an instinct of our nature, 
he does not  thereby mean  that  it  is  a blind or  irrational instinct.     For 
in Aberdeen circles,   as  Campbell explains,  the  term   'instinct'  was  used 
for self-evidence  in contingent matters,   in order to distinguish   that 
operation  from self-evidence in abstract  relations"   (ibid.,   p.   119). 
Oswald held that   "Common  sense  is  rational   judgement,  and all  too often 
common  opinion,  perverted by prejudice  and passion,  falls below the 
rational standard"  (ibid.,   p.   122).     "Oswald  is  perfectly  clear where 
he stands:     the   appeal  to common sense is  the  appeal to our rational 
perception of  first principles, whether in  the material or the moral 
orders;   it  is quite distinct   from all blind propensities  and   instincts; 
to deny this  is  to take away our distinctive humanity"  (ibid., p.   121). 
20Andrew Skinner,   "Economics and History:—the Scottish Enlight- 
enment,"  Scottish Journal of Political Economy   (February,   1965), PP-   ^~'4- 
Peter  D.   Garside has  recently written of   the influence of   the   "philosoph- 
ical historians" of   the Scottish Enlightenment upon the  thought of  Sir 
Walter Scott.     It was  Scott who,  in  remembering  in his  later  years his 
teachers  at   the   University  of  Edinburgh   in   the   late  eighteenth  century, 
referred   to the  Edinburgh of his  student days as  containing .,   .   .   a 
circle   .   .   .  which has perhaps at no period been equalled,   considering 
the depth and  variety of  talent which   it embraced and concentrated. 
(Peter i).   Garside,   "Scott  and  the   'Philosophical' Historians," Journal 
of  the History of  Ideas,  Vol.   XXXVI,   No.   3   [July-September,   1975],  p.   499.) 
Scott  had been either student  or friend to Robertson, Ferguson  and Dugald 
Stewart,  among others.     Stewart had been Ferguson's successor  as Professor 
of Moral Philosophy at  the University of Edinburgh  (idem).     Garside  sees 
in Scott ;s  novels evidence of  the  Scottish "philosophical" historians 
"...   deep sense  of the essentially social nature of history,   the 
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sophisticated  determinism,   the sharp  awareness of  the effects of 
historical  environment on behavior"   (ibid.,  p.   497),   and the   "main 
themes of   'philosophical'  history"—"The   inevitability of progress, 
the  importance   of property  in development,  the power struggle between 
classes,  the effect of social environment on  'manners'   ..."   (ibid., 
p.   500).     If  Scott was directly exposed  to the thought of some of   the 
leading  lights  of   the  Scottish Enlightenment,   then so was Burke.  Skinner 
stated   the   case   for Burke's  Scottish  connection,  as  Garside did  for Scott. 
Skinner wrote that  "Edmund   Burke was   installed as  Lord Rector of Glasgow 
University   in  April of  1784;   an office   .   .   .   [which]   enabled him to make 
direct  contact with some, of  the  leading  academic thinkers of   the day— 
Adam Smith,  William Robertson and John Millar"(A.   Skinner, op.   cit., p.   1). 
Skinner did not  pursue the  Burke side   of  the equation, but wrote of   the 
Scottish side,  and scene.     The present  study's purpose has been to place 
both the Burkean  and the Scottish "sides"  together as part of the same 
spirit of a particular historical period—a purpose motivated in part 
by suggestions offered by  a reading of   some of the assumptions of   the 
French  "Annales" historiographical school.   (For "Les  Annales" school, 
see J.  H.  Hexter,   "Fernand   Braudel and   the   'Monde Braudellien   ..." 
The Journal  of Modern History,  Vol.   44,  No.   4  (December,   1972],  pp.   480- 
539,   and Traian  Stoianovich,   "Theoretical  Implications of Braudel's 
'Civilisation materielle,'" The Journal of Modern History, Vol.   41,  No.   1 
[March,   1969],  pp.   68-81.)     For  the Scottish   "philosophical" historians, 
see Duncan Forbes,   "'Scientific'  Whiggism:    Adam Smith and John Millar," 
Cambridge Journal,  Vol.   VIII   (1954),  pp.   643-670;  see also, Roy Pascal, 
"Property and   Society:     the   Scottish Historical School of   the Eighteenth 
Century," The Modern Quarterly,  Vol.   I   (1938),  pp.   167-179.     Forbes saw 
the figures  of   the  Scottisli Enlightenment  as  cosmopolitan philosophes. 
Adam Smith was such a philosophe  rather  than merely or exclusively  an 
economic theorist.     Adam Smith, wrote   Forbes,   "...  was one of the 
pioneers of   the  idea of progress of society  in  this  country,  at least, 
that his was  the  seminal mind   in  those   researches   into the history  of 
civil society that  play as   large a part   in the  intellectual history of 
eighteenth-century  Scotland"   (Forbes,   "'Scientific'  Whiggism," ibid., 
p.   644).     Forbes   characterized  the writings of the  Scottish philosophical 
historians—including those  of Lord Kames, Adam Smith, John Millar,   and 
Dugald Stewart—as  representing that  '"sociological evolutionism"    (ibid., 
p.   645)  which struck a balance between  history and   reason,  or, between 
nature and morality.    To Smith,  "the  idea of the progress of society did^ 
not   abolish naturrechtlich   (natural law)   thinking   ...  but  perfected  it 
(ibid.,  p.   645).     Millar described Smith as  "the   'Newton'   of  the history 
of   civil society because,   unlike Montesquieu, he had discovered,  or 
systematically applied,   the   'law'   of progress"  (ibid., p.   646).     But  if 
Smith's and   the  other Scottish figures'   notions of   the idea of  progress 
went  bcvond  Montesquieu,   their   ideas  of   the   laws  of   sociological  evolution 
differed markedly   from those  of  the associationists Hartley,  Priestly, 
Godwin and  Condorcet.     The   latter school's  ideas of progress were    more 
propagandist  than   scientific"  (ibid.,  p.   649).     Smith, Millar,   Ferguson. 
et   al.  were not   '"moral Newtonians'"   (idem), but assumed the   reality of  a 
complex or heterogeneous historical development,  a development  which 
could be made sense of, but  a reality which was not  distorted by over- 
simplified Whiggish and/or positivist  "laws" of history.     (For   the Whig 
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interpretation of history,  see Herbert  Butterfield's  classic, The 
Whig Interpretation of  History   [London:     G.   Bell and Sons,   1963,   1931]; 
for the  positivists,  see Maurice  Mandelbaura,  History, Man and Reason. 
A Study  in Nineteenth-Century Thought   [Baltimore, Maryland:    Johns 
Hopkins Press,   1974,   1971], pp.   10-11,   13-18,  171-174;   and Frank Manuel, 
The Prophets of  Paris   [Cambridge,  Mass:     Harvard University Press,   1962.) 
Duncan  Forbes wrote:     "John Millar,  though  a militant Whig, was  as much 
of a social scientist  as  a reformer, equally  concerned  to explain  as  to 
change   the world,  and  like Adam Smith he distrusted  perfectabiiity. 
Progress  for the school of Adam Smith was a   'law'  of history and not  an 
article   in a new religion.   .   .   .   their conception of progress did  not 
jilt history, but  on  the contrary  rested on   the deepest   insight   into 
historical process  that  the rationalist  eighteenth century ever  attained. 
.   .   ."   (ibid.,  p.   651).     In the  late nineteenth and early  twentieth 
centuries, German scholars were  concerned with "das Adam Smith Problem 
(the  relation of   the  sympathy  in  the Theory of Moral Sentiments  to  the 
selfishness  in the Wealth  of Nations   .   .   ."(ibid.,   p.   152).     Forbes   cited 
the words of one German of  that  controversy   (H.  Huth's  Soziale und   Individ- 
ualistische Auffassung   im 18.  Jahrhundert,   1907)  who held  that  "Adam Smith 
only appeared  to put   individual  interests before those of society"   (ibid. , 
p.   152).     By going beyond   the empirical  generalizations of Montesquieu 
and avoiding the   immanentism of   the rationalists as propagandists   (Turgot, 
Condorcet, Hartley and  Priestly),   the Scottish historians as sociological 
evolutionists,   Forbes  seemed to be  saying,  laid the groundwork for a more 
permanent sociological explanation,  or justification,  of  the events  of 
the  French Revolutionary period,   than did the pre-Revolutionary  French 
philosophes, whose writings served   as merely the immediate catalyst  or 
immediate justification of  those events.     Forbes wrote:     "Just as Gibbon's 
philosophic calm and  elegant scholarship were more deadly to Christianity 
than anything in  the whole battle   array of the philosophes  in France, so 
in the deep political slumber that  prevailed  in Scotland before  the   French 
Revolution,   there was  constructed   a far more powerful weapon  than anything 
hurled   against  the old order by  the school of Voltaire"   (ibid.,  pp.   652-653). 
It might  be suggested here,   in  reference  to recent work on American 
whiggism in the   (American)   Revolutionary  period,  that   it   is perhaps   a 
failure  to seriously consider  the  possible  influence  of  the  thought   of  the 
Scottish sociological historians upon Americans'   thinking,  that   is one of 
the reasons  for   (1)   the one-sided  equation by some historians   (such  as 
R.   R.   Palmer, Bernard Bailyn and Gordon S. Wood)  of American whiggism with 
'the doctrine of numerical democracy" and/or with the  ascendancy of   Che       _ 
Legislative branch  as   constituted  by direct representation of    the   people, 
and   (2),   for the perplexity and/or  refusal by   these  historians  to  recog- 
nize  the   two-sided  aspect  of American whiggism.    J.   R.   Pole asked   In his 
review-essay of  Bailyn's  long introduction to his collection of  the  Pam- 
phlets   of  the American  Revolution   1750-1776   (1965):     "What,  then, was an 
American Whig?    One whose  colonial experience enabled him to continue  to 
combine   the  interests  of a Tory with the opinions of a Radical.        (J.   R. 




.   2   [1966]     p.   233.)     Pole noted Bailyn's  "great  stress on  the  importance^ 
the American revolutionaries of.the English tradition of  radical  dissent 
i of a Locke as  exemplar of a Whiggish tradition which saw    ultimate 
authority and   'constituent power'   [(Palmer's  phrase)   as  residing]   exclusively 
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in the people"   (J.   R.   Pole,   "The  Creation of the American   Republic," 
Review of The Creation  of  the American  Republic,   1776-1787,  by Cordon 
S.  Wood   [19691   ...   in The Historical Journal,  Vol.  XIII,  No.   4 
[1970],   p.   799).     Pole  argued  that  such a view as Bailyn's  and Wood's 
only succeeds  in  avoiding the   true historical "perplexity" in which 
the "theorists of  American whiggistn" found  themselves  in regard,   for 
instance,   to  the problem of political   representation   (see .1.   R.   Pole, 
"Anatomy of   the  American Whig,"  ibid.,  p.   232;  see  also William E. 
Nelson on the   "ambiguous arguments  against  legislative power" common 
in revolutionary America—Nelson,  Americanization of   the Common Law. 
The  Impact   of  Legal  Change on Massachusetts Society,   1760-1830   [Cambridge, 
Mass.,   and  London,   England:    Harvard University Press,   1975],  p.   13). 
That  is,  there seemed   to be  an anomaly between Whig  theories of  direct 
democracy and  immediate  representation  (which would have been   translated 
into unicameral legislative bodies  at  the   time of   the drafting of state 
constitutions during  and after  the  Revolution)   and   the  common  retention 
in  fact by the  colonies,  of upper  legislative chambers  in their respec- 
tive state  constitutions.     In his  review of Bailyn's book, Pole mentioned 
as an aside,   that   "perhaps  (in  regard  to Bailyn's stress on  the English 
tradition of radical dissent   as  formative  of American  thought,  a stress 
taken by Bailyn upon  the  lead of Caroline  Robbins'  The Eighteenth-Century 
Commonwealthmen   [1959])   the  Scottish sources deserve more  credit   than 
they are given"   (Pole,   "Anatomv of   the American Whig,"  ibid.,  p.   231). 
Given the historical  fact of  Scottish influence as pervasive upon American 
colleges  before  the  Revolution,  and  upon American  revolutionary literature 
in general   (see Henry May, The  Enlightenment  in America     [New York:    Oxford 
University Press,   1976],  pp.   341-351) ,  Pole's off-hand suggestion assumes 
the proportions of   a significant  historiographical  imperative  for any 
serious  student of   the   thought  of  pre-Revolutionary American whiggism. 
21 The Annual Register, or a View of the History, Politics, and 
Literature for the Year 1777, 3rd Edition (London: J. Dodsley, 1785), 
p.   214. 
22 Ibid., p.   215, 
23 Idem. 
24 Idem. 
25The   Annual   Register,   or  a  View  of   the  History,   Politics,   and 
Literature   for  the Year  1777,   3rd Edition(I.ondon:    .1.   Dodsley,   1785), 
pp.   215-216. 
26, DPeter Hans  Reill,  "History and Hermeneutics   in  the Aufklarung: 
The Thought  of Johann Christoph Gatterer," Journal of Modern History, 
Vol.  45,  No.   1  (March,   1973),  pp.   24-51. 
27 Ibid., p.   34. 
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See  "Burke's Bill  for the Regulation of the Civil List 
Establishments," February  15,   1785,   in Writings  and  Speeches  o£ 
Edmund Burke   (Boston:    Little, Brown & Co.,   1901),  II,  p.   213." In 
the  "Reflections," Burke used  prudence  and foresight   almost   inter- 
changably:     see  the  "Reflections"   (1790)   in ibid.,  Ill,  p.   455.     By 
prudential statesmanship,  Britain could  form contingency plans so as 
to anticipate   the future   course of events  regarding  foreign  relations, 
and thus shape events,  and not have events—the actions and policies 
of foreign  states—shape  those of  the British state.     See  ibid.,  II, 
pp.   229-230;  II,  p.   247;   II,  p.   382;  and Speeches  of  Edmund Burke 
(London:     1816),   I,  p.   131.     For Burke's  talent   of   forecasting  the 
course which  the  French Revolution would  take,  see  Sir William Holds- 
worth, A Historv of F.nglish Law in  16 volumes   (London:    Methuen  & Co., 
Ltd.;  Sweet   and Maxwell,   1966   [1938], X,   pp.   95-96). 
29 Reill,   ibid.,  p.   28. 
30Reill,   ibid.,  p.   29. 
^Hush Trevor-Roper,   "The Historical Philosophy of  the Enlight- 
enment," Studies on Voltaire  and   the Eighteenth Century  (Institut et 






Ibid. , p. 1668. 
Ibid. , p. 1669 
Ibid. , p. 1670. 
Ibid. ,  p. 1671. 
Idem. 
37Trevor-Roper,  ibid. , p.   1668. 
38Ibid. ,  p.   1675. 
39Ibid. ,  p.   1676. 
40Ibid. ,  pp.   1677-1678. 
4lIbid. , p.   1678. 
*2Ibid. ,   p.   1678. 
A3Ibid. ,  p.   1679;   see   also pp.   1679-1687. 
*4Ibid.,  p.   1685.. 
45Ibid. ,  pp.   1685-1686. 
46Ibid.,   p.   1686. 
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See:     C.P.   Courtney,  Montesquieu  and  Burke,  Modern Language 
Studies  (Oxford:    Blackwell,  .1963); Co.lm Klernan,  "The Enlightenment 
and science   in eighteenth-century   France".Studies  on Voltaire and  the 
Eighteenth  Century   (Banbury,  Oxfordshire,  England, The  Voltaire Founda- 
tion,  Thorpe Nandeville House),   Vol.   LIXa   (1973),  249pp. 
48 Ibid. , p.   12.1. 
49 Idem. 
50Kiernan,  ibid., p.   137. 
-'-One may see  this as  the   case in a consideration of Montesquieu's 
dinstinction between  the "nature"  and  the  "principle" of a particular 
form  of  government.      In  this   instance,   the   "nature"  of   a  government  would 
correspond   to the philosophical  argument, while  the  "principle" of  a 
government would correspond   to  the historical argument.     To Montesquieu, 
the nature  of a government  is;   that  is,  a government of  a certain nature 
creates   itself and sets  itself   in motion.     It   is  the   ideal that can 
exist  apart   from man  and his history.     The principle of   a government must 
assume   the  previous existence of  the nature  of a government;   the former 
is a human-motivated  process which,  as  a philosophical   inferior, serves 
and  fulfills   the nature of a government.     Since history   is merely the 
corruption  of  the principles  of various  types of governments   (see Montes- 
quieu,   Spirit   of   the  Laws   [Montesquieu,   Baron  de,  The   Spirit  of   the  Laws, 
translated   by Thomas Nugent, with an  Introduction by Franz Newman,  The 
Hafner Library of Classics Series   (N.Y.: Hafner Publishing Co.,   1949), 
Book VIII,   i, p.   109]), Montesquieu's stated "design"  in The  Spirit  of 
the Laws was  to discover the relation between  the  laws   and the principles 
of each government   (see  ibid.,  Book V,   i, p.   40),  a relation which acts 
ideally to invigorate  governments,  but which occasionally becomes imbal- 
anced because  adversely affected  by historical circumstance and human 
passion. 
52 Idem. 
53John  Angus   Campbell,   "Edmund  Burke:     Argument   from  Circumstance 
in   'Reflections on  the  Revolution   In France,'" Studies   in Burke and His 
Time,  Vol.   XII, No.   2   (Whole No.   40)   (Winter,  1970-71),   p.   1765. 
54Ibid. ,  p.   1776. 
55Ibid.,  p.   1.777.     Seamus Deane   in his recent  article summarizing 
Lord  Acton's  views  on  Burke, pointed  out  that Burke opposed the  course 
of the   French Revolution because  it  did not   conform to Burke's  specific 
criteria of necessary  revolution   (as did the  Revolution Settlement of 
1688),   and   to Burke's  special  idea of  the social compact.     Burke  condemned 
the course of events   in France on  the basis of his own political experi- 
ence and  readings,  and  upon "the fixed moral realm" which he recognized. 
Deane wrote  that Acton  ignored  "...   the   fact that Burke   [was]   the 
supporter of   five revolutions," and so therefore was not opposed to 
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revolution qua  revolution.   (Seamus  Deane,   "Lord  Acton and Edmund 
Burke," Journal   of  the History of   Ideas,  Volume XXXIII, Number 2 
[April-June,   1972],  p.   333.)     Regarding Burke's  support  of  five revo- 
lutions,  Deane   cited   (idem)  Alfred Cobban,  "Edmund Burke  and the 
Origin of   the Theory of Nationality," Cambridge Historical Journal, 
Vol.   II   (1926),  40.     Deane wrote  that  Burke "...   regarded the 
French upheaval  as unique precisely because  it   threatened  the integrity 
of the European   (and  consequently  the British)   culture by  introducing 
into it  a virus which would have  fatal  results—the  Idea of  individual 
rights  anterior to the social compact and  the assertion  of  this  idea 
at  the compact's  expense.     In Burke's opinion,   the Revolution,  like  the 
Reformation,  imported  into  the  countries of Europe   interests   'other  than 
those which  arose  from their locality and natural  circumstances'.   .   .   . 
Burke was moving outside the limits of his environment and  applying with 
an energy,  which  Acton never equalled,  a standard   of moral evaluation, 
of  fixed principle   [emphasis added], not dependent upon  local conditions 
for  its validity so much  as  local  conditions were dependent  upon  it  for 
their survival.     To defend whatever is as  right,  Burke had  to demonstrate 
that  the French  Revolution was wrong.     He was not   a dupe  of history;  he 
condemned   the course   it had  taken.   [Emphasis added.]     In doing so,  he 
preserved   his moral  position by positing  two levels of experience,   the 
volatile political  level   and the   fixed  moral realm  [Deane  cited the 
"Reflections":]   'There are  some   fundamental points   in which nature 
never changes—but  they  are  few and  obvious,  and belong rather  to morals 
than   to politics.     But  so  far  as   regards   political  matter,   the  human 
mind and  human affairs are  susceptible of   infinite modification'-,   and 
of  combinations wholly new and unlooked   for.   .   .   .'"  (Seamus  Deane, 
loc.   cit.).     Burke was neither a  "dupe of history"  in the sense of being 
an historicist—of  desiring  "to preserve what   actually was   'as   it  was" 
(ibid.,  p.   331)--nor in the  sense  of being a skeptic.     Acton was  correct, 
said Deane,   in his   (Acton's)  view of  skepticism—Acton held  that   "skepti- 
cism and blank conservatism were  allied.      'Whatever  is right'   leads to 
'Refusal to admit wrong developments,'  and skepticism is  always  chary 
of any attempt  to  improve   the human situation"  (ibid., p.   329).     But 
Acton was  at  the same time   incorrect  in seeing Burke as  such a skeptic 





Campbell,  ibid.,  p.   1776. 
Ibid.,  p.   1782. 
Sk Inner,   op.   cit. ,   p.   5. 
Ibid.,   p.   22. 
60 Idem. 
61See  above,  Chapter  IV,  p. 79 et passim.,   for Burke  s kinship, 
through his   comments  on the  Scottish historians   (Robertson), with  the 
new critical  "philosophical" history of  the Enlightenment.     For  instance, 
after briefly describing the vast  subject-matter of  Robertson s volumes 
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on  the  History of  America,  Burke wrote of  Robertson's mastery of  the 
material:     "The number, variety,  and   richness  of  the materials,  did 
not,  however,  lessen  the difficulty of  the execution."     Robertson 
"was equal  to the undertaking."     (Burke),  The Annual  Register   .   .   ■ 
for the  Year  1777,   3rd  Edition   (London:     J.   Dodsley,   1785),   p.   215. 
A.   Campbell Fraser  concluded his short book on Reid with  the 
reminder that:      "...   the distinctive  feature of  Reidism is not vague 
acknowledgement of   the  common sense, but   acknowledgement of  it  as  it  is 
to be  found when steadfast reflection  is   applied  to the  final mental 
experience of man.   ..."    A.   Campbell   Fraser, Thomas Reid,   Famous  Scots 
Series,   (Edinburgh  and London:     Oliphant,  Anderson  and Ferrier, n.d.), 
p.   142.     The   first mental experience,  so  to speak,   is  the  assumption of 
the  "real existence of  outward  things,   our own individual personal 
existence;  and  the existence  of God,"  (ibid.,  p.   138),  or,  in other 
words,  of  the existence of  objects,  subject, and   transcendent   ideal 
(see  also,  in  the  present   study,  Chapter V, p. 125). 
For the distinctions   in the Common  Sense philosophy,  see: 
Frederick Coplcston,  S.J., A History of  Philosophy,  Vol.   V,  Modern 
Philosophy:     The   British  Philosophers,   Part   11,   Berkeley   to  Hume   (Garden 
City,  N.Y.:     Image  Books,   1964), pp.   169-176. 
G.   N.   Cantor,   "Henry Brougham and  the  Scottish Methodological 
Tradition,"  Studies   in   the   History  and  Philosophy  of  Science,   Vol.   II, 
No.   1   (May,   1971),   pp.   69-89. 
65 Ibid.,  p.   78. 
66Ibid.,  p.   71. 
67 Idem. 
68 Cantor,   ibid. ,   p.   72. 
69 Idem. 
70Cantor,   ibid. , p.   73. 
7JIdem; see Burleigh Taylor Wilkins, The Problem of Burke's 
Political  Philosophy   (Oxford:     Clarendon Press,   1967),  p.   71,   for his 
description of Burke'8 similar use of  Hume,   i.e.,  accepting Hume  up   to 
a point,   then dropping him for  other   Less exclusively sceptical  thinkers. 
72 
73 
Ibid., p.   74. 
Ibid. ,  p.   75. 
74Ibid.,  p.   75.     The notion of  a  "just   induction" is not unlike 
lie blending of demonstrable  fact  and  the extra-empirical  content  of what 




from  Bent ham's   "act  utilitarianism").     See  Burlcigh  Taylor  Wllkins, 
Til. ■_ I'roh loin o(  lUirke's  Political  Philosophy   (Oxford:     Clarendon Press, 
19(>7) ,  pp.   12-13;   see also, J.   J.   C.   Smart, An Outline  of   a Syslem of 
Utilitarian  Ethics   (London  and N.Y.:     Cambridge  University Press; 
Melbourne:    Melbourne University Press,  1961),  pp.   4-5. 
75 Idem. 
'Roger L. Emerson, "The Social composition of enlightened 
Scotland: the select society of Edinburgh, 1754-1764," Studies on 
Voltaire and   the Eighteenth  Century,  Vol.   CX1V   (1973),  pp.   291-321. 
77, 'Ibid. 
78 Ibid. , p. 
295. 
76. 
79 Ibid. ,  p.   78. 
80P.ichard Olson, "Scottish Philosophy and Mathematics 1750- 
1830," Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. XXXII, No. 1 (January- 
March,   1971),   pp.   29-44. 
81 Ibid. , p.   32. 
82 Idem. 
83 Olson,   ibid.,  p.   33. 
84 Idem. 
85 Idem. 






Olson,   ibid.,   p.   41. 
Ibid. ,  p.   35. 
Ibid. ,  p.   42. 
Ibid. , p.   38. 
92David Daiches, The Paradox of Scottish Culture: The Eighteenth- 
Century Experience, The Whidden Lectures for 1964 (London: Oxford Univer- 
sity Press,   1964) ,  p.   82. 
93For  the extra-empirical a priori  element of Stewart's  thought, 
see G.   N.   Cantor, op.   cit.,  p.   76,   and  Frederick  Copleston,  A History of 
Philosophy,  Vol.   5,  Modern Philosophy:    The British Philosophers, Part  II, 
Berkeley  to Hume  (Garden City, N.Y. :     Image Books,   1964), pp.   169-176. 
118 
David   Daiches,   The  Paradox  of   Scottish   Culture:     The 
Eighteenth-Century Experience, The Whidden  lectures   for  1964   (LondonI 
Oxford University Press,   1964),  p.   7.'.     Roger L.   Emerson wrote  of  the 
Edinburgh  "Select  society" members'   "qualified belief  in progress" 
which was manifested   in their belief   that:     "...   a Baconian  ideal 
of increasing  knowledge  and   [they]   expected it   to be  applied   to   control 
their natural and social environment.     In  the  arts  and sciences,   in 
better  farm management,   in more expert mining,  and manufacturing 
practices,   in improved  communications  and civic works,  progress was 
manifest and encouraged by  them.   .   .   ."     (R.   L.   Emerson,  op.   cit., 
p.   322).     See also, William C.   Lehmann,  Henry Home Lord Kames  and  the 
Scottish Enlightenment   (The Hague:    Martinus Nijhoff,   1971),  p.   xii. 
Dugald Stewart was  the  "spokesman" for  the Scots'   theory of moral 
philosophy which  "held  that  all specific subjects  of  study should serve 
primarily  to forward  one's  liberal education and  to develop man's 
intellectual  powers."   (Richard Olson,  op.   cit.,  p.   41), when he wrote: 
"'It ought   to be  the leading object of  any one  to become an eminent 
metaphysician, mathematician,  or poet;  but  to  render himself happy as 
an   individual,   and   an   agreeable,   a   respectable,   and  a  useful   member  of 
society'.   .   .   .     The  first  consideration and  object of  all   education 
is   'to cultivate   all  the various principles of our nature, both  specu- 
lative  and  active,   in  such a manner as   to bring them to the greatest 
perfection of which   they are susceptible.   .   .   .'"  (ibid.,  pp.   42,  43.). 
95 Charles  E.   Vaughn,  Studies   in  the History of Political 
Philosophy  Before   and  After  Rousseau,  ed., E.   G.   Little   (Manchester, 
England:     The University Press;  London,  New York:     Longmans,   Green 
and Co.,   1939)   Vol.   II,  p.   59. 
MacCunn,  Quoted by John C.  Weston,  "Edmund Burke's View of 
History," The  Review of Politics, Vol.   XXIII, No.   2   (April,  1961),  p.   203. 
''Gerald  W.   Chapman,   Edmund   Burke.     The  Practical   Imagination 
(Cambridge,  Mass.:     Harvard University Press,   1967),  p.   121. 
98Ibid. ,  p.   161. 
Sir Ernest  Barker,  Essays on Government   (Oxford:     Clarendon 
Press,   1965,   1945),   p.   222. 
100T , Idem. 
l0IBarker,   ibid.,  pp.   222-223.     Elsewhere Barker maintains   that 
Burke does  not merely  impose   the dead hand of the past  on the present, 
but also  that Burke would wipe  out  the  future by the  act  of making it 
synonymous with  the  present: 
"Nor again,   should  the hustle of  the  time hurry us  into the sort of 
planning,  precocious and premature,  which  imposes   the deadhand of 
the present   on  the life  and growth of  the  future.     It  is necessary 
to plan for  the  future;   it   is  also necessary  to leave the   future  free 
to plan for  itself.     Tom Paine,  arguing against  Burke's   idolization 
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of  the   tradition   of   the past,   contended   thai   'earli present   genera- 
tion  is   competent   lo  its own purposes.'    There may also  be   an 
idolization of   the competence  of  the present;  and it  is  also neces- 
sary to contend  that  each  future generation  is  competent  to   its 
(Ernest  Barker,   ibid.,  p.   263).     [And  the  traditions of  the past  are 
visible   to Burke,  says  Barker,   in Burke's   "vision of  the total state":] 
.   .   .   There  is   a vision   ...   of the one  and only organization:     the 
vision of  the   total  State  which is all  and everything,   and   include.'; 
all and  every purpose   ...   it was   the   theory of  the modern nation- 
State,   as  it   appeared  to Burke   .   .   ."(ibid.,  p.   20). 
Here,  Burke   is  locked  into the past, which  takes   the  form of what seems   to 
be a proto-fascist state;  Barker seems  to be  to  Burke wh.it  J.   R.   Talmon 
was to .lean-Jacques  Rousseau and   the  French   Revolutionary  state:     thai    i   , 
we have a monolithic  structure.     (See J.   L.   Talmon,  The Origins   of Totali- 
Larlan Democracy  ftl.Y. :     Praeger,   r>f>01).     For our purposes,   this means 
passive   acceptance   of   a   fait   accompli,   with   no  discrimination  between 
subject,   object  or   transcendental  ideal--or  rather, no recognition of   these 
three categories. 
Leslie  Stephen,   History   of  English  Thought   in   the  Eighteenth 
Century   (N.Y. :    G.   P.   Putnam's  Sons,   1902   [1876]),   II, p.   23. 
103 Ibid.,   pp.   23-24. 
(Burke),   "Thoughts  on  Frencli Affairs," Writings   and Speeches 
of Edmund Burke   (Boston:    Little,  Brown &  Co.,   1901),  III,  p.   372. 
P.   H.   Nowell-Smith says   that writers of   the  intuitionist 
school   (represented   in eighteenth-century England by  the  "Moral   Sense 
school)   deny  any difference between  the world of   is   and the world of 
ought.     Because they confuse  is and ought,   the   intuitlonists cannot 
maintain  the existence either of objective moral  principles  or of   an 
objective empirical order.     According to  the   intuitionist   position, 
reality and  our knowledge of reality have but  one source—our  immediate 
intuition.     Ends become means   immediately perceived   (or   rather,   Celt). 
Not only does   "no gap exist" between   is and ought, but  the   realms oC   is 
and ought   themselves  do not exist as separate entities.    The moral   recog- 
nition of   is  and ought,   and the  epistemological   function of   attempting 
to reconcile  the  is  and the ought,  are both disregarded by  the  intuition- 
ist position.     Nowell-Smith  is  apparently referring  to Francis Hutcheson 
(see  infra, p.96et   passim)  when  the  former says 
"...   I may know that a certain  action will please God  or maximize my 
own pleasure  or produce the greatest happiness of  the greatest  number; 
but   this   is   all   knowledge  of  what   is  or will   be   the  case   [and   knowledge 
of what   the  intuitlonists wrongly take  to be   the ought,   the end, not 
the means].     It still makes sense to ask whether I ought   to do the 
action.     As   [I.   A.]  Prichard points  out  a   'link'   is required  to connect 
the statements of  facts with an injunction  to do or not   to do something. 
...     We must now see whether   the intuitionist  is in a   [good]   .   .   . 
position to provide this  link,  to bridge  the gap between   'is'   and 
'ought'.   .   .   . 
At  first sight  it  seems   that he is;   for he has so arranged matters 
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(hat  no rap exists.     Earlier moralists  tried to derive obligation 
statementa  rrom statements of  other kinds   [i.e.,   from objective 
standards  l>v which to measure  the world of   'is']; but,   for  an 
intuitionist ,  obligations are  immediately  and underivatively known 
and   require no deduction.     The demand   for a bridge,   for an  argument 
connecting   'ought'   to   'is'   is  senseless because we are directly 
confronted by   'ought.'     But  a closer examination will show that  this 
way out  of  the difficulty  is  a spurious  one.   .   .   .     The  intuitionist 
cannot  both maintain the  immediate  and underivatIve  character of 
moral  knowledge   11 he   'ought'],   and   also   the  analogy with  empirical 
discourse   [i.e.,   an   assumption  of the objective  reality of  the 
empirical world]  which  justifies his use  of such terms   as   'see,' 
'recognize,'   'true,'   'mistaken,'   'know,'   'fact,'   and   'objective.'" 
P.  H.  Nowell-Smith,   Ethics   (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, London:     Penguin 
Rooks,  1959,   1954),  p.   38. 
106 "Burke's Table-Talk  at  Crewe-Hall," Publications  of   the 
Philobiblon  Society   (London:     1862/63),  p.   3A.     Burke's animus   toward 
the empiricist  skepticism of  Hume   (for Hume,  see Ernest   Cassirer,   The 
Philosophy  of   the Enlightenment   [ P.oston:     Deacon Press,   L962,   1951,   1932], 
pp.   98-Hill)   also stemmed   from Burke's aversion  to the empiricists'   monism 
and   rcductionism   (viz.,   the   reduction   of   reality  and  of  man's   perception 
of  reality   to one origin—the world of sense), only  in  their rase,  Burke s 
aversion  cited  a confusion between  subject   and object, a psychological/ 
epistemological confusion,  rather  than  a  Ieleological confusion   between 
the world of ought  and  the world of   La. 
107Perhaps  a more plainspoken example  of this moral confusion 
resulting  from an  indiscriminate  monism,   are   the words of  the  authors  of 
a recent work on business management  theory  and techniques, The   Theory   and 
Management   of  Systems   (Richard A.   Johnson,   Fremont  E.   Kast   and James  E. 
Rosenzweig, The Theory and Management, of  Systems   [N.Y.,  San  Francisco, 
Toronto, London:    McGraw-Hill Book Co.,  Inc.,   1963],  McGraw-Hill Series 
in Management,  Keith Davis,   Consulting Editor).     Shortly after citing 
Pope's Essay on Man as  the  theme  of   their work: 
'Observe how system Into system runs, 
What  other planets  circle other suns' 
Alexander Pope,  An  Essay  on  M.in   .    .   . 
(ibid.,   p.   x) , 
the authors equate Pope's harmonious universe with  chaos: 
".   .   .   the  antonym of systematic is chaotic.     A chaotic situation 
might  be described as one where   'everything depends on  everything 
else'   [sic].     Since two major goals of science  and research   [n   any 
subject  area are explanation and prediction, such a condition  cannot 
be tolerated.     Therefore  there  is considerable   incentive  to develope 
bodies  of knowledge  that  can be organized   into  a complex "hole, with- 
in which subparts  or subsystems can be  interrelated.   .   .   ."(ibid.,  p.   5) 
See Appendix D for Burke's views on the  relation of  parts  to their whole; 
Burke's views  are based  on  a similar hostility as Johnson et  al.   s  toward 
the indiscriminate monism which confuses  the  real and the ideal,   subject 
and object. 
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Shaftesbury 's harmonious,  and confused,  universe  coincides 
with Lucien Goldman's  recent   (1968)   characterization of the  ethical 
theory of  the Enlightenment.     The ethical  theory of the period included 
the  assumption  of  a neutral,  natural morality,  a harmony of  interests, 
and a    system Burke   implicitly refuted   (see   ['Burke],  Review of "An 
Essay on   the Genius  and Writings of Pope," by Dr.   Warton,  in The Annual 
Register   .   ■   .   for the Year  1782   [London:    J.  Dodsley,   1783],  pp.   203- 
214).     Perhaps what   is more  to the point here,   the ethical system, or 
chaos and  confusion,  described  by Goldman,  assumes an individualism at 
odds with  Burke's use  of the  term  (see  Francis P.   Canavan, The Political 
Reason of Edmund  Burke   [Durham, N.C.:     Duke University Press,   1960], 
p.   31;   and  infra.,  p.104,   for Burke's strictures   against  the passive 
individualism of,  respectively,  the moral  intuitionists,  and  for Burke's 
own  active,  forming interpretations of  the past).     Goldman referred  to 
...   a schema often repeated in  the Enlightenment:     the  assertion 
that  the private  and the public interest  coincide.   .   .   .     The infer- 
ence   ...   is  that it suffices  to act  in one's  own interest without 
paying any regard  to the  general  interest.   .   .   . 
.   .   .   France's great   individualist  poet,   Corneille   .   .   .  whose 
[two dramas,   'Rodogune'   and   'Heraclius']   chief  characteristic  is 
that virtue  and vice  are   treated as morally good. 
The argument   is not   that  the  individualist  view is  incompatible 
with any moral  system, but,  on the  contrary,   that  it  is  compatible 
with  all moralities,  and   thus entirely neutral between them.     This 
is precisely why,  on the basis of  individualism,  no system of values 
can be established  as necessarily valid."   (Lucien Goldman, The Phil- 
osophy  of   the  Enlightenment.     The   Ghristian  Burgess   and   the  Enlight- 
enment,   translated  by  Henry  Maas   [Cambridge,   Mass.,  The  M.I.T.   Press, 
1973   (1968)],   esp.   Chapter I,  part v,   "Ethical Theory," pp.   24-31; 
pp.   27-28.) 
"Caroline  Robbins,  The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthian 
(Cambridge,  Mass.:    Harvard University Press,   1959),  p.   187. 
109 Idem. 
110, ■'Frederick  Copleston,  S.J. ,  A History of Philosophy:  Volume 5, 
Modern Philosophy:    The British Philosophers, Part   I,  Hobbes  to Paley 
(Carden City, N.Y. :     Image Books   [A Division of Doubleday and Co.,  Inc.], 
1964   (1959]), pp.   191-193. 
Ill 
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Ibid. ,   p.   192. 
Ibid. ,   p.   193. 
113Father  Copleston explains  the broader assumptions of Hutcheson's 
narrow utilitarian  formula.     "...   [Hutcheson]   offers  a criterion for 
judging between different possible courses of action.       In comparing  the 
moral quality of  actions in order to regulate our elections  among various 
actions proposed,   or  to find which of  them has the greatest moral excel- 
lence, we  are led by our moral sense of virtue to judge  thus:     that  in 
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equal degrees of  happiness,  expected to proceed  from the action   [empha- 
sis added],   the virtue  is  in proportion  to  the number of persons  to 
whom the happiness  shall extend   ...   so  that  action  is best which 
procures   the  greatest happiness  for the greatest numbers'   ..." 
Copleston,  History  of Philosophy,  V,   i, p.   193. 
Little,  Brown Edmund Burke, Writings and Speeches   (Boston: 
& Co.,  1901),   I,   p.   125. 
Burke,   "Letter to a Member of  the National Assembly"  (1791), 
Writings  and   Speeches   (Boston:     Little,  Brown & Co.,   1901),   IV, p.   31. 
(Burke),   "Extracts  from Mr.   Burke's Table-Talk at  Crewe-Hall, 
Written down by Mrs.   Crewe," Miscellanies of  the Philobiblon  Society, 
Volume VII   (London:    Whittingham and Wilkins,  1862/63),  pp.   13-14.     But 
six years before,   Burke had written   (letter of June  1,   1791),   that  an 
indulgence not  balanced by a refinement   led  to over-indulgence and  self- 
absorption in  "our own desires"  and to a subsequent moral confusion.     The 
feelings,   amorphous   and  contradictory and uninformed  as   they were, were 
certainly not  to be  passively accepted  as morally correct merely because 
they existed   in a harmonious or  "benevolent" universe.     Burke wrote: 
"   .   .   I  question much whether moral policy will justify us  in an 
endeavor  to interest the heart  in favour of  immoral,   irregular,   and 
illegal  actions,  on  account  of particular touching circumstances  that 
may happen  to attend  the  commission or  the punishment of  them.     I 
know Poets are   apt enough  to chase Such Subjects  in order  to excite 
the high relish arising from the mixed sensations which will arise 
in that  anxious embarrassment  of  the mind whenever it   finds  itself 
in a    locality where  vices  and virtues meet near their confines   .   .   . 
.   .   .   the  Philosophers,   in order to insinuate their polluted 
Atheism into young minds,  systematically flatter all their passions 
natural and unnatural.     They explode  or  render odious or  contemptible 
that  class of virtues which restrain the  appetite.     These are at 
least  nine out  of  ten of  the virtues.     In place of all these  they 
substitute  a virtue which they call humanity or benevolence.    By these 
means,   their morality has no  idea in it of   restraint, or indeed of a 
distinct  settled principle of  any kind.     When  their disciples  are 
thus  left free  and guided  only by present  feeling,   they  are no  longer to 
be depended  on   for good or evil.     The men who today snatch the worst 
criminals  from justice, will murder  the most   innocent persons   to- 
morrow.   .   .   ■ "(fBurkel.  The  Correspondence of Edmund Burke,  Eds., 
Alfred   Cobban and Robert  A.   Smith   [Cambridge,  England  and Chicago, 
111.:     1967],  Vol.   VI, pp.   269-270,  "Letter to Claude-Francois De 
Rivarole,  July  1,  1791.) 
In the  "Reflections," Burke spoke  of  the  false  tolerance of   the French 
revolutionaries,  arising  from the same  "species of benevolence" and re- 
quiring not  any critical judgement or discrimination concerning  the 
objects of   toleration, but merely a passive and vague awareness  of  their 
existence  in the same harmonious  universe. 
".   .   .   we hear  these new teachers  continually boasting of their spirit 
of  toleration.     That those persons should tolerate  all opinions, who 
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think none to be of estimation,   is  a matter of small merit.     Equal 
neglect   is not   impartial kindness.     The  species of benevolence 
which arises from contempt  is no true charity.    There  are in England 
abundance of men who tolerate in the   true  spirit of  toleration.     They 
think the dogmas of religions,   though  in different degrees   [emphasis 
added],   are  all  of moment,   and  that  amongst  them,   there  is,   as 
amongst all  things of value,  a just ground of preference.     They  favor, 
therefore   [presumably after making some kind of  critical judgement   on 
the merits  of  the  respective sects],  and  they tolerate.     They  toler- 
ate,  not because  they despise opinions, but because they respect 
justice."([Burke]  Writings  and Speeches of  Edmund Burke   [Boston: 
Little,  Brown  &  Co.,   1901],  Vol.   Ill,  p.   431,  from the   "Reflections.") 
117Ibid. ,   pp.   35-36. 
118Burke,   "Letter  to a Member of  the National Assembly"  (1791)in 
Writings  and  Speeches   (Boston:     Little, Brown & Co.,  1901),  Vol.   IV,  p.   32. 
119 See  Ernest  Cassirer's essay on  "'Spirit1   and   'Life'  in 
Contemporary Philosophy"   (1930),  Appendix D,  p.279,  in  the present  study. 
(Burke)   The  Correspondence of Edmund Burke,  Vol.   VI   (July, 
1789-December,   1791),  Eds., Alfred  Cobban  and Robert  A.   Smith   (Cambridge, 
England  and Chicago,   111.:     1967),  pp.   148-149. 
121 Hans  Bartli, The  Idea of  Order.     Contributions  to a Philosophy 
of Politics   (Dordrecht, Holland:     D.   Reidel  Publ.   Co.,  1960), p.   36. 
199 
Ibid. ,  pp.   36-37.     The  reason why  the views of Karl Barth are 
distinguished  from those of Canavan and others who similarly interpret 
this phrase of  Burke's—"the species  is wise,   the  individual  is  foolish, 
etc.—is   that while  the others see  their interpretation of  Burke's phrase 
as  indicative of   the natural  law content  of Burke's  thought,  Barth makes 
no such emphasis upon such origins  of Burke's  thought. 
123Constant Noble Stockton,   "Three Enlightenment Variations  of 
Natural Law Theory," Enlightenment  Essays,  Vol.   I, No.   2   (Summer,  1970), 
p.   127. 
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CHAPTER  V 
THE  KINSHIP  BETWEEN  SCOTTISH,   BURKEAN AND KANTIAN 
THEORIES  OF KNOWLEDGE 
A crucial  factor necessary to note In the equation which 
would seek to suggest   a similarity between  the  assumptions of  the 
Burkean position and   the  school of Scottish Common Sense realism, 
is  the  independent  reality  of  the subject.     The subject  is  the  active 
human  intellect working upon and shaping  the empirical world, while 
at the same  time being guided by  a partially known  transcendent, 
objective moral end.     That philosophy which  suggests the reality of 
matter  to the exclusion of  all else  is  empiricism,   or  its offshoot, 
nominalism.     That philosophy which sees  a transcendent   (as opposed   to 
immanent)   ideal—wherever  placed—as representing exclusively reality 
is  called  generally,   idealism.     The difference between a philosophy 
of empiricism and   one of  realism is  the presence of the reality of 
the  forming human  reason;   also,  of   the  reality of  the  transcendent 
ideal   acting,   or  having   a   limited   influence   on,   the  human  reason 
which shapes  the empirical world.     Scottish  realism   (and Kantian 
idealism)   included  all three  of  the above levels of  reality.     Empiri- 
cism sees matter  as   real and all else as  supplemental or derivative 
from the reality of  the empirical world.     The Burke portrayed by 
Gerald W.   Chapman  implicitly  assumes  the existence of all three real- 
ities,   as do the  figures of  the Scottish school,  and  this means  the 
separate  reality of each of  the three—empirical object,  human subject, 
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and  transcendent   ideal  (as distinguished from the  immanent  ideal of 
the Leibniz-Wolff  rationalism of the seventeenth  and  the  Shaftesburian, 
Moral Sense school of the eighteenth century). 
Thomas  Reid   in An Inquiry into  the  Human Mind on   the Principles 
of Common Sense   (1764)   and Essays on  the  Intellectual Powers of Man 
(1785)   assumed   the existence  of all three philosophical  realities,  and 
formed his system of Common Sense upon  the   interplay among the  three 
independent   realities.     Reid  criticised  Locke, Berkeley and Hume  for 
destroying the  reality of  the mind,   the reality of matter  and  the 
reality of the perceiving human intellect. 
.   .   .   according to Locke,   ideas are nothing by the  immediate objects 
of   the mind   in thinking.     Now [says  Reid]   'Bishop Berkeley,   proceed- 
ing upon  this  foundation,   demonstrated  very easily  that there  is no 
material world.   .   .   .     Mr.   Hume shows us no partiality in favour 
of the world of  spirits.     He adopts the  theory of  ideas  in its full 
extent;   and,   in  consequence shows that   there  is neither matter nor 
mind   in  the universe;  nothing but   impressions  and  ideas.'       In  fact, 
Mr.   Hume's system does not even  leave him a self  to claim the proper- 
ty of his   impressions and   ideas.'     Ideas,  therefore   .   .   .  have by 
degrees   'supplemented their constituents  and undermined  the existence 
of  everything but  themselves.   . il 
Now Reid  recognizes  two levels  of  reality,  subject  and object,   as   repre- 
sented   in his   famous distinction between sensation  and perception,  know- 
ledge and  reason working with  the senses which interpret   the empirical 
world.     Either  the one or the other is destroyed by Berkeley (matter) 
and Hume   (mind).     It   is because  Reid recognizes the   independent   reality 
of both worlds—mind and matter, subject  and object, that he sets  him- 
self  against  Berkeley and Hume. 
Such  a philosophy as  Reid's would represent  a reaction against 
the development  of philosophy during  the previous  century,  as described 
by    Ernst   Cassirer  in his classic study of The Philosophy  of  the Enlight- 
enment   (1932).     This  development took the  form of an empiricist  reaction 
126 
against the  rationalistic systems of  the seventeenth century.     However, 
both traditions   in philosophy,  seventeenth century  rationalism with its 
"esprit systematique,"     and eighteenth  century empiricism with its 
maxim of  "Nothing  is   in  the  intellect which was not   first  in sense," 
are  really,   for   the present  purpose of  contrasting  them with Reid  and 
his school,   the  opposite  sides of  the same general philosophical coin. 
For our purposes,   there  is not  a new coinage  in philosophy minted  in 
the eighteenth century,   but merely a flipping of  the same  coin onto its 
opposite side.     That  is   to say, both systems  assume   that there is one 
plane  or source of reality,   from which all else derives.     It  is   this 
derivation against which  Reid   (and Kant)   stands,   in whichever form it 
assumes—rationalist or empiricist.     It  is  the point here to present  the 
traditions   to which Reid  and the Common Sense school stood opposed. 
Reid's  philosophy  itself  is not gone  into here.     In both rationalist 
and empiricist systems,   subject  and object mesh into one because  of the 
exclusive source  of  realities assumed   in each respective school.     Dual- 
ism is  absent   in both systems, and,   as a result,   the   independent   reality 
of both  subject  and  object suffers. 
The  exclusive  and ultimate  reality in seventeenth century 
rationalism consists  of   the  "ideas which the mind  finds within itself." 
Cassirer explains: 
The  fundamental question  of  the  truth of knowledge of  the agreement 
between concepts  [in the subject,   the human mind]   and objects, had 
been solved by   the great rationalistic systems of   the seventeenth 
century by reducing both the  realm of   concepts  and  that   of objects 
to  the  same  original stratum of being.     In  this  stratum concepts 
and  objects meet and  from this original mingling  is derived all 
their   later correspondance.     The nature of human knowledge can only 
be explained  in  terms  of   the ideas which the mind  finds within  it- 
self.     These   innate   ideas  are the seal  that  is  from the  first  stamped 
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upon  the mind,   assuring It once and for all of   its origin and 
destiny.   .   .   .   the   'primitive notions'   in our minds   [according 
to Descartes,   include  the concepts of]   .   .   .   being, number,  and 
duration   .   .   .   extension,   form and motion   .   .   .   and the concept 
of  thought.   .   .   .     These models  and prototypes point forward  to 
empirical  reality, but they can do so only because at   the same 
time  they point backward  to its origin.   .   .   .     Reason,  as  the 
system of clear  and  distinct  ideas, and  the world,  as  the totality 
of  created being,   can nowhere   fail to harmonize;   for they merely 
represent different versions or different expressions of the same 
essence.    The   'archetypical  intellect'   of God  thus becomes  the 
bond   between  thinking and being, between truth and  reality,  in 
the philosophy of Descartes.   .   .   .  perception is possible only by 
the procedure  of   relating the  accidental  to the necessary,  the 
merely  factual  to something rational,   the temporal to the eternal. 
We  attain to knowledge  of   the physical world by reducing matter  to 
extension  rather than by  attributing to  it any quality perceptible 
to sense.   .   .   . 
Ultimately,  knowledge not merely comes  from within ourselves, but pene- 
trates more deeply and points back to the divine being.    The end result 
of Cartesian philosophy is   that God underwrites the  reasonable acts   of 
men.     "...   every genuine  act  of  cognition, every act of reason, 
brings  about an immediate union between God  and  the human soul. 
The sensory world  is merely  an extension in  the  first  instance from 
the reason of man,   and, in the second   instance,  from that  reason,   to 
"the harmonious substance  of   our common master."      Although  the eight- 
eenth  century empirical rebellion against  the above mode of  thought 
involved a  "secularization of  thought,"7 it was a secularization which 
nevertheless constructed—with  its  apex at Hume—just  as much a deriva- 
tively enforced  system as  that of   the rationalists of   the preceding 
century.     The base of   the philosophical pyramid is now merely upended, 
and  "the ground  of experience," not divinely reflected  reason, becomes 
the base upon which  all else  is built.8    When Cassirer is describing 
the eighteenth-century answer to seventeenth-century rationalism,  he 
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states  that  "flights  into transcendent worlds must be avoided.     No 
foreign element may be permitted  to come between knowledge  and reality, 
q 
between subject  and   object,"    he is not referring to a transcendent 
deity, but  to  the  immanent  God of   the seventeenth-century  rationalists, 
a God ultimately  and practically on the same stratum as   the  reason of 
man, which sees   the demonstrability of God  in that  reason of man— 
I say practically because sucli a concept which sees an immanent  rela- 
tion of God  to the   reason of man, which sees  the  demonstrability of 
God  in that  reason,   considers  any  rationalistic construct weaved  from 
that  reason undei-written by  the divine hand,  to have all   the  real  force 
carried   as would be through any  letter of  instructions  from a Creator 
to his  creatures with a  Creator's  signature  on  the bottom line  of the 
instructions.     Now a transcendent  Being is  different  from an  immanent 
Being—the latter,   in its extreme instance,   assumes a complete  identity 
with this world, with either human  reason or nature, or both—"the 
indwelling and   inworking  of  the Deity  in nature  and man.""       This 
immanentization  is  opposed in  the extreme by  the doctrine  of  transcend- 
ence : 
The doctrine that God,  in his proper being and  essential nature, 
is prior to and   above the world;   or that he has reality in him- 
self  apart   from his works. 
Transcendence contrasts and  correlates with Immanence.     It 
may be  asserted   in such a sense as  to isolate God from the world, 
in which case  it excludes  immanence.     It was   the character of 
Deism   [pervasive  in the eighteenth century]   that  it  associated 
with  a one-sided notion of  transcendence  that   of  an external 
and wholly mechanical  relation of  the deity  to the world.     Extreme 
assertion of immanence results   in pantheism or naturalism.     Extreme 
assertion of transcendence leads   to deism,  or else thrusts  God out 
of  all   conceivable  relation to the world.   .   .   . 
In terms  of  the above definitions,  Cassirer seems  to be using  "transcend- 
ence" when he  really means to use the  concept  of  immanence while 
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describing the alternative which  the empiricists offered  to Cartesian 
rationalism.     Cassirer has the empiricists  ask  rhetorically of the 
seventeenth-century  system-builders:     "For what  relation remains 
between the ego and   the external world, between subject and object, 
if we eliminate transcendence  as our bridge?"    The empiricist  answer 
is "a direct   influence of the one upon the  other." But   it was   the 
immanent God,  not  the  transcendent God against which  the empiricists 
were working;   for transcendence   is only in  its extreme form associated 
with a deistic  clock-maker God,   a God who  creates,  but does not pre- 
serve.     There   is a middle ground between   immanentism and deism, or 
harsh transcendence,   which might be  called   a "soft   transcendentism," 
in which God  is neither  completely set apart and above the universe 
and its history nor   totally within  it: 
Naturalistic and   pantheistic conceptions of   immanence  are  those 
which  tend  to identify the Deity completely with  the  inworking 
force of nature.     This leaves no place   for  transcendence.     It  is 
possible,  however,   for God to work in nature, grounding its 
existence  on phenomena,  and yet   to be something more in himself, 
to possess a being  that  is not  identical with his   operations. 
In this sense transcendence  seems  to be   the  presupposition of 
immanence.   ... 
This  "soft   transcendentalism"  comes closer  to representing  the answer 
of Reid's  school to  the empiricists and would avoid what amounts  to the 
immanence  of  the empiricist position itself;  for  the empiricists   formu- 
late a basic maxim upon which   they build   the  "bridge" between subject 
and object.     But really,  Cassirer uses  an unfortunate analogy in the 
"bridge"  case,   for a bridge supposedly connects  two separate  and 
distinct banks  across  an otherwise dividing river.     But   the empiricists, 
in Cassirer's description, end  up destroying any distinction between 
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between subject  and object,  the mind and matter.     Cassirer describes 
the development  of empirical philosophy in the   century preceding Hume, 
beginning with  the empiricists'   reaction  to the  immanent  Reason of 
the Cartesians. 
For what   relation  remains between  the ego and  the external world, 
between  subject and object,   if we  eliminate  transcendence  as our 
bridge?    What  conceivable connection  is there between subject and 
object  other   than  that   of a direct   influence of  the one upon the 
other?     If  the ego and   the physical world belong  to different 
strata of  reality,   and   if despite  this  fact  they are  to  come  into 
contact   and establish   a connection,   then such a  connection would 
seem possible only  if   external reality were  to partake of  conscious- 
ness.     The only known  empirical form   [emphasis added]   of  such a 
participation  is,  however,  that  of  a direct  influence.     This alone 
can bridge  the gap between idea and object.     The assertion  that 
every  idea that we  find   in our minds   is based  on a previous  im- 
pression  and   can only be explained on  this basis,   is now exalted 
to the  rank  of an   indubitable principle.   .   .   .   [in]  Hume's skepti- 
cism   .   .   .   [Empiricism now bases  its doctrine on  the psychological 
axiom,  or]  maxim   'Nothing is   in the  intellect which was not   first 
in sense.   .   .   .   LH 
This new  form of monism sees its   task as doing away with  the  last ves- 
tiges of  any doctrine which  in the least assumes derivation  from any- 
thing besides  the  "Nothing   is in   the  intellect" dogma. 
Both   [English and  French psychologies]   .   .   .   attempt  to go beyond 
Locke   [considered   anathema because of his distinction between 
sensation and   reflection and his  "critical" empiricism].     Both 
these  psychologies want   to get  rid of  the last remnants  of dualism 
which had  remained   in  Locke's psychological    principles;   they want 
to do away with the distinction between internal and external 
experience  and reduce  all human knowledge  to a single source.    The 
difference between sensation and  reflection  is only apparent and 
it vanishes upon further analysis.     The development of  empirical 
philosophy  from Locke  to Berkeley and   from Berkeley to Hume 
represents a series  of   attempts  to minimize  the difference between 
sensation  and  reflection, and   finally to wipe it  out altogether. 
...   and   to eliminate   the last vestige of  independence which Locke 
had attributed  to  reflection.   .   .   . 
Reid   in Scotland and Kant   in Germany wish not merely  to declare  the 
independence  of reflection  and mind  from  the confines of a moral 
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Newtonian   (or pseudo-Newtonian—see Appendix A)  one-world order, but 
to do so  in a manner which would retain  also the  reality of  the objec- 
tive empirical world,  and which would bring the two  together  in such a 
complementary way as   to avoid both  a subjective idealism on the one 
hand,  a pyrrhonic scepticism and  a radical empiricism  (later,   called 
positivism) ,  on the  other.     The  former results  in a naturalistic deistic 
monism, which  includes  the  fusing of subject  and object  so as  to make 
them indistinguishable.     The latter  results   in a mechanical "interaction" 
between  subject  and  object somewhat  as  in Ilartlean Associationism or 
Hutnean scepticism  (and leading  to  the political and moral calculus of 
the utilitarianism of  Hutcheson  and  Bentham); Hartley's Associationism 
stems from a harmonious pseudo-Newtonian  universe and Hume's view has 
the similar effect  as the harsh  Cartesian dualism regarding the mechan- 
ical-like relation between subject   and object. 
Hans Reichenbach emphasized  the difference between empiricism 
and the  transcendent  position  regarding the position of  the independent 
human intellect  in the  respective  schools. 
The   incorporation of  the human observer into the physical world 
is one   of  the  fundamental characteristics of an empiricist  phil- 
osophy.     The  transcendental conception of knowledge makes  a cut 
between physical reality and   the human mind and thus arrives at 
unsolvable problems,  like  the problem of how we  can  infer  reality 
from mental data.   .   .   . 
The  alternatives which Reichenbach described here of  a complete  aliena- 
tion between subject and object   on the  one hand, and  total fusion of 
subject   and object on the other hand,  corresponds  to the specious 
alternatives which Leo Strauss offered between his Aquinas as  repre- 
sentative  of   "the" Natural Law tradition and his Hobbes, who represented 
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the  "modern" natural rights  tradition   (see supra.).     Reichenbach 
continued with his presentation of   this either/or  situation in contem- 
porary twentieth-century   thought.     In  its modern form,   the failing  to 
separate subject   and object  is  seen in 
.   .   .   Heisenberg's  disturbance through the  act  of  observation and 
Bohr's   complementarity.     According  to these  interpretations,  Heisen- 
berg's   indeterminacy  leads   to  the  conclusion  that it  is  impossible 
to draw  a line  of  separation between observer and physical object; 
as the  observer changes  the world  through  the  act of  observing, we 
cannot  say what  the world is,   independent  of  the human observer.   .   . 
That  is, if   it   is   impossible to draw a line between  the observer and  the 
observed,   and  the   transcendent   ideal,   one   is   forced   in  this  situation  to 
"take sides" as   to  the exclusive reality of either one of  the three 
categories which one chooses to regard as  the ultimate  and one  reality. 
Such an exclusivist   choice   is called "reductionism"  in philosophical 
terminology. 
According  to Paul Hazard,   the  "philosophic des lumieres" 
represented what might be   called   the philosophical  parallel of what 
Reichenbach described as  Heisenberg's principles of  indeterminacy— 
the hopeless   confusion between subject  and object,  mind  and matter 
(or,  past and  present,   that  is,  the  impossibility of  the present  inter- 
preting in any way  the  separate and   removed past without  at  the same 
time distorting  that past).19    In  the chapter on "Nature  and Reason" 
in his book on eighteenth-century thought,20 Hazard saw the philosophes 
as adding to  the   confusion between nature and reason, and  to this effect 
cited  Burke's  phrase   (although Hazard did not say or  imply it was 
Burke's famous phrase):     "Nature never says one  thing and wisdom anoth- 
er."21    So,  Hazard concluded his  chapter by supporting the opposite 
18 
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extreme position.     This position states  the  impossibility of human 
reason applying any  structure  or logic to phenomena without distort- 
ing those  phenomena   (including empirical  and historical phenomena). 
'Nature   is not  to be equated with reason.     So say  today our 
thinkers   .   .   .   among them an illustrious biologist,   Charles 
Nicolle   [who said,  sounding like Reichenbach's Heisenber] 
.   .   .   'Nature   .   .   .  knows nothing about  the logical  and the 
illogical—nothing about  reason.     Nature   is.'    Of  all  the 
failings of  Reason,  the most widely met with is  that of  ascrib- 
ing  its  own  attribute of  rationation,   its own reasoning faculty 
to  the  phenomena  it  is examining.     "...  what we did was  to 
invest  things with   laws which were merely  those of our own 
mind.   .   .   .     The human mind distorts phenomena by subjecting 
them to  the rule  of  logic.   ..." 
In   the very heart of  the   'philosophic des  lumieres,'   there 
exists  an essential disharmony,  for has not  this same philosophy 
melted   together  into a single doctrine,  empiricism, Cartesianism, 
Leibnizianism,  and   finally Spinozaism?   .   .   .    That  is why Europe, 
to put   some  order into  the   theory of  knowledge, has need of Kant. 
.22 
As Hazard had characterized  the  eclectic   confusion of eighteenth-century 
23 thought,   Reichenbach similarly saw the "end of the story"      of post- 
relativity  and  post-quantum physical  theory,  as  the "dubious nature" of 
"the substance of the universe;2     "According  to   [Max Planck's quantum 
theory]   .   .   .   energy consists  of elementary units,   the quanta,   and 
whenever energy  is emitted  or absorbed there will be one or two or one 
hundred  quanta transported,  but never will  there be a fraction of a 
,,25 
quantum.     The  quantum   is   the   atom  of  energy. 
Reichenbach pointed   to the   recognized  impossibility of  separating 
"observable" phenomena  from "unobservable" phenomena,  of being unable   to 
tell whether  the  action of atoms  is  characterized by a wave effect  or 
as particles,  and  "whether light  and matter  consists of particles  or 
waves."26    These unobservable,  and  therefore, unknowable   (in their sub- 
stantial reality)   phenomena are all part of  the "world of  small  things" 
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(of microscopic relationships),   as  opposed  to the   "world of  large 
things"  (macroscopic  relationships),   the  latter of which are observable 
27 
and knowable. This bifurcation of  reality is  the  legacy of  quantum 
physics,  according to  Reichenbach. 
Since we can no longer hope  to discover the  substance  of  reality 
or matter   (of,   for instance, the  internal structure,   and   therefore  the 
external motion or history)  of   that complex  atom which post-quantum 
physics has  revealed   in place of  the unitary atom of  classical physical 
theories,   physics  can now merely describe perceived  reality according 
to whichever of   the  theories of   reality  (partially based  on unobserv- 
ables)   one wishes to accept   (matter as waves or as particles).     Theories 
of reality now become   theories  of our knowledge of  that   reality   (or of 
those   realities).     This  is 
.   .   .   the  final outcome of  the  controversy between   the adherents 
of  waves   and  of  corpuscles,   which  began  with  Huyghens  and  Newton, 
and,  after  a development of  centuries climaxed in  the quantum 
mechanics of  de Broglie   [who held  that   light  consists both of 
particles and of waves.],'"  Shrodinger   [whose views were similar 
to de Broglie's],   Born   [who saw waves  as   representing "probabilities" 
while the  "elementary entities were assumed to be particles"], 
Heisenberg   [similar to Born,30 seemed   to back into supporting the 
wave theory,   for his principle of  indeterminacy  assumes we  lack 
the  knowledge to  predict  the path of microscopic   (bounding on the 
unobservable phenomena)   particles]   and Bohr  [whose  "principle of 
complementarity" or of  correspondance assumed   it  possible  that Born s 
problematical waves were physically real,  and,  to that extent,  rele- 
gating particles  to somewhat   less  a real status  than  in Born's 
idea];3*  the  question:  what   is matter cannot be answered by physical 
experiments   alone,   but   requires   a  philosophical  analysis  of   physics. 
Its  answer  is  seen   to be dependent on  the question:    what  is  know- 
ledge?   [Reichenbach's   emphases].32 
Reichenbach referred  to "polarities"       and  "the principle of anomaly 
which can be derived   from the  foundations of quantum mechanics,"" 
whereas  the above-mentioned  physicists did use  less harsh  language  to 
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to demark  the  limits  of our knowledge of   tliis   class of   (observable) 
phenomena  from that   class   (of unobservables).     But  Reichenbach 
remained  obstinate in his pessimistic attitude   and declared that 
the softer language  of  the physicists whom he has cited—the   "comple- 
35 mentarity  of quantum mechanics"    —cannot  be employed  in describing 
the bifurcated  polarized   reality  that does  in  fact exist   in post- 
quantum physical  theory. 
Heisenberg himself assumed  a more  optimistic attitude   (regard- 
ing our knowledge of   reality)   in the   face   of the split  in  reality 
between the unknowable,  unobservable microscopic  "world of  little 
things,"  and the knowable,    observable  "world of big  things," than did 
the pessimistic  Reichenbach.     In a 1962 article on "Planck's  Discovery 
and the Philosophical Problems  of Atomic Physics,"      Heisenberg denied 
any subjective element   in natural science   as  long as we  remember that 
that science  is our knowledge  and elaborate description of   the work- 
ings of nature and not   an exposition of nature  in its entirety as 
apart from the observations  of man.     Given  this  assumption,   the 
observations of man will now avoid subjectivity and will not  distort 
the observed objects,   because  it  is  assumed we are incapable  of 
distorting   them. 
'In atomic physics,   the observations  can no  longer be objectified 
in such  a simple manner:     that  is,  they cannot be  referred   to 
something that  takes  place objectively  or in  a describable manner 
in space and   time.     Here  it   remains still to be added  that   the 
science  of nature does not  deal with nature  itself but  in   fact 
with  the science   [Heisenberg's emphasis]  of nature  as man  thinks 
and describes  it. 
This does not   introduce an element   of subjectivity into 
natural science.     We do not by any means pretend  that  occurrences 
in the  universe depend  on our observations,  but we point  out  that 
natural  science stands between nature  and man and that we  cannot 
renounce  the use  of man's intuition or  innate  conceptions.->/ 
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Heisenberg is  here merely denying what Nicholas Capaldi  called the 
"abortive   Copernican  revolution in philosophy" which represented  the 
post-Kantian  attempt of subjective   idealism to do away with  the 
substantiality  of  the objects of reality and  to consider only the 
perceiving subjects  and  the experienced or perceived objects as con- 
stituting  reality   (which was synonymous witli our knowledge of  reality). 
While Hume and Kant  accepted  as part of the real world both objects and 
experience and both realized  that   "there is no metaphysical justification 
for the distinction between objects  and experience,"      Hume's  "meta- 
physics" will   not  allow him "to make  the distinction between self  and 
experience."40    Hume's problem is with  the reality of  the subject   (see 
below,  p.150))  not   (and more to the point here)  with  the  relation 
between experience  and  objects.    Kant's  Copernican revolution recog- 
nizes,  of  course,   the  reality of the subject,  and   this  is his  "great- 
ness,"  for he  showed  that  "a non-empirical self with a priori apparatus 
n4l 
is a necessary  condition for knowledge, even scientific knowledge. 
But,  and  to the  point here,  Kant's  Copernican  revolution replaced  the 
rigid Cartesian dualism.     Cartesian dualism had attempted to explain 
the  relationship between objects and experiences,  but  could not explain 
how,   in  its bifurcated  dualistic world,   subjects  came  to traffic with 
experiences,  let   alone with objects   (which  the subject  could know 
only  through the mediatory experiences).     Capaldi's schematization  of 
the world  of Cartesian dualism was  as  follows: 
42 
; ir 
subject(s) experience(s) object(s) 
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The Copernican revolution of Kant would avoid both Cartesian dualism 
and  the  later subjective   idealism of  the post-Kantian during the 
early nineteenth  century.     At  the same  time,   though,  the more  recon- 
ciliatory Kantian dualism   (a "natural" dualism)   assumed subject  could 
traffic with object   through experiences, or,   through the  subject's 
reconciliation of  its  a priori  categories of knowledge with the 
independent  objects as   filtered   through experiences.     Subjects meet 
objects halfway,   and   "experiences" are just as much the  language  so 
to speak,   of  objects,   as  they  are of   the subject's a priori categories 
of understanding.     Capaldi   illustrated   the Kantian scheme      as follows: 
s        • O 
(subjects) (experiences) (objects) 
But Capaldi seemed   to  think  this scheme  as a precursor of the modern 
"sophisticated  subjectivism"     in which "E" is  the   "world of phenomenology" 
and "S" is  the  "rules   of language" which merely express  or describe 
phenomenological  reality. A "complete  Copernican Revolution" would 
consist, said Capaldi,  of the  "negation of  (E),  and  a universe consist- 
ing solely of   (S)   and   (0)   interacting without   intermediaries,"       or, 
as   follows : 
:o 
The Kantian Copernican revolution,  as  distinguished  from the "complete 
Copernican Revolution," recognized  a three-tiered  reality of subjects/ 
experiences/objects   (and,  Capaldi noted, Kant  is here one with James 
Beattie,  the Scottish Enlightenment  Common-Sense realist,      who was 
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favorably   reviewed  by Burke  In the  1773 issue of  the Annual Register. 
Kant attempted  to reconcile the  three  realms   (or,  rather,  the   two 
realms,  for "experiences"  are merely the by-products of   the  interaction 
between subject  and object). 
It  seems  that   Capaldi's attitude—his wish  for a complete 
Copernican  revolution—is similar  to Reichenbach's view that   the 
substantiality of matter   is hopelessly beyond   the knowledge of man, 
so that  the question of   "What is matter," necessarily becomes  dependent 
on  the answer  to the  question,  "What  is knowledge?"    In  other words, 
Capaldi's  "complete"  revolution in philosophy—the   immediate  interaction 
between  subject   and   object—seems   to   invite   a  repetition  of   the  epistemo- 
logical  consequences  of   the rigid,  bifurcating Cartesian dualism.     That 
is,  in a rigid dualism,   either mind   (Descartes)   or matter   (Hume)   is 
exclusively equated with  reality   (our knowledge  of  reality)   and all 
else is  derivative. 
But Kant's  limited  revolution in philosophy would view know- 
ledge as   consisting of  the questions both of  "What   is matter" and 
"What is knowledge?".     In   this sense, Kant  is  closer to  the untroubled 
quantum mechanics of say,  de Broglie, who could accept matter   (light) 
as of both particles  and of waves.     Or, Kant  is  closer  to Born's 
attitude of  the  "complementarity of quantum mechanics," which would 
accept  the  unobservability of the "world of small  things," while avoid- 
ing,  at  the same time,   shoving that  realm off  into a remote  corner of 
reality,   as  Cartesian dualism might,  and equating  the observable  "world 
of   large  things" with  the  totality of  reality,  and equating our know- 
ledge of  this  reality with a knowledge of  final  things. 
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Ernst  Cassirer explained,   in terms more  optimistic  than 
Reichenbach,   and more  in line with the Kantian conciliatory attitude, 
the philosophical significance of post-quantum mechanics.47    Cassirer 
saw the  attitude  of Keats'   "negative  capability"   (or what Burke 
called Newton's   "patient Thought"—see Appendix A)   as  common among 
many of  the  earlier   theorists of quantum mechanics.     That  is,   those 
holding  to  the   inexact quantum  theory were  capable of living with  the 
ambiguities  and  uncertainties which inhabited  the grey area between 
the  assumptions of  classical   (Newtonian)   physics  and those of quantum 
theory. 
Cassirer saw Bohr's correspondence principle  as an attempt   to 
bridge  classical  and  quantum concepts of  reality: 
The  correspondence principle,  as Bohr emphasizes,   is  an expression 
for the endeavour,  despite  the basic opposition between  the postu- 
lates  of quantum theory and   classical   theories,  to utilize by 
suitable  reinterpretation every feature of  the  classical theories 
in the development  of  the quantum theory. 
Accordingly,   the  contrast between the  classical viewpoint and 
that  of  quantum theory was not  to be obliterated, nor  could  the 
chasm between  the  two be properly bridged.     But by means  of  the 
correspondence principle a methodological, heuristic maxim was 
set up which was  to guide  the  course of research and  instruct  it 
to use  the  different  types of  laws in such a manner  as  to lead to 
a unified description of natural events.   ° 
Heisenberg,   continued   Cassirer, would use  the  "laws of  classical physics' 
in order to shape  the  observer's  approach  to knowledge of  the empirical 
world. 49 
...   So little do Heisenberg's uncertainty relations   (including 
his principle of   indeterminacy)  waive  the assumption of strict 
laws  of nature that they actually give directions as  to how to 
arrive   at,   and how to formulate,  these  laws  in order to make  them 
conform to the conditions of our empirical knowledge.     [He says 
that]   ...   all statements   in physics have a relative  character  in 
that  they can express  the state of the observed object never   'in 
itself   but merely  in relation to the means of observation used. 
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This sets   limitations  to our knowledge of  experience,   including our 
"formulation of  physical  concepts." For example, we  know that   in 
order to plot  the positions  of  an electron,   the electron must be 
illuminated,  but  also that  this  illumination changes  the course of 
the electron  from its original path.     This  is called  the  "Compton 
effect."    But  if we   take  into account   the  Compton effect,  together 
with,  for instance,  the fact that   "the shorter the wave  length of  the 
light used,   the more precise will be  the determination of position," 
we recognize both  the limitations of  our knowledge and  yet arrive  at 
ever more precise  calculations of the behavior of matter. Heisen- 
berg's uncertainty  relations still apply to  the observable world of 
"big  things," but  they also conform to  law, which is the "general 
requirement   of   causality." The uncertainty relations   "may correct 
the formulation of  the causal principle   [of  reality]  but  they  cannot 
simply  deny   or  overthrow  its   content. 
The  introduction of  limiting  conditions of our knowledge of 
matter merely requires  that we give a "fresh determination and 
interpretation"56   to our observations and knowledge of matter, not 
that we deny determination or causality.     For example,   Cassirer wrote 
that   the  "causal realtion,   if  interpreted   in a critical  rather than a 
metaphysical sense," should be seen to contain "a statement not 
immediately about  things, but  about experience.   ...     It expresses 
something about  the  structure of empirical  knowledge.   .   .   .""       This 
doesn't  involve  any distortion of  the  observed events,  but enhances 
and makes ever more precise  our knowledge of   the observable events. 
When experience  shows   that   there  are  "limits  to our observation," we 
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only have more "respect"  for the new phenomenal matrix in which we 
may apply the old   "causal  thinking."     Cassirer refers here   to "the 
c o 
newly discovered   factual realm"JO  (emphasis added).     This process of 
discovery  "by no means   renounced   the  requirement  of  determination; 
but it had  to arrive at  a new conceptual means   in order to  do justice 
to it.   .   .   ." This  is the sense  in which "Heisenberg established a 
causal  law of quantum mechanics." "Determination  is thus   re-estab- 
lished," but only  for  "those measurements which,   according  to the 
principles of quantum mechanics,   are not  capable  of  any increase  in 
precision,"      or,   those measurements  of the observable phenomena. 
Cassirer  concluded   his  chapter  on   the   "Foundations   of  Quantum 
Theory" with  a    summary  of  the  "general epistemological situation" 
left in the wake  of quantum physical theories.     The post-quantum  (and 
quasi-classical)   epitemological situation  is  similar to the   "limited" 
Kantian Copernican Revolution  (supra,  p.136).    The  "strict  dualism" 
(as Cassirer called  it)   of  the post-quantum epistemology,   is  akin   to 
Kant's natural dualism in that both schools of  though maintain the 
separateness  of  questions  or reality and of questions  of knowledge, 
by offering  a theory of  our  intermediate knowledge,   involving what 
Capaldi  called  "experiences."    In post-quantum epistemology,   Cassirer 
wrote, 
...   a  firm connection between knowledge and   reality is estab- 
lished,   as well  as  a thoroughgoing correspondence between the 
two,   in which,  however,   a strict  dualism is  contained.     For 
however much we may extend and  refine the sign system of  our 
concepts,   it  always   remains merely  a mediate expression   of 
reality.     The  objectively real  is presupposed  as  something 
persisting and  substantial, but  in its substantial existence 
it  cannot  fit   into  the sign language of our concepts of 
nature.   ■   •   ." 
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Cassirer rejected  the epistemology of   "'naive realism.1" Naive 
realism assumes  the existence of  "absolute,  completely determined 
entities   from which we  can immediately read off  the laws and to which 
we can  attach  them as  their attributes." Such assumed givens of 
man's experience would be similar to what Kant  called,  and denied, 
the  "intellectual  intuition" of   things-in-themselves   (see supra, p. 
sources  of  our knowledge of  reality. 
The  process of  knowledge involves  first,  limiting our knowledge 
to a certain realm of  reality—a realm beyond which  the quark search, 
for example, would take us,  or the search  for the "essence" of matter, 
the indivisible atom of  classical physics—and determining the inter- 
mediate  character of our knowledge of reality in general.    We thereby 
arrive  at  a more precise knowledge,   including the  formulation of laws, 
of  the  reality which  a priori,  the mind   is  determined  capable of appre- 
hending. 
Our knowledge  attains objectivity without distorting reality, 
or rather,  our knowledge  is objective because we have taken great pains 
to see  that   that   reality is not distorted. Cassirer wrote: 
.   .   .   What in fact   constitutes   the  content of   our empirical 
knowledge  is  rather the totality of  observations which we 
group  together   in definite  orders  and which,   in accordance 
with this process of ordering, we can represent by theoretical 
laws.     The extent  of  the dominance  of  these  laws marks   the 
extent   of  our  objective   knowledge.     Objectivity  or  objective 
reality  is attained only because and insofar as there is  con 
formity  to  law-not vice versa.    Thus  it  follows  that we cannot 
speak of  physical entities except under  the  conditions of physical 
cognition.   ...     We do not simply read off  the  laws  from the   _ 
object   [as the pseudo-Newtonians did when  they equated    Nature 
with a machine-like  rationalism (see Appendix A), or as  the 
Shaftesburian Moral Sense school did when they divinized    Nature 
(see Chanter   III)]-we condense its   laws,  and thus   into objective 
statements,   the empirical data available through observation and 
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measurement.     Apart   from this reality there exists   for us no 
other objective  reality  to be investigated  or sought after.6? 
Kant and Cassirer seem to be saying that since naive realism rejects 
an intermediate theory of knowledge, any objective knowledge is then 
impossible. 
The moral  implications of naive realism include a passive,  non- 
critical, non-discriminating  approach  to the   (supposed)   immediate 
objects  of experience.     Nature  and man,  object  and  subject, become 
confused.     All  "'moral appraisal'" or the choosing   to act according 
to objective  standards,   is  lost. 
One may see  in Burke's kinship with  the eighteenth-century 
"philosophical historians" the  similarity of his  thought with  that of 
the  "limited" Kantian  Copernican Revolution and  the  assumptions of 
post-quantum epistemological   theory.     Burke  and   the   new  philosophical 
historians  rejected   the naive  realism of  the naked  facts of history 
—and sought   to bring  these facts  into some kind of  coherent system— 
without  distorting the substantiality of   the givens of history   (see 
Appendix D).     In Cassirer's  terminology,  the philosophical historians 
sought  to discover the  laws of historical experience, while maintaining 
the  independent  reality of   the objects of history.     Heisenberg's words 
are  remembered  here:     "'natural science  stands between nature and man. 
The book from which  this citation from Heisenberg was taken,  is   titled 
The  Imagination of  an  insurrection.     Dublin Easter,   1916,  by William 
Irwin Thompson. 
Thompson's book is an attempt to trace  the  origins, direct and 
indirect,  of a significant historical event  to,   in  a great  degree,  its 
,,.69 
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literary    origins.     It  is  an  attempt  to trace these origins   to 
thoughts  in the minds  of participants  of   the historical  action, 
thoughts which  impelled   the making of  history.     Just  as  the attitude 
of genuine Newtonianism,  of   the  "limited" Kantian Copernican Revolu- 
tion,   of   Burke   and   the  new  "philosophical  historians,"  and  of   the 
post-quantum theories  of physics  and knowledge—just  as  these  combine 
a complex view of   the givens  of reality with an  active,  dynamic 
subject  shaping  the  givens  of  reality into the more  coherent   "experiences" 
of reality—so Thompson described  the  literary works of William Butler 
Yeats,  AE,  Sean 0'Casey,  etc., which "intensified  the nationalistic 
consciousness of  a generation  of  Irishmen" prior to 1916,       and put 
them in a favorable  "frame  of mind"  to shape history.     Otherwise,   the 
vast   complexity  of   the historical/phenomenal realm would overawe  and 
shape men's  lives  and  actions.     Thompson  certainly did not deny  this 
complexity when he  said: 
In the  causality of  the  cultural process,  A does not simply 
cause  B:     A affects B;  B  reaffects A;  AB conditions  the emergence 
of C,   and before  C is fully appeared,   D is already coming forth 
with  an effect  that will  entirely transform the  completed  ABCD. 
And even  in such a grossly oversimplified  four-term sequence, 
the  greatest  oversimplification  is A,   for the  alpha that  interests 
us may be  the  omega of  a sequence that  is absolutely necessary to 
the  understanding of   it.'1 
The   (philosophical)   historian  is not frustrated by  this  complexity, but 
is only made aware  of   the need  to shape  it according  to  the a priori 
conditions of his knowledge of reality,  so that  that reality will not 
envelope him.     Thompson continued: 
The historian is  thus  forced to select, but since everything  is 
related,   [as   it  is both as regarding  theories  of  reality and   theories 
of knowledge   in  the Moral  Sense  Shaftesburian/Pope/Rutchesonian 
school], he must be  able  to select the relevant from the related- 
ness  of all  things.     In short,   the historian must  already possess 
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the knowledge he   is seeking to acquire.     To understand history, 
one must stand outside history, not just   to avoid bias, but   to 
be  able  to perceive distinctness and relation.     This separation 
of  subject  and  object was  a difficulty  in classical theories of 
perception.   .   .   .'* 
Thompson then cited   (as a parallel in physical theory   to the  above 
historical  theory)  Heisenberg's  confident  separation  of subject  and 
object,  observer and  observed, which yet  avoids any subjectivity.     This 
is one of  the problems which the eighteenth-century "philosophical 
historians" had  attempted   to solve.     Peter Hans Reill wrote that 
By  the sixth  and  seventh decade of the eighteenth   century,   the 
problem of  the   relationship between the observed   and  the observer, 
and  the   influences upon  a  thinker due to social,  historical,   and 
intellectual   forces   .   .   .   became vital.'3 
As shown elsewhere   (see Appendix  D),  the eighteenth-century "philosophi- 
cal historians" believed  the problem to be  solvable. 
The  Scottish writers  also,  as sociological historians  or as 
"limited primitivists   (see Chapter III) ,   implicitly assumed they  could 
discern structure  and   form in the evolutionary processes stretching 
from the  primitive   to   the  civilized state, without at   the  same   time 
distorting that perceived historical/phenomenal process.     The  past was 
considered  to be,   in  the  language of quantum theory,   part of  the 
observable world of   "big things," not  the unobservable world of   "little 
things."    A modern sociological historian has perhaps  defined more 
concisely   the  benefits   to  be  derived   from  the  study  of   a  structural 
past,  a past which need not be distorted because of  any applied 
analysis, but,  on  the   contrary, made more evident   to present historians. 
Philip Abrams recently wrote: 
.   .   .   Many current  accounts  of   the historians'  past,  requiring as 
they do a wholesale rejection  of any form of structural analysis, 
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strike me  as no better suited   than the normal version  of  the 
sociologist's past to deal with these  issues.   .   .   .     What   I 
have tried   to do is   to show how one could begin to move 
towards a more penetrating historical sociology.     The essen- 
tial step  is not to abandon the structural  typing of past and 
present but   rather  to recognize  that the   function of structural 
types is not  to allow us  to by-pass history by inferring  logically 
necessary  tendencies,  but on  the  contrary  to direct  attention  to 
those kinds   of historical inquiry which we should expect,   theoreti- 
cally,   to explain phenomena of structural  transformation.7'1 
Translated  into eighteenth-century  thought,  Carlyle's mad 
Mahometan  Caliph  dipping his head  in  the enchanted water, would have 
done better to  dip his head into one  of  the Leibnizian monads.     He   could 
then have beaten out, not  one minute   into seven long years, but  an 
infinity out   from any one  of   the self-sufficient monads which  individually 
reflected the universe in its entirety,  and which together, formed   a con- 
tinuum throughout   the Leibnizian plenum.     The   form and structure of   time 
and  space   (or place, or,  of an historical setting)   is nonexistent  in 
the monodology of Leibniz.     Therefore,  any knowledge of  observed phenom- 
ena (historical   as well as empirical)   is destined  to be  frustrated   in 
its  attempts   to  discern structure  in  the wrongly-assumed observables, 
because  confronted with  infinity directly before  its very nose.     Leibniz 
held that, 
If  a person were able  to  cognize distinctly all  that   is happening 
in or appearing to him at  the present moment, he could  foresee  all 
that will happen  to him or appear  to him  forever.75 
In  this monism,   the subject  and object  are not merely confused  as   to  the 
space  they occupy, but  also  as to  the  time they are about   (or—past   and 
present,   and   future,  are confused with one  another in this  continuum). 
From the  epistemological standpoint,   or,   from the  perceiving 
subject's view,   and,   in  the  language  of quantum physics,   the monads  are 
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of the  "world  of small things" and  therefore properly outside the 
realm of human knowledge.     It was  in order to avoid  the inevitable 
frustration of   the   attempt to know or feel  (the  structure  or form of 
historical/phenomenal)   "unobservables"  that Kant opposed  the popular 
eighteenth-century   "physico-theological proof."        This was also why 
Burke  opposed   the   "fatalism and necessity"  (as  lie puts it)   and  "ration- 
alism" of  the school of  Leibniz/Pope/Shaftesbury/Bolingbroke. Speci- 
fically, Kant's  "empirical realism"  corresponds   to the methodology of 
the Scottish sociological historians of  two centuries  and/or to Philip 
Abram's "historical sociologists" of the  twentieth century.     Kant's 
empirical  realism is an instance of his natural dualism in which subject 
and  object   (present  and  past)   are separate, yet   traffic with each other 
somehow,  and,   to a  certain extent,   form one another.     Although,  as 
Copleston said,  Kant's argument   is  "somewhat  involved," it is clear 
that   if  an historian  followed Kant's methodology,  the historian could 
successfully discover a structure in historical  phenomena without   con- 
fusing or subjectivizing  those  phenomena.     Copleston described  Kant's 
position  in this respect: 
Kant   argues  that  internal experience  is possible  only  through 
external experience.     [Kant's argument was  that]   ...   I am 
conscious  of my  own existence  as determined   in time   [the 
historian of  his  present  setting].     But all determination in 
time,   in respect,  that is,  of succession  [of  pattern,  of cause 
and  effect   relationships],  presupposes   the existence of some- 
thing permanent   in perception.     But  this something permanent 
cannot be  something within myself.     For it   is the  condition of 
my existence  in time.     It  follows,   therefore,  that  the Percep- 
tion of my  own existence in  time is possible only  through the 
existence  of  something real outside me.     Consciousness  in time 
is  thus necessarily connected with the existence  of external 
things;  that   is,  not merely with  the  representations   [Copleston s 
emphasis]   of  things external to me. 
The point made by Kant   is  thus  that  I cannot be conscious  of 
myself except mediately,  that  is  to say,  through   the immediate 
consciousness  of  external things.   .   •   • 
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For the historian or philosopher to be conscious of himself as exist- 
ing in a certain setting  is not,  or should not,   infer that  this reali- 
zation sets him hopelessly against   the notion of  investigating the 
empirical or historical objects of his enquiry.     On the  contrary, 
"armed" with  this  realization of an  intimate relation with his external 
setting,  he will not   internalize the independent, external  reality 
which he   is investigating,  such as  the Leibnizian rationalists  and 
other physico-theologists  did. 
Needless  to say,  the historian or philosopher following Kant's 
words, would not be  liable to  infer  the absolutes   (invoked   in  the 
physico-theological   argument)   from his  own  experience.     The   laws  which 
the people  of   the eighteenth  century—the correct Newtonians,   the 
sociological historians—attempted   to discover in natural or historical 
phenomena—would more   likely come out of a genuinely objective phenom- 
enal order. 
Arthur 0.   Lovejoy's  "critical  realism,"  like Kant's   "empirical 
realism," assumed that   one  of   the reasons   for the decline  of  the 
"Great Chain of Being"  concept   (a form of  the physico-theological 
argument)   toward the end  of  the eighteenth century was 
...   due  to the  fallacy of   transcribing the temporal  terms of 
concrete existence  into  the eternal   [absolute]   forms  of   the 
Platonic essences.     The temporal   [phenomenal/historical]  world 
is a contingent  one,   .   .   .   'its magnitude,   its pattern,   its 
habits, which we   call   laws, have something arbitrary  and  idio- 
syncratic  about   them.    .    . 
The historian need not,   though, become one of Lovejoy's  "anti-intel- 
lectual rationalists" whose   "...   rationality when  considered  as 
complete,   as excluding  all  arbitrariness, becomes itself  a kind of 
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irrationality.   ..." Any "irrational" arbitrariness  does not 
result from the search  for structures or laws of natural  and histori- 
cal phenomena, but   from a wrong-headed   theory of  reality   (such as  the 
monism of Leibniz   or  Cartesian continuum,  and of the physico-theologi- 
cal arguments),   and   its mate,  a facile theory of knowledge  of  this 
ill-perceived  reality.     The natural dualism of Kant,  of  the  Scottish 
writers,  of Newton and his non-impetuous  followers—and of  Burke— 
avoids,   in  regard  to   theories of  reality,   the kind of irrational arbi- 
trariness of which Lovejoy spoke.     But   the latter group may  at  the 
same  time seek patterns and  laws   in an  a priori-recognized  independent 
and objective nature  and/or history. 
Chapman's  Burke seemed  to assume   the  independent  reality of 
all three categories—transcendent   Ideal,  perceiving subject,   and the 
reality of  the phenomenal world, whether perceived or not—as did  the 
Scottish Common-Sense   school of realism.     Chapman's  Burke may be 
distinguished   from the Burke portrayed by Strauss  and Stanlis, who 
place him within a rigid, hierarchical natural law tradition,  a 
tradition which considers  the human subject and the phenomenal world 
in general as  derivative. 
Leslie Stephen's criticism of Hume's scepticism warned of  the 
deficiencies   inherent   in such a position as Hume's which denies  the 
possibility  of drawing a line between  the subjective  and   the  objective, 
without  distorting either realm.     To Hume, perception and  sensation 
are synonymous; every perception depends  on the defective  sensations, 
and  therefore  "cannot  have  that reality which is to be  found  in the 
transcendental world alone, where  it  is assumed we might  see  things 
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unaffected  by the   character of  our eyes   [our senses]."    But our senses 
are our exclusive way to   interpreting reality. 
...   If we take an object   to pieces in our imagination, we  find 
that,  when we have  removed   all  the qualities known  to us by our 
senses, we have  removed everything.     The supposed   'abstract  idea,' 
which   remains behind,   is,  as Berkeley has shown,   a mere empty word. 
A thing   is  the  sum of   its qualities;  and what we  call  the abstract 
idea of   a triangle   is  but  the  idea of  a particular   triangle regarded 
as representative of   an  indefinite multitude of  other triangles. 
Thus, whenever an  idea  is suggested  as corresponding  to some  inde- 
pendent   reality, Hume   challenges   it to give an account of  itself. 
Can we   trace the derivation to some previous  impression?     If we 
cannot,   it   is  an empty word.     If we  can,   it must  share the unreality 
of   the   impression which it  represents.   . 81 
There  remains no distinction between the external  and  the internal;  there 
is nothing outside of us   for "every object of  thought  is either a sensa- 
tion or   the   representative   of a sensation, an actual or a decaying impres- 
sion.   .   .   ."82    Stephen  is  next   to contemptuous of Reid as  a philosopher, 
seeing the  Scotsman as seeking merely a "justification of the ordinary 
beliefs of mankind;"83 Reid does not even justify his  principles,  but 
takes them for granted, because any "attempt  to advance beyond our 
premises can only lead us   into hopeless  scepticism [therefore], we may 
as well stay where we are."84    The influence  of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson 
and   the early Moral Sense  school is direct upon Reid,   according  to 
Stephen   (and when a number  of  commentators have seen an influence of 
the Moral Sense philosophy on the thought of Burke who viewed—or 
reviewed,   in  the Annual  Register—Reid'a  philosophy favorably, Stephen's 
correlation  between   the  Moral  Sense  school  and  Reid's   affects   our view 
of Burke),   and   is reflected   in Reid's  falling back upon  the support 
of  the Deity when Reid comes upon  a principle which cannot be  proved. 
"As with Hume we  can only  observe  the  sequence of  phenomena, but now we 
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assume  Chat  a divine power causes  the sequence to be  invariable,"85 
rather  than  that  cunning or feigning  of the mind   that Hume says  is 
responsible   for making  it  appear the  atomistic sensations,   "pitifully 
naked  and destitute"       are part of a system larger or more profound 
than the sum of   themselves.     Stephen   forgets   that  Reid was   the  first 
philosopher  to articulate the distinction between sensation and percep- 
tion   (a partial use of   the  reason) ,   and many other distinctions  as a 
result   of  this  primary  distinction  within  his   comprehensive  system. 
That such is  a true  representation of  Reid's philosophy  is shown else- 
where  in this  study.     Nonetheless,  Stephen does help us   to understand 
the general  intellectual  climate  in  Britain in which Reid  and his 
school   flourished.     Stephen sees two  lines of  escape from the  radical 
individualism of Hume, who held  that   the "single method of discovering 
truth was  to examine the furniture  supposed   to be  stored  in that 
receptacle." One line was the philosophy of Kant,  and  the  other 
CO 
line was  the   "introduction of  the Social element"      onto the nominal- 
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sense.    The   'sensuous world'   (nature)   and  the   'intellectual world'   (free- 
dom, morality)   are   thus not posited  as   two opposing absolute  forms of 
being and   for  that  reason the necessity  for  this opposition must be 
derived  from principles  of  knowledge"   (emphases added)   (ibid., p.   201). 
52Idcm. 
5^0r again, by  limiting  our knowledge, as   in the  above example, 
we acquire  in the process  a    "renewed analysis" of the causal principle 
of classical physics—we  can "prevent   the  stealthy introduction in the 
formulation of  the   causal principle of elements which  are  in principle 
unobservable"   (ibid., p.   127),  elements of  the "world of   little  things," 
as Reichenbach put  it.     Heisenberg recently   (1973)   applauded  the  idea 
of limits  in quantum mechanics,   and saw such a methodology as prologue 
to the discovery of new laws of matter.     At  a symposium on  Copernicus, 
held at the National Academy of   Sciences  in Washington,  D.C.,  Hesienberg 
warned of  the wrong-headed  philosophical  assumptions behind the  futile 
search for unobservables.     "...   the mechanical views  after Newton 
have been   rather Democritan, especially atomic physics  in the  last  cen- 
tury   .   .   .   the Platonic view is   (rather)  really the deepest of   the 
views   .    .    . 
"Plato was right  and Democritus was wrong.   .   .   .     We should not 
look for the smallest particles,   as Democritus did   .   .   .   this ever-con- 
tinued search   for the quark   (sub-quanta)  particles  is  a consequence of 
the wrong philosophy.   ...    You are just  close to an essential point 
in philosophy, merely,  the ontological   question of whether mathematical 
structures  are  forms  in the mind, or whether  they are  there before  the 
human  mind   ever  was   created. 
"There is  a very great difference between  this kind of objective 
idealism of Plato and,   let  us say,  the more  subjective idealism of   the 
nineteenth  century.     I would definitely be  in favor of   the objective 
idealism of Plato."    Heisenberg  is convinced   that such  fruitless search, 
as a science, has  come to  an end.     He seems   to be  implying  that unless 
the search  is not declared  closed,  the laws which have hitherto guided 
the search  after quarks and  their behavior will possibly begin to arrive 
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at distorted   results,   that   is,   crossing the  line between observable 
and unobservable phenomena without knowing it, without  being  aware of 
the distorting effect  of observer on  observed,  or of the  unknowable 
qualities of  the phenomena itself.     "I  am rather convinced  that such 
a field  as elementary  as particle physics can  come to a close  like 
thermodynamics, or like optical atomic spectra, which has  come to a 
close.   ..."   (The Nature  of Scientific Discovery.    A Symposium Com- 
memorating  the  500th Anniversary  of the Birth  of Nicholas Copernicus, 
Ed., Owen Gingerich   [Washington,   D.C.:     Smithsonian Press,  1975]   ["The 
Fifth International  Symposium of  the  Smithsonian  Institution organized 
jointly with  the National Academy of  Science   in  Cooperation with the 
Copernicus  Society of America]   "Discussion with Professor Heisenberg," 
pp.   556-573,   p.   566.)     This does not   infringe  or delimit  our knowledge 
of phenomena,   because now, declared Heisenberg, with as fine  a line as 
possible drawn between observable  and non-observables, we can proceed 
to "look  for  symmetries  instead of entities"  in  the   former world  (ibid. , 
p.   565).     Burke had a similar attitude  toward  the "quiet happiness"  of 
a wisdom which accepted human limitations, as  a corollary of, not 
passively  following nature, but of rather accepting the  reality of 
nature   (see  supra.,  p. 46).    This  is  Burke's  realism.     The acceptance 
of man's  limitations   involves another  corollary besides   those  of safe- 
guarding   the   substantiality  and   independence   of   observable  nature,   and 
of  the resultant greater ability  of man to more precisely shape and 
synthesize  that nature.     Man now avoids seeking "lost  causes," so to 
speak,   and   avoids the  inevitable   frustration which results  from such 
activity.     In   Determinism and  Indeterminism in Modern Physics,  Cassirer 
wrote: 
"The entities of physics,   its empirical objects,  are of course 
never completely given, because  they are never completely 
determined; but  on the other hand  they no longer  threaten us 
as  a mysterious  impenetrable  absolute to whose last  roots we 
cannot reach.     For the attributes  of their empirical and 
theoretical determinability is now included in their defini- 
tion;   this  determinability constitutes physical entities,   in- 
stead  of merely expressing  an  accidental  and individual feature 
of  them.   .   .   ."(Cassirer, Determinism and  Indeterminism,  p.   132.) 
Both the   independent   reality of  the phenomenal world and man's more 
perfect  knowledge of   this world were safeguarded  by limiting man's 
knowledge in  the above  fashion.     This   is  the effect of  Cassirer's 
denial of man's knowledge  of  the   "completely given" empirical  objects 
of physics   (corresponding  to Kant's unknowable  noumena—see  immediately 
above),   and,   one  might   say,   the  effect   of  Newton's  denial  of   the 
Aristotelian  occult  qualities   (see Appendix A)  which some writers  of 
Newton's  day would still  assign to the  objects  of nature.     Such 
Aristotelian notions  of nature would onlys serve  to frustrate man s 
would-be knowledge of  that never-to-be-known nature. 
54Ibid., p.   123. 
55Ibid.     p.   124.     See Stephen G.   Brush,   "Irreversibility and 
Indeterminism:     Fourier to Heisenberg," Journal of the History of  Ideas, 
Vol.  XXXVII,  Number  A   (October-December,  1976),  pp.   603-630.     Brush 
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emphasized  the   fact   that  prominent  post-quantum physicists  did not 
deny the existence of the  absolute determinism of  classical  physical 
laws, but merely questioned the certainty of our knowledge  of such 
laws.    The  "transition from determinism to indeterminism" was  really 
a transition  from determinism to uncertainty.     This  involves  the 
formulation  of  new theories  of knowledge,  rather  than the  overturning 
of previously-held   theories  of reality.     Brush wrote  that post-quantum 
physicists  such  as, 
".   .   .   Rutherford   .   .   .   Maxwell,   Boltzmann, Planck,  and  Einstein, 
would   find   it   inconceivable that  anything in nature could happen 
'by chance'  without any  cause at all.     Hence, whenever we find  them 
using  the words   'probability,'   'chance,'   'statistical,'   or   'sponta- 
neous,'   we must  assume  that such  terms only refer  to our  lack of 
knowledge  of causes,  not  to the  absence of causes   [Brush's emphases]. 
The  fallacy of   that  interpretation   is that   it   could apply equally 
well to Born  and  Heisenberg, or to anyone who believes   in an   'uncer- 
tainty principle'   as  distinct   from an   'indeterminancy principle.' 
Heisenberg himself emphasized  that his principle applies  to our 
knowledge  about   the world   [Brush's emphasis].   .   .   . 
.   .   .the  transition  from determinism to  indeterminism is linked 
with  the posit ivistic-pragmatic-operationist-instrumentalist-phenom- 
enalist  attitude  that many physicists  adopted   in the early  twentieth 
century.   .   .   .     Positivism ...   is  a retreat  from the  aspiration 
to know and   understand   [emphasis  added]   everything,  an  admonition 
to be content with  the partial  knowledge   that  can be attained at  a 
particular stage  in the development  of  theory and experiment.     A 
positivist  may call himself an indeterminist, meaning that his 
science  cannot determine   that which  lies beyond present   observation; 
indeterminism  is  then the  same  as  uncertainty   [emphasis   added;   this 
was the  position of  Bohr,  Heisenberg and  Eddington].    Or he may 
call himself  a determinist meaning  that his   theory correlates all 
known  or knowable   facts   [emphasis  added]   about  the observable world, 
and that  anything beyond  that   is not his  concern  anyway   (this was 
Planck's  position)   .   .   ."(Brush,   ibid., pp.   626-627). 
For the continuity between classical and quantum physical  (or, epistemo- 
logical)   theories,  see  also Joseph Agassi,  "Continuity  and Discontinuity 
in the History of  Science," Journal of   the History of   Ideas,   Vol.   XXXIV, 
No.   4 (October-December,   1973), pn.   609-626,  and Margaret J.   Osier, 
"John Locke  and  the  Changing Ideal of  Scientific Knowledge," Journal of 
the History of   Ideas.  Vol.   XXXI, Mo.   1   (January-March,   1970),  pp.   3-16. 
These  three   articles   represent  what  may  be   called   the  post-Kuhnian 
historiography of science—Thomas S.  Kuhn of M.I.T.   stressed   the discon- 
tinuity of scientific knowledge in his seminal  1962 work, The Structure 
of  Scientific  Revolutions. 
56Ibid. ,   p.   127. 
57Ibid. ,  p.   114. 





Ibid., p. 127. 
Ibid. , p. 128. 
Ibid. ,  p.   128. 
ft"? ^Ibid., p.   130.     Cassirer wrote of Newton's  thought  that  it 
maintained  a dualism while still deriving a  coherent  interpretation 
of the empirical world,   so coherent   in fact,   that  "definite  religious 
tendencies  seized upon Newton's work and  took  it  into their service." 
But  "Newton's  gravitational  theory" itself,  for instance, distinguished 
between theories of  reality and theories  of  our knowledge  of  reality. 
"Not only as   regards  to  its substance   [theories of  reality],  but  also 
on the authority of   its   "form"   [literally, usage or method of procedure, 
and,   in the  present  context,  representing the   theories  of knowledge]   it 
belongs for us purely and  exclusively to natural and scientific thought; 
and  if one  removes   it   from this  its ground and  floor,   it  seems  to lose 
its meaning.   ..."   (Ernst Cassirer,   "Die Philosophie  im XVII.   und XVIII 
Jahrhundert," Actualites     Scientifiques et  Industrielles  841.     Philosophie 
Chronique  Annuelle   [publlee par L'Institut  International de  Collaboration 
Philosophique] ,  Vol.   V   [1939],  p.   60,   [Trans,   par R.R.H.J. 
63 
64 
Ibid. , p.   131. 
Ibid. ,  pp.   131-132. 
^Reid's  realism was not  a naive realism in  this sense   (see 
Arthur R.   Rreenberg,  "Hamilton and  Reid's Realism," The Modern School- 
man,  Volume  LIV, Number  1   [November,   1976], pp.   15-32,  esp.   pp.   15-17. 
The   late Lionel Trilling seemed  to have been anwering the 
reductive,  pessimistic argument of  Reichenbach's description of Heisen- 
berg's views, when Trilling described  "objectivity" as both  the state 
of the mind's   fullest expansion,   and the  "respect" for the  independence 
of  the objects  of perception. 
"...   Objectivity  is by no means  an  invention of  science.     It  is 
by no means  a  limitation upon  the  range of perception.     It does not 
imply the devaluation of   the  object   that   is preceived,   its  charac- 
teristic purpose  is not  reductive. 
Actually the opposite is so.     The aim of what we properly call 
objectivity  is the  fullest possible  recognition of  the  integral^and 
entire existence of  the object   .   .   .  objectivity  is  the effort   'to 
see the object,   as   in  itself   it   really is.*    The object, whether  it 
be a phenomena of nature, or a work of art, or an idea or a system 
of  ideas,   or a social problem,  or,   indeed,  a person   (or an histori- 
cal event[s]),  is not   to be seen as   it, or he or she,  appears  to 
our limited  thought,   to our predilections  and prejudices,   to our 
casual  or hasty inspection, but  as  it  really is   in itself,  in its 
own terms,   in these  alone.   ... 
It  is   an effort which can never wholly succeed.     That  it must 
at  least partially  fail,   that   the object  as  in   itself it  really is 
can never  finally be known,   is guaranteed  by the nature  of   individual 
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persons,  by the nature of society, even, the philsophers   tell us, 
by the nature of the mind itself.     In  the  face of  the certainty 
that the effort of objectivity will  fall short of what it  aims 
at,  those who undertake  to make  the effort do so out of  something 
like  a sense of intellectual honor,  and out  of the   faith that in 
the practical  life,  which includes  the moral life,   some good must 
follow from even the   relative success  of  the endeavor.     (Lionel 
Trilling,Mind   in the Modern World   ["The  1972 Jefferson Lecture  in 
the Humanities"]   [N.Y.I  The Viking Press,  1973], pp.   33-34.) 
What might be  called  the  objective  limitation of  the human mind's  inves- 
tigation and   analysis of  objects   (in  the broadest sense), was   for 
Trilling,   as  it was   for Cassirer and   for Heisenberg,  a process which 
led, not  to pessimism and   frustration, but  rather  to precision and 
confidence  in   our knowledge of  reality. 
67 Ibid. , p.   132,  p.   137. 
68See  Cassirer,  Determinism and  Tndeterminism,   Chapter 13, 
passim.     For  "moral appraising," see P.   H.   Nowell-Smith, Ethics   (London: 
Penguin Books,   1954),  pp.   176-182. 
69See  Maurice Mandelbaum, History, Man & Reason   (Baltimore  & 
London:     1974,  1971),  p.   46. 
William Irwin Thompson,  op.   cit. ,  p.   233. 
71 Idem. 
72Thompson,  ibid.,   p.   234.     This  is not unlike what Harriet 
Cilliam recently called   the   "...   empirical  [Gilliam's emphasis] 
impulse" of   the  idealist  historiography by R.  G.   Collingwood and Michael 
Oakeshott.     The  representative   (subjective)   idealist  F.   H.  Bradley had 
"...   conceived mental   life as an   'immediate flow of  feelings  and 
sensations, devoid  of  all  reflection and self-knowledge.'    But,  as   the 
idealists  of   the  twentieth century—Collingwood and Oakeshott  especially 
—were to  realize,   this  description of experience   is such as   to make all 
knowledge  of self and other beings  impossible.     Collingwood and Oake- 
shott,   consequently,  conceived experience no longer as  immediate but 
as a   'concrete whole'   containing mediation or thought within itselt: 
'There is no sensation which  is    not also  thought, no intuition which 
is not also judgement, no volition which is not also recognition. 
This  thesis  can be considered another product of  an empirical  impulse, 
it seeks  to  leave whole what   'analysis divided into experience and what 
is experienced.   .   .   ."   (Harriet Gillian,,   "The Dialectics of  Realism and 
Idealism in Modern Historiography Theory," History and Theory,  Vol.  XV, 
No.   3  [1976] ,  p.   235.) 
73Reill,  op.   cit.,   pp.   42,  46. 
^Philip Abrams,   "The Sense of  the Past and Origins of  S0^0^'" 
Past  and Present, Number 55   (May,  1972),  pp.   18-37, esp.   P. 
32. 
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colorful  language, Thomas  Carlyle wrote  in his essay,   "On History 
Again"   (1833),  of the necessity  for the historian to "compress" the 
givens of history into understandable structures   (or,   to use the 
fashionable word, paradigms)   in order to attain "Universal History," 
or, objective history.     Carlyle wrote:     "...   History,  then,  before 
it can become Universal History,  needs of all things  to be  compressed. 
Were there no epitomizing of History,  one  could not remember beyond  a 
week.     Nay,  go to that with  it,   and exclude  compression  altogether, 
we  could not  remember an hour,  or  at all;   for Time,   like Space,  is 
infinitely divisible;   and   an hour with  its events, with  its sensations 
and emotions, might  be diffused   to such expansion  as should cover the 
whole  field of memory,  and push all else over the  limits.    Habit, how- 
ever,  and  the natural   constitution of man,  do themselves prescribe 
serviceable  rules for  remembering;   and keep  at  a safe distance  from 
us all   such  fantastic possibilities;—into which only some  foolish 
Mahometan  Cnllph, ducking his head  in  a bucket of enchanted water, 
and so beating out  one wet minute  into seven  long years   of servitude 
and hardship  could  fall.    The  rudest peasant has his  complete set  of 
Annual   Registers  legibly printed   in his brain;  and, without  the 
smallest  training  in Mnemonics,   the proper pauses, subdivisions,  and 
subordinations  of  the  little to  the  great,   all   introduced there. 
Memory and  Oblivion,   like Day and Night,  and indeed  like  all other 
Contradictions  in this  strange dualistic Life of  ours,   are necessary 
for each  other's existence; Oblivion is   the dark page, whereon Memory 
writes her  light-beam characters,   and makes  them legible; were it  all 
light,  nothing could be read there,  any more than if  it  were all 
darkness.   ..."     ([Thomas Carlyle]   Carlyle's Complete Works   [The 
Sterling  Edition],  Vol.   Ill   Critical   and  Miscellaneous   Essays,   Collected 
and Republished   [Boston:    Estes  and Lauriat,   1869], p.   79.) 
75Leibniz.     A  Collection  of  Critical Essays,  Ed., Harry G. 
Frankfort   (Garden  City,  N.Y.:     Anchor Books, Doubleday  Co.,  Inc., 
"A Doubleday Anchor Original,"  1972), p.   3. 
76Wolfgang Philipp  cited  Kant:     "'Physicotheology is  the attempt 
of  reason to conclude   from the purposes of nature  to the highest  cause 
of nature  and   its qualities.'"    Wolfgang Philipp,   "Physicotheology in 
the age  of Enlightenment:     appearance  and history." Studies on Voltaire 
and  the  Eighteenth Century   (Transactions of  the second   international 
congress   on   the   Enlightenment   III),   Volume  LVII   (1967),   p.   1233.      See 
also  Frederick  Copleston,   S.J.,   A  History  of  Philosophy,   Volume   6, 
Modern  Philosophy,  Part  II,  Kant   (Garden City, N.Y.:     Image Books   [A 
Division of  Doubleday  and  Co.,   Inc.],   1964,   1960),  p.   168. 
77See Burke,   review of  "An Essay on  the Genius  and Writings  of 
Pope," by Dr.   Warton  in The Annual Register   ...   for the Year 1782 
(London:     J.   Dodsley,   1783), pp.   213-217. 
78Frederick Copleston, A History of  Philosophy, Vol.   IV, Modern 
Philosophy,  Part II, Kant   (Garden City,  N.Y.:    Image Books,  W«*)t P-   *'i 
see also  S.   Komer,  Kant   (Baltimore,  Maryland:    Penguin Books,   1964,   19^5;, 
p.   93. 
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Philip P.  Wiener,   "Towards  Commemorating  the Centenary of 
Arthur 0.   Lovejoy's Birthday   (October  10,   1873)," Journal of  the 
History of  Ideas,  Vol.   XXXIV,  No.  U   (October-December,   1973), p.   597. 
See  also, Lovejoy,  The Great  Chain of  Being.     A Study of   the History 
of an  Idea  (N.Y. :     Harper and   Row,  1965,   1936),  espec, Chapter IX, 
"The Temporalizing of  the Chain of Being," pp.   242-287.     For Lovejoy's 
critical realism,  see his The  Revolt  Against  Dualism  (Chicago:    Open 
Court,   1930),   and  F.   Copies ton, A History of Philosophy,  VIII,  ii,  pp. 
150-153.     See also,   in the present study,   infra., pp.       et  passim, 
and et passim. 
80Wiener,   "Commemorating the  Centenary of A.   0.   Lovejoy," idem. 
81Leslie  Stephen,  History of  English Thought   in the Eighteenth 
Century   (N.Y.:     G.   P.   Putnam's  Sons,  1902),  Vol.   I,   p.   38. 
82, David Leslie  Stephen,  Thought,  Vol.   I, p.   39.     Also see: 
Hume,  A Treatise   of Human Nature, Ed.,  Intro,  by Ernest C.  Mossner 
(Baltimore,  Maryland:     Penguin Books,   1969),  Part  IV,  Sect,   ii,  Book I, 
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APPENDIX A 
A Note on Newtonianism and  Pseudo-Newtonianism 
in Reid and Burke 
The supposed Newtonian immanent!zation of Nature with the ab- 
solutes of the laws  of physics has been seen as the distinguishing 
characteristic of the Age of Reason.    Ernest Barker suggested a general 
similarity between the Moral Sense school and Butler in the sense that 
both worshipped "Nature" which "was the divinity of the century" and 
which had been unravelled by Newton.     '"Nature and Nature's laws lay 
hid in night:/ God said,   Let Newton be!  and all was light'."     (Pope's 
epitaph on Newton).       Newton had brought man and God close together 
by revealing God's  rational design  in Nature. 
Newton had supplied a clue to the mighty maze of things,   and 
shown the universe to be not mysterious, but gloriously 
rational and comprehensible,  moving majestically  'according 
to the ordainer of order and mystical mathematicks of the 
city of God!   ...   In the deistical writers of the time  (such 
as Collins,  Togland,   Tindal,  or Shaftesbury),   religion is 
represented as   'natural,'   resting upon the evidence of God  s 
wisdom in the creation,  and upon the natural moral sense of 
man,   which  inclines him to love the highest when he sees it. 
In the social and ethical spheres,  too,   what has been called 
'moral Newtonianism'  became the vogue;  gravitation preserved 
the stars  from wrong,   and in human affairs   'self-love and 
social,•   which were ultimately the same,  maintained a natural 
equilibrium.     Metaphysical or divine sanctions  in morality 
were at a discount.   .   . Even Bishop Butler.   .   .  labours to 
show that   'conscience,'   a principle above mere impulse,   is 
yet a past of human nature,  and derives its authority from 
its   'naturally'  commanding position amongst the component 2 
faculties  of man.     (Ernest Barker.    The Character of England) 
So,  even Butler succumbed somewhat to what Basil Willey calls the 
„3 
famous  eighteenth century alliance between Nature and Reason. 
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The upshot here for Burke studies would have Burke a moral Newtonian 
of the Shaftesburian  (not the mechanistic) variety in which "Nature" 
is identified with history,   and which in turn the feelings reflect, 
but,   to which reason must conform.    Willey takes Burke at Burke's 
most extreme instances of optimistic,  monistic "Newtonianism": 
The perfections of our Constitution  (Burke) writes,   are   'the 
happy effect of following nature,   which is wisdom without 
reflection,   and above it.   .   .   . By a constitutional policy, 
working after the pattern of nature, we receive, we hold,  we 
transmit our government and our privileges,  in the same manner 
in which we enjoy and transmit our property and our lives.   .   .   . 
Our political system is placed in a just correspondence and 
symmetry with the order of the world.   .   .'   (Willey says:) All 
this has been achieved by a   'conformity to nature in our arti- 
ficial institutions,'  and by calling in the aid of her unerring 
and powerful instincts, to fortify the fallible and feeble con- 
trivances of our reason. 
J. H.   Plumb has traced more explicitly,   if not as precisely,   as Willey 
did,   the development of the "widespread acceptance of Newtonianism 
broadly interpreted   (my emphasis).-5    Plumb described the dovetailing 
of this pervasive climate of faith in the eventual triumph of reason 
and observation of external reality to reveal the Design of Nature, 
into the strident  "anti-intellectualism" of Burke who "made a mystique 
of tradition" and whose distrust of empiricism    and distrust of critical 
reason7 made him an early representative of a new age (of romanticism) 
in which 
.   .   .   the growing forces of occultism and credulity   (are 
prominent,   and in which).   .   . the social transference.   .   . 
was taking place in   'enlightened'  attitudes  (from the 
governing elite and socially dominant classes to the lower 
orders of society. 
Plumb characterized the Enlightenment attitude generally as 
...  a heightened consciousness of the need for logical and 
experimental processes  (and a).   .   .  faith in,   and reliance on, 
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man's capacity to study himself,   his institutions,  his history, 
and his  social relationships  through his intellectual capacities 
working on the observable." 
Locke,  more than any one  individual,   represents the critical rational- 
ists,  the critical empiricists,   the "sceptical,   Baconian,  materialist" 
tone of the Enlightenment,  which characterized the Augustan Age in 
England (1688-1715).    But after 1720,   Plumb argues,  this critical at- 
titude gave way in England to a fear of intellectual,   scientific, 
social and political inquiry until,   in the period after 1760,   we can 
see, when contrasted with the Augustan Age,   "remarkable" changes  in 
the intellectual climate. Such  inquiry as existed in the Augustan 
Age existed now in the second half of the century only among the dis- 
senters,  the rising commercial and industrial classes,   and "above all, 
across the border in Edinburgh and Glasgow." Burke,   "whose beliefs 
12 
were anything but critical and materialist,"   " and which coincided 
with the beliefs of Pope,13 represented the "steady drift away from 
the principles of criticism"1    and toward the principles of occultism, 
credulity,   and "rationalization rather than empiricism"      of the 
English governing classes during the period,   1760-1800.    Burke's po- 
litical,   constitutional,   epistemological theories,  or the relative weight 
he gives to the various faculties of the mind in interpreting reality, 
and his views  of reality itself,   and of the universal order of things  - 
all these serve as  instruments  of rationalizing - or accepting with 
"credulity"  -  "Ncwtonianism broadly interpreted,"  i.e.,   the immanenti- 
zation of the physical order of the Newtonian world through the moral 
order of human freedom resulting in a reductionist epistemology and 
ethics.     In this case,   such reductionism takes the form of a  passive, 
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non-forming  faith in the ability of man';; observation or "justifica- 
tion      of an already-formed physical order of nature.    Man's  "reason" 
will reveal the Reason in Nature—this is what Plumb means when he 
says the "step from Newton  (or Newtonianism) to rational theology was 
easily made"     —and since the moral order and the physical order become 
synonomous  in "Newtonianism broadly interpreted," the mind is passively 
affected by sensible or moral objects in either realm.     Further,  the 
reality and independence of objects  in the empirical physical world 
suffers,  because the world of sense objects  (or,   the course of history, 
as a succession of sense-objects) becomes  a blank tablet which not so 
much justifies as  sijnply displays the a priori rules of action of the 
Divine Plan   (this   is what Plumb presumably means  when he says the Divine 
Plan of Newtonianism would be revealed by the perceptive intellect). 
The substance and spirit of this rational theology which comprises 
both the reality of mind and of matter by infusing each within an 
immanent pervasive divinely-originated Reason,  was captured by Pope's 
"Essay on Man." 
All Nature is but Art,  unknown to thee; 
All Chance,  Direction,  which thou canst see; 
All Discord,  Harmony,   not understood; 
All partial Evil,  universal Good: 
And spite of Pride,   in erring Reason's  spite^g 
One truth is clear,   'Whatever is,   is right.' 
Such a philosophy resulted in a  "hardening of tradition  (and) a growing 
indifference to scientific speculation."19    Burke's philosophy is  in 
the line from Newtonianism and the naive rationalistic theological 
optimism of Pope: 
.   .   .The rationalization of prejudice,   the sanctification of 
the status  quo,   the attribution of historical inevitability 
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and Divine Providence to inequality and human suffering cer- 
20 tainly acquired its most persuasive apologist in Burke.   .   .   .' 
Burke's  reductionist eqistemology and ethics are part of his rational 
theology. 
In a I965 review of Carl B. Cone's two-volume biography of Burke, 
plumb assumed as correct the portrait of Burke in Russell Kirk's The 
Conservative Hind   (1953)»   a book which gave great impetus,   if it did 
not originate,   the post-World War II American Conservative "Cult of 
Burke." 
.   .   .  Burke believed that wisdom was  instinctive and religious 
rather than rational or intellectual.     Time and Providence, 
the slow revelation of moral law and moral purpose,  human 
wisdom gradually accreted over the centuries like a geological 
sediment,  the poverty of reason compared with the Divine Plan 
which mysteriously binds past,  present and future together, 
the idea that there is  an order,   sanctified by God and History, 
that keep things   (and men)   fast in their place—these concepts 
litter Burke's words and speeches.2 
In this  deterministic world in which the physical order overwhelms 
(or is synonomous with) the moral world  (moral law as "accreted over 
the centuries like a geological sediment"),   "reason,  or enlightenment.   . 
are figments of dreams,   delusions,   fairy lights."  '    We will leave 
aside for the moment the  fact that Burke's writings,  and especially 
his earlier writings  [his   "Vindication of Natural Society"  (1756)  and 
his  "Essay on the  Sublime and the Beautiful"  (1757)l23 "hich are more 
philosophically explicit than his later works,   -that these earlier 
efforts are distinct and direct contradictions of any immanent deter- 
minism and of any reductionist psychology or ethics; and Burke's writings 
especially represent philosophical assumptions opposed to a reductionism 
which takes the form of a  vague  intuitional ethics internalizing both 
the principles of ethical action.    In this  case,   the fulcrum,   the 
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center of all thought and action becomes the internal sense,  the moral 
sense, which is passive,   non-forming,  and derivitive of both the phy- 
sical and the moral realms.     This is the intellectual implication and 
the historical development  (the Moral Sense school)  of a misinterpre- 
tation of Newton,   of a  "Nowtonianism broadly interpreted" which con- 
tributes to "the growing forces of occultism and credulity."    Burke, 
on the contrary,  believes  in a transcendent ideal;  he does not believe 
in an immanent ideal  (in Kantian termi.nology, Burke could be said to 
believe in a  regulative,   heuristic more than in a constitutive ideal), 
and thus Burke can assume the possibility,   and the actuality,   of human 
judgment to freely obey the moral laws and shape,   to that extent,   the 
real natural   physical world. 
Burke's assumptions are not unlike Ira Wade's recent and sym- 
pathetic precis of Ernst Cassirer's view of Enlightenment thought. 
Although to Enlightenment thinkers,   wrote Wade, 
Nature.   .   .   is  a closed system of causes and effects,  of 
reasons and implications;  there is nothing accidential or 
arbitrary therein. 
still,  man's awareness of this reality is not synonomous with his 
knowledge of it.     That is to say,  Enlightenment theories of knowledge 
and their theories  of reality overlapped,  but were not completely 
coincident with one another.    What Cassiere called the seventeenth- 
century "spirit of systems" had confused theories  of reality and 
theories of knowledge.25    Wade wrote of the seventeenth-century con- 
fusion,   and of the eighteenth-century separation of the two realms of 
reality and knowledge. 
.   .   .  there was  in the period 1670-1730 a confusion in the uses 
of philosophy,   theology,  and morality.   .   .   . Metaphysics had 
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understood that it was its duty to prove the existence of God, 
the immortality of the soul,   the nature of the material uni- 
verse,  and the rules of right action.    When difficulties had 
thrown into question the ability of philosophers to prove these 
things,  there arose two attitudes.     On the one hand,  some pro- 
claimed that religious truths could not be proved by reason 
and must,  as always, be accepted on faith.   ... On the other 
hand,   some sought to discredit metaphysics as a subject useful 
to man,   holding that only physics was the proper sphere of 
philosophy.    Very quickly,   physics was thought to provide 
knowledge not only of the physical world but of man's place 
and his role in its organization.    Hence, philosophy vns now 
concerned primarily with science [the outside universe]   and 
morality  [the inside world of man].     It was this attitude 
which accounted for the tendency to trust what the human mind 
could know and the corresponding tendency to distrust what 
appeared mysterious. 26 
The important point is that the eighteenth century made the distinction 
between science and morality,  between nature and man,   or,  between theories 
of reality and theories of knowledge.    Cassirer wrote:   "...  Nature 
and knowledge are to be placed [according to the assumptions of eigh- 
teenth-century thought]   on their own foundations and explained in 
terms of their own conditions."2'''    Yet the eighteenth century believed 
that thought was capable of shaping that separate reality:   as opposed 
to the internalizing,   deductive spirit of systems of the seventh-century, 
the eighteenth century 
. . . wants to enter into the activity of the spirit. Its 
task is not to reflect but to shape life [The "competence" 
of thought to shape life]. . . involved both the limits of 
thought and its  capabilities as a dynamic force. 
The notion tha.t thought could be both limited and expanded by partially 
shaping the independent phenomenal realm,  was the epistemological 
corollary of the recognition,   in the first place,  that there were 
indeed two separate and independent realms of reality.    Knowledge 
and the accumulation of knowledge was the result of the ever-defining 
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and redefining,  and refining,   of the relationship between the two 
realms of reality.     Wade wrote: 
.   .   .   knowledge of the world does not stop with knowledge of 
external objects;   it is the means whereby one sees reflected 
the possibilities of the inner reality.     Since the cosmos is 
limitless both in time and space,  knowledge tends to become a 
neverending series of relationships between the self and the 
phenomena  of life,   in which the correlation between the uni- 
verse and the self guarantees the validity of thought   [that 
is,   the  objectivity of thought]   and the legality  [or,   reality] 
of the external world.     Knowledge thus involves both thinking 
and feeling,   sensibility and thought,   experience and rational 
awareness.   .   .   .   [emphases added] " 
The idea of a  limitation of human knowledge is tied up with the idea 
of the very existence of a separate,   independent of reality.     The idea 
of the expansion of human knowledge follows upon the ideas tha.t man 
is capable of an intermediate perception,  or,   of perceiving objects 
removed in time and place from the perceiving subject.    The expansion 
of human knowledge is partially induced by man's awareness of,   as 
Cassirer wrote, 
This transcendence beyond that which is immediately given in 
the sense  impressions   [including,   one might add,   empirical and 
historical givens].   .   .   It appears equally clearly in the 
formation of our concepts of experience   [as in our theories 
of mathematics],   for the concepts which theoretical physics 
is based  cannot be explained in terms of a combination of 
perceptual ideas.    To be sure,   they begin with such ideas, 
but they do not end there; they use these ideas of sense as 
a starting point but they transform them by means of the inner 
autonomous activity of the understanding.    This autonomous 
activity,   not the mere habit that comes from the regularity of 
the perceptions,   is what constitutes the  real core and sub- 
stance of the first laws of motion.   .   .   .J 
The point is that the epistemological notion of intermediate perception 
is based upon a dualistic theory of reality,   of the actualities and 
possibilities   of the external and internal realms of science and morality, 
nature (empirical and historical) and man.31    The assumed givens of 
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nature or science are shaped and "transformed," but not distorted by 
man's understanding.     Newton's great achievement lay in "the intellectual 
transformation of empirical material," not the disintegration of matter. 
The difference between the two attitudes,   is the difference between 
genuine Newtonianism and what Alexandre Koyre called "pseudo-New- 
tonianism"   (see Appendix A).    The natural dualism upon which an 
intermediate epistemology is based,   limits reason on the one hand, 
and,   on the other hand,  both enlarges the scope and play of reason 
and simultaneously gives that reason an objectivity which it would 
not otherwise have had in the confused world of seventeenth-century 
cosmology (see infra., Chapter III). 
The Newtonianism from which derived the rationalistic theologi- 
cal optimism,   and which,   according to Plumb,  was the groundwork of 
Burke's thought—this Newtonianism was only one possible interpretation 
(or misinterpretation)  of Newton's thought itself.     Perhaps it is  sig- 
nificant that the moral (and political) Newtonianism which Willey and 
Plumb see as the origins of Burke's thought is more evident in Burke's 
later,  more polemical works   (Willey's citation above  is  from the "Re- 
flections") than  in the earlier works mentioned above  (the "Vindication" 
and the "Essay on the Sublime and the Beautiful").    Just as,  according 
to Plumb,   the critical spirit  in all disciplines evaporated in England 
(though not in Scotland)  during the last half of the eighteenth century 
into the mists of the romanticist occult and credulous,   and into an 
ascendency of feeling and sentiment over reason   (critical or dogmatic), 
Burke's emphasis  or tactics changed from an early concern with the 
front facing against an unexamined and unrestrained trust or faith 
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in internal feeling and sentiment considered as a touchstone of the 
state and of the constitution   (unquestioned prescription)  and certainly 
as a touchstone of individual ethics and morality and of epistemology, 
to a front facing against an equally unexamined,  unrestrained use of 
dogmatic reason.     Perhaps this change of emphasis,   or change of front 
(note,  that it is not being suggested that Burke was inconsistent,   or 
reductionist/determinist,   for he never stressed as an ideal either 
the exclusiveness  of reason or of sense and feeling as a source of 
knowledge representing some perfect immanent ideal—Burke merely changed 
fronts,   but his general strategy and his instruments of warfare remained 
the same in the struggle against the different forms of determinism 
and reductionism)   is gotten by Burke as a result of the surfeit of the 
pervasive moral Newtonianism in England represented by Shaftesbury, 
Pope,  Hutcheson and others and which included an indulgent,   self- 
confident rationalizing of the perfect Newtonian order of the world 
(a world indistinguishable from the perfect plenitude of the Leibnizian/ 
Wolffian world)   and an internalization of moral law and ethical action. 
This branch of Newtonianism is distinguished from the other branch in 
which determinism and reductionism merely takes a different form—the 
deterministic materialism of Hartley in England and of Helvetius,  d'Hol- 
bach,  LaMettrie,   etc.,   in France; this  second branch of Newtonianism 
reduced all reality to the empirical world,   and knowledge as consisting 
of received sense-data which,   not so much re-formed or re-shaped as 
redistributed,   according to the external criteria of the good (rather 
than the more objective true),   constitutes judgement and ethical cor- 
rectness.     It is merely suggested here that Burke did not accept either 
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of the two branches  of Newtonianism, but rather correctly interpreted 
Newton's  philosophy as a critical,  more open-ended and certainly not 
reductionist or deterministic,  philosophy and methodology as was as- 
sumed by many eighteenth-century commentators and popularizers of 
"Newtonianism."    Burke, therefore, by going back to Newton,   rather than 
accepting Newtonianism,  would to that extent prove an exception to 
J. H.   Plumb's schemata of the eighteenth century as changing from an 
earlier critical approach to reality,   epistemology,   ethical and moral 
problems   (and political thought)  in the time of Newton,  to a later-- 
in the period in which Burke flourished—non-critical credulity and 
occultism.    A brief review of the views of Newton himself and of the 
eighteenth-century popularizer of Newton,   the Scotsman Colin Mac- 
laurin,     will hopefully give the reader a clear understanding of the 
intellectual climate—one stressing the critical,   analytical use of 
reason—of England and Scotland in Burke's time. 
Plumb had said that the "sceptical,   Baconian, materialist" 
attitude toward human affairs,   an attitude "very much in tune with the 
Enlightenment," was   "for reasons that still need to be sought,  more 
common in Scotland" than in England.     Perhaps a correct interpretation 
of Newton by Maclaurin was one of the reasons for the more critical 
attitude in Scotland,   or,  perhaps, Maclaurin reflected the critical 
32 
attitude of the Scottish Enlightenment in general.        Maclaurin was 
almost alone among eighteenth-century Newtonian popularizers  in cor- 
rectly interpreting Newton  (and was most probably the one most likely 
to have been read by Burke.     A review of Newton and Maclaurin will aid 
in an understanding of the possible origins of Burke's philosophical 
assumptions. 
199 
Alexandre Koyre,   a pre-eminent scholar of 17th/l8th century 
intellectual history until his death a decade ago,  mentions the two 
forms which Newtonianism,   deviating from Newton,  took in the course 
of eighteenth-century thought.    An "unholy alliance"  between Newton 
and Descartes   (the Shaftcsburian/Popc/lIutcheson Moral Sense view),  and 
between Newton and Locke  (the mechanistic views of the French materialists 
and Hartley) was  forged by their respective followers  out of the "pseudo- 
imitation"  of Newton himself.     This pseudo-imitation involved a mis- 
interpretation of the meaning which Newton gave to the forces of gravi- 
tation and attraction,   and Newton's methodology in general. 
Newton and his most famous British popularizer among the British, 
Colin Maclaurin,   denied that attraction was merely another changeless 
property of matter such as mass, which could be wholly explained as 
to its substance and its origin or original impetus.     It had an inde- 
pendent reality of its own which could be described, but not explained 
by the language of mathematics in the Cartesian fashion,  and which 
could be neither described nor explained by assigning to the objects 
of the independent reality of the empirical world the "occult qualities 
of the Aristotelians."    Newton says in regard to the latter point, 
that to assign occult qualities to objects  in nature amounts to a 
meaningless redundancy; Copleston describes Newton's attitude:".   .   .   to 
say that a  specific type of thing is  endowed with a  specific occult 
quality in virtue of Which it acts and produces  its observable effects 
is to say nothing at all."33    Attraction could not,  on the other hand, 
be explained by the language of mathematics,  the language Descartes 
had used to describe and explain reality; Copleston explains this  side 
of Newton's aversion to dogmatic thinking: 
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.   .   . mathematics  is regarded by Newton as an instrument or tool 
which the mind is  forced to use rather than,   as with Galileo, 
an infallible key to reality.   .   .   .  It is doubtless right to 
stress the importance which Newton attached to mathematics,  but 
one must also emphasize the empiricist a.spect of his thought. 
Galileo and Descartes believed that the structure of the cosmos 
is mathematical in the sense that by the use of the mathematical 
method we can discover its secrets.    But Newton was unwilling 
to make any such presupposition.31* 
Marie Boas Hall emphasized Newton's genuine empiricism or realism 
in the Principia: 
[The Principia was].   .   .  presented in mathematical  language, 
but every effort was taken to ensure that it described the 
real world as it really existed and was no romance or dream, 
however enticingly rational.    This is the Newtonian triumph.   .   ... 
Though Newton's world was   'eminently rational,  mechanical 
world,   it was not a wholly mechanistic one.3'' 
Henry Guerlac  explained Newton's distinction between the use of mathe- 
matics as a  language to describe our limited  knowledge of reality, 
as distinguished from the assumption that mathematical laws describe 
the substance of that reality itself. 
The springs and wheels operating   [Newton's universe] are left 
undescribed.     It was enough that mysterious forces  like uni- 
versal gravitation or attraction were shown by his  investiga- 
tions to work their wonders.   ...   It was enough for Newton 
that such forces could be measured and the laws of their action 
determined.   .   .   content to set  forth the quantitative laws of 
motion and their consequences,  Newton was offering an abstract 
mathematical description in place of the pictorial type of 
'explication'   favored by the Mechanical Philosophers.    This 
explains why the  first criticism elicited by the Principia, 
when it became known on the Continent   [where Cartesian philoso- 
phy held   sway],  was that it was a brilliant display of mathe- 
matics,   but that it was not physics at all.   .   .   . Newton was 
netting  forth the mathematical principles   [Guerlac  s emphasis j 
of natural philosophy,   not a natural philosophy in the accepted 
sense"   [that is,   not as reason's revelation of the causes and 
substance of reality,  and the movement of bodies themselves. 
Nevertheless,  what] "Newton had carefully described as the 
mathematical principles [Guerlac's emphasis] of natural philosophy, 
became for many--though Newton could hardly have agreed-the ideal 
of physics  itself.36 
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E. W. Strong referred to this treatment of mathematics as a tool,   a 
means of explaining the efficient,   as opposed to final causes of the 
movement of bodies as part  of Newton's  "mathematical conceptualism." 
The mathematical conceptualist "... affirms that we cannot conclude 
properties of existing things from mathematical evidence,   for such 
evidence does not extend beyond logical relations in comparison of 
the mind's   ideas." In an earlier article,  Strong wrote of the balance 
in Newtonian methodology between empiricism and reason,   of Newton's 
awareness of the distinction between theories of reality and theories 
of knowledge. Newton is thus opposed to both metaphysical and to 
mechanical a priori hypotheses which attempt to interpret the real 
empirical world deductively.     In his  standard history of scientific 
theory and method or "attitude," A.   Rupert Hall wrote: 
In Newton's eyes,   scientific comprehension was not limited to 
vague qualitative theories on the one hand (of the occult 
qualities which Aristotelianism would assign to bodies,   or of 
the Leibnizian/Wolffian cosmology which confused metaphysics 
and physics),   or definite statements about a state of affairs 
much simpler than that which is actually experienced on the 
other  (Cartesian rationalism);   it could proceed,  by due tech- 
niques,   to definite ideas about all that is physical,   down to 
the properties of each constituent corposcule.    To illustrate^ 
this conception of science is the purpose of the   'Principia. - 
Newton said in the Principia of 1687 that he sought neither the final, 
metaphysical causes,  "or what the Scholastics called  'formal causes,' 
namely,   natures or essences," nor "the ultimate efficient cause" of 
gravity. 
When   [Newton]  says that he has been unable to discover the 
causes of the properties  of gravity inductively and that he 
frames no hypotheses,   he means that he is concerned only with 
the descriptive laws which state how gravity acts,  and not with 
the nature or essence of gravity.    This is made clear by a 
statement in the Principia ma.thema.tica.     'Whatever is not 
r 
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deduced  from the phenomena is to he called a hypothesis; and 
hypotheses,   whether metaphysical or physical,  whether of 
occult qualities  or mechanical,  have no place in experimental 
philosophy.   .   .   .  ° 
When Newton had thus explicitly denied the fallow,  unproductive and 
redundant occult qualities within objects of the empirical realm, 
whether that occultism take the form of Aristotelian essences or of 
mechanical formulas,"   .   .   .  nobody with the single exception of Colin 
Maclaurin—followed   [Newton]   in that point."        Both Newton and Mac- 
laurin realized that a genuinely "experimental philosophy" must "purify" 
the physical sciences  from metaphysics and mechanical determinism in 
order to derive any general principles from phenomena;   such an atti- 
tude is a major step in the development from,  to use the title of Koyre's 
most famous book,   The Closed World to the Infinite Universe (1957). 
True Newtonianism is a coherent, yet open-ended system. 
Caroline Robbins wrote that "Though some commentators misunder- 
stood his writing,  Newton did not even make gravity a dogmatic principle, 
and was careful to notice the difficulty of explaining its nature as an 
1+2 
attraction,   or force,   or a property of some sort."        Colin Maclaurin 
was one of these few who did not misinterpret Newton,  when the former 
"described the groundwork of his master's philosophy": 
' .   .   .'   tho all sorts and degrees are equally the object of 
philosophical speculation;  yet it is  from those vhich aro Propor- 
tioned to sense that a philosopher must set out in Ms ™quiries, 
ascending or descending afterwards as his pursuits may require. 
He does  well indeed,  to take his views  from many points of 
sight,   and supply the defects of sense by a well regulated 
imagination;  nor is he to be confined by any limit in space 
or time;  but as his knowledge of nature is founded on the 
observation of sensible things,   he must begin with these^and     ^ 
must often return to them,   to examine his progress by them.   .   . 
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Maclaurin's words could have easily been taken as rules of philosophizing 
by the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment whose "methodological 
thinking" similarly combined empirical observation and an extra- 
empirical use of the intellect.    Reid's notion of "suggestion," for 
instance,   would require a   "well-regulated imagination" in order to 
abstract from experience certain mathematical ideas   (see Chapter III). 
Burke spoke and wrote as  if he were following Maclaurin's and Newton's 
rules of philosophizing.     For instance,   see Burke's arguments against 
the speculative rationalism of Bolingbroke,   Chapter III, p.6 of this 
study,   in which Burke not only defends the critical use of the reason, 
but defends the critical use of the individual reason.    Robbins wrote 
that Newton'r. thought helped in establishing that  "faith in individual 
reason and the likelihood of right action developing from its unham- 
pered exercise    [without which faith],   no movement for widespread 
political rights and privileges could gain many adherents. 
The following explication of Newton or,   rather of Newtonianism, 
should serve the purpose of distinguishing between the vulgarized 
Newton of Hartley's Associationism,  which built exclusively upon Newton 
as sensationalist,   and the equally one-sided view of Newton of the 
"Moral Sense"  intuitionists.    This latter group of prominent English 
thinkers  internalized  into an unanalyzable ethical intuitionism the 
Newtonian world order;  by doing so,  the English intuitionists did,   in 
a sense, bring back those "occult qualities  of the Aristotelians" which 
Newton had excluded from physical nature—now those "occult qualities" 
were considered by this group to be the substance of moral nature. 
Newton and Maclaurin denied any occult or mechanistic explanations 
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of attraction.     It was wrongly assumed that attraction was a physical 
property of matter than a "mathematical force" as Newton had described 
it.    The upshot was the argument from design—the clockwork implies 
the Clockmaker,   Who had set the clock in motion,  and let it run on its 
own,  according to immutable,   and eventually demonstrable,   laws of 
nature  (although Newton had believed in the continual presence of the 
Deity—a necessary presence in a less than perfect universe—but not 
the knowability of Nature and Nature's God,   for Newton,   to repeat, 
did not presume to explain attraction). 
Thus the Newtonian science,  though as mathematical philosophy of 
nature it expressly renounced the search for causes   [both 
physical and metaphysical],  appears in history as based on a 
dynamic conception of physical causality and as linked together 
with theistic  or deistic metaphysics.   .   .   .  ' 
As will be shown below,  Burke also renounced the search for causes, 
both physical and metaphysical, whether in the form of Hartlian mechani- 
cal associationism and the mechanical sensationalism of the French 
materialists   (Helvetius,   d'Holbach,   LaMettrie,   etc.),  or,   in the form 
of the teleological arguments of the English Moral Sense school of 
Shaftesbury/pope/Hutcheson.    Koyre   described 
...  the particular and emotional structure   [of the eighteenth 
century ] as its optimism,   its divinization of nature,   and so 
forth.    Nature and nature's laws were known and felt to be the 
embodiment of God"^  will and reason.    Could they,   therefore,  be 
anything but good? 
To conform to the laws of nature was  to obey the will of God.     Now, 
it was but a   short  step to interpret nature as so perfect as to require 
no divine presence or intervention;   in short,   the success  of Newtonian 
science in revealing such order and symmetry in the world,   eventually 
transformed the original Newtonian Deity Who had been Creator and 
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fc7„ active Preserver, "   into a merely distant Creator.     "Like the God of 
Descartes and Leibniz—so bitterly opposed by the Newtonians—he had 
nothing more to do in the world."    This idea  of the perfection of the 
world—i.e.,   if God had withdrawn from being a continuing ruling 
presence over the world,   the world that operates according to His laws 
did not require His continual superintending which imperfect creations 
and creatures require of their creators—together with the corpuscular 
theory of Newton,   resulted in the  second major strain which Newtonianism 
assumed in the eighteenth century—what might be called a moral teleo- 
logical atomism.     Koyre wrote in his Newtonian Studies: 
...  as  strong was the belief in   'nature, '  so overwhelming 
the prestige of the Newtonian   [or pseudo-Newtonian]  pattern of 
order arising automatically from interaction of isolated and 
self-contained atoms,   that nobody dared to doubt that order 
and harmony would in some way be produced by human atoms 
acting according to their nature, whatever this might be.   .   .   . 
The enthusiastic   [or pseudo-imitation]  of the Newtonian   [or 
pseudo-Newtonian] pattern of atomic analysis and reconstruc- 
tion.   .   .  led to rather bad results.     Thus the unholy alliance 
of Newton and Locke produced in atomic psychology,   which 
explained   [or explained away] mind as a mosaic of  'sensations' 
and   'ideas'  linked together by laws of association   [attraction] 
[and].   .   .  atomic sociology,   which reduced society to a 
cluster of human atoms,   complete and self-contained each in 
itself and only mutually attracting and repelling each other. 
Newton,   of course,   is by no means responsible for these 
and other monstra engendered by the overextension—or aping-- 
of his method. 
The seeming paradox of eighteenth century thought is, that, although 
it developed from the one philosophy of Newton, "Newtonianism" split 
the century in two. On the English scene, there emerged, on the one 
hand, the complacent optimism of the Moral Sense philosophers; this 
school saw in the orderliness and Reason which Newtonianism had sup- 
posedly revealed, and translated it into an immediately felt moral 
intuition which reflected the harmonious order of the universe.     Such 
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a cosmology,   of course,   disregarded or minimized both the inductive 
empirical methodology of Newtonian physics,   and Newton's balanced and 
critical use of reason as distinguished from his wrongly supposed 
dogmatic use of reason.     It was assumed by the figures of this  school 
that the critical use of reason was redundant in a pre-established 
harmony of the universe characterized by a. natural identity of interests. 
On the other hand,   there emerged the ideal of the positive restruc- 
turing of society according to the "atomic  sociology" expressed in the 
associationism of Hartley,   and in the utilitarian formula,   starting 
with Hutcheson,  and,  on  the continent,   in the dogmatic materialism 
of Hclvetius,   d'Holbach,   LaMettric,   etc. 
Thomas Reid chose to oppose Hartley on the grounds that Hartley 
was a perversion of Newton's methodology and physics,  that,   in other 
words,   Hartley was a "pseudo-Newtonian"  in Reid's eyes.    Peter Gay 
described Hartley's explanation of his mechanical methodology,  an ex- 
planation consciously aping the Newtonian,   or pseudo-Newtonian, 
method.     Gay cites Hartley and Reid's motives for opposing Hartley: 
.   .   .   'The proper method of philosophizing   [is ].   .   .  to discover 
and establish the general rules of action,   affecting the subject 
under consideration,   from certain select,  well-defined,  and well- 
attested phenomena,   and then to explain and predict the other 
phenomena by these laws.    This,'  Hartley concluded,   'is the method 
of analysis and synthesis recommended and followed by Sir Isaac 
Newton.'     It is significant   [Gay continues] that when Thomas Reid 
criticized Hartley,   he criticized him not simply for being wrong, 
but  for being a bad Newtonian.     It was,   in an indisputably New- 
tonian universe, the most telling    Schimpfwort Reid could find. 
Reid's   "correct" Newtonianism is made more clear in his disagreement 
with Henry Home,   Lord Kames,   over the nature of physical theory. 
Kames,   although a preeminent philosopher,   jurist,   essayist,   etc.   of 
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the Scottish Enlightenment,  merely dabbled in physical science.    His 
misinterpretation of Newton reflected his amateur approach to physical 
theory,   of which he thought the aim should be: 
...  to explain empirically established laws,   in the sense of 
uncovering the hidden reality behind the veil of appearances. 
Reid's views here resembled those of Hume, who held that such 
aspirations were doomed to failure.   ...       ... According to 
Reid,   physical theory seeks to represent a set of experimental 
laws by means of a  system of mathematical propositions deduced 
from a small number of principles.   .   .   . While Kames urged that 
it was necessary to borrow elements from a specific metaphysical 
system to complete a  physical theory,   Reid allowed physics and 
metaphysics to be autonomous.   ... 
Reid explained his Newtonianism to Kames  in a letter of October,   1782: 
.   .   .   'I am apt to think that yor Lordship.   .   .  has mixed too 
much Motaphysicks with Physicks.     It is a common way of speaking 
but  inaccurate,  that the province of physicks is to discover the 
Causes of natural Phenomena.    Physicks,   as I think,  has nothing 
to do with Causes properly so called.     Its province is to dis- 
cover the general Laws according to which the phenomena of 
Nature are produced;  and these can only be discovered by induc- 
tion  from Facts observed by our Senses.    Abstract Reasoning 
about Causes has nothing to do here.-5     .   .   .  That Bodies do 
actually gravitate according to the Law discovered by Newton, 
is a   Fact,   which I think is acknowledged by all Parties.    But 
whether this Gravitation be the Effect of a Power originally 
given to Body by the Creator,  or the Action of an Active Soul 
united to the Body,   or an impression continually made upon it 
from without,   either by a Subtile Ether or by some Spiritual 
Being,   or by the first Cause; these are Questions beyond the 
Region of Physicks,  because they are not to be determined by an 
Appeal to facts  observed by the Senses,  but by abstract Reason- 
ing,   if they can be at all determined.   .   .   .3 
As what Burke called the "Patient thinking"5U of Newton applied to 
theories  of reality,   it also applied to theories of knowledge.     Reid, 
in his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man  (1789),   seconded New- 
ton's animus toward the use of "hypotheses"  as a method of investiga- 
ting nature.     For instance,  on the topic of discoveries made of "the 
internal structure of the human body," Reid wrote: 
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Such discoveries have always been ma.de by patient observation, 
by accurate experiments,   or by conclusions drawn by strict 
reasoning from observations and experiments;  and such dis- 
coveries have always tended to refute, but not to confirm, 
the theories and hypotheses which ingenious men have inven- 
ted.55 
Rather,   follow Newton's way,  advised Reid: 
The  first rule of philosophizing,   laid down by the great 
Hewton is this:.   .   .   'No more causes, nor any other causes 
of natural effects  ought to be admitted but such as are both 
true,   and are sufficient for explaining their appearances.' 
This is a golden rule.  .   .   .5° 
Neither the causes of the laws of nature nor of how we come to know 
the operations of the laws of nature,   are proper subjects for specu- 
lation.     Reid wrote: 
...   it  is  evidently in the nature of conjecture to be uncer- 
tain.     In every case the assent ought to be proportioned to the 
evidence.   .   . though we may,  in many cases,  form very probable 
conjectures concerning the works of man,   every conjecture we 
can form with regard to the works of God,  has as little proba- 
bility as the conjectures of a child with regard to the works 
of a man. 
The wisdom of God exceeds that of the wisest man,  more than 
his wisdom exceeds that of a child.     [A wise man,  as a child,  has 
little chance of genuine knowledge].   .   . when he pretends to 
conjecture how the planets move in their course   (which conjecture 
would be a hypothetical theory of reality),  how the sea ebbs and 
flows,  and how our minds act upon our bodies   [and vice versa,-- 
a conjecture, which would merely be a hypothetical theory of 
knowledge].   ' 
The very foundations  of Reid's Common Sense realism are based upon 
the distinction between metaphysics and physics,  a distinction pre- 
paring the way,   so to speak,  for Reid's rejection of the use of hypo- 
theses,  which do in  fact confuse physics and metaphysics. 
Burke was also aware of the good and the bad uses to which 
Newton could be recruited,   as is seen  in his  interpretation of Newton, 
an interpretation differing from most of his contemporaries,   in his 
"Inquiry into the Sublime and Beautiful. 
,,58 
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Burke perhaps underestimated the use to which Newtonianism could 
be put—of mechanico-rationalistic  system-building of the human mind 
(Hartley's associationism)  or of human society (the Jacobins)—Burke 
attended rather to undermining the pseudo-Newtonianism of the Moral 
Sense school.     This  is suggested in Burke's essay on the "Sublime and 
the Beautiful."     In his  long  introduction to the bicentennial edition 
of the "Enquiry," J.   T.  Boulton wrote that Burke was a genuine New- 
tonian here because he was "the first writer on aesthetics in English 
to take up the uncompromising sensationist viewpoint „59 The idea of 
„60 Burke and Hume that "sense-experience is the ground of all"      the 
workings of the mind,  together with Burke's belief,   contrary to Hume, 
that a  fixed standard of taste among all men could be determined," 
cast Burke in the Newtonian methodological mold.     Boulton put Burke 
in his place: 
The   'Essay'   [on Taste,  part of the introduction to the 2nd 
edition of the   'Enquiry'].   .   .  The conclusion that Burke 
reaches—that taste operates by fixed principles in all men- 
illustrates the eighteenth-century inclination to d^cover 
immutable laws governing human life and activities. 
Corresponding to Newtonian methodology, Burke assumes the existence 
of immutable laws governing taste.    Burke believed with Hume that, 
in Hume's words,".   .   .'in the production and conduct of the passions, 
there is a certain regular mechanism, which is susceptible of as accu- 
rate a disquisition as the laws of motion,   optics,   hydrostatics,   or 
any other part of natural philosophy."63    In criticising the aesthetic 
of Francis Hutcheson,   Burke nevertheless "curiously acknowledges the 
validity of associationism"6U as a weapon against the intuitionist 
ethics of Hutcheson. 
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But boulton is quick to add that Burke*s sensationalist aesthet- 
ics reject associationism.     For Burke,   the "'natural properties of 
things'    (of the sense-data] remain.   .   .  the rource of aesthetic ex- 
perience," rather than what might be called the natural propensity among 
things.    By the "natural propensity of things," Burke's meaning was 
closer to Montesquieu's meaning than either to the "organicist" notion 
of natural,       or to the associationist notion of the strictly quanti- 
fiable "agreement" and "disagreement" among objects and/or among 
(aesthetic) ideas.    Burke's thought was also closer to Reid's notion 
of suggestion (see than to the materialist-mechanistic notion of 
agreement and disagreement as criteria upon which to base our knowledge 
and judgement of the reality and the relations among objects of per- 
ception. Reid explicitly denied the exclusively sensationalist/ 
materialist criteria of agreement/disagreement as the basis of de- 
riving any theories of reality and of knowledge. Since the world 
of experience is complex,   our knowledge of it must be complex,  or 
heterogeneous,   also.     S.  A.   Grave described Reid's position: 
(We do not).   .   . begin with simple qualities and build up 
complex objects out of them.    As we realize when we reflect 
on experience,   we begin with what is  complex and reach what 
is  simple by analytic abstraction.     'Nature presents no 
object to the senses,  or to consciousness,   that is not com- 
plex. '    And if we had only our senses and not the superior 
powers of understanding,  by which we can analyse the complex 
object,  abstract every particular attribute from the rest, 
and form a distinct conception of it,   'every object in our 
experience would be the   'confused'   totality it probably is 
to the lower animals.     'So that it is not by the senses im- 
mediately,  but rather by the powers  of analysing and abstrac- 
tion,  that we get the most simple anggthe most distinct notions 
even of the objects of sense'.   .   .   . 
Even simple sensation requires a judgement capable of bringing a struc- 
ture and unity into knowledge in a more subtle and complex way than 
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that of merely comparing isolated sensations and "discerning their 
agreement and disagreement." "    Phillip D.  Cummins recently denied that 
Reid was a  "naive" or  "direct realist."'      Reid denied that perception 
involved simply the direct and immediate perception of material objects. 
Perception was not,   for Reid,  an "E-relation," or the simple and direct 
contact or impression of object on subject.     Reid was rather an "indi- 
rect realist" as in the case of memory,   "in which the material thing 
which is perceived does not exist."'       This position is compatible 
with that of the  "critical realists" in America at the beginning of 
the twentieth century;   these critical realists--among them Arthur 
Onken Lovejoy  (1873-1962),  who wrote The Revolt Against Dualism (1930), 
--stood against both "representationalism [ which held that the objects 
of perception are  "ideas" and really not the objects themselves]    and 
direct or naive realism.    The critical realism position could better 
explain,   for example,   "our perception of a distant star   [or,   a distant 
historical epoch or event] when the star has ceased to exist." 
Although the critical realists were involved in the "considerable 
difficulties"73 which are a part of any genuine dualism,   they were, 
nevertheless,   all "agreed in maintaining that what we directly perceive 
is some character-complex or immediate datum which functions as  a sign 
of or guide to an independently existing thing."    The critical realists 
believed that  "...   from the very start and by their very nature the 
immediate data of perception point to physical objects beyond themselves. 
Returning to Cummins's  article,   it  is evident that in Reid's thought 
as  in Burke's  and Kant's   (see infra., Chapter III),  knowledge is a 
relation as much as it  is the simple perceiving of an immediately 
„7k 
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given material object.    As an indirect  (and critical) realist,   Reid 
holds  "that in a judgement   (of perception) such as   'I see a coin' 
the phrase   'a coin'   refers to a material thing which is not perceived, 
but which stands  in one or more specific relations to the presented 
object." The relations constituting knowledge include the relation 
between perceiving subject and perceived object and the relations among 
the objects. Reid is so much the indirect realist,  that Cummins 
77 referred to Reid's dualism as "almost.   .   . Cartesian." "For Reid, 
as for Descartes,  the characteristics  of things are of two sorts. 
On the one hand,   there are mental activities   (acts,  operations);   on 
the other,  there are physical properties.    There is a corresponding 
division among substances."'      Reid's dualistic theory of reality 
corresponds to his heterogeneous  or intermediate theory of knowledge, 
which assumes the capability of perceiving and judging of objects  re- 
moved from the immediate spatio/temporal proximity of the subject. 
Gerald W.  Chapman in describing Burke's  epistemology,   could 
have been describing Reid's.    Chapman wrote: 
It is  simply a fact,  whether  one likes it or not,  that large 
masses of judgement,   partiality,   attachment,  and affection, 
have to operate without reflective analysis:   nobody in politics 
or elsewhere can affort to epistemologize before the taking 
of every toast and tea....   It is  this refined perception, 
not a brash chauvinism,   which moves  Burke to panegyrize English 
character.   .   .'79 and to panegyrize "'all our old prejudices 
which are in fact "implicitly ratiocinative" and embody prior 
efforts of judgement,  grasp,   and appropriation.   .   .   . 
The following observations by Burke made toward the end of 
his life,   amount to a  paraphrase of Reid's philosophical assumptions. 
Burke said in a conversation with Mrs. Crewe that the imagination could 
only be used properly in later life,  not in youth  (and perhaps this 
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partially explains his earlier flirtation with associationism), because 
the imagination,   "...  however ready it was to come forward could not 
be exercised without a Stock of Knowledge and that the active faculties 
of Man were at  first employed in selecting and rejecting materials 
for that Stock." Here Burke was warning against putting too quick 
and too literal a trust in one's immediate sentiments or imagination, 
as reflecting some lofty transcendent truth,  before acquiring a stock 
of knowledge gained or sifted from the empirical world.     In his 1756 
essay on the "Sublime and the Beautiful.   .   .," Burke stressed the 
limitations  of the  imagination,   rather than speaking of it as any kind 
of an intuitive moral sense to be taken passively and immediately at 
face value as  reflecting some moral imperative.    Burke wrote: 
.   .   . the  imagination while it produces works of art and affects 
greatly the passions of man is restricted first to the senses 
and finally  (this is where the aesthetic judgements enter) by 
the understanding itself.    The senses provide the materials upon 
which the imagination must work,  and the understanding provides 
the evaluation of the works of the imagination.    The dependence 
of the imagination upon the senses.   .   .   . 
Of course the whole purpose of what Burke had in mind when writing his 
essay on aesthetic theory,  was to make his readers realize the com- 
plexity of heterogeneity of its origins--as in the senses,   the judge- 
ment and understanding,   and the imagination,   rather than exclusively 
upon a vague intuitionist sentiment as the contemporary Shaftesburian 
"Moral Sense"  school would have it,   or,   exclusively upon the associ- 
ationist  quantification of the process by which we come to know reality 
(agreement and disagreement among the material objects  of perception). 
Boulton pointed out that Burke's   successors   (James Beattie, 
Archibald Alison,   Payne Knight, Dugald Stewart,  Hugh Blair)  all 
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dissented from Burke, and favored associationism in aesthetic experi- 
ences. "Sensationalism is not favored by any one of them: for all of 
them, in varying degrees, association is the important factor in aes- 
thetic experience." In spite of the associatlonist theory prevalent 
in Burke's contemporaries, Burke could stand exposed both to the ex- 
ternal, mechanistic associationism of Hartley et al., and to the in- 
ternalizing ethical intuitionism of Hutcheson and Alexander Gerard. 
Now Hutcheson was as much affected by the pervasive Newtonianism 
as was Burke and the associationists,  but in Hutcheson,   "clearly in- 
fluenced by Shaftesbury,"      the Newtonianism took a different form. 
Gerard and Hutcheson saw the origins of aesthetic experience in the 
"internal sense" which in turn reflected the  "general laws" ordained 
by the '"Author of Nature."'    Hutcheson believed that, 
God works methodically,   evidenced by the regularity and unifor- 
mity apparent in the universe;  God's  creations are, by His 
wisdom,   designed to achieve desirable ends—consequently it 
is natural for man to take a delight in objects which are regu- 
lar and uniform.    It is equally natural for him to respond 
through the internal sense. .85 
Eurke labelled it "'unphilosophical to a high degree'" that Hutcheson 
took his  faith in the internal sense to the extreme position of creating 
"a special  faculty  (of the  "senses") to deal with every separate phase 
of (aesthetic)  experience,"86 and then seeing this internal moral sense 
as reflecting a divine origin. 
However,  Boulton seems to have overlooked the fact that Burke 
was really not a  "pseudo-Newtonian"   (Alexander Koyre's phrase),  not 
even in the   "Enquiry," where Burke does appear to be arguing from de- 
sign.    Burke only said he can give the cause of our aesthetic experi- 
ences,  which are the sensational "'natural properties of things," 
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not the cause of the cause.    Burke's argument is not teleological 
(or,  physico-theological).     In the  "Enquiry into.   .   .  the Sublime and 
the Beautiful,"   (Section IV,i),  Burke said that '"Newton first dis- 
covered the property of attraction, '   and calling it gravitation,  was 
able to work out  its laws,   without ever being able to say exactly what 
-87 gravitation was. Or,  we have directly from Burke the following: 
When Newton  first discovered the property of attraction,   and 
settled its laws,   he found it served very well to explain 
several of the most remarkable phenomena in nature; but yet, 
with reference to the general system of things,   he could 
consider attraction but as an effect,  whose cause at that 
time he did not attempt to trace.    But when he afterwards 
began to account for it by a subtle ether,  this great man.   .   . 
r.cemed to havcRguitted his usual cautious manner of philoso- 
phizing.   .   .   . 
Burke was not a pseudo-Newtonian,   or one of Newton's  "impetuous" pupils, 
His argument  is  not teleological,  but deontological.     Burke's Newtoni- 
anism is not one of explaining God's way to man, but of attempting 
to partially reveal man's place in God's universe,  a universe which 
must always  remain partially incomprehensible. 
When one becomes  aware of the content and course of eighteenth- 
century Newtonianism,   the similarity between Reid and Burke is under- 
scored against this background.    Perhaps Burke had read the famous 
"General Scholium" of the 2nd edition of the Principia (or he  surely 
had access to the edition of Newton's works published by Samuel Horsley 
in London during 1779-1785).    Here,  Newton had said that he was unable 
to find the causes of gravity and therefore does not presume to form 
any hypothesis based upon gravity other than the description of gravity 
as a universal natural phenomenon.    Newton wrote in the  "Scholium": 
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'Hitherto I have not been able to discover the cause of the 
properties of gravity from phenomena and I  frame no hypotheses. 
For whatever is not deduced from phenomena is to be called a 
hypothesis;  and hypotheses,  whether metaphysical or physical 
(for metaphysical in Newton's  sense,   see below), whether of occult 
qualities  or mechanical,   have no place in experimental philoso- 
phy.'^ 
Perhaps Burke's statement of the ambiguous element in Newton (as dis- 
tinguished from the eighteenth-century "pseudo-Newtonianism")  struck 
in Burke that same responsive chord as did the "natural dualism"  of 
the late eighteenth-century Scottish school of Common Sense realism. 
This dualism included,  generally,   a combining of continuity and uni- 
formity with uncertainty and unpredictability,   into a whole which was 
neither completely mysterious   (for instance,   a talismanic whole made 
inevitable upon the assumption of the occult qualities with which the 
Aristotelians would have invested matter,  or the mystery following 
upon the naturalistic theism of Shaftesbury,   Pope and the English "Moral 
Sense" school),   nor exclusively knowable and predictable  (as would be 
the case of the English associationists,   Locke to a  certain extent 
and Hartley,  and the French materialists,  d'Holbach,   Helvetius and 
Condillac,  and,  finally, the English utilitarians).    But these are the 
two extremes which Newton's  "impetuous"  followers represented in the 
eighteenth century.     The divergent paths which Newtonianism took in 
the eighteenth century are similar to the earlier and later stages  of 
historic!sm which Maurice Mandelbaum has recently described.91    Mandel- 
baum was writing of the later brand of historicism which was  "prevalent" 
in the writings  of 
.   .   .  nineteenth-century social theorists   [who held] that there 
are laws which determine the direction in which any society or 
institution will tend to move over the course of time.   .   . there 
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ore interesting and compelling parallels between this  sort of 
scientific necessitarianism and that earlier phase of histori- 
cism in which teleological conceptions had been favored,  and no 
attempt was made to establish societal laws.-*2 
If we take the earlier phase of historiclsm as comparable to the 
eighteenth century teleological "physico-theological" argument and the 
English "Moral Sense" school of ethical intuitionism, and see the later 
phase of historicism as comparable to the associationist/utilitarian 
argument, then the divergent paths which historicism took in the nine- 
teenth century are not unlike the divergent paths which Newtonianism 
took in the eighteenth century. 
In terms of strictly epitemological theory, Scottish Common 
Sense realism represented a complementarity between sensation and re- 
flection,   object and subject,  a relation in which the characteristics 
of the terms  are evident, but which is itself  (the relation) unknowable 
in the reasons of its being what it is and in the entirety of its 
operations.     This describes the "Significance of the Newtonian Syn- 
thesis," described by Alexandre Koyre,  as distinguished from the monism 
of "pseudo-Newtonianism," the latter of which was fashioned by Newton's 
truant and impetuous followers.    Koyre's descriptions of Newton's views 
makes Burke's  interpretation of Newton's work in Burke's   "Enquiry" 
more understandable   (including Burke's episteraological ideas,  and, 
thereby,   to a certain extent,   his views on historical knowledge). 
Burleigh Taylor Wilkins said of Burke in this  instance:   "What Burke 
is doing is pointing to the incompleteness of his own causal explana- 
tions."93    This is done by Burke with the aid of the analogous,   to 
Burke,  Newtonian methodology.     Koyre's exposition of Newton's metho- 
dology includes a consideration of Descartes,   as Newton's main 
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protagonist in eighteenth-century thought;   in fact,   the struggle be- 
tween Cartesianism and Newtonianism is largely the story of eighteenth- 
century thought   (although Koyre did not paint a black-and-white picture 
of this confrontation of systems,  and therefore,   for this,   did not 
stand entirely opposed to Colin Kiernan's view of the thought of the 
oil 
century in this respect.)       Koyre approvingly cited Fontenelle's  "Eloge 
de M.  Newton": 
'These two great men,   whose Systems are so opposite,  resembled 
each other  in several aspects.   .   .   . Being excellent Geometricians, 
they both saw the necessity of introducing Geometry into Physicks; 
For both founded their Physicks upon discoveries in Geometry, 
which may almost be said of none but themselves.    But one of them 
taking a bold flight,   thought at once to reach the Fountain of 
all things,   and by clear and fundamental ideas,  to make himself 
master of the first principles; that he might have nothing more 
left to do,  but to descend to the phenomena of Natures as to 
necessary consequences;  the other (Newton) more cautious,   or 
rather more modest, began by taking hold of the known phenomena, 
to climb to unknown principles;  resolved to admit them only in 
such manner as they could be produced by a chain of consequences. 
The former sets out from what he clearly understands,  to find 
out the causes of what he sees; the latter sets out from what 
he sees,   in order to find out the cause,  whether it be clear or 
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reprint of Maclaurin's Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophical Discoveries, 
17lt8  (cited in David Knight.     Sources  for the History of Science 1660- 
191)4   ("The Sources  of History:  Studies  in the Uses of Historical Evi- 
dence" Series).     Ithaca,  New York;  Cornell University Press,   1975,   p.  154. 
^ Robbins,   op. cit.,   p. 72. 
^Alexandre Koyre,   Newtonian Studies  (Chicago:   1968.   1965), 
p. 20.     For Newton's  "impetuous followers,"  see Peter Gay,   The Enlighten- 
ment.    An Interpretation.    Vol.  II The Science of Freedom (New York: 
Alfred A.  Knopf,   1969),   Chapter Two,  Part 1.,   "The Enlightenment's 
Kewton," pp.  128-1^0,  and Chapter Two,   Part 2.,   "Newton's  Physics With- 
out Newton's God,"  pp. 140-150. wrote:   "...  while 
Newton's disciples  honored Newton's modesty.   .   .  some of his more im- 
petuous followers used Newton's very triumphs as an argument against 
Newton's self-restraint and revived the age-old claim for universal 
knowledge.   .   .   . The history of eighteenth-century science is   far more 
than the history of assimilating Newton's ideas,   confirming Newton's 
guesses,   generalizing Newton's conceptions beyond his expectations.   .   . 
(Ibid.,  p.  I3U).     See also G.  Buchdahl,    The Image of Newton and Locke 
in The Age of Reason  (London:   1961),  and Henry Guerlac,   "Where the 




Copleston,   History of Philosophy,  Vol. V, pt. i,  p.  165. 
"The God of Newton.   .   . was not a vague First Cause,  a divine watchmaker 
who first wound up the celestial mechanism,   or the prisoner of his 
own laws,   as Leibniz implied.    He was a  free agent,  whose periodic 
intervention was necessary if the  'laws of nature' were to function 
at all.   .   .   . While the Cartesian philosophy.   .   .   encouraged a mechan- 
istic view of the physical universe, the Newtonians  stressed the im- 
possibility of man's attaining to an understanding of final causes, 
and the dependence of the material world on regulation.     (Newton assumed 
many defects in those laws of nature already made evident to man,   and) 
.   .   .   such defects could be remedied only by the direct intervention 
of God.    If God said   'Let Newton be,'     from Pope's famous couplet on 
Newton ,  Sir Isaac returned the compliment."    Norman Hampson,   A Cultural 
History of the Enlightenment  (New York:   Pantheon Books, A Division of 
Random House,   1968),   77-7b1.     See also Peter Gay,   The Enlightenment, 
II, 141. 
1.8 Alexandre Koyre,   op.  cit.,  pp.  22-23. 
The 
^Peter Gay,   The Enlightenment.    An Interpretation 
Science of Freedom (New York:  Alfred A. Knopf,  1969),   4-101. 
Volume II 
50Hume wrote  in his History of Newton:   ".   .   ..Cautious  in admit- 
ting no principles but such-aT^i?e founded on experiment,  but resolute 
to adopt every such principle,  however new or unusual;  ftm•**2Z+> 
ignorant of his  superiority above the rest of mankind,  and thence less 
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careful to accomodate his reasonings to common apprehension.   .   .   . 
While Newton seemed to draw off the veil from some of the mysteries 
of nature,   he showed at the same time the imperfections of the 
mechanical philosophy;  and thereby restored her ultimate secrets to 
that obscurity,   in which they ever did and ever will remain.   .   .   . 
David Hume.     The History of England from the Invasion of Julius 
Caesar to the Abdication of James the Second.     A New Edition,  with 
the Author's last Corrections & Improvements.     Boston,  Crosby,  Nichols, 
Lee and Company,   l86l.    Volume VI,  p.  371*- 
5-^Ian Simpson Ross,   Lord Kames and the Scotland of His Day 
(Oxford:  Oxford University Press,  1972), pp.  359-360. 
Trenchard More,   in speaking of Newton's use of the term 
'metaphysics," wrote:   "The word metaphysics,  as used here,  must not be 
confused with philosophy.     It refers to those speculations  on natural 
phenomena  which cannot be put to the test of experimental observation." 
Louis Trenchard More.     Isaac Newton.    A Biography (N.Y.:  Dover Publi- 
cations,   Inc.,   1962   (193'+).   P-  78. 
53 
5V 
Ibid.,  pp.   361-362. 
■*Ca. Burke to Sir Lawrence Parsons, (March, 1793), in (Burke). 
The Correspondence of Edmund Burke. Vol. VII Jan., 1792-August, 1791*- 
(Cambridge,   England;  Chicago:  Univ.  of Chicago Press,   1968),  p.  359- 
"-'Thomas Reid,   Essay on the Intellectual Powers of Man.   (Dublin: 
L.  White,   1786),   I,   U9. 
56Ibid.,   p.   51. 
57Ibid.,  p.  1+8. 
58Besides a correct interpretation of Newton per se,   another 
contemporary source could serve in the arsenal against^Hartley|s  as- 
sociationism and the mechanistic reconstruction of society;  this other 
source was  the Scottish school of proto-sociologists which attempted 
a "scientific study of society"   (Peter Gay,   op.  cit.,  II,  p.   332) 
through the observation of human nature in various settings,   past and 
present,   a methodology closer to that of Montesquieu rather than to 
that pseudo-Newtonianism—this latter would apply Newtonian laws of 
Physics to assumed laws of human moral nature.     The mechanism of pseudo- 
Newtonianism is a genetic rather than a generic,   or historical,   approach 
to human nature and explaining its motivations and actions.    Harry 
Prosch referred to "the later degeneration of Newtonian dualism into 
pure and simple materialism"   (Harry Prosch.    The Genesis of Twentieth 
Century Philosophy.     The Evolution of Thought  from Copernicus to the 
Present.     Garden City,   N.Y.:  Anchor Books Doubieaay and Co.,   Inc., 
1966.  1961,,   p.  6k).     Part of this degeneration involved the fact that 
"everywhere the general tendency was to give mechanical or anyhow quasi- 
mechanical explanations of events and things,   (ibid., p.  60).       mese 
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'mechanical1   explanations have often been called  'genetic'  explanations, 
because they are historical or growth patterns analyses which tacitly 
assume that larger wholes develope or generate from combinations of 
smaller parts according to certain laws of combinations.    This means 
that no event is   'explained'   through reference to  'final causes'   or 
to purposes and aims.   .   .   (ibid., p.  68).    In fact,   there exists no 
purpose nor even any purposiveness to the movements of the isolated 
atoms,   which are assumed by the post-Newtonians to constitute the 
ultimate and only reality.    The "genetic hypothesis" of Condillac,  the 
French Materialist,   is related to the dualism of Locke as the genetic 
explanations of the monism of the pseudo-Newtonians is related to the 
dualism of Newton. M. W.   Beal pointed out Condillac's opposition to 
Locke's dualism.     "Condillac takes the empirical dictum,   'Nihil est 
in intellectu,   quod non fuerit in sensu,'  to be the foundation of any 
science of the mind.   .   .   . But Locke had failed to remain true to this 
genetic account of our knowledge and understanding,  because he spoke 
of the understanding as distinct and independent of sensation.   .   .   . 
Condillac's philosophy attempts to remain true to the genetic hypothesis 
by showing that the  intellect itself is a result of or ultimately 
traceable to sensation.     In carrying out this  endeavour,   Condillac 
wants to reduce metaphysics to a seul principe.    This principe is the 
view that all faculties of the mind are nothing more than   'transformed 
sensation'."    M.  W.   Bcal.     "Condillac as precursor of Kant."    Studies 
on Voltaire and  the Eighteenth Century  (The Voltaire Foundation,   Banbury, 
Oxfordshire),  Vol.  CII   (1973),   194.    Condillac's monism and reductionism 
does not correspond to the general thought of the Enlightenment as 
interpreted by Wade and others   (see p.   9) as a quite complex and hetero- 
geneous mix.     Condillac's genetic argument especially runs counter 
to the thought of the Scottish Enlightenment.     Condillac's perversion 
of the dualistic Locke  (See Cassirer,  The Philosophy of the Enlighten- 
ment   (Boston:   Beacon Press:  19o2  (1932),   pp.   99-100)  like the pseudo- 
Kewtonians's perversion of Newton, and the genetic argument he used 
was shown by Maurice Mandelbaum to be an offshoot of associationism 
(see Maurice Mandelbaum.     History, Man and Reason.    A Study in Nine- 
teenth-Century Thought  (Baltimore, Maryland:  The Johns Hopkins Press, 
197'-*;  1971),  p.   143).    Both associationism and geneticism,   wrote Man- 
delbaum,   claimed that  "Experience   [played].   .   . a dominant role in all 
[Mandelbaum's  emphasis)   aspects  of thought,  that in the course of his 
experience an individual acquires wholly new capacities which become, 
quite literally,   a second nature to him"   (idem.).    This seems to border 
on Lamarkianism.     However that may be,   it is helpful in order to under- 
stand more clearly the contrast between the genetic view and the as- 
sumptions  of the thinkers  of the Scottish Enlightenment,--to read the 
late Arnold Toynbee's words on the "genetic" and the    comparative 
approaches as they apply to historical study.     Toynbee s description 
of the "comparative" approach in historical studies corresponds to the 
assumptions of the  "sociological historians" of the Scottish Enlighten- 
ment.    Toynbee said that a strictly narrative,   descriptive history 
corresponds to the genetic approach.    But even separate narrative his- 
tories,   when combined with one another,   are more than the sum of their 
parts.     "To link them together we have to compare them,   and then to 
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analyse their likenesses and differences"   [emphases added]   (Arnold 
Toynbee.    Change and Habit.     The Challenge of Our Time,   Chapter IV 
"Annex:   The Genetic and the Comparative Approach," London,  N.Y.:  Ox- 
ford Univ.  Press:   I966,  p.  88).    But because historical study requires 
an historical object,  as part of a complex and continuously changing 
"flow of life and the plurality of its flowing streams,"  "both an his- 
torian's and a sociologist's  eyes" are needed   [emphasis added]  so as 
not "to forfeit the possibility of seeing life whole"   (idem.).     This 
double-barrelled use by the historian of the "comparative" and the 
"genetic approach is similar to Philip Abrams's recent appeal for a 
"more penetrating"   "historical sociology"   (see infra.,  Chapter V), 
and to the eighteenth-century "sociological historians"  of the Scot- 
tish Enlightenment   (for the Scots,  see infra.,  Chapter III),  and 
lastly,   to the  "new Philosophical historians" of the Enlightenment 
in general (see infra., Chapter IV). 
"^ Burke   .     A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of our 
Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful.    Edited,  with an introduction 
and notes by J.   T.   Boulton   (London:  Routledge, and Paul;  N.Y.:   Columbia 




Ibid.,   p.   xxxv. 
Ibid.,   p.   xxix. 
"Ibid.,   p.  xxviii.    Burke's confidence in this respect is not 
unlike the general Enlightenment optimism and,   in particular,  to that 
of the methodology of the sociological historians of the Scottish 
Enlightenment,   who sought laws of human behavior in society,  and of 
society itself.     For the general Enlightenment thought,   see Appendix C; 
for the Scottish school,  Chapter IV. 
Idem. 63 
6k Ibid.,   p.  xxxiv. 
65For Montesquieu's and the "organicist" meaning of natural, 
see Chapter III. 
66For instance,   "Helvetius reduces to sensation or sense-perception 
all the powers  of the human understanding.   ... To judge is to per- 
ceive similarities and dissimilarities between individual ideas     ... 
To iudrc is simply to perceive."    Frederick Copleston.    A History 
5 Philosophy garden City.Vw York:   196U  (I960),  Vol. VI    Pt    1    P; 50. 
For the other like-minded French materialists,   see 0g., VI,  ^Chap- 
ter Two "The French Enlightenment   (2),' pp.   53-7MSpcc.   re: the Baron 
Paul von Holbach   (1723-1790),  pp.  63-6U,and re:   Pierre Jean Georges 
Cabinis   (1757-1808),   pp. 65-66. 
67 Ibid. 
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S.  A. Grave.    The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense  (Oxford: 
At the Clarendon Press,   I960),  p. 80.     See also James McCosh.     The 
Scottish Philosophy (New York:   Robert Carter Bros.,   1875),  p.   211. 
For Kant's  similar views,   ibid. 
""see Henry Laurie.     Scottish Philosophy in  Ptc National 
Development.   (Glasgow,  James MacLehose & Sons,   1902),p.  132;   see also 
Andrew Seth.  Scottish Philosophy (Edinburgh:   William Blackwood and 
Sons,   189!)),  pp.   78;  8<4-85;  and James McCosh. The Scottish Philosophy 
(New York,   N.Y.:   Robert Carter Bros.,   1875), p.  211). 
Phillip D. Cummins,   "Reid's Realism." Journal of the History 
of Philosophy,  Vol. XII,   No.   3  (July,   197*0,   318;  See also Arthur R. 
Greenberg,   "Hamilton and Reid's Realism." The Modern Schoolman, Vol. LIV, 
No. 1 (November,   1976),   15-17,  ajid,  more generally,  Andrew Ward,   "Direct 
and Indirect Realism." American Philosophical Quarterly,   Vol.  13,   No.  1+ 
(October,  1976),  287-29^ 
?1Ibid.,  p. 323. 
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^Alexandre Koyre,   "Concept and Experience in Newton's Scientific 
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Kineteenth-Ccntury Thought. Baltimore, Maryland: London: The Johns 
Hcpkins Press,   I97H   (1971),  p.   113. 
^Wilkins,   op.  cit.,  p.  125. 
9^sec Colin Kiernan,   "The Enlightenment and Science in Eighteenth- 
Century France." Studies  on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, 
Vol.  LIXa  (1973),   PP.  139-lt9 et passim. 
95 'Alexandre Koyre,   op.  cit.,   p.   53. 
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APPENDIX B 
Kant:      Shaping  Che  Phenomenal  World1 
Kant  had   in his  earliest writings accepted  the validity of 
Newtonian physics   - he  considered  the Newtonian world order as a 
necessary pre-condition of his own Copernican Revolution.     Kant's 
Copernican Revolution was a new metaphysics of knowledge and ex- 
perience  involving a  theoretical  justification of Newtonian science, 
and at the same time replacing the older Continental rationalism - 
the metaphysics of  the Cartesian and   the Leibnizian/Wolffian 
schools.2     Even  in Kant's pre-Critical days, when lecturing as   an 
"ordinary" professor of logic and metaphysics at Konigsberg  (1755- 
1770),  and using Wolffian  text-books   in philosophy,  he nevertheless 
stressed   to his  students   the  importance which  experience played  in 
our knowledge  of reality.     "Philosophical  theorizing in the void was 
by no means a Kantian   ideal!13    Kant's new "metaphysics of knowledge  or 
of  experience"   -   including  his  Copernican  Revolution  -  was,   unlike   the 
older metaphysics,   limited  by  the   inherent  qualifications  of  Newtonian 
physics   itself,  and by Kant's own conception of the noumenal realm and 
of   the  pure   reason.     Kant's  position   is  distinguished   from  all  previous 
metaphysical   systems  because  Kant   excludes  a  monistic view  of  reality 
and with  it,   its necessary corollary,   a reductionist  theory of knowledge. 
An epistemology assuming one ultimate  source of reality  from which 
everything else derives would assume  all knowledge of this  reality  to 
be  "objective" knowledge  - whether "evident" or demonstrable  (that  is, 
- 
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evident   to  some   internal  sense  -  in eighteenth century  terms,   the 
English  "Moral  Sense" school  - or demonstrable by precise  charting 
of some assumed  given mechanical   law of physical nature onto human 
nature and behavior).     Such a reductionist epsitemology reflected 
cither a higher  truth  (the Lcibnizian/Wolffian view)  or a wider good 
(Hutchcson)   or  actually being in  itself (the  view of Cartesian rational- 
ism)   the highest  truth or  the broadest good. 
Kant's  new metaphysics was   "limited" by his "correct" Newtonianism 
and  the  concept  of the noumenal  realm in the  following way.     Kant's posi- 
tion is distinguished   from all previous metaphysical systems  because 
Kant  excludes any monistic   interpretation of reality and reductionist 
theories of knowledge.     Kant rejects any ethical theory which pre- 
supposes  any  form of monism or reductionism;   and historically,   such 
ethical  theories have  taken  the naturalistic  form.    Lewis White Beck 
uses a military metaphor to describe "Kant's Strategy" against both 
dogmatic rationalists  and sceptical empiricists>    (Beck is  speaking 
of the "historical and epistemological   citidel" of Kant's philosophy 
rather  than Kant's moral  theories,   or his  theory of freedom.5    Beck 
sees Kant  as  engaged   in a two-front war.    Kant's opponents belong to 
one of three different  categories of philosophy, each of which   is dis- 
tinguished  by   its   concern  for a particular philosophical problem. 
These   three  categories historically developed  into "two great  coali- 
tions,"  opposed   to  each  other  and   both  opposed   by  Kant's  new  philoso- 
phy.     Beck  lists   the   "three  great perennial divisions  in metaphysics" 
which Kant   set   forth as  the   initial   (the  broadest)   framework of  "the 
theory of  the scope and   function of reason."6    The  three divisions are 
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concerned respectively with problems dealing with what Beck calls  (1) 
the object  of knowledge   (or  the term used throughout   the present 
study,   problems of reality,   (2)   the  origins  of knowledge   (or problems 
of the  theory of knowledge,  epistemological   theories), and   (3)   the 
methods  of knowledge  (or, ethical problems).     Kant gives  the content 
of the above  three "dichotomies" as  follows: 
(1)     re:     the object of knowledge (reality 
intellectualists  v.  sensualists. 
re:     thejprigin of knowledge  (epis.):\j 
noologists   (rationalists)   vs.  empiricists 
(2) 
( 3)     re:     methods of knowledge  (ethics): 
Scientists  (systematic "scholastic 
^ 
 ii i stic philosophers)   v. naturalists 
The "certain  family affiliations" (as  indicated by the arrows)  among the 
above divisions  conclude a system of alliances   forming "two great coali- 
tions"  - on the one hand,   formed  from the axis of the rationalistic 
Leibnizian/Wolffian school and, on  the other hand,   the "entente  founded 
in  modern   times   by  LockC;'
8 descended   from  the   sensationalist/empiricist/ 
Q 
naturalistic axis.     The mature Kant was not  committed  to either coalition. 
The position of the Lockian entente regarding the three divisions of 
philosophical problems was reflected   in  its basic assumption  that  "all 
our  knowledge  came   from experience."    Hume is   the best example of the 
entente's   "skepticism in metaphysics"  (the problem of reality),  "natural- 
ism  in  ethics,"  and   "skepticism  tempered  with  naturalism"   in  epistemol- 
0gy.»10  Although  Kant  agreed  with  the  I.ockians'   skepticism  in metaphysics, 
he  could   not   accept   the   latter   two positions.      In  the   face   of  the  first 
coalition,  Kant's   strategic question was:     "How could  he give up a 
•supernatural metaphysics  (after Hume had awakened Kant  from his Wolffian 
dogmatic  slumber)  without making a metaphysics  out of naturalism?" - 
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whether   the naturalism took the   form of the empiricist-based  ethics 
of Hume  or  the eudacmonistic ethics of Shaftesbury and Hutchcson.H 
How could he avoid both particularizing the universal  and universalizing 
- or at   least  generalizing - the particular?    The  second  coalition which 
Kant opposed Leibnizian/Wolffian dogmatic rationalism,  did  not  consider 
any "problem" of reality  to exist,  because everything,   including 
epistemology and ethics, was derivative in a monistic,  pre-established 
universal harmony.'2    Kant's   task was  to  find a common denominator  - 
"a common but   false" assumption - among the  two  coalitions,  and   to 
destroy   that   common  assumption:        "...  here  (for  Kant)   a  victory  on 
cither   front  will   be  a  victory  on  both   .   .   ."13     Kant   believed  he  had 
found   such a   false  common denominator  among the empiricist  and rational- 
ists   in  their  common belief that  "There  is  but one ultimate sense source 
(the epistemological problem)   or  faculty (the ethical problem)   of know- 
ledge. "W     "Leibniz,  he  tells us   intellectualized [sense-based]   appear- 
ances while Locke [and Hume]   sensualized all   the concepts of   intellect." 
[Kant's]   question was:    How not  to be a dogmatist   in metaphysics 
without  being a skeptic in our [subjective]   knowledge of nature. 
Hume's   skepticism was  all   of  a piece:     no  objective  necessary 
knowledge  of matter  of  fact  either   in  or  beyond  experience. 
Leibniz's dogmatism was all of one piece:    a P**"1 *"**•*■• 
of both what  is  in and what is beyond experience.    Kant ««*** 
to break these  two continuities;  and he saw that each was based 
Kant's   strategy  is  best  expressed,  Beck believes,   in the  following cita- 
tion from the Critique of Pure Reason: 
 ,.„     int-in" tions  without   concepts   are 'Thoughts  without  content  are  empty,   intuitions „cnsiblc'    that 
intelligible.'17 
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This   is  said by Kant   in connection with his distinction between analytic 
and synthetic   judgment.    Analytic judgments represent,  so to speak,   the 
rationalistic coalition,  because such judgments have no empirical  con- 
tent;  rather,   they "relate concepts  to each other by  finding one  con- 
tained   in  the   intension of the other" in a manner similar  to  the  sub- 
18 
ject/predicate rationalism of  the Leibnizian view.     Synthetic  judgments 
use   the "given" of the empirical world as a fulcrum (not  the  "given" of 
a noumenon,   but  the given object subsumed under one or another of the 
categories and  principles of the sensibility and the understanding.19 
"Synthetic  judgements arc  syntheses of concepts which are held   together 
by their  common reference  to something given   .   .   .   ."20    Kant's  strategy 
is  to deny any  epistemological reductionism.     Beck continues: 
.   .   .   Notice Kant's  strategy here.    There  are two  factors  involved 
in knowing:     sensibility and understanding.    Neither alone  can 
give us  knowledge;   either alone is blind or empty  (Empiricism is 
blind;   rationalism is  empty).    Knowledge comes  from the application 
of  one   to  the   other   .... 
This  Kantian balance of rationalism (a priori concept)  and empiricism 
is the  concluding reminder which Norman Kemp Smith in his standard 
Commentary  on   the   Critique  of Pure  Reason wishes  to  leave his  reader 
of   the  essential   heritage  of  the  Critical   philosophy.     Kant's   concept 
of the possibility of experience reflects his reliance on  the  empiricism 
of  Hume  and   the   a  priori   rationalism of Wolff.     The  actual   crude   "givens" 
of empirical data are  transformed  into the possible experiential reality, 
a  reality  made   knowable   through   its  position   in   the  universal  and 
necessary  spatio-temporal order  - the reality is made yet more precise 
when  subsumed  under   the  a priori  rules,  principles,   categories   of   the 
sensibility and   the  understanding.    While Kant agrees with Wolff's 
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definition of philosophy as  "lying wholly  in the sphere  of pure a priori 
thought," Kant  "radically transfers" the problem transforms  the problem 
of the possibility of  the experience  from a rationalistic base onto an 
empiricist base. 
.   .   .   (Philosophy's]   function is  to determine prior  to specific ex- 
perience what  experience must be;  and  obviously that   is only possible 
by means of an a priori,  purely conceptual method.   .   .   .  The prob- 
lem of  the   'possibility of experience'   is the problem of discovering 
the conditions which necessarily determine experience  to be what   it 
is.     Kant,  of  course,   radically transforms  the whole problem,   in 
method  of  treatment  as well as  in results, when in defining the  sub- 
ject-matter   of   inquiry  he  substitutes   experience   for  things  abso- 
lutely  existent  [emphasis added].    This modification    is primarily 
due   to   the   influence  of  Hume..     But   the  constant  occurrance   in  Kant's 
philosophy of  the term  'possibility'  marks his continued belief  in 
the Idealist  view of  thought.    Though  pure  thought  never by  itself 
amounts   to knowledge   - therein Kant departs  from the  extreme ration- 
alist position  - only  through  it   is any knowledge,   empirical or a 
priori,  possible at all.    Philosophy,   in order to exist,  must be a 
system of a priori rational principles.    Nothing empirical or hypo- 
thetical  can  find any place   in it.    Yet at   the same  time  it  is  the 
system of the a priori conditions only of experience,  not of ultimate 
reality.     Such  is the  twofold relation of agreement  and difference 
in which Kant  stands   to his rationalist predecessors.« 
In historical   terms,   of Kant's  correct Newtonianism and his  con- 
cept   of   the  noumena,   it  might  be  said   that  Kant's  disavowal  of  Hume's 
skepticism in regard  to cpistemology and  ethics represents a reaffirma- 
tion by Kant  of Newtonian physics and Newtonian methodology,   of the 
possibility of a knowledge of an objective world of experience.    On  the 
other hand,  Kant as a Newtonian could not  accept Leibniz's dogmatism 
which denied   knowledge of an objective experiential world  and which 
asserted a direct  a priori knowledge of that which   lies   beyond experience. 
In Kantian terms, Leibnizian dogmatic rationalism asserted an intellec- 
tual   intuition of noumena,  or supersensual reality.    The monism and   the 
reductionism of the  two coalitions of Leibniz/Wolff/Shaftesbury/Hutche- 
son on  the one hand,  and  of the Lockean/Humean school on  the other,  were 
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anathema  to Kant  on  the ground of Kant's positive belief in  the objective 
reality of Newtonian physics;   in other words, Kant would have perhaps 
awoken from his pre-Critical  rationalistic "dogmatic slumber" without 
the prodding of Hume, who,  although a skeptic regarding metaphysics, 
was also a  skeptical empiricist. 
.   .   .   Hume awoke him from his   'dogmatic slumber'   - Kant's  term for 
his early  faith  in the power of reason to give metaphysical know- 
ledge-    Yet  even if he had not accepted Hume's argument against 
the possibility of metaphysics,   it   is probable  that Hume's  stric- 
tures  on natural  science would have aroused him.     For both rational- 
ism and  empiricism,   if carried  to the ultimate   (monism)   deny the 
necessity and universality of natural  science,  and Kant's  conviction 
of the certainty of Newtonian mechanics was   too deep to be shaken by 
any negative conclusions drawn from speculations  concerning the 
human  mind.    .    .   . 23 
Kant's  "metaphysics" would  not   imagine systems,  as Newton had warned 
against,   but would  seek to  justify  the uniformity and objectivity of 
that  same  law-governed world Newton had described.    This justification 
would rest upon  the assumed   reality of the matter of  the empirical world 
from which Newton had derived his  laws of physics,  and  the reality of 
those   laws  themselves,  and   the mind   that  had discovered and recited 
those   laws.     Kant  stood opposed   to rationalistic and/or teleological 
"justifications" of the Newtonian system,   justifications which reduced 
reality and man's  knowledge of reality to one origin and one meaning. 
Kant did not  abandon Newtonian physics   for any other kind  of physics. 
But he  did abandon  the Wolffian philosophical  tradition  in favour 
of an original  philosophy 24 
Kant not only accepted Newtonian physical  laws per so,  but he also would 
look to Newtonian methodology25 as an aid   to replace  the old metaphysics 
and gain new knowledge of what amounted to a new reality.     For Kant,   the 
term knowledge  is   limited to sense-experience of the Newtonian world,   - 
and,   following Newtonian laws of physics and of methodology, Kant's 
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Critical  philosophy distinguishes  between the subjective and objective 
on the one hand,  and between  the  ideal and  the real   (noumenal and 
phenomenal)  on the  other.     These Newtonian and Kantian discriminations 
avoid monistic views of reality and reductionist views of knowledge, 
and therefore,   the   indeterminancy described  by lleisenberg (see Chapter 
V)  of any knowledge of reality.     In viewing knowledge as   limited   to sense 
experience, 
.   .    .   Kant   is,   of course,  a child of his  time.     The absolute 
sufficiency of the Newtonian physics  is a presupposition of 
all  his utterances on this   theme.     Newton, he believes, has 
determined   in a quite  final manner  the  principles, methods  and 
limits of scientific  investigation [emphasis added].     For  though 
Kant  himself imposes upon science a  further limitation,  namely, 
to appearances   (of the noumenal realm,  as distinguished  from 
the   "reality" of the phenomenal realm),  lie conceives himself, 
in  so  doing,  not  as weakening Newton's natural philosophy,   but 
as  securing  it against all possible objects.   .   .   . 
But Theodore M.   Greene's description of Kant's  faith   in  the "finality 
and perfection"27  of the Newtonian system resembles   the harmonious, 
and closed, Leibnizian universe,   characterized by that  "fulness,"  that 
28 
plenitude described  by Arthur 0.  Lovejoy.    Neither Newton nor Kant 
assumes   scientific   investigation  to be  capable of revealing laws   in 
nature which are  to be considered as   final or perfect.     The results of 
scientific   investigation should rather be  characterized as   fruitful  than 
as   final. 
Greene  does  describe   the  parallel  methodology  among  Kant's   three 
Critiques   - an analytic methodology proceeding from the particular 
given of  experience   (physical,  moral and aesthetic experience,  respec- 
tively)   to  the  general or  the universal. 
His   starting-point   invariably   is  concrete human ^P^"" j^YI 
another of  its  characteristic  forms      This  experience he regards a 
datum,   the material   for  philosophical   investigation.    Thus,   in 
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Critique   of  Pure   Reason  liis  starting-point   is  man's  ordinary  know- 
ledge of so-called physical objects;   in his  ethical writings   (the 
Critique  of   (Pure)   Practical Reason)   it  is man's moral sense of 
duty;   and   in his  doctrine of aesthetics  (Critique  of Judgement) 
it   is   the appreciation and creation of beauty.    If   the  factual 
reality of any one of these experiences  be denied,   Kant's analysis 
of   it   loses at  once all point  and meaning;   if, on   the other hand, 
it  be admitted as  an existential  fact,   the  importance of his  sub- 
sequent   investigation is   apparent." 
Scientific and/or philosophical  investigation should always begin with 
the particular or ordinary givens of the phcuomenal and/or moral realms. 
Kant  in his  early  "Enquiry  into the Distinction of the Principles 
of Natural Theology and Morals" (1764) writes,   in the   same spirit as his 
later mature writings,   of the need   for a change of method  from previous 
barren metaphysics:     "The genuine method of metaphysics   is  fundamentally 
of the  same kind  as  that which Newton  introduced   into  natural science 
and which was   there  so  fruitful."30    Kant warns   the metaphysicians  that 
if we are  to   increase our knowledge of reality,   of human nature,  we 
must "...   turn rather   to a method analogous  to  that which was  employed 
so successfully by Newton in natural  science.   (The metaphysician)   should, 
indeed,   begin  by   clarifying  the  confused   concepts  of experience  and  giving 
them adequate and abstract expression.   .   .   ."31     It was  because '!   .   .   Kant 
never  doubted   the   general  validity  of  Newtonian  physics  within   its  own 
field  [that  Kant's]   .   .   .   later problems   [the application of a priori 
concepts   to  a  posteriori  empirical  phenomena]   arose on   the  basis   of  this 
conviction.   .   .   ,"32    Nathan Rotenstreich  says   that what he calls Kant's 
Schematism  is   an  attempt   by  Kant   to   solve   the   "problem  of   (the  objectivity 
of)  empirical  knowledge," that  is,  how the   "subsumability" of the sense 
data of  the empirical world under a prior 
i concepts  is  possible  (the other 
half of the problem of reconciling a prior 
i concepts and a posteriori 
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matter is   taken up by  the Transcendental Deduction the function  of 
which is   "to  establish  the validity of the a priori   concepts   for  a 
posteriori datum."■"    But   the salient point here  is  Rotenstreich's 
statement   that  Kant's philosophy was nothing but  the  sum of the prob- 
lems Kant   faced  subsequent  to declaring  the  two realms of reality  - 
of a posteriori matter and of a priori mind. 
The  starting point of Kant's analysis is   the heterogeneity of  the 
elements   composing knowledge;   i.e.,   the datum and the concept. 
Once  this  heterogeneity  is established,   there is  no way of solving 
the problem of knowledge  by denying the heterogeneity,  as  for   in- 
stance Leibniz  tried  to do in assuming that,   in  the last analysis, 
the difference between empirical  knowledge and  truths of  facts on 
the one hand, and rational knowledge and  truths  of reason on   the 
other,   disappears.    The problem Kant   faced   is an outcome of  the 
emphasis  placed  on heterogeneity:     is knowledge possible alto- 
gether once  there are different  elements   composing knowledge   .   .   .3*» 
The same heterogeneity which  characterizes epistemological problems also 
characterizes   ethical problems.    Kant  says  that morality is  impossible 
without a heterogeneous concept of  the good.    The will of the moral 
agent strives   COD freely to maintain his moral  obligation of resolving 
the  "tension between the natrual and moral aspects of  the good."    The 
universality of the moral  law tells   the moral agent what he ought   to do 
as  a  free   sensible  being,   not  what  he  must  do.     This   striving by   the 
moral agent   to always make  the  correct  choice   is what   constitutes happi- 
ness, not  static,  a priori concepts of virtue,   self-interest  or desire.35 
Newtonian  physics   postulates  and  Kant  accepts,   the  uniformity  and 
objectivity  of  Nature,   but   since  experience  and   the   fragmenting  empiri- 
cism of  Hume   cannot   explain,   except   subjectively,   or  psychologically, 
the  uniformity  of  Nature,   the  possibility  of mathematical  and   scientific 
knowledge,   - Kant proposes his Copernican 
Revolution,   "the  theory  that 
objects conform to  the mind rather than  the other way around.' 
•36 
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Because  the  structure of human sensibility of  the human mind   is 
constant,   objects will always appear to us in certain ways.   .   .   ." 
A pure science of Nature  is possible because objects of experience, 
to be objects  of experience,  must of necessity conform to certain 
a priori  conditions   (the  categories and principles of the under- 
standing) . ™     [In Kant's words:]   .   .   .'the principles of possible 
experience   [possible,  because subsumed under one or another of  the 
a priori  categories and principles of the understanding - the 
"schematized"  categories  and principles now,  since they have  con- 
tributed   to the shaping of  experience]   are then at  the same  time 
[as  each other]   universal   laws of Nature,  which can be known a 
priori.    And   thus  to the problem  ....     How is  the pure science 
of Nature possible? has been solved'   .   .   . Without  synthesis  there 
is   for us  no  Nature;  and  the a priori synthesis gives laws  to 
Nature.    These necessary laws are  in a real sense  imposed by  the 
human subject;   but  they are at the  same  time objective  laws 
[emphasis   added], because  they are valid,   and necessarily valid, 
for  the whole  range of possible experience,   that   is,   for Nature 
as   the   complex  of  possible  objects   of  experience.   .    .   .[emphasis 
added].Jy 
Kant's analysis   of  the subjective conditions of experience, of the empiri- 
cal world governed  by Newtonian  laws of physics,   is  carried  through by 
our  "ascending process of synthesis whereby empirical reality  is   con- 
stituted."40    The  process  begins  at  the  two sources of human knowledge 
- sensibility and  the understanding.     "Through the former objects   are 
given  to us;   through  the  latter  they are thought.'**    The knowledge of 
objects  gained   by  the sensibility,   through sense  - experience,   is  similar 
to  the  knowledge  the empiricists would  say we obtain   from raw sense- 
datum of experience;   but  the objects of  sensibility represent merely 
the   first  step   in  the a priori  synthesis  of knowledge   - "thought   can 
(the   categories   of   the  understanding)   get   to  work on  objects  only  when 
they  are  given   to  sense."42     Further,   the  objects  of  sensibility, 
although "given"  to us,  are nevertheless not   "things-in  themselves, 
things  as  they  exist  independently of  the synthesizing activity of the 
human subject."     "Sense-experience  itself involves such an activity namely 
snythesis   in  the a priori  sense  intuitions 
of space and  time.    Things- 
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in-tlieraselves  are never  given to us  as objects:     that which  the under- 
standing  finds before  it   .   .   .  as  the given is already a synthesis of 
form and matter."43    Synthesis of the objects of  sensibility is  the 
work of the understanding and without   it  there  can be no knowledge what- 
soever.    The  gaining of any knowledge  is synonomous with the knowledge 
of the possible objects of experience.     First,   the understanding has 
synthesized   the data  (or  "manifold")   of sense experience through appli- 
cation of   the  a priori  categories and principles   (this process   is  called 
sense  intuition).     These  categories allow the lone subject  to gain  know- 
ledge of reality beyond his  immediate experience and setting.     The rela- 
tion between  "the one perceiving and  thinking subject"^ and  the mani- 
fold of  (sense)   intuition or experience  (what might  be called perception) 
is  called pure apperception.     "Unless   the manifold of (sense)   intuition 
could   be  brought   ...   to   the  unity  of  apperception,   there  would  be  no 
experience,   no  knowledge   ...  no objects.""    Knowledge of reality is 
objective   in the sense  that  the human subject has  applied to the natural, 
physical world  a priori categories of sensibility and understanding which 
.     , „„,i   t-U„e   i-ako   the  subject  beyond   the   immedi- synthesize natural phenomena and  thus  take tne su j 
46 
ate range of  simple non-synthesizing,   strictly empirical perception. 
. .   0n„„47  in  ti,e   sense  that   the  schematized But  knowledge of reality  is  subjective      in tne  sen 
categories  of  understanding which  enables  us   to  know  of  the  data  of 
sense   intuition,   do  not  enable  us   to  know of  supersensible  or  noumenal 
reality.     In   fact,  Kant denies  the epistemological validity of un- 
•   „ 48    To believe  that such unschematized  categories schematized   categories. i°  Deiieve 
r    u ml   obiects   if to wipe away the objective 
give us  knowledge of phenomenal objects 
„i,  t-he cateeories of the understanding 
empirical world,   as  seen through  the categorx 
242 
playing upon  sense-intuited experience.    The unschematized  categories 
would  substitute  for  the  sense or phenomenal objects an "intellectual 
intuition" of  supersensible or  noumenal objects.     But, Kants  says, 
"all  intuition is  sense  intuition,"49 and denies  "the notion that 
human beings  enjoy or  can enjoy an  intellectual   intuition of noumena. 
.50    Not   to deny an   intellectual   intuition of noumena would  force 
Kant   to accept  the positive reality and direct apprehension of noumenal 
objects by  the  intellectual  intuition  - the   function of noumenon  in this 
scheme would  be  to act  as  a vehicle,   transforming "completely indeter- 
minate, unknowable something" called  the  transcendental object  into a 
form acceptable  for  the   intellectual  intuition  to grasp.51     But, Kant 
says  that we  do not have a faculty of   intellectual  intuition;  on  the 
other hand  are neither noumena objects of sense-intuitions nor  capable 
of being subsumed within any categories of the understanding.     Thus 
the   existence  of  noumena  remains  problematical,  and  does  not  yield 
knowledge.      But   the   idea   of  the  noumenon  does  serve  as   a  limiting, 
a       real   limiting  concept   of  tUe^    operation  of   the understanding 
upon the possible objects  of sensibility,  and serves as  a limiting 
concept on the understanding itself,  or,  what noumenal objects  the 
understanding chooses  to  consider as  lying outside  the range of  its 
[the understanding^   synthesizing categories and principles. 
The understanding limits sensibility   'by givingthe name 
noumena   to  things   considered   in  themse  ve     and   not  aB 
phenomena.     But   it  at   the  same  txme   sets   lrmxts   to   it 
self,   that   is,   of  not   knowing  them  (noumenon)   by  means_ 
of any categories and  of thinking them simply as  an 
known  something.53 
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Or,  again,   Kant  says   in the  concluding sentence of his  chapter on 
phenomena and  noumena   in The Critique of Pure Reason   (2nd ed.)   that 
the noumenon   in  its negative,  regulative   (limiting)   use  is  indis- 
tinguishable   from the unknown thing-in-itself  (the object  of  the would- 
be  intellectual non-sensuous   intuition).     ".   .   .   the problematic 
thought which   leaves  open  a  place   for   (intelligible  objects)   serves 
only,   like an empty space,   for  the  limitation of empirical principles, 
without   itself  containing or revealing any other object of knowledge 
beyond  their  sphere."5^    The noumena performs what might be called 
its negative  epistemological   function by serving as a brake upon the 
understanding, which,   "overestimating its powers  and prerogatives, 
proceeds  to  transform the notion of  the  transcendental object   (the 
object of  the  impossible  intellectual   intuition)   .   .   .   into the  con- 
cept  of  a  noumenon."55     The  noumenon  serves  as   a mediator,   so   to   speak, 
between the unknown transcendental object  and  the understanding,   a 
relation loosely analogous   to  the mediating  function of the  imagination 
between  the   concepts  of   the  understanding and   the  manifolds  of   (sense) 
intuition.56     The   relation   is   loosely  analogous   because while   the   imagi- 
nation  mediates   between   two  modes  of  judgment,   sensibility  and  under- 
standing,57 which are grounded  on  the appearances of  the objective 
world   -  and   leaves  no   "empty  spaces,"   -   the  noumenon  does   leave   "empty 
spaces"   in   the  region  between   it  and   the  schemati.ation   thought  performs 
on  objects   of  experience.     So,   even   in   the   realm  of  Nature,   for  Kant,   the 
world of Newtonian physics,   there  is an unknown   factor   (analogous,   one 
might   say,   to   the  Newtonian  void,   see Appendix A)   which performs   the 
negative  function of theoretically placing limitations  upon  the  science 
of  Nature. 
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However,   the  highest application  to which Kant extends the 
cognitive   judgments  of  the mind  is expressed   in his  concept of the 
transcendental  Ideas   (including the Antinomies")  of the pure reason. 
The pure reason is a  cognitive  faculty of the mind which,   although 
it  cannot   be  used   to   increase  our   scientific  knowledge  of  objects, 
still  does  have  a  proper  positive   "regulative"  function  to  perform 
(as distinguished   from  the negative  function of the noumenon vis-a- 
vis   the  phenomenal  world.5°    Given  Kant's  grand  design  to   ".   .   .   re- 
concile  the world of Newtonian physics,   the world of empiricist 
(phenomenal)   reality governed  by  causal  laws which exclude  freedom, 
with  the world of the moral  consciousness,   the world of freedom. 
.   .   ,59  -still  the concept of the pure  theoretical reason   (as dis- 
tinguished   from the pure practical reason which gives laws   for the 
moral  realm)   affect   activity   in   the  phenomenal  world   to  the  extent 
that  the regulative Idea prods one  into action (somewhat   like the 
function of  the metal  rabbit   in a dog race)   not a word moral action 
certainly,   but   then  again,   not   a wholly  phenomenally-based   action. 
Pure  reason  gives   to   the  phenomenal  world   an  open-endedness,   thereby 
saving   it   from being   completely  subsumed  under  deterministic  phenomenal 
laws of Nature,  while  at   the same time not detracting from  that world's 
objectivity. 
The   theoretical  reason,  of  itself,   can  toll  us  only that  It  sees 
no   impossibility   in  the concept of freedom and  in the   idea of 
supra-empirical  noumonal  reality.     The   concept  of  the  moral   law 
(schematized   in   the  Crjtigue  of  Practical   Reason),   through  its 
inseparable   connection with   the   idea  of   freedom,   gives   US a 
practical  (moral)   assurance of  the existence of such a reality 
and of our belonging to it as rational beings      And    heretical 
reason,   on  the basis  of this assurance,   can attempt to think 
noumenal reality so   far as  the practical reason warrents our 
assuming it.   .   .   . 
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The  Ideas of the pure reason allow room for expansion, or at 
least  exposure,   of the phenomenally-originated judgments of the mind, 
to  the  unconditioned   (by  any  phenomenal   considerations).     The   "un- 
conditioned"   is  "a concept which stands  for something which  is always 
subject  and  never predicate."        Kemp Smith reminds us that Kant had 
eliminated  the doctrine of  the transcendental object  (and   the possi- 
bility of an   "intellectual   intuition")   from his  teaching and had 
assigned   the   categories as means   to an understanding of empirical 
objects;   now,   the  "function of mediating the reference of phenomenal 
nature  to a noumenal basis   falls   to  the Ideas of Reason. Copleston 
explains  the mediating role of reason: 
The understanding  (Verstand)   is  concerned directly with phenomena, 
unifying  them in  its  judgements.    The reason  (Vernunft)   is not 
directly  concerned with phenomena in this way,   but only  indirectly 
or mediately  (emphasis   added).     That   is  to say,   it accepts  the 
concepts  and   judgements  of the understanding and seeks  to unify 
them in  the  light  of a higher principle.6 
This higher principle of unification   is an unconditioned reality, not 
given  in experience.     If  the  ideas of  the pure reason do not attempt 
to "fill   in"  the empty spaces,   so to speak,  betwee,. reality, noumenal 
reality  and   the  phenomenally-based   judgments  of   the  mind,   the  Ideas 
do at   least  attempt  to explain the outlines of the relations between 
the  active   judgments  of   the  understanding and  sense-based  objects,  but 
objects   limited   in   their   extent   by   noumenal  notions.     Again,   the  doc- 
trine  of   the    noumenon  assumes   the   empty  spaces  resulting  from a  limited 
empirical   knowledge  eventually  will   be  partially  taken  up  by  objects 
other  than  those exclusively proximate and dependent upon  the under- 
standing's   immediate   judgments.     Kant   expresses  the  negative/potential 
aspects  of   the  noumenal   concept: 
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The  concept  of  the noumena  is   .   .   .   not  the concept of an object, 
but   is  a problem unavoidably bound up with  the limitation of our 
sensibility  -  the problem,   namely as  to whether there may not be 
objects  entirely disengaged   from our sensuous species of  intuition. 
This  is a question which  can only be answered  in an   indeterminate 
manner,   by saying  that,   as  sense  intuition does not extend  to all 
things  without  distinction,   a  place  remains  open   for  other  different 
objects   [emphasis  added]. 
The space which  the  uncertainty of the negative concept of the noumenon 
leaves open,   for possible extension of the objects and  judgments of the 
understanding  is not  a totally unconditioned space.     But a totally un- 
conditioned reality  Is what   the  Ideas of the reason demand   for their 
"satisfaction."65     It   is merely unconditional   in the  sense that  the 
understanding cannot  possibly synthesize  in  one setting the  totality 
of phenomenal  objects.    A recent   commentator, Lewis White Beck,  says 
that   the  Critique   of  Pure  Reason  requires   the   formal  unity  of  the  a 
priori   laws  of nature,  but   it does  not establish the   idea of an equally 
inclusive   system  of   individual   objects.     Nature,   says   Kant,   (in   the 
first   Introduction   to   the  Critique  of  Judgment   (1790)   constitutes  a 
system by  its   transcendental   laws   (of  the pure reason) ,  but 
. . . there is such an infinite multitude of empirical laws and so 
great a heterogeneity of forms of nature . . . that the concept of 
a system according to these  empirical   laws must be wholly alien to 
the understanding,   and neither the possibility nor even  less   the 
necessity of  such  a whole can be conceived   .... 
The understanding synthesizes  nature  through synthetic  a priori categories- 
i.e.,   they  do  not   represent   a  posteriori   Baconian  generalizations   con- 
structed   from  actual   received  empirical  data.     Such  a   formulation  of  a 
posteriori empirical  generalizations  is only one of  the   functions  the 
judgment   performs   as   its  role   in  Kant's  Critique of  Judgment  as 
mediator   or  bridge   between  the  phenomenal  realm of  nature and   the 
noumenal  realm  of   freedom  (morality).     The   judgement  proper  accepts   the 
Ikl 
judgments   (a priori)   of the understanding and  those of the reason and 
the regulative  concept  of the empirical whole which these two  faculties, 
taken together,   have assumed.     But  the charting of the actual  "relation- 
ships among the phenomena of nature,"  to which  the regulative concepts 
have given   "sense and direction,""' are provided by the faculty of 
judgment.°° Judgment   (i.e.,   the meaning of the term as used  in  the 
third Critique,   as mediator between nature and   freedom, as distinguished 
from its  generic use  -   judgment as  synonomous with thought  in general  - 
in the  first and  second  Critiques)   accepts both  the positive causality 
(reality)   of nature and   the positive causality  (duty)  of freedom (the 
freely chosen duty by  the  individual  to obey transcendent moral   laws). 
These two positive realities were expressed as an antithesis of  the 
pure reason,  but  here  the judgment  can solve  the antinomy between 
Nature and  Freedom "only when  the  relationships between the two worlds 
is developed affirmatively."69    The  judgment attempts  to develop  this 
affirmative relationship  by expanding particulars  (in  the phenomenal 
world)  under  the  given universals   (of the moral world),  and of particu- 
larizing universal*  according  to  the given particulars.     In eighteenth- 
century terms, we must assume a positive causality of the physical 
laws which Newton described,   but we must avoid  the vulgarization of 
Newton,   or   that   pseudo-Ncwtonianism which would   create  a mechanistic, 
deterministic universe by universalizing particulars without particulars. 
We are  never  excused   from searching £or a "finical expUnation of 
any  simple   fact   ("-^-^jA,!?  %SVZE£>  Z£ 
its organization.     This limitation  is particularly relevant  to human 
action.   .   .   .70 
248 
In order   that  the judgment reconcile Nature and Freedom by universalizing 
particulars  and  by particularizing universals,   it assumes a "formal de- 
sign" or order  throughout nature   (including man in nature).    This  idea 
by the  judgment  of a  formal  design or purpose  in nature does not impinge 
upon the reality of a mechanistic Newtonian nature;   in  fact,   it supports 
this  nature,  while at   the same  time,   the  idea allows man to step outside 
himself in order   to gain a certain degree of objective perspective on 
his character without  recourse to any notion of final Causes or Purposes 
or to any exclusive consideration of his position in the  free moral realm, 
apart   from  nature.     Kant's   thesis   that   "'Purposiveness   can  be  without 
purpose,'"71   (elaborated   in   the   first  part  of  the  Critique  of  Judgement, 
the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgement")   allows an objective Newtonian 
nature and a mind   capable of shaping this experience according to certain 
a priori   concepts   - without  at  the same  time succombing to a  fruitless 
search   for   final   causes   inevitably ending in that Philistine wisdom 
satirized by  Voltaire   (sec  infra)   and historically stemming from the 
Leibnizzian/Wolffian rationalism which Newton did not represent.     S. 
Korner describes   Kant's   thesis which allows a systemitization of experience 
according to apriori concepts, while  avoiding that  certainty which demands 
to know  the  causes of  causes  until  the  final unconditioned reality  is 
readied. 
empirical   judgement.    .   .   . 72 
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Kant uses  the distinction between purposeful and purpose to describe the 
natural world  and   the moral world respectively. 
Man as  a noumenal  (moral)   being must act according to a purpose, 
while nature   (or,   man as  located  in nature)   is merely purposeful   in the 
sense   indicated  directly  above.     "Man's  moral   conduct  understood  as   con- 
formity with   his  own   internal   law (reflecting a higher objective  law) 
transcends mechanical  causality  in which causes are external to the 
acting character." That   is,  man's moral  conduct   is autonomous,  all 
of a piece;   such  conduct  -   including thought  and action -  is,   in  the 
terminology of logic,   is subject  and not predicate.    On the other hand, 
mechanical  causality as a purposeful whole  is not autonomous   - any un- 
conditioned unifying purpose   it  has is  expressed only negatively  through 
the  concept  of the noumena.     Nevertheless,   the moral purpose of man  can 
bo judged  "without  prejudice   to a  (purposeful) mechanistic explanation 
of nature."    "Because both of  these  ideas,  purposive design and mechanism, 
function  methodologically without   interference with each other, we see how 
the  ends   of   freedom  may  be   thought  of  as  possible within  the  system of 
nature.    .    .   ,"74     Even when   set   against   the  autonomous moral  realm,   the 
phenomenal world more   than holds   its own positive purposiveness against 
any  subsumption  within   the  purpose  of  the moral  realm.     The  moral  realm 
described   in   the  second   Critique   transcends   the  phenomenal  realm,   it 
docs not  detract   from the positive reality of  the phenomenal realm. 
From  the  view  point  of  the  powers  of   the  judgment,   of  the  under- 
standing,   it  might   be   said   that   the  concept  of   the  noumenon performs  an 
act  of  omission while   the  Ideas  of  the  pure  reason  perform an  act   of  com- 
mission.     That   is,   the   noumenon   limit   the  expansion  of   the   faculties  of 
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the  judgment   for   the most part  to the  phenomenal realm (for the most 
part,  because  there seems  to be an unfulfilled phenomenal grey area 
which  "other  different  objects" may occupy  (see  supra)   but are not 
themselves(noumenon)   actively engaged   in the faculties'  probing.     But 
the  Ideas  of  the  pure reason do actively seek to expand,   not   limit,   the 
judgments  of   the  understanding  to  some  unconditioned   state  beyond   the 
noumena,  and   to reunify  these judgments  according to  the Ideas of the 
uncond it ioned. 
This  unconditioned  state which   is never a predicate of any yet 
higher subject,  does not   itself stand as a subject of which all  lower 
levels of reality are derivitive predicates.    On the contrary,  the 
unconditioned   Ideas of reason serve the  lower phenomenal world,  so to 
speak,   in  a   "regulative"  rather   than  a  "constitutive"   (of  reality) 
capacity.    The  transcendent  Ideas of  the reason originate of course 
in  the  mind,   and   "pass   beyond  experience"   to  the  unconditioned.     But   the 
Ideas have  no  separate reality apart  from the reason   that uses  them as 
a catalyst,   as  a means  to gain knowledge of that phenomenal reality 
bounded by  the   concept of the noumenon.     In other words,   the concept 
of  the  noumenon   involves   a  theory  of  reality.     The  concepts  of  the   Ideas 
of the reason   involves a  theory of knowledge.    The Ideas  "pass beyond  ex- 
perience"   but   they  do  so   through   the  mind's  reason.     The   transcendent 
Ideas   do  not   pass   to  any   loftier  reality  corresponding  to  the  phenomenal 
world,   but   merely  attempt   to  more  precisely define  our  knowledge  of  the 
relation of phenomenal man to noumenal  reality."    The Ideas  go beyond 
experience,   but   they do step   into  the realm of noumenal reality (though 
such a step does   take place   in Kant's Critique of  (Pure)   Practical  Reason) 
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Copies ton   summarizes   the   three   Ideas  of  the  pure  reason  and   their 
characteristics  as   cognitive  faculties of the mind and  their regula- 
tive reality: 
.   .   .the soul as  permanent  substantial  subject,   the world as  totality 
of causally related phenomena,  and God as absolute perfection,  as   the 
unity of  the  conditions  of objects of thought   in general.    These  three 
Tdeas  are  not   innate.     At   the same time  they are not derived empirical- 
ly.    They arise  as a result  of the pure reason's natural drive  toward 
completely  completing the synthesis achieved by the understanding. 
This does not mean  .   .   .   that   the pure reason carries  further  the 
synthesizing activity of the understanding considered as  constituting 
objects by   imposing the apriori conditions of experience known as   the 
categories.     The  tdeas  of pure reason are not "constitutive"  .   .   .76 
(they)   do not  give us  knowledge of corresponding objects.'7 
But   the Ideas  are regulative and  as such,   exert great value as a kind of 
heuristic principle.'0 
For example,   the   Idea of  the world as  a totality  (the second Idea 
of  the pure reason)   the  total  system of causally related phenomena, 
constantly  spurs   us on  to develope even wider scientific explanatory 
hypotheses,   ever wider  conceptual syntheses of phenomena.     It serves, 
in other words,   as a kind of   ideal goal?gthe notion of which stimu- 
lates   the mind  to renewed  effort.   .   .   ■ 
The  regulative   function  of  the   transcendent   Ideas  of  reason  coincide  with 
Ernst Cassircr's   explanation of what an  ideal means  in Kantian terms   - 
an  explanation  which   stresses   the   Kantian   ideal  as  not  divorced   from 
empirical  reality or  experience,   but necessary for the  "completion" of 
experience   to  the  extent  the  principles  and   categories  of  the  understand- 
ing can carry  it. 
...   in  Kant's   system  an   ideal   is  not,   as with  Plato     something 
opposed   to experience  -  something lying outside it ^elevated 
above   it.     It   is rather  a moment, a  factor  in the process of ex- 
perience   itself.      It  has  no   independent   isolated  °"tological  exist 
ence;   it   is a regulative  principle that   is f <"""**""! "" 
of experience  itself,  completing it and giving it a systematic 
unity.80 
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"natural" synthesizes  "life"  to fJ-^gj^^wS  life   is 
substantially compromising that   life.     Bo™°?"" "*_,  serving it.     If 
formed   life.     The  natural  is   form,  **""*£% gj"g^and to 
life detaches   itself  from this  form,   if   it seeks  to Uow 
assert   itself   in  isolation from this form,   if it   is unwilling 
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APPENDIX C 
The Scottish Philosophes:    At Home in Their Society and 
in Their Century or,   the Prince Street   (Edinburgh)/ 
Argyle  Street   (Glasgow) Philosophes vs.   the 
Grub Street   (London)  Philosophes* 
Roger L.   Emerson wrote that  the  thinkers of the Scottish En- 
lightenment held,   Cor  instance,   to a rational Christianity which was 
neither  anti-religious  nor  anti-clerical, who held a "qualified be- 
lief in progress," and who 
.   .   .  would be  that portion of the social elite which chose to 
be concerned with ideas  for the delights and pleasures of  con- 
templation or   for the usefulness   they might   find   in them.   .   .   . 
Not  Utopian dreams  but an understanding of their historic rights 
and  privileges  of their regions or  corporations would be most 
likely to  come   from their discussions and pens.   .   .   .    While be- 
lieving  in natural  laws,   they believed  the social order specified 
by  these  laws   to be hierarchical." 
But   it was precisely because  such "conservative  intellectuals"5 were 
not alienated   from  their  society as,  Emerson noted,   the French philo- 
sophes   in  their salons,  or the London   "Grub Street" radical writers 
were,   that   the   Scots  had   such  a  great   impact  on  their  countrymen. 
Emerson seems  to  suggest   that  this gave a greater cohesiveness 
to  the  Scottish   Enlightenment   than  existed  among  the  English,   and  even, 
among the more disaffected French. 
...   in no other part  of Europe were  the powerful^ interested^ 
ideas and  so   free  to act upon then,      ™J"^J   in che Athens of the 
tical and  resulted no  in a "e«venly city, but » an ved 
north,   filled with learned men and  scholars,   "J" x 
country-side and populated  by a prospe ring, well gOV^      P    P^ 
This  should  not make us regard the Scots as  "" *      6 
should make  us  aware of  the differences  in Enlightenmen 
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Emerson's   (1973)  view of Scottish Enlightenment  thought  seems 
almost  a paraphrase of Peter Gay's  characterization  (1972)   of the 
Enlightenment  philosophes as moderate "agents of modernization."    Gay 
had written of  the philosophes   in general   (as Emerson did of the Scots) 
--that  "the philosophes   from Edinburgh  to Vienna, Philadelphia to Milan' 
were committed   in  their minds  to a continual improvement  in their 
respective societies.    They therefore worked  for day-to-day reforms 
within their  societies.7    The philosophes, Gay wrote, 
. . . wanted to retain their place, or improve their place, in 
existing society, and to enact their reforms gradually. True, 
the 'low' Enlightenment - the Grub Streets of Paris and other 
publishing centers - pushed the revolutionary possibilities of 
the Old Regimes much further. But the efforts of these true 
radicals did not make themselves visible until events overtook 
them in the 1790's. There were few Revolutionaries before the 
fact:     the philosophes were reformers within the system. 
In  the  second place  [not articulated by Emersonl,   since the 
philosophes  spread   their   ideas before   the emergence of    mass 
culture,'   their relations with  their public,  actual and poten- 
tial,were  essentially  cordial.     .   .   .   the philosophes were not 
an avant-garde   .... 
Arthur  Donovan referred   to  the   fact  that, 
The Scottish Enlightenment was a national movement  in the sense 
that   it was  supported by the dominent members of society.    The 
Edinburgh philosophers   .   .   . were not an embattled little    lock 
of outrageous philosophes.    Quite the opposite   .   .  .   .    ™*"e 
tually Scottish philosophy was  innovative,  even revolutionary, 
but socially it was quite secure. 
To  Arthur  M.  Wilson  himself   the   philosophes   in general  enjoyed 
the  same  double-edged   status  of  reformers   and  realists,   of  "citizens" 




The philosophes'   sense of ease [a sense fortified by the assump- 
tion that   the  "scientific world view was continually advancing 
against   the various   forms of  fanaticism and superstition      gave 
them the  confident  conviction  that realistic proposals   for change 
had a  chance of  realization;   the philosophes'   sense of tension 
underscored   their  conviction that  there was much work to be done. 
The late  eighteenth century   .   .   . was a time when philosophes 
were not  simply  the  spokesmen,  but also  the goads of their time. 
Thus  the  Enlightenment  represents a conjunction rare in human 
affairs,   a   time when reformers were close enough  to the core of 
events  to  think  their efforts worthwhile,  yet  farenough  from 
that  core  to think their efforts necessary.   . 12 
As the Scottish  thinkers  sought not  "utopian dreams," but an  "under- 
standing of  their historic rights and privileges of their regions or 
corporations,"  so Gay's philosophes practiced a political realism in 
which  they  "adjusted   their aspirations  to  their estimates of local 
possibilities."13     They 
.   .   .  practiced   the [philosophical]   modesty they so prized  in 
their hero,   Newton,  by offering proposals adapted  to a single 
time and  a single place.     Even Rousseau,  speculative Platonist 
that he was,   found  it possible to differentiate among Corsica, 
Poland and Geneva [for which he wrote constitutions]. 
This  principled realism,   this modesty,  and  this   flexibility 
explain yet  another distinctive characteristic of the Enlighten- 
ment   .   .   .   .14 
At   first   glance,   perhaps   the  "differences  in Enlightenment" 
which  Emerson said existed between Scotland and  the Continent would 
be the greater willingness on  the part of the French philosophes  to 
speculate,   for   instance,   on  a  science  of man.     It   is   this  last   charac- 
teristic with which Gay concludes his short review of the Enlightenment, 
Gay wrote: 
.   .   . They [the philosophes]   believec.that . science of man  is 
possible,   and that such a science will lead tnrougn / 
relativism to truths  on which reason.ble «n can agree.    I 
perhaps   in the  force of this   Idea that the Einax 
question, Why was   the Enlightenment?, may be  ro       , 
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vigor of  the philosophes'   conviction  that man,   freed  from the 
trammels  of  superstition,   could devise a social  science that 
would  lead   from interminable squabbles over phantoms  to firm 
consensus of realities.   ...'■* 
If one remembers, with Gladys  Bryson and  Douglass Adair,  that  the 
Scottish universities  in the  Eighteenth century had  "developed the 
chief centers of eighteenth-century social science research and pub- 
lication  in all   the world,"  (see supra.,   Chapter III),   then Gay's 
concluding words apply especially to the Scottish Enlightenment. 
A recent historiographical  trend on the  general  tone of Con- 
tinental  (French/German)   Enlightenment  thought,  serves  to bring 
Scottish Enlightenment   thought,  as described here,   into a less hostile 
position vis-a-vis   the  intellectual assumptions of thought on the 
Continent.     In a recent  review-essay of  "Peter Gay's  Enlightenment," 
James Leith   criticised Gay for   characterizing Enlightenment  thought 
as   free of  the  encumbrances of  "Christian   fanaticism" and "mysticism" 
and of a priori  ideals   in general.^    Rather,   the age was  characterized 
by a "secular  humanism," or,   in Gay's phrase, by a "'modern paganism,'" 
and was  inhabited  by  that   "'little  flock'" of philosophes who were 
"moderate,   hard-headed  and practical,   certainly not  carried away by a 
new faith,"17 as   they were so portrayed   in Carl Becker's  classic study 
of The Heavenly £lfl ^  t&g Eighteenth Century, (Princeton,   1932).    Leith 
comments  that 
...   the philosophes'  reasoning often ^tLS^SA^ 
definitional  rather   than empirical  .   .   .gNor were 
as relativistic as Gay would have  them. 
This   is   reflected   in  the  philosophes' 
.   .   .   tattitude  toward moral phil*-*?.££*%] "f^tae 
and especially  in  the]   .   .   .    realm of •JJfVW.U 
philosophes'   avoidance of unrestrained relativism. 
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and   in the  figures of,  among others, Voltaire, Hume,  Kant and Diderot?0 
Leith   cited Gay's own words,   that  "'.   .   .   the philosophes were relativists 
about   their  relativism'"21 Hume and Diderot,  for example,  both held to 
a transcendent morality.22 A  last, but lengthy citation from Leith 
hopefully will be excuseable because  it not only explains  the Continen- 
tal position,   but also   that of the Scottish Enlightenment(and,  of the 
"moderate"  Enlightenment   in Berlin,  from the mid-century debate over 
Newtonianism,23  as being more  in step with the mainstream of  thought 
during the period. 
Recognition   in the   thought of the philosophes of  the persistance 
of rationalistic habits,  of the survival of providential notions, 
and of  the  limitations of their relativism is vital to determining 
more precisely one of  the major questions which concerns Gay  - 
the nature and extent  of the modernity of the Enlightenment.    Take 
the  case of relativism.    The  introduction of a certain degree of 
relativism into their thought allowed  the philosophes  to appreci- 
ate a greater variety of historical epochs,  political practices, 
artistic  forms,  and  even moral customs.    Their partial relativism 
distinguishes  them from medieval Schoolmen,  Renaissance classicists, 
and  seventeenth-century rationalists.    But their instinctive 
rejection of  complete relativism,   their sometimes deparate reten- 
tion of universal  also marks  them off from the historic!    s of 
the nineteenth century and  the protean men of the *«*££•    J°m 
exaggerate   the relativism of the philosophes  is  to dislocate  them 
historically  [emphasis added]. 
"Moral   customs" and   "partial relativism" are only oxymoronic terms 
with a pure philosophical,  definitional context.     But  the Kantian notion 
of  freedom and   its reconciliation  through  the judgement with  the natural 
r  "„rnl   customs"  and  resembles   the realm,   has   the effect  of a system of    moral custom. 
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with Reason itself  -  therefore  its disciples could state  in perLect 
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authority."    Giorgio Tonelli,   "The   'Weakness    of Reason in  the Age of 
Enlightenment."   Diderot  Studies,   Vol.   14   (1971),   pp.   222-223).     This 
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lectual humility" by which "Reason's self-confidence became    P^adoxi 
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old argument:     ".   .   .   in fact,  Enlightenment  intellectuals, while pre- 
tending to substitute  the rule of Reason  for tradition and authority, 
were simply substituting  for other traditions and authorities  some 
traditions and  some  authorities which  they considered as the true 
ones   .   .   .   'Proud Reason1   again,  discloses  itself  in its intentions 
as a rather obsequious reason"  (idem.).    Arthur M. Wilson could have 
been describing Tonelli's above words rather than  the interpretation 
of Enlightenment   thought which he was   in  fact summarizing - that of 
Carl   Keeker's Heavenly City of  the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers 
(lectures  delivered   at  Yale   in   1931,   and   published   in   1932).     Wilson 
wrote:     "Becker's  lectures argued   that  the reasoning of the philosophes 
was as   scholastic in  its own way as  that of the thirteenth century had 
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Christoph Gaterer,  Peter Hans Rcill  (see supra.,  Chapter IV) noted 
that "Contemporary  inquiries   into the nature of the eighteenth- 
century historiography have  challenged  the  traditional view that the 
Enlightenment was  either a historical or antihistorical  (Reill, p. 
24).     R  ill  listed  those writers representing the  traditional view 
of Enlightenment   thought:    Wilhelm Dilthey's  1901 classic,  "Das 
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1953;   1936)   and Andreas Kraus,  author of Vcrnunft und Geschichte: Die 
Bedeutiing der deutschen Akadcmicn  fur die Entwicklung dcr Geschicht- 
swissenschaft   im spatcn achzehnten Jahrhundert (Freiburg,   1963).    See 
Reill,   pp.   24-25.     More recent revisionist works have been "more 
sympathetic  to the historical consciousness of the Enlightenment 
(Reill,   idem.).     They are:     Johann Huiringa.     Im Bann der Gcschichten: 
Bctrachtungen and Cestaltungen  (Basel,  1943); Emery Neff.    ThePoetry 
of History   (New York,   1947);   Herbert  Butterfield. Man on His Past: 
The Study of Historical Scholarship (Cambridge, England, 1955); 
A. P. Momigliano, "Gibbon's Contribution to Historical Method in 
his Studies in Historiography (London, 1966), 40-55; Lastly, Reill 
lists . . . Peter Gay's earlier article, "The Enlightenment in the 
History of Political Theory," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 69 
(1954), 374-390, and thus underscores Leith's view of Gay as being 
not wholly  the representative of the "modernist" view of the Enligh 
'"see also:     Arthur M. Wilson,  "Unfinished  Business in Enlightenment 
ten- 
"  (ibid.,  p.   326).    The thought of the 
complex,  rather  than naive and simple.   . 
Two years   later Wilson,   i review-essay of Gay's later book, 
olume  I   of  The  Enlightenment     ftfl  Tnteroretation,   echoed Leit^s 
and undeserved misfortunes, 
philosophes was  "subtle and  comp 
(idem.) . 
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An  Interpretation,"  Diderot   Studies.  Vol.  X  (1968),   303-313.     Especially 
p.  304.     The  philosoplies'   thought was characterized by a "sustained 
critical  thinking"  (ibid.,  p.  306), or even "a philosophy  (Wilson's 
emphasis)   that equated   itself with criticism .   .   ."   (ibid., p.   308). 
Gay believes   that what   is  "the philosophy that made philosophers out 
of the philosoplies   is   .   .   .   the philosophy of history" (ibid.,  p. 
309).     Such a philosophy developed  in the works of "Voltaire, Montes- 
quieu,  Condoreet,   Robertson,  Hume, Giannone, Raynal, and, most of all, 
Gibbon  (into)   a coherent world view, one that was critical and secular" 
(idem.).     But,  although "logically" the "most critical of all" the 
philosophies  and  the  logical  "end-point of the philosophy of the En- 
lightenment"  (idem.)   would be Hume,   - "unless it be said that Kan 
was"  (idem.)   - Gay notes that the philosoplies did not  follow Hume 
to his   logical end-point.    Rather,   the philosoplies as Gay wrote,  saw 
that Hume's  "epistemology was extremely disturbing in its  implications 
and therefore hard   to assimilate"   (ibid.,  pp.  309-310),  and  they  "simply 
refused  to  face up  to Hume's rigor"  (idem.).    The philosoplies "blandly 
insisted  upon being more complacent about human reason than his philosophy 
would warrent   them in doing"  (idem.).    To the extent  the philosophes did 
not  totally   identify with  Hume's scepticism,   they were not ahistorically- 
minded or anti-historically minded.    Given the   fact  that one of Gay s 
"mentorstand masters'  was Cassirer   (ibid., p.  307),   it is not surprising 
that Gay seems  to  identify with Kant rather than with Hume as the  cul- 
mination of Enlightenment  thought.    Wilson saw Kant   in Gay's closing 
words of Gay's  book.     Gay had declared  that his book 
.   .   .  decides   between the Christian millennium, with  its 
ideal of dependence,  and  the Enlightenment, with  its 
ideal of autonomy,   in favor of autonomy'   (pp. 496-496). 
Now,   this   is  very much like Kant's declaring that  cnlight- 
ment   is man's  release  from his self-incurred   tutelage. 




Reill's categorizing of ,t  thought and Gay's  kinship with Cassirer, Rein 8 ««•■£}■"*£ 
;sirer   in  the  traditionalist school of Enlightenment historiography 
lGM Enlightenment  as  ahistorical)   demands qualification      RobertDarn 
ton (Yale University),  who,   in the  1971 review-essay of thesecond 
volume  of  Gay's  Tfee   jpj ^htenmentj     An  Tntcrprctation     ™<*U 
"exaggerating the  Enlightenment's radicalism" and the  influence oi 
the philosoplies over  the general public  (in the light of the quanti. :ita- isoplies  over   cne  geuuLoi.  Kv.»..-   v—   - -«..«.<«„,i  K« 
tive and  sociointellectual history of the period as pracJ«cd by 
"Lea Annales" school   in France,  and aspec^a UjM    JJPJJ ente    in^the 
2-volume Annales product, l.ivre et societe   (Pans,   tv/vj 
Darnton saw that Gay's 
.   .    .   philosoplies   are not desiccated rationalists,  naive prophets ,-minded village atheists.    They are compli- 
-__IJ..«~I nrnhlcms.   irrational   in their 
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APPENDIX  D 
A Note on Burke and  the Problem of Intermediafie    Knowledge 
and   the Complex Act of  (Historical Perception) 
Gerald Chapman sees  Burke as  the  inheritor  of a long tradition 
in British philosophy going back to Francis Bacon,  a tradition which 
Chapman  calls one  of  "rational empiricism."    What   this amounts to is 
a kind  of law of  change,   a rule which articulates Burke's ".   .   .  almost 
obsessive awareness  of the  interrelatcdness of things  in actual life," 
before  Burke himself articulated  it,  and acted   it,   and upon it.    The 
interconnectedness of experience,  or rational empiricism, was  translated 
by Burke  into what Chapman  calls  the "practical  imagination."    It is 
this "practical   imagination"  together with what Chapman calls   Burke's 
"organicism" or  the objective  content   in Burke, which  largely defines 
Burke's   thought.     Chapman's  view of Burke merits  consideration here 
because   it   seems   to  be  what  might  have  been   for  Burke  a  translation, 
into political   from strictly philosophical terms,   of  the Scottish Com- 
mon Sense school.     There  seems,  at  the least,   to be a verisimilitude 
between  the  Burke portrayed  by Chapman and  the only school of philosophi- 
cal   thought   contemporary  with  Burke,   the  Scottish  school  of  Common Sense 
realism. 
Chapman  sees   that   although  Bacon  had  not  any  overriding,   trans- 
cendent,   objective moral yardsticks by which  to measure the empirical 
world,   the  empirical world   itself could be made sense of,  given the 
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recognition of  the reality of the nominalistic  individual and  the 
charting of  the   complex changes and actions among these individual 
atoms.    Within his nominalistic-empirical framework,  Bacon is a 
systemitizer. 
True [says   Chapman,  quoting Bacon],   'in nature nothing really 
exists   beside   individual  bodies,'   but within  the  acts  and   changes 
[Chapman's   emphasis]   of   individual  bodies,   there  is a   'latent 
process' which  is   'perfectly continuous'   though  invisible  in 
its  causal   texture,   and   this  causal  texture   'embraces the unity 
of nature  in substances  the most unlike.'    Thus,  the causal 
texture [rational  unityl   of concrete  change  is  the true object 
of philosophy,  and hence  the name   'rational empiricism.' 
Rational  empiricism is  the  fath  that all concrete particulars 
are generated  by interlocking principles which,   though very 
intricate  and obscure,   can nevertheless be  inferred  from their 
'effects.'2 
But   if Burke were   left here,  his appeal would remain somewhat  like 
what Cassirer   called   the  "vulgar appeal  to what   is  called adverse 
experience," or   to   that   view which sees,  according to Pope's  credo, 
"universal  good   in partial  evil," and which characterizes the early 
Moral Sense  school   in Britain in  the eighteenth century.     But Chapman 
carries  Burke  further.     Burke  is placed as one of the "inheritors of 
empiricism";   another  legatee of the  inheritance was John Home, Lord 
Kames,  one of  the  leading lights of the Scottish Enlightenment.     But 
Burke and Kames  and the others build upon this empiricism of Bacon. 
These  later   inheritors  of empiricism 
.   .   .   came  to experience more than they could rationally account 
for.     Thus   they wrestled with  insistent dualisms of permanence 
and  change,   unity and multeity,  generality and particularity, 
abstraction and  circumstance,   ideality and   fact,     tacts had 
penumbras  and   fringe areas of meaning that defied  classifica ion 
and experimental rule,  and unfolded vistas of startling complexity 
and nuance.     One  thinks of Lord Kames'  being haunted by    relations 
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'Cause and  effect,   continguity  in time or in place,  high and  low, 
prior and posterior,  resemblance,   contrast,   and a thousand other' 
relations   connect   things  together without end.    Not a single thing 
appears   solitary and altogether devoid of connection:     the only 
difference  is,   that  some are intimately connected,  some more 
slightly,   some near,   some at a distance'   .   .   .   ,3 
The important point  is  that  Burke recognized and  "wrestled with the 
insistent dualisms" mentioned.    And  this wrestling served to channel, 
in Burke's   thought,   the premises of experience into the promises of 
experience,   the actuality   into the possibility. 
The premise of experience  flowed  - and  transformed an atomistic, 
nominalistic   fund   of empirical data  into an experiential philosophy, 
a philosophy  in which  the  givens are the  complexities of the empirical 
world  crisscrossed with a priori  ideals. 
[In Francis  Bacon's]   'love quarrel of the rational and empirical 
faculties   .   .   .   'organicism'   is  born.    The texture of enduring 
causes   too  subtle   for sense and a priori reason is a haunting 
certainty which must somehow be reconciled with  fleeting fact 
and value.     The practical empiricist,   like Burke, discovers his 
need  for a self-legislated restraint of reason in order to con- 
tinue   'empirical.1     He resists  the  threat of mental  inflation 
he stops   the  dangerous  spiral of his  thinking,   so as not  to 
break his moorings   in experience and perish in the thin air of 
conceptual abstraction.     Thus,   though he may not escape believing 
in a universal  order of  causes, he shies  from it with reverent 
caution.     He   is committed  to the theory of a strict,  overarching 
rational order,  but also  to an exploration of actual existence 
for   its  latent and  emergent circumstances.    Nature yields  some- 
thing  to History,  and  the  chain of causes  is  submerged  in the 
chain of events.   .   .   . 
This attitude  or,   if you will,  methodology,  becomes  less diffuse and 
less  tenuous when steered by  the active,   forming human  intellect.    Chap- 
man's description  of  the process of the reality of  the human mind work- 
ing on the reality of not merely the empirical  facts  themselves,  but on 
the continually emerging pattern of  facts,   i.e., on the experiential 
world-Chapman's description   is as eloquent as anything Burke ever wrote: 
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.   .   .   reality presents  itself as a fabric of actualizing possi- 
bilities requiring the human mind   to make endless reconciliations 
o£ possession and  emergence, each emergent as it  is assimilated, 
modifying  the whole  tenor of the possessed,  by an endless  feeling 
attention  to  incursions  of novelty,   like showers of meteoric 
light within   the atmosphere of the  familiar.   .   .   .-" 
When Chapman  comes down  to marking Burkc's most distinguishing charac- 
teristic,   chapman  balances   the  complex empirical and the  forming, 
organizing  intellect.     Chapman  calls   this process in Burke  the use 
of the "practical   imagination," which Chapman defines as 
...   the power   to experience  the   life of a thing in  its  concrete 
complexity,  discriminate   its relations,  and act upon [or reverence] 
its   latent   good.     Such an   imagination as discerns answers to the 
questions,   'How is   it actually?'   and   'What is  its meaningful rele- 
vance?      .   .    . 
If Burke  reverenced  an emerging empirical   fact or events,  he reverenced 
it  for  its relation  to  the  changing whole it had  recently  joined  - the 
whole defined by  empirical data,   transcendent a priori ideals and  the 
active human  intellect.     The   form of the relation remains  stable - its 
content merely changes after   the human intelligence has received and 
interpreted  "actualizing possibilities" and  transformed  them into an 
".   .   .   increase  [of]   one's   intelligence of probabilities."' 
Chapman equates   the above process, which Burke uses  to reform 
through a happy harmony of permanence  and change with a process of 
"common sense." 
Confronted with a novel occasion,   ^^^^/"^rthe^course 
necessities,   its   correlation of ^°f£ *""?!^Ipie8'  or 
of action  latently most effective,  and  for  Che    P**"clJJ        hael8] 
fruitful   generalities  which  may  Jjjpg-J- tfg^  J(   ^ 
occasions  to  produce,  or avoid,   ii Hence his  emphasis 
increase one's   intelligence of Probabll^";ined by the actual, 
on   'common sense.'   .   .   .   Common ■•"••"•gJJS* within  the 
is often blind   to hypothetical goods and °b    in        ^ adjustment 
familiar,   but   it   is  also  capable ot great 
to novel occasions.   .   .   • 
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Chapman  seems  to be unaware,  by his use oC  the phrase,  common sense  - 
he places   it within quotation marks, and makes no mention of Reid or 
the  formal   school   itself  - of  the fact that he is describing indeed 
a formal   school of  thought which  flourished   in a setting contemporary 
with Burke   is ascendency  in British public life. 
David K. Weiser's  recent   (1975)  description of the  correspon- 
dence,   "central   to all Burke's writings" between nature and culture, 
faintly echoes Chapman's  earlier portrait of Burke's thought.    Weiser 
cited  Burke's  "Reflections": 
'Our political  order   is placed  in a just correspondence and   symmetry 
with  the order  of the world,  and with the mode of existence decreed 
to a permanent body composed of transitory parts; wherein by  the 
disposition of  stupendous wisdom, moulding together  the great 
mysterious   incorporation of  the human race,   the whole,   at one time, 
is never  old,   or middle-aged,  or young,  but  in a condition of un- 
changeable constancy,  moves on through the varied tenor of per- 
petual   decay,   fall,   renovation, and progression. 
As  in Chapman's  Burke,   the  Burke here recognizes a constant relation 
between  the   constant whole and  the changing parts which have joined 
it in the past and   are constantly  joining the whole.W    While Chapman 
seems  to emphasize  the modifications which the transitory parts   play 
on the whole, Weiser emphasizes  the modifications which the constant 
whole  imprints upon  the parts.    Weiser continued,  after the above 
citation: 
,   .     „ii   iwifn's writings,  is   the analogy The argument here    central   to al    Burke Jtx g  , ^ _ 
[expressing Burke's own values, and not merely ub dersJLl 
calPpurpose8s  of eliciting a desire    response    r« ^#%OTtlnue. 
between  nature and  culture      In both ««w   , Government,  he 
constantly while the   'transitory parts    eon* and g 
claims,   must  emulate this two-fold process, rather than 
turmoil.*2 
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Or again,  Chapman's  Burke  corresponds  to a recent description o£ the 
eighteenth  century German historian, Joliann Christoph Gatterer. 
Gatterer   's   thought was representative of the new critical 
history of  the  Enlightenment,  and,  as we have seen (see chapter IV), 
not unlike  the assumptions of the Scottish Enlightenment  (and of 
Burke).     P.  H.  Reill   characterized Gatterer's historical  thought as 
a mean between  the  extremes  of the seventeenth  century erudites,   the 
hewers and gatherers of raw data who had almost blindly amassed  "the 
seeming  chaotic collection of  facts" on the one hand,  and,  on the 
other hand, Gatterer's  thought  as  "abstract speculation."13 
The brunt  of Gatterer's  argument   is  that a synthetic history,  a 
history  that would  be more than a mere chronological arrangement 
of atomic   facts,   requires a flexible, ordering and  treatment of 
historical material.     Problem,  evidence,  and  presentation were, 
he believed,   inseparably intertwined.   .   .   .   [Gatterer]   .   .   . 
cautioned  his  readers and  students to remember that everything 
was  part  of a  larger whole.    No event was to be considered 
radically particulate or  totally unique.     Each was  tied   to a 
complex set of preceding and  contemporary events and could^not 
be understood without reference to them.    Every history had  to 
be related   to a   larger  set of questions and was a function of 
larger processes  of universal history. 
To the extent   that Gatterer was   in  fact representative of Enlightenment 
thought   - Reill  sees Gatterer's  essay as  challenging "the traditional 
view that   the  Enlightenment was either ahistorical or antlhistorical," 
a view exemplified   in Wilhelm Dilthey and Ernst Cassirer16and that 
Chapman's  and Wciser's  interpretations of liurke's  thought are correct, 
then,  liurke's   thought   is not wholly alien to his age. 
Burke's review  in the  "Annual Register"  (1769)  of William Robert- 
son's The   History  gnd   Rnlan  of  th-  Emperor   Charles  V  ....   took  the 
same attitude  to the  erudites as  that of the later German historian 
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Gattcrer.     Burke  thought,   as Gatterer,   that particular  facts must be 
interpreted   in  the context  of the  "whole system" of which they were 
a part.    Yet,  at   the  same  time,   Burke respected  the particular parts 
of the whole  to  the extent   that  these parts could never be wholly 
comprehended by the historian.     Burke wrote of the predecessors of 
Robertson: 
Since the revival  of  letters   (in the sixteenth century),  through 
an  indefatigible  spirit  of disquisition was exerted upon other 
subjects;   yet men  of genius were,   in general, deterred  from 
entering  far   into  this  [".   .   .   the  subversion of the Roman Empire], 
The subject,   from its   importance, was  indeed  inviting:    but the 
chaos of rubbish   in which  it was buried, and  the patient drudgery 
to be  submitted   to  in making  the search, were too discouraging. 
Thus,  enquiries   into  the most dark and  interesting subjects, 
which required   the  acutest descernment,  under the direction of 
the best   formal  judgement,   to be applied  to their  investigation, 
were abandoned  to  the   indiscriminate zeal of antiquaries, or to 
the undistinguishing labor of compilers.    It  is  true  that Muratori 
and  some  other  late writers have, with equal industry and ingenuity, 
developed many valuable monuments of those dark periods;  but  their 
energies were directed   to particular parts,  and did not  take  in 
the whole  system.1' 
On the other hand,   the  particular   facts had a reality of their own, 
a reality which  precluded   their   total  subsumption within   the whole  - 
Burke  continued: 
.   .    .   Men  of  genius   are  apt   to  think  that  they  C0«pxehend every 
part  of a subject  at   first view;   and  it  is no wonder  If in this 
opinion   they sometimes overlook,  during the tiresome  task of 
searching and  comparing a great number of authorities,,   some 
that   it might have  been wished   they had  considered. 
This  respect   for   the   separate  reality  and   identity  of  historical   facts 
and the use of  the  critical- analytical  faculties of the mind  to shape 
these  facts   into a  coherent whole   is,  again,   characteristic of the new 
"philosophical history" of  the Enlightenment,   and  is represented in 
Gaterer.     Reill wrote: 
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While retaining much of the vocabulary and apparatus of the | 17th 
century  erudites]   polyhistorians,  the Aufklarer put them to a dif- 
ferent  use.     Where  the polyhistorians saw the establishment of the 
chain of historical events as  the end of their task,  the historians 
of  the Aufklarung saw it as  only a necessary preliminary to genuine 
historical   thinking.     The next step,  and the vital one, was  to 
bring everything  into a   'system of events.'    This required the use 
of  the philosophical spirit,  or critical analysis,   to see some 
events as  causative,  others  as  contingent.1J 
The  "system of events,"  the whole  into which the naked facts of the 
historical phenomenal realm must be brought by the philosophical 
historian,   is not   totally alien,  as   to the effects such as  "system" 
has  in  the mind  of   the perceiving and questioning historian,   from 
Kant's  "systemitization of experience" which he demonstrated  in his 
Critique of Pure  Reason  (see Appendix B). 
Further,   Rcill   cited  Ralph Cudworth's The True Intellectual 
System as an  example of  the balance  in the "philosophical history" 
between sense and   the   critical  reason, between purely descriptive and 
critical/analytical methodology.    As Cudworth,   the Cambridge Platonist, 
has been compared with Kant,  and   to Reid   (see Chapter  IV),   it is not 
inappropriate here  to note his  resemblance to Burke or Robertson. 
Rcill wrote  that Gatterer 
... was  neither a Lockean nor * ff^^^X The   " 
He   came   close   to  the  view propounccd  ^Cudworth _ 
Trn.   Intellectual   SystemI    whlc jM  .    *    JJ noC  mean   that 
tions  of existence were  inadequate      in ^  the 
Gatterer rejected   the in„ortance of the sen experienCe 
only immediately  'evident      even     « Cha* ^ * things 
with our own senses.     In •ctuV"*V    chere are two other types 
are evident.     Theoretically,  however    there 
of   individual  experience:     past and  future   . 
An "evident" event or  "evident history" combined in Caterer's 
"philosophical  history" sense and  the critical reason.    This gave 
the historian that  "intermediate  knowledge" which set him free from 
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his   immediate setting and   from his direct  line of perception, allow- 
ing full play for the  critical  faculties to develop. 
The philosophical historian of the Enlightenment inhabited and 
roamed over the realm of the possible as well as describing the realm 
of the actual. 
According  to Gattercr,   both fiction and history provided a type 
of truth.     Fiction described and made evident the realm of the 
possible;  history sought  to deal with  the realm of the actual 
individual  moment.    An evident history had to combine both.21 
This was also Kant's domain(s) ,   for he had described reality and our 
knowledge  of  it as  touching both  the world  of  the actual and the 
world of the possible   (see Appendix  li). 
Bacon's  and Burke's   "organicism" which rejects both  "mental 
inflation" and a crude empiricism,  and sees knowledge as  consisting 
of a continually emerging pattern or  fabric of "actualizing possi- 
bilities," and of endless reconciliations,   - this organicism, or 
what Chapman  called  Burke's   "practical  imagination,"  is similar  to 
Ira Wade's  view of the  general assumptions of Enlightenment  thought 
Wade wrote   that   in  the eighteenth century,   knowledge assumed a 
"never-ending series  of relationships between  the self and  the phenomena 
of  life   .   .    ."   (sec Appendix  A).22     The  self,   to  use  Chapman's   language 
had the  creative  imagination  to see   the potentialities with which  the 
actualities   of  the phenomenal world must be reconciled.    Chapman's des- 
cription of Burke's  "creative  imagination is not unlike what Cassirer 
called  Kant's   "productive  imagination;'23 Ira Wade had  said of eighteenth 
century  thought,   that   it wanted  to  enter into the "activity of the 
spirit" of  life,   and  shape life, while at the same time respecting the 
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"legality" or  Independent objectivity of both thought and  the objects 
of thought   (For Wade,  See Appendix A). 
Burke's  "creative  imagination" and Kant's  "productive imagina- 
tion" assume a  like relationship exists between spirit and  life,  or 
between  the possible and the actual.     Cassirer called the relationship 
"one of the deepest  and most   fruitful sections of Kant's Critique of 
Pure Reason,"   for  it   shows  that, 
...   the   function of pure reason,   if it  is not  to remain empty, 
has need  of a  further   function as   its completion and necessary 
correlative   - a  function which Kant designates by the name of 
'productive  imagination.'     And he went on to infer  that  every- 
thinc wc are accustomed   to call sensory   'perception    is most 
closely bound up with  this   function - that the productive imagi- 
nation also   forms  an   'ingredient  of every possible perception. 
If  this   is  so,   then what we call  the intuition of the    actual 
does not occur without   the outlook and prospective glance into 
the   'possible'   -  then,   furthermore,  the  construction of the 
•objective' world of experience is dependent upon    he original 
formative powers  of the Spirit and upon the fundamental  laws 
according to which they act.2 
Because  the worlds  of the possible and of the actual,  of Life and 
Spirit,  of morality  and nature,  are not estranged   from one another, 
because  Life   is  not     defined   as   the   'wholly  other,'   as   the  contra- 
dictory opposite of Spirit,'   as   is the case of the harsh manichean- 
like dualism of Descartes,"   -  the natural dualism of Kant allows 
the two realms   to  traffic with each other without becoming confused 
with  one  another.     The  problem was   stated  by  Cassirer   in  the   form 
of a .uestion:     "How   is  the  Spirit able to exert any influence on a 
. K lono-   - how can the i-rnnscendcnce of the 
world   to which   it  docs  not  belong,        now  can  
„f 1 ife'26 Like Burke's morality 
Ideas be reconciled with the   immanence of Lite. 
"insinuating"  itself   into the phenomenal/historical realm?? Kant's 
schema assumes   that, 
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.   .   .   the human  spirit does not directly turn against   its objects, 
but  rather weaves   itself [emphasis added]   into a world of  its own, 
a world  of  signs,   of symbols,  and of meanings [see Appendix A for 
Reid's  similar "critical" and   indirect realism].    And herewith 
it really   forfeits  that   immediate oneness which,   in the lower ani- 
mals,   unites   'observing'   and   'effecting'   [a oneness which Reid 
also denied   in his   famous distinction between sensation and per- 
ception,   and his   idea of  the  complex act of perception; see 
Appendix A].     This   is perhaps  one of the most  characteristic 
traits  of  the animal world,  of  its organic firmness and its 
inner organic health,   that   in  it  this unity is not strictly per- 
ceived.2^    The world  of  the Spirit,  on the contrary, does not 
come   into existence until the stream of Life no longer flows 
freely,  but   is held back at  certain points [see the discussion 
on the  "Art  vs.  Nature" problem in eighteenth-century thought, 
infra.,   Chapter III,  passing   - until Life,   instead of unceasingly 
Riving birth   to new Life and  consuming itself  in these very births 
(much like Hobbesian  "felecity," )  gathers  itself together  into 
enduring   forms,  and projects   these  forms out of and in front ot 
itself by no mere quantitative increase,   enhancement or  intensi- 
fication  of Life  can we ever attain the realm of the Spirit. 
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The "spirit"   (or morality,   the possible)  may traffic with 'life" 
(nature,   the actual)   only  if "Life" has a substantial  form of its 
own and   is not   cowed,   so  to  speak,  by  the Spirit. 
Kant's   "productive   imagination," by  further substantiating the 
independent  reality of subject and   (especially)  object, would thereby 
give more substance to  the  terms  of the relations  (between the "self 
and the phenomena of Life")   which Ira Wade saw as central to the 
assumptions  of eighteenth-century Enlightenment  thought.    Cassirer 
wrote  (1907)   that  such relations were not merely between the self or 
ego and  external   subjects,   but  between   the  self  and, 
...   the principles  and  the logical structure££0** 
[emphasis  added,   see  Chapter  V] ™"^elves;   they  are 
'external'   objects   exist   in- and  for- »      "cordingly, we 
given under   the conditions of  ^f^^ce before we 
have  to develop the norms and  rules o*      r ^    what  is 
make statements about  the nature oIWi^ •   •   '    damentai 
now sought   (in  the Kantian philosophy)   is 
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logical form of experience as such, which must apply to 'internal' 
(morality) as well as 'external' [science, for Wade's distinction, 
see supra, Appendix A].32 Knowledge with respect to objects cannot 
be entirely different from knowledge with respect to our ego; both 
kinds  of  knowledge  should  be united by an all-embracing principle. 
Part of  the "logical structure of experience" is  the recognition that 
even the most   simple perceptions  involve  complex,  structural assump- 
tions,   that 
scientific (and even pre-scientific)   concepts are not random 
aggregates of qualities,  but are established with a purpose.    We 
do not   .   .   .   form a class  of reddish,   juicy    edible things, under 
which  cherries and meat might be subsumed. 
We do not   form such  classes  because  this  is part of the  common,  yet 
complex,   baggage we carry into our everyday perceptions which are 
only apparently  simple.     The  complex act of perception which  is 
part of  the objectification of experience, was one of Reid's central 
doctrines.3*    Andrew Seth   (Pringle-Pattison)   showed  that Reid and Kant 
thought   the  concepts of  space and  time were not Cartesian "separate 
and distinct   ideas"3* but were  the real and absolute "conditions of 
the possibility of objects  to be  carefully distinguished  from the 
prick of  sense."3?    Wiat might be called   the actuality of objects 
was  the  "sensation" of  them produced   in  the perceiving faculties, 
"in other words,   we have an  immediate perception of a certain quality 
or  matter  which  has   to  be   carefully  distinguished   from  the  sensation 
.   „ nlacc -38    rue rules of corn- 
on occasion of which  the perception takes place. 
ize  the existence of 
mon sense   (one  of   the  first  of which  is  to recogn 
the objects of perception)  order sen 
;ations and perceptions  into a 
cohesive and workable whole.3*    Since  the sensations are endless, 
knowledge represents, rather  than generalizations based upon an 
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accumulation of data,   a relation or ongoing process of fitting sensa- 
tions   into one or  another of  the qualities of matter of which percep- 
tion is  the articulator.    Here again,  knowledge is  like Chapman's 
notion of it  as  an  "emerging  fabric of actualizing possibilities"40 
Felix Kaufmann described  the Kantian epistemology in terms of relations. 
What   is  required   is  rather a relation  (Kaufmann's emphasis)  in 
terms of which  the variety of  (actually or potentially)  given 
objects  may be  ordered.     Such a relation does not dispose of 
the qualities   of the  individual objects  concerned  - if it did, 
it would not be  of any aid  in  investigating specific objccts;- 
but   it replaces   fixed qualities by general rules which enable us 
to grasp   'uno actu'   a total scries of possible qualitative 
determination.   i 
The following description by Kaufmann of Cassirer's Kantian notion of 
knowledge as   the ordering of  the relations between the actual and the 
possible objects of perception (the possibilities of objects as 
representing  the relations between subject and object),   - Kaufmann's 
description resembles  Chapman's and Burke's  "practical imagination" 
which includes reality as presenting  itself as a fabric of actualizing 
possibilities   requiring the human mind to make "endless reconciliations 
of possession and  emergence."42    Kaufmann wrote of the epistemology of 
Cassirer as a  "Marburg" Kantian."43    "The totality of experience as it 
represents  itself on any  given  stage of knowledge  is not a mere aggre- 
gate of data of perception;   it has a complete and  intricate structure 
which  constitutes   its   unity."44     IHmitry Cawronsky,  again   sounding  like 
Chapman on Burke,  described  the dynamic and comprehensive qualities of 
Cassirer's  epistemology  which   gave   it   its definite  classicist  bent. 
.   .   .   Cassirer's memory was not   just a passive "P-ity ,-or^of 
storage for acquired   knowledge  - "J* ""^ mental absorp- 
Coethe's  sense,   a process of repeated and  «*«iv* elements 
tlon,   combined with a keen ability to ■•• £"J3£.,%5 
of a problem and   its organic relation to other pr 
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But the classicist  organicism of Cassirer is directly opposed to Che 
organicism of the romanticists,   for   the latter 
consists   in the transformation of a single event or in- 
dividual   fact   into an absolute and general principle of the 
whole.   .   .   .     (in which)   one principle, one  function, one special 
power dominates  and determines the whole.    Classicism, on the 
contrary,   always  recognizes  several principles as quite indepen- 
dent   of each other,  although closely connected and organically 
related and   capable only  in their organic interrelatedness of 
creating and   forming the  spiritual world of man.   .   .   .    [Cassirer's] 
mental associations were amazingly rich,  colorful, and always quite 
exact.     He possessed   in high degree the gift which Goethe called 
'imagination   for  the truth of reality,'  or   'exact sensory imagina- 
tion.1     .   .   .  his   thinking   .   .   .   always remained measured, objec- 
tive,   realistic.46 
Like Hurke's  "organicism" or  "practical  imagination" and Kant's 
"productive   imagination," Cassirer's  classicism was both  compre- 
hensive and  critical;   it  embodied  that natural dualism which could 
not only  "live with"   the different realms of reality (subject, object; 
the moral  and   the natural;   the possible and the actual),  but which 
would bring them together  somehow in a creative active and progressive 
relation neither   ignoring nor distorting one another. 
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There  is an  unmistakable difference bet-ecn °J ^.ate answer  is 
human responses.     In the  first case a dire" ™e the answer is delayed, 
given to an  outward  stimulus;   in the secon        ^,-r.roA Drocess of 
It  is   interrupted  and  retarded by a slow and complicated p 
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thought.    At   first  sight  such a delay may appear to be a very question- 
able gain.     Many philosophers have warned man against this pretended 
progress.     'L'honmo qui medite,'  says Rousseau,   'est un animaal 
deprave1   .... 
Yet  there   is no remedy against this reversal of the natural order. 
Man cannot  escape   from his  own achievement.    He cannot but adopt the 
conditions  of his  own life.    No longer in a merely physical universe, 
man lives   in a symbolic universe.    Language, myth, art and religion 
are parts of   this universe.    They are the varied threads which weave 
the symbolic  act,   the   tangled web of human experience.    All human 
progress   in  thought  and experience refines upon and strengthens this 
net.    No longer   can man confront reality immediately, he cannot see 
it    as  it were,   face  to  face.    Physical reality seems to recede in 
proportion as  man's   symbolic activity advances.    Instead of dealing 
with the  things   themselves man is  in a sense constantly conversing 
with  himself   ....      (Ernst   Cassircr.     An Essay on Man.    An  Introduc- 
tion  to  a  Philosophy   Of  Human  Culture  (Toronto,  N.Y.,  London:   Bantam 
Books   (A National General Co.),   1970, pp.  26-27).    The Burke described 
by Chapman read  as   if he had  subscribed  to the above dualism. 
29Ibid.,   p.   869. 
30For   instance,  C.   Douglas Atkins  recently wrote of the common 
eighteenth-century opposition to the assumptions behind the ancient 
Christian heresy  of Gnosticism.    Atkins  concentrated on the major 
f (Dryden,   Swift, Pope)   in England during the period, 
1    S-17 0    in order  to  show the "Augustan distance  from    nosUcis, 
[C.  Douglas  Atkins,   "The Ancients,   the moderns    and gOM"elf>. 
Stjdtea!on Voltaire and   <U. Eighteenth Century, (transactions of the 
Fourth  international  congress on the J^ghccnmen      T)    Vo 1    CL    (        I 
1551     Gnosticism represented   to the 18th-cent«yl"«** "^logy 
Atkins  considers,   the  same unacceptable "gj^^^'SSTttat, 
which  Descartes  dualism represented  in f ""W"    J™ rafl1cal dualism 
.   .   .   the   'cardinal   feature of gnostic £oughti8 the 
(emphasis  added)   that governs the relation of God and t. 
correspondingly  that of man and word    JU *™J 
transmundanc,   its nature alien to that »      Gnosticism .   .   . 
which   it   is   the  complete antithesis   .   .   .  . (        tne uorld 
•for  the   first  time  there arose the notion J""*^,.   .   . 
in terms  of   its physical  substance,   is  the enemy 
(Ibid.,  p.   151) . 
Gnosticism,   in   its   turning away from the r***'^""*^ "*"  *** U 
and  its view that  "the soul is Imprisoned in tne o   y       ^ adherent8 
visible  and   finite  [ isl    .    .   .   illnS,l°"'     h-c, doos  not  conform"  (Ibid, 
a sense of superiority over  the reality w ^^ £rQm his 
page  153).       The  Kantian Cassirer s  claim en ^ ^ physicai 
own achievement" of reconciling himeeir«. assumptions.    As such 
and sumbolic universe,  runs  counter to ^nos "delayed answer 
human responses,  unlike organic reactions,  must g 
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to the reality of  the universe.     But  the Gnostic addict's answer to the 
universe   is not  delayed because his universe is exclusively o£ the 
"Spirit" and of  the  transmundane,  of which all else (Cassirer's "Life" 
included)   is,   not  even merely derivitive   from, but totally in opposi- 
tion to.     The Gnostic   is  thus  free  to construct "systems which contain 
the ultimate truth and must  be   imposed on recalcitrant reality by means 
of violence   .   .   .,   the addict  is dispensed   from the responsibilities of 
experience  in the  cosmos.1   (Idem.).    Part of this responsibility is the 
capability of "live with," as Cassirer said,  the "tangled web of human 
experience."    But Gnosticism represents a refusal to accept the In-Be- 
tween,   the  tension  of existence,  recognized by the Greek philosophers 
and embodied  in Christian  thought" (Ibid.,   p.  154).    The classical/ 
Christian  natural   law tradition and  the natural dualism of that tradi- 
tion would  side with the Kantian view of Cassirer against the radicalism 
o£ Gnosticism.     Burke was  speaking as   if he saw the  ideology of the 
French revolutionaries as   the secular equivalent of Gnosticism, when he 
saw the Revolution as one  of  "doctrine and   theoretic dogma" and as the 
first "complete  revolution in  the history of mankind." (Leo Strauss 
Natural Right and History,  Chicago and London:    University of Chicago 
Press,   1974  (1953),   p.   302. 
31See Chapter V of  the present study. 
32Science,   for Wade's distinction,  see Supra., Appendix A. 
33 Ibid.,   p.   187. 
34 Ibid.,   p.   222. 
35 See  infra.,  Appendix A. 
36Seth, Pringle-Pattison,  op.   cit.,  p.  56,  ^      ''T        Vrhe 
term "ideas," see  Robert McRae,   "'Idea' as a Philosophy    Term xn the 
Seventeenth   Centory."     Journal of the  H^nry  of  Ideas,  Vol.  XXVI,        . 
(April-June,   1965),   175-190. 
37Andrew  Seth,   — - - »" '"«"">"•    M^^^ff^^dlelP^nd 
and German   Answers   to  Hume   (Edinburgh  and  London:     William Blackwell 
Sons,   1894) ,   132. 
38 Ibid.,   p.   84. 
3Vid   separated  and  verified   -^^J^^^ESI"' 
(subject).      Reid   was   "ouite  emphatic  abOUt-g"^JV^S^,., 
between perception and  consciousness lor cne o j "tendency to pass 
but,  on  the  other hand,   Reid  saw the mind as navln8 ^ fc 
from the  sign [ the  "idea" of the object of perception ^ ^ 
signified [the object  of sensationl.       R-L-LaU,wc     ' 
,287 
at Thomas  Re id." Journal   of the History of Ideas.  Vol. XIII, No. 4 
(Octobor-Deccmbci ,   1962),   549;   see   Chapter  IV,  p.   5 of  the present 
study  for  Reid's notion  of "suggestion" as a bridge between object and 
subjcctl .     R. L.  Caldwell wrote:     "Despite this clear distinction be- 
tween perception and   consciousness,  and  the object appropriate  to each 
power,   there   is   still  an   intimate connection between perceiving and 
having sensations   .   .   ." [idem.].    The objects of each respective 
realm are neither sacrificed nor do they subsume the objects of one 
another. 
40 See  supra.,   Chapter  IV of the present study. 
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